Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

This study aims to highlight the consequences on outposts in Afghanistan in the context of COIN and ISAF during 2003-2012. Previous research in this area is more oriented towards the perspective of COIN at the strategic and operational level and not at the tactical and local level. For example, previous research has written about how important military presence and adaptation are, but not what consequences the company that is deployed to an area and conducts the COIN operation receives.

The study was designed with Kilcullen’s theory about COIN and his 28 articles as a basis, and the study was conducted with in-depth interviews as the main empirical material, with officers who served in the Swedish Armed Forces, and the British Army during 2005-2012 in Afghanistan.

The study finds that one consequence at one of the outposts was from the terrain, which was that the local infrastructure couldn’t support heavy military vehicles that came to the outpost, which resulted in the roads and irrigation ditches being destroyed by the vehicles' weight. The study also found interesting patterns amongst the informants that had the same consequences, which was that the roads leading towards the outposts were often very few, which led to a predictability for the enemy to use against the units stationed at the outpost. Another interesting find in this study is that there was a difference in how open each outpost was. For example, the British Army’s outposts were more open to civilians than the Swedish outposts, although the British Army had more fighting in their area than their Swedish counterpart.