During the Six-day war, Israel unexpectedly defeated four enemies and emerged victorious in only six days. This study attempts to examine how this was accomplished and the extent to which Sweden, also a small state, might be able to apply the lessons learned from Israel’s use of air power. To this end, the present study’s analysis draws on the theoretical perspectives of two widely known and acknowledged air power scholars, Robert A. Pape and John A. Warden. Their respective theories ”Coercion by Denial” and ”The Enemy as a System” on the use of air power seem in important ways to be in opposition to one another. However, study findings indicate that Israel combined elements from both approaches and neither theory can alone provide sufficient guidance for a small state. Therefore, the two theoretical perspectives were found to be complementary, where drawing on certain key dimensions of each could be the most favourable for a small state such as Sweden. In particular, the results of the analysis underline the importance of achieving air superiority. This study concludes that the uniqueness of each nation’s strategic context indicates the potential need for new theoretical insights, better tailored for small states.