The Falklands war started with the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on April 2 1982. As a result, the British sent a task force with the intention of retaking the islands. The difficulties for the task force were many. First, they had to travel by sea for nearly 8000 miles before even reaching the islands. Secondly, they would be outnumbered and thirdly they would have to deal with great difficulties of logistics. Even though it was a joint operation the battle can be seen as a battle between two air forces. With the sinking of ARA General Belgrano, the naval battle was over before it even began and the ground war was largely a sideshow according to various sources. The fight was therefore largely confined to the air arena and hopefully that is where the answers of the outcome can be found. By testing two different theories about air warfare the outcome of the conflict may be explained from a new perspective. There are various explanations concerning why Great Britain won the battle but they mainly focus on technical advantages or leadership. The only research done with a theory as an explanation is Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War written by Rodolfo Pereyra, but the research is limited by the intention of understanding the theory rather than understanding the outcome of the conflict. This essay will attempt to explain the outcome from two relatively modern air force theories, and by doing so the understanding of the conflict will develop.
Even though the theories could help in understanding parts of the conflict none of them could explain the outcome. It is possible that is why former research has not focused on theories and the outcome could be explained by other factors such as technical aspects or leadership performances. Additional research is needed to fully understand why Great Britain won the battle of the Falkland Islands.