Strategic bombing was introduced as an idea in the early 20th century and became debated in its first use during the first world war. John Warden, a modern proponent for strategic bombing, puts forth the idea that the introduction of precision-guided-munitions allows for strategic bombing to be a viable and more importantly the optimal use for airpower in armed conflicts today. Warden markets his theory, the enemy as a system, as a method that allows airpower to be deployed and alone be able to achieve strategic effects and win wars. Skeptics to this idea argue that empirical evidence shows that modern strategic bombing does not produce strategic effects that wins wars therefor making it inferior to other methods of employing airpower. Because the debate is heavily focused on the strategic level, the lower levels becomes neglected. This essay will test Wardens theory on the operational level of war with the purpose to examine what effects, if not strategic, are generated at the operational level and how it affects an offensive and defensive actor of a war. The results will aim to answer whether John Wardens theory of strategic bombing generates effect and is a viable method for airpower for the operational level of warfare.