Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

On 1 November, 1954 an armed insurgency against French rule commenced with a large scale terrorist attack throughout various parts of Algeria. France responded by sending troops from the continent to Algeria and was soon involved in a full out counterinsurgency against the Front Liberé National (FLN), a revolutionary movement organised in a classical communist insurgent pattern.

Many of the experiences the French gained conducting counterinsurgency in Algeria have been examined by writers of COIN literature. The conclusions have been incorporated into counterinsurgency doctrines of many countries, and the works of Galula, who experienced the war, is considered basic literature for many counterinsurgency courses. This has been inherited by modern COIN literature. The US FM 3.24 draws from the French experiences and theorists in its main body.

This essay examines whether modern counterinsurgency literature derived from French experiences and theories gained, fighting FLN fails to address the question on how the insurgent organisation is structured. It provides a few arguments why we should know this, such as knowing your enemy’s structure will help you understand his vulnerabilities. To archive this and lay a foundation for the argumentation it first compares the Algerian FLN to modern day Taliban to establish if their organisational structures are different or similar.