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In 2003 coalition forces invaded Iraq under the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to de-pose Saddam Hussein. Major combat operations ended after only 21 days with a decisive victory for the US-led coalition despite some unfavourable conditions, such as lack of superiority in numbers.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if an explanation to the success can be found in modern theories of combined arms warfare. The theoretical framework is derived from the theories of Robert Leonhard, Milan Vego, Jonathan House and Ångström & Widén. Through a qualitative single-case study the extent to which the coalition forces used combined arms warfare is examined from a theoretical viewpoint.

The results show that the coalition forces did complement abilities to a large extent primarily by combining different combat arms and by using close air support. They also acknowledged and made use of the advantage of terrain to a limited extent. Definitive conclusions whether the theo-ries can contribute to an explanation to the coalition forces success during Operation Iraqi Free-dom can not be drawn however due to an uncertainty regarding one of the variables.