In 1967 Israel clashed in a short but intense war with its middle eastern neighbours, later labelled as the six-day war. At the time Israel was poorly equipped and outnumbered in all areas compared to its opponents. Egypt was, on paper, the strongest contender against Israel being backed up with resources by the Soviet Union. Despite this Israel did not only come out on top but did so remarkably quick and with an efficiency that had not been seen since the German Blitzkrieg during world war II.
To this day there has been plenty of attempts to explain tactical success or defeat and what underlying factors that contribute to one side emerging victorious in tactical battles. Often these attempts single out one or a few deciding variables. The purpose of this study is to test Thunholm & Henåkers relatively new approach to explaining tactical success as an ideal sequence of factors and methods. Through a case study of the events of the six-day war this study will attempt to either reinforce or falsify the ideal sequence as a tool for understanding and explaining tactical success or defeat.
The result of this study reveals a continued need to test Thunholm & Henåkers theoretical framework in cases with a very high level of detail and possibly in a quantitative approach as well due to the nature of tactical events and effects being a matter of probability.