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Kraftsamling vid ubåtsattacker: En teoriprövande fallstudie på ubåtsattacker under andra världskriget
Swedish Defence University.
2017 (Swedish)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Many theorists have discussed the question of the fundamental principles of warfare. But the importance of the principle of concentration of force for warfare is controversial and the theories about the principle are too general to say something about the reality. So what is required to achieve success with a concentration of force?

In order to answer this question, this essay deals with the basic principle of warfare on the concentration of force from recognized theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, John M. Collins and Milan Vego, in the context of submarine attacks. The study has a deductible theoretical research effort and the purpose is to identify and describe which variables that contribute to success in implementing a concentration of force and how they affect submarine attacks.

To create a coherent image of the principle, the principle is measurable by identifying variables to achieve success with concentration of force. From the theories, the author identifies five variables: aggregate strength, spread, opponent knowledge, mobility and misleading. To investigate the principle, the variables are tested against two submarine attacks during World War II, which are known to be cases where the concentration of force was used.

The result shows that during the two attacks only two variables, combined strength and spread were identified. During the attack on the HX 229/SC 122 convoys, which from the attacking party are considered a successful concentration of force, all variables were identified. However, the attack on the SC 130 convoy was considered as a failed concentration of force, since only two variables were identified. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2017. , 37 p.
Keyword [sv]
Krigföringens grundprinciper, Kraftsamling, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Collins, Vego
National Category
Other Social Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-6811OAI: oai:DiVA.org:fhs-6811DiVA: diva2:1121182
Subject / course
War Studies, Thesis
Educational program
Officersprogrammet (OP)
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2017-07-12 Created: 2017-07-10 Last updated: 2017-07-12Bibliographically approved

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a9e27929e6ee0d566e6510dfde4ad1b1647d1b4dd69e94c253c93c39b74b024d441a7303dc6de9e670ec099e20ac41a525aad9a17f2249dd0a8843bdff146427
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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf