How to reach success in counterinsurgency (COIN) is an age-old question that only becomes more relevant as the technological asymmetry of conflicts increase. Nowhere is this asymmetry more apparent than in the utilization of airpower. This thesis aims to further increase the knowledge of how COIN can be waged successfully and what role airpower has in such operations. A case study of airpower operations in Iraq 2004-2009 was examined as to whether a change in airpower strategy correlated with the dramatic reduction of violence, and what effect this might have had on the outcome. The shift in airpower strategy was analysed with two contradicting paradigms of population-centric and enemy-centric airpower in COIN, which where exemplified by the David Galula’s and John Warden’s theories, respectively. The findings show that a shift towards a more population-centric airpower strategy occurred. Thus, it concludes that the way airpower was utilized might serve as additional explanation for the reduction of violence. Furthermore, this increases the reliability of Galulas theory and the population-centric strategy suggesting that airpower used accordingly might correlate with a successful outcome. Meanwhile it continues to primarily play a supporting role.