This study examines the unexpected outcome of the six day war between Israel and it’s neighboring countries. Israel who managed to fend off four aggressors in a war that lasted only six days, where the success was greatly attributed to the Israeli air force. This outcome played an important role for the future of airpower and gave rise to the theoretical framework we have today.
Two of the most established theories that arised after the war is John. A. Wardens ”The enemy as a system” and Robert. A. Papes ”Bombing to win”. These theories advocates different approaches to the use of airpower and how to generate success. The aim of the study is to analyze in which way Israel used their air-force to generate this success and to challenge the view of a single theoretical framework as superior over the other. The result indicate that the success in the use of airpower in the six day war was achieved by a combination of methods from both theories where air superiority was a critical factor. The result also challenges the view of Wardens five ring model and how strategic effect is actually generated. The final conclusions of the study is hard to generalize due to the specific circumstances of the war and more research is needed.