Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

The Security Dilemma is a term generally used to denote the self- defeating aspect of the quest for a state to seek security. The steps that states take to increase security can be counterproductive because they might deepen the hostility between rivals and so lead to war rather than peace. One of these steps can be to join a military alliance. Previous research shows that opinions differ as to whether the effects of military alliances create deterrence, détente or provocation. Theorists Senese and Vasquez claim that the main reasons for war-onset concern territorial disputes, rivalry, alliances and arms races. 

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of military alliances effect on conflicts compared to other causes. By applying Senese and Vasquez’s Steps-to-War theory to a comparative study, this study examines the effect between territorial disputes, rivalry, alliances and arms races to war-onset. The cases are The Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967 and the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008. The results show that Senese and Vasquez’s theory is applicable to the comparative case study, though the theory has its shortcomings, related to the importance of alliances during the Cold War and the absence of an arms race.

This study shows that alliances effect on war-onset depends on the underlying causes in the specific situation. The circumstances surrounding both cases seem to consist of the fact that one thing leads to another regarding conflict escalation. First territorial disputes occur and if combined with rivalry and later joining or having the intention to join a military alliance, war-onset is likely to occur within five years.