Endre søk
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Kraftsamling vid ubåtsattacker: En teoriprövande fallstudie på ubåtsattacker under andra världskriget
Försvarshögskolan.
2017 (svensk)Independent thesis Basic level (professional degree), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
Abstract [en]

Many theorists have discussed the question of the fundamental principles of warfare. But the importance of the principle of concentration of force for warfare is controversial and the theories about the principle are too general to say something about the reality. So what is required to achieve success with a concentration of force?

In order to answer this question, this essay deals with the basic principle of warfare on the concentration of force from recognized theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, John M. Collins and Milan Vego, in the context of submarine attacks. The study has a deductible theoretical research effort and the purpose is to identify and describe which variables that contribute to success in implementing a concentration of force and how they affect submarine attacks.

To create a coherent image of the principle, the principle is measurable by identifying variables to achieve success with concentration of force. From the theories, the author identifies five variables: aggregate strength, spread, opponent knowledge, mobility and misleading. To investigate the principle, the variables are tested against two submarine attacks during World War II, which are known to be cases where the concentration of force was used.

The result shows that during the two attacks only two variables, combined strength and spread were identified. During the attack on the HX 229/SC 122 convoys, which from the attacking party are considered a successful concentration of force, all variables were identified. However, the attack on the SC 130 convoy was considered as a failed concentration of force, since only two variables were identified. 

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
2017. , s. 37
Emneord [sv]
Krigföringens grundprinciper, Kraftsamling, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Collins, Vego
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-6811OAI: oai:DiVA.org:fhs-6811DiVA, id: diva2:1121182
Fag / kurs
War Studies, Thesis
Utdanningsprogram
Officersprogrammet (OP)
Veileder
Examiner
Tilgjengelig fra: 2017-07-12 Laget: 2017-07-10 Sist oppdatert: 2018-03-26bibliografisk kontrollert

Open Access i DiVA

fulltext(521 kB)129 nedlastinger
Filinformasjon
Fil FULLTEXT01.pdfFilstørrelse 521 kBChecksum SHA-512
a9e27929e6ee0d566e6510dfde4ad1b1647d1b4dd69e94c253c93c39b74b024d441a7303dc6de9e670ec099e20ac41a525aad9a17f2249dd0a8843bdff146427
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Av organisasjonen

Søk utenfor DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Totalt: 129 nedlastinger
Antall nedlastinger er summen av alle nedlastinger av alle fulltekster. Det kan for eksempel være tidligere versjoner som er ikke lenger tilgjengelige

urn-nbn

Altmetric

urn-nbn
Totalt: 515 treff
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf