To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy.
The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably.
This article considers whether the Somali pirates were deterred by the naval task forces between the years 2009 and 2013. By disaggregating data and using previously unpublished records regarding the naval operations, two areas of operations are identified as potential periods of deterrence. The article uses a model of asymmetric deterrence to study the outcomes and equilibria of the navy-pirate interaction. It is found that the naval operations eventually did deter the Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, but that this objective was not met in the Somali Basin. It is concluded that the operational focus on the Gulf of Aden coupled with the fact that the area is relatively smaller than the Somali Basin enabled the naval credibility, thus effectively denying the pirates access to the sea. Conversely, limited attention by the naval units and the long Somali southern coast with its open waters impeded naval control in the Somali Basin. In connection to these findings some conclusions regarding naval deterrence are discussed.