The use of special operations to achieve political and strategical aims have risen in modern warfare. There is a lack of studies about special operations in general and especially studies about protection against these operations. Therefore, the aim of this essay is to explain how a defensive actor can achieve success against an offensive special operation. Through analyzing William McRaven´s theoretical framework about relative superiority, how an offensive special operation can achieve success, with the reversed ambition three hypotheses are formed. Namely that the probability of the success of a defensive actor depends on a) concealed actions or unsystematic changes in the defense b) a relative to the special operation matutinal indication of the enemy by the defensive actor c) the defensive actor manages to contain or delay the enemy in battle.
This study substantiates these hypotheses through the study of two cases of special operations, the raid on Makin Island 1942 and Operation Prelim 1982. The two latter hypotheses were strengthened in the study; however, the result depends on the delamination and definitions of vital concepts of the study. In combination, the hypotheses are an embryo of academical understanding of protection against a special operation and should be considered an inspiration for additional and more extensive studies on the phenomenon.