During last decade, a rise in military tension can be noticed across Europe. The increase in both conventional and unconventional acts of aggression in the area has led to countries needing to revaluate the organisation of their armed forces. Doing this, Sweden has had to change their focus in favour of a territorial defence. The creation and organisation of new brigades puts a big emphasis on the integration of combined arms.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how Robert Leonhard’s theory of combined arms can explain the course of events on the Golan heights during the Yom Kippur war 1973. The theory consists of three principles that are broken down into operational indicators. These are later used to analyse the case.
The results point towards a connection, where implementing Leonhards three principles in organisation, planning and execution, increases the chances of success on the battlefield. The study also finds that Leonhard does not explain the relationship between the three principles. This reduces the theory’s ability to explain outcomes where both sides use different principles against eachother.