This article compares the use of maskirovka (the Soviet and Russian art of deception) in two Moscow-led military operations: the seizure of Kabul in 1979 and the occupation of Crimea in 2014. It does so using a framework derived from Barton Whaley’s writings on military de-ception, which offers a useful heuristic for cross-space and cross-time comparisons. The aim is to contribute empirically to the broader discussion about continuity and change in Russianwarfare since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The article argues that deception was used in both operations to support the military seizure of territory. That is to say, it was not used to bring about a system collapse through non-military means in the Crimea; rather, deception was an auxiliary to military action in both operations. The main observed difference between the two cases consisted in the more gradual and composite use of deceptive measures in the Crimea compared to in Afghanistan. In the Crimea, Russia was able to maintain an aura of uncertainty around its intent and the presence of its troops even as information about the reality of the situation began to filter through. In Afghanistan, the mask of deception all but vanished when it became known that the forces attacking the Taj Beg palace were Soviet.