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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a surge in demand for defence materiel, prompting significant adaptations in manufacturing logistics to meet the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces; donor nations, meanwhile, were prompted to bolster their own military capabilities. This heightened demand for defence materiel has reached levels sufficiently unprecedented as to exceed available supply capacities. This study investigates the factors influencing the evolving dynamics of interactions among states, companies, and supranational agencies within European ammunition and grenade manufacturing supply chains. Grounded in theoretical frameworks on supply chain and of state-defence industry, it explores changes in the defence industry structure, the institutional context, the perspectives of the companies and inter-institutional and corporate relationships. Empirical data were drawn from a range of sources, including official EU and state documents, published analyses, as well as interviews and focus group discussions with Swedish defence industry representatives. Our findings indicate a shift from transactional contracts to trust-based agreements aimed at fostering supply chain resilience and enhancing dynamic capabilities. This study contributes to a deeper understanding and theoretical advancement in managing military and security challenges, with particular emphasis on enhancing readiness, resilience, and the scaling of military capabilities across cross-border defence supply chains.

Purpose

Management and risk techniques within industries have been studied from various disciplines in nondefense-affiliated industries. Given the assumption that these techniques, strategies and mitigations used in one industry apply to other similar industries, this paper examines the defense industry for risk assessment. We characterize interactions for onward application to risk identification in the defense industry.

Design/methodology/approach

This research employs a systems theory approach to the characterization of industry interactions, using three dimensions including environment, boundaries and relationships. It develops a framework for identifying relationship types within system-of-systems (SoS) environments by analyzing the features of interactions that occur in such environments.

Findings

The study’s findings show that different systems environments within the defense industry SoS exhibit different interaction characteristics and hence display different relationship patterns, which can indicate potential vulnerabilities.

Research limitations/implications

By employing interaction as a means for evaluating potential risks, this research emphasizes the role played by relationship factors in reducing perceived risks and simultaneously increasing trust.

Originality/value

This paper intends to develop an initial snapshot of the relationship status of the Swedish defense industry in light of the global consolidation in this industry, which is a relevant contextual contribution.

In this research the focus lies in examining the dynamics of civil resistance in Ukraine, with a particular interest in the role of innovation. Our research aims to explore civil resistance through the theoretical lenses of innovation, entrepreneurship, and ecosystem theories. As we have observed in previous crises, such as the recent pandemic, significant disruptive developments often arise in response to times of crisis. Our study delves into both societal and individual commitments to national defense during such crises. Civil resilience refers to the ability to maintain essential societal functions—such as supply chains, energy, shelter, healthcare, transportation, and information dissemination—while concurrently sustaining public morale and a collective will to defend. Our theoretical framework for understanding social innovation and creative resistance activities is grounded in the concepts of societal resilience, social innovation, and ecosystems. NATO defines societal resilience as a society’s capacity to resist and recover swiftly from major disruptions, including armed conflict, natural disasters, health crises, and critical infrastructure failures. This involves a comprehensive approach, combining both civil and military preparedness. I will not delve deeply into the distinction between resistance movements and civil resistance, but it is an important differentiation that our research addresses. Civil defense engages the entire society, focusing on collective resilience during periods of war or imminent threat. This concept extends beyond military involvement to encompass a wide array of societal actors, ensuring that essential functions continue to operate under crisis conditions. In Sweden, civil defense entails organized resistance efforts coordinated by governmental authorities. It is part of a broader, structured defense strategy that enables the population to contribute effectively to national defense. On the other hand, societal resilience also includes more spontaneous and organic initiatives. These emerge when individuals or groups independently respond to immediate needs or specific challenges, complementing the formal structures of civil defense. Our research investigates how civil resistance and societal resilience has supported Ukraine’s military efforts. Specifically, we aim to: • Examine the concepts of civil resistance and societal resilience and creative activities in Ukraine through the lens of innovation and entrepreneurship theory. • Analyse the interactions between individuals, organizations, and civil society using an ecosystem approach. Understanding the dynamics of ecosystems is crucial for preparing and adapting technologies, as well as for establishing parallel systems when existing infrastructures are compromised. Our methodology combines a thorough literature review with empirical data collected from Ukrainian informants. Key aspects of resistance and resilience through social innovation that we have identified include: • Endurance: The capacity to endure significant stress and change while maintaining essential societal functions. • Adaptation: The ability to self-organize and mobilize resources and innovations to respond to evolving challenges. • Agility: The need for rapid, flexible responses, as the aggressor’s tactics and strategies are continuously shifting. • Learning: The importance of being able to learn from experience from one day to the next day. In our ecosystem analysis, we focus on several components: • Actors: Individuals and organizations contributing to resistance and resilience efforts. • Social Innovation: The development of novel solutions to societal challenges. • Social Resilience: The ability of society to withstand and recover from disruptions. • Identified Purposes: Specific objectives that guide the actions of these actors within the ecosystem. At the current stage of our research, one significant finding has emerged: the importance of "dual purposes." This refers to systems and components within the ecosystem that serve both civilian and military functions. This dual-use capacity underscores the need for integrated approaches that enhance resistance and resilience across both domains. In this context, governance, institutional structures, and effective management play a critical role in ensuring that resources and capabilities can be mobilized flexibly to meet both civilian and military needs. But also, being able to take initiative and act locally without authority control.

The critical role of artillery is underscored by Ukraine's ongoing efforts to defend its territory. The artillery ammunition used by the Ukrainian defense forces is supplied by countries that donate from their own defense depots. Consequently, as these countries donate to Ukraine, they must replenish and expand their own ammunition stocks in response to the deteriorating security situation. This has led to an unprecedented demand for grenades and ammunition, far exceeding the available supply capacities. In response, the European Union has initiated the "Act in Support of Ammunition Production" (ASAP) to enhance ammunition production within Europe. This initiative permits states to invest in grenade and ammunition manufacturers without such investments being classified as state subsidies. Additionally, it allows for direct procurements, circumventing the regulations associated with public procurement processes. European grenade and ammunition manufacturers have long had their order books filled, preventing them from meeting the immediate demands of various defense forces and states wishing to donate/supply ammunition to Ukraine. These predominantly privately-owned manufacturers have shown reluctance to invest in increased production capacities without a guarantee of long-term demand that would ensure financial viability. Furthermore, manufacturers face challenges beyond investment hesitancy, including shortages of raw materials and critical components such as primers, gunpowder, and explosives. Thus, any increase in ammunition and grenade production volumes necessitates a corresponding expansion in the supply chain capacity. Additional concerns include securing a skilled workforce and obtaining permits and land for new manufacturing facilities. In essence, while the EU's initiative is essential for establishing the conditions for increased production capacity, tangible results from this investment will take time to materialize. Ongoing instances of forced ammunitions manufacturing have resulted in subpar quality, underscoring the need for stringent quality control and highlighting the demanding nature of ammunition manufacturing. Two critical considerations arise when states provide support to enhance ammunition and grenade manufacturing capabilities: the specific requirements and specifications of their own defense forces and the unique specifications of the ammunition required by Ukraine. The purpose of this study is to delineate the current state of ammunition production and the various limitations encountered. Empirical data for this research was gathered from a diverse array of sources, including official documents, published analyses, public service news, interviews, and focus groups. The findings indicate a need for greater robustness, resilience, and flexibility to adequately respond to significantly deteriorating security situations. Nations must re-establish close relationships with defense firms, partially reconstructing long-standing, strategic, trust-based relationships that existed prior to the New Public Management (NPM) transformation in the defense market. To manage this transition effectively, ammunition manufacturers and their associated supply chains must significantly enhance their dynamic capabilities and devise innovative yet stable solutions. The insights from this research will benefit political decision-makers, procurement authorities, defense forces, and ammunition manufacturers by providing a deeper understanding of the conditions necessary for grenade and ammunition manufacturing.

This article outlines the experiences gained from the re-establishment of the Gotland Regiment and the Dal Regiment, focusing on the logistical implications. The empirical data was collected through interviews conducted between 2022 and 2023. The responses from these interviews were subjected to a targeted thematic content analysis, organized according to the PESTELI model. An intriguing observation is that there is not a single individual or authority responsible for planning and making decisions to facilitate the growth of the Armed Forces. Success necessitates extensive coordination among various entities, including the Armed Forces, the Fortifications Agency, local municipalities, regions, County Administrative Boards, The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), private entities, and educational institutions. The experiences between the Gotland Regiment and the Dal Regiment vary, influenced by factors such as the distinct nature of their activities, local access to training areas, and opportunities for facility rentals. A crucial challenge for achieving rapid expansion (including infrastructure like buildings, warehouses, garages, and skills) is the availability of personnel and competencies, along with the requisite infrastructure to effective utilize equipment. In the initial phases, due to a lack of equipment for new activities, materials must be temporarily borrowed from other regiments and distributed through the Armed Forces' materiel distribution order. An identified weakness is that the inclusion of new units temporarily depletes existing units of their equipment and, to some extent, their commanders. Newly established units cannot effectively manage equipment without appropriate storage, workshops, and skilled resources to maintain and care for the equipment. Striking a balance between activity levels, personnel availability, material resources, and equipment maintenance is crucial. As new equipment is integrated into the units, additional maintenance skills must be acquired, and the involved personnel must be trained accordingly.

Purpose

The total defence (TD) concept constitutes a joint endeavour between the military forces and civil defence structures within a TD state. Logistics is essential for such joint collaboration to work; however, the mismatch between military and civil defence logistics structures poses challenges for such joint collaboration. The purpose of this paper is to identify logistics concept areas within the TD framework that allow for military and civil defence collaborations from a logistics operations perspective.

Design/methodology/approach

Pattern-matching analysis is used to compare patterns found in the investigated case with those prescribed from the literature and predicted to occur. The study seeks to identify logistics concepts within TD from the literature and from the events describing the Swedish response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Pattern matching thus allows for the reconciliation of logistics concepts from the literature to descriptions of how the response was handled, albeit under a TD framework.

Findings

Findings show quite distinct foci between the theoretical and observational realms in terms of logistics applications. While the theoretical realm identifies four main logistics concepts, the observational realm identifies five logistics conceptual themes. This goes on to show an incongruence between the military and civil parts of the TD.

Research limitations/implications

This study provides basis for further research into the applications and management of logistics activity within TD and emergency response.

Originality/value

Logistics applications within TD have not, until now, received much attention in the literature. Given this knowledge gap, this study is of original value.

Considering the current instability within the European security landscape, militaries are seeking new ways to grow and counter emergent threats. However, there is a rarity of armed forces addressing logistics growth within literature. Thus, this paper investigates growth concepts that can enable military forces develop, conduct, and grow logistics to achieve its operational objectives. The paper undertakes extant literature analysis of three relevant theories of growth as a means to review for comprehending organizational growth. The relationships between logistics and three growth theories as well as industry growth practices are analysed. Argues that the development of the concept of logistics growth in the military require support not just from established growth theories but also from long-standing industrial practice in order to fully develop the best strategic-fit growth concept for the military. Nine propositions reflecting antecedent relationships amongst theoretical variables for growth are developed. Study serves as a point of departure for further research on military growth in general and military logistics growth in particular and provides military leaders with disciplinary options for evaluating logistics growth strategies for achieving operational objectives and goals.