In the aftermath of operation iraqi freedom, the world has seen the rise and fall of an entirely new kind of enemy, the islamic state. The field of research can be viewed as divided and a discrepancy can be seen upon whether to face this threat with counterinsurgency-campaigns or conventional means depending on if the islamic state is to be considered a proto-state or not.
This thesis aims at establishing a profound understanding on how the fall of this organization could be understood in accordance with the coalition and U.S foreign policy including its decisionmaking. This has been achived by examining the U.S strategy towards ISIS in order to gain understanding on wheter David Galulas theory on COIN or David J. Lonsdales theory on conventional strategy is the preferred means to an end on such organizations.
The result of the analysis shows that the coalition was successful fighting ISIS with conventional means and not due to well conducted COIN. Although it could be argued that the coalition reached the first step of a COIN-campaign, the U.S has declined a long-term commitment in the middle-east. The contributions made with this study lays mainly in the understanding of strategic concepts and assessing the opponent.