In March 2014, Russian-backed protestors started to take over administrational buildings in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s involvement in the conflict gradually escalated into an open inva- sion with regular forces. Even though Russia’s military power is many times more stronger than that of Ukraine, in 2021 Russia still haven’t been able to incorporate Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Since Russia is such a strong actor, how can this be? Sweden is also a weak state under threat from Russia and lessons that could be of benefit to Sweden need to be learned from this conflict.
Through a theory-consuming case study this paper aims to analyse the events and examine the outcome of the conflict in eastern Ukraine between March 2014 and March 2015 through three different perspectives on asymmetric conflict; Andrew Mack’s theory of will, Patricia Sullivan’s theory of cost and Ivan Arrequín-Toft's theory of strategic interaction. The study results in the findings that Mack’s and Sullivan’s theories can explain the outcome of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, while Arrequín-Toft’s Theorin only partially can explain the outcome of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This is an important contribution to further research into the possible lessons learned from the asymmetric conflict between Ukraine and Russia; with results that could be applied to a Swedish context.