Military units around the world use Clausewitz’ thoughts about war, but how can winning and losing war be explained when modern warfare is conducted differently from in the 19th century? Clausewitz argues in his theory about the culminating point of victory that many factors complement and interact with each other. However the current thinking focuses on single factors affecting the culminating point of victory.
The aim of this thesis is to test Clausewitz theory about the culminating point of victory and its validity in modern warfare. This will lead to increased understanding about Clausewitz’ relevance to current warfare at particular levels. The method uses a theory to test a single case study from the Second Iraq War, specifically Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The result will explain how Clausewitz’ theory about the culminating point of victory is understood in modern warfare on a strategic level when lack of operational resources prevents achieving the political aim. The conclusion is that Clausewitz theory about the culminating point of victory is valid in modern warfare, but needs more systematic studies to evolve.