Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

The German army won a decisive victory against the Franco-British forces during the Battle for France in 1940 in what historians later would call the ”blitzkrieg”. There have been many miscon-ceptions about the myth of blitzkrieg, mainly that the Germans won because of material superiority. These misconceptions have later been denounced, and new studies emphasizes the German tactical superiority as one of the key components for military success.

This study strives to explain how the German army could achieve their victory by comparing two theoretical concepts about maneuver warfare. The concepts used are Robert R. Leonhards three principles of maneuver warfare and William S. Linds three filters for maneuver warfare in explai-ning the outcome of the battle for France.

This study has shown that both Leonard and Lind’s principles of maneuver warfare can explain the success of the German army. However, some indicators imply that the crucial success was in the use of mission-type orders, exercise of command, and encouragement of own initiatives. This made it possible for the Germans to pass through their decision cycle faster than their opponents, thus giving them the advantage of initiative. This made the French unable to parry the actions of the Germans, which utimately led to the defeat of the Allied forces in France.