Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

At the height of the Cold War, the Saur Revolution made Afghanistan a place of insecurity and many internal conflicts. Guerrilla groups began to emerge in the country. The pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan asked them for help in solving the problems. The Soviets responded and in 1979 their invasion began. After a decade of war, no improvements had been made in the country, quite the contrary. This meant that the Soviets chose to withdraw from the conflict in 1989 when they saw no victory in sight. They left a country shaken by war.

This essay aims to examine and understand why the insurgents managed to win over the Soviet Union and the regime and highlight the strategic problems during the conflict. How regular troops fight is ineffective against guerrilla troops and if another strategic thinking is needed to win against insurgents. This has been achieved by studying literature from both the Soviet perspective and the insurgents' perspective based on Katagiri's theory of why insurgents win against states.

The results of the analysis mainly show four factors that lead to the insurgent's victory. Tactical action, local superiority, support from foreign actors, and support from the local population