The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century evolved into extended counterinsurgency operations based on lessons from The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960. However, these lessons have been questioned as the study of the emergency has concentrated on one-sided studies, looking to explain the outcome merely as a result of the counterinsurgent’s actions. Furthermore, the case contradicts former research stating that the use of coercive measures leads to failure, which indicates that other factors also affect the outcome. Therefore - to be able to draw correct lessons from cases of counterinsurgency - it is not only needed to study the acts of the counterinsurgent, but also the actions of the insurgent. Hence, this case study examines what measures the insurgent used and how these, combined with the acts of the counterinsurgent, affected the outcome. The study suggests that the insurgent embraced an enemy-centric strategy which, through the substantial use of coercive measures, outweighed the coercive measures of the counterinsurgent and consequently alienated the insurgent’s cause from the population. Therefore, the findings complement past explanations to why the uprising failed and highlights the dynamics of insurgency warfare.