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In the field of research into special operations, there is a need for a wider understanding of why special operations succeed, and how individual special, direct-action operations can contribute to both tactical and strategic outcomes, because their strategic effects have often been either marginalized or heavily exaggerated. 

To further expand our knowledge of how special operations can succeed, and the possible strategic effects of such operations on conventional combat forces’ operations, the study examines the case of Operation Deadstick, using Willliam H. McRaven's theory of relative superiority and James D. Kira's theory of the strategic importance of special operations. Operation Deadstick was a special operation during the invasion of Normandy in 1944 with the objective of seizing two bridges that were important for both sides. Extensive defense preparation had been carried out at the bridges.

The results of the study indicate that McRaven's theory can be used to explain the success of the case at a tactical level, as the principles are met to some extent. The principle of simplicity through good intelligence, as well as the importance of extensive exercise before the operation, are described as strong contributors to the success of the operation. However, the success was also largely due to misjudgment and the opponent’s lack of fighting spirit. The operation's strategic impact, defined as the increased effect of conventional combat forces, was primarily the seizure of important infrastructure in a way otherwise not possible for conventional forces, and which was unexpected by the opponent. This contributed to increased freedom of action for higher commanders.