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The risk for seabed security threats in the Baltic Sea has increased significantly in the last decade, with constant doubtful maritime accidents that resulted in broken communication cables laid on the ocean floor, leading to enormous financial losses. Marine sabotage crimes affecting multiple nations, require the development of a regional maritime transport policy, addressing seabed security threats based on a regional agreement and respective convention, since any policy must be implemented under the rule of law. This paper analyses the development of a regional agreement for cooperation in maritime security, among all the affected States in the Baltic, to protect critical marine infrastructure with the expansion of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (the “Helsinki Convention”) and the respective Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission – also known as the “Helsinki Commission” or “HELCOM” as established in 1974 pursuant to this Convention to include maritime security. The authors concluded that the development of such agreement and respective security policy is highly feasible, because besides the limited Russian territory in the Baltic Sea, all waters belong either to the territorial sea or the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of one of the involved States and there is not “High Seas” in the Baltics which facilitates this alternative.

Abstract: The term of terrorism has been widely discussed by several   authors   and   security organizations   previously.   The overall common contribution is that a certain activity cannot be approached   under   the   prism   of   terrorism   unless   it   has   a   clear deliberate   political motive. Certainly, the   strong   connection between   drug   crime   organizations   and   terror   groups   has been argued   by   an   extended   number   of   national   authorities   from different   countries. An initiative   was   presented   before   the   US Congressional   Foreign   Affairs   Committee   to designate as “Terror   Foreign   Organizations” to   a   total   of   nine   of   the organized crime groups from Mexico (drug cartels), endorsing the   US   armed   forces   act   against   third   countries   where these criminal   organizations   have   their   operations.   Such   actions   can fall   under   the   term of “invasion” or “violation   of   a   nation’s sovereignty rights”. This paper analyses the concept of foreign terror organization, within the framework of drug cartels including the legal aspects related to   such   resolution.   It   also   explores   other   alternatives, such as formulations of defence and security alliances in defence and   security   systems   or   coalitions   organised   to   face   common security challenges. Finally, it examines   the   concept   of   narcoterrorism   based   on selected literature and presents a mapping of crimes performed by   drug   cartel   organizations   that   may be   classified   as narcoterrorism actions. These varies from massive killing to the use of bombs during a national celebration to the launching of landmines in their two varieties: anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, among others, to fundamentally shift the paradigm from “Transnational Organized     Crime”  to     “narcoterrorism,” becoming “hybrid organizations”.

Abstract: Terrorism, which as a term defies a very clear definition, is not a newborn phenomenon. And although it is ubiquitous in all societies, its sources or motives -as well as related methods- vary greatly over time and space. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) constitutes a typical example of the anticolonial   wave   terrorist   groups   struggling   for   self-determination after the collapse of empires in the twentieth century. As such, it belongs to the so-called “old” or traditional terrorism as opposed to al Qaeda or ISIS, which represent what are said to be “new” terrorist groups. The reasons that prompted the rise and development of the IRA as a terrorist group and its key characteristics have been much discussed in the related literature. The strengths of the IRA, that is the factors that made it long-lasting and successful, as well as its shortcomings along with their potential effects have been adequately researched. Similarities and differences between the IRA and other terrorist groups, especially in the light of their core   values, their   followed   strategies   and   the   nature   and effectiveness of counter strategies on governmental level have also been well recorded in the terrorism literature. Even though there exist a few studies focusing on the economic repercussions of terrorism, the economics of the IRA both from the input (terrorist financing) and the output (economic consequences of terrorism) side do not seem to have attracted much attention. This paper aims to explore the economic impact of the IRA by employing an input-output approach. Desk research was used to gather and analyze data from various sources, such as books, journals, reports and relevant websites. The results suggest that more recent literature points to a plethora of non-US fund-raising mechanisms for the IRA, contrary perhaps to the popular history or early studies on the subject. The results also indicate that the IRA, with its use of violence, negatively   affected   in   multiple   ways   the   British economy and, even more, that of Northern Ireland, not to mention that of the Irish Republic. The results are discussed in terms of three types of economic impact, namely direct, indirect (or, intangible/secondary) and “other” costs of the IRA terrorist attacks, always bearing in mind the short-run versus long-run perspectives.

This chapter analyses the evolution of technological tools to improve port and maritime security, in relation to relevant regulations for their effective use and implementation on board ships and port facilities, based on the legal provisions established under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. New technology applications can contribute to reducing security threats at sea. However, international regulations and national laws are not reformed at the same speed as the evolution of technological innovation in ships and other sea-going vessels. The slow reform of regulations and laws is delaying the benefits that novel solutions might bring to the maritime industry and to the whole world in terms of maritime security. In this chapter, the authors introduce a limited number of technology applications instruments, with the use of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) systems, similar to those used for inspection and maintenance, but combined with sensors to strengthen port and maritime security and, at the same time reduce the illegal trafficking of drugs. Desk research and relevant selected literature from this wide research field were used for the collection/analysis of the data and identification of a suitable solution. The authors suggest changes to the ISPS Code to standardize such equipment on board vessels, equating its need and significance to the Automatic Identification System (AIS), or the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), to counter drug traffic by sea threats of the type of packages affixed to the bulbous bow of vessels, which is quite common, especially in the Latin-American region. Finally, outline future trends in drug detection on board vessels due to continuous technical improvement, which is also used by criminal ring organizations, arguing that in the same way as transnational organized crime is adapting and implementing innovative technology, governments and international organizations must also follow this adaptability to deter such security threats and improve the security of ports and oceans.

A proper assessment of maritime security risks at the national level is crucial to a national maritimesecurity plan (NMSP) in order to secure the concerned country’s ports, vessels and territorial sea. Thus, the importance of implementing a national maritime security assessment (NMSA) to counter securitythreats and ensure the continuity of national and international trade. The most important set of inter-national regulations concerning maritime security is the International Ship and Port Facility Security(ISPS) Code, which includes revision, approval and control of compliance of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be based upon the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA). This paper proposes a mathematical dynamic model that calculates in real time the residual risk for the whole country and each of its ports by adapting and expanding the formula and procedures established in the Code, which since it has already been implemented around the world, gives the opportunity to take advantageof this quantitative solution to administrate maritime security risks on a nation-wide basis and create an effective national maritime security plan, which would allow the concerned authorities to improve situational awareness and adapt to security changes through a better planning of human, economic and material resources to deter security threats. The model was tested with the use of five encoded categories as countries, each of them with three ports, which encompassed three port facilities. The results indicate that this methodology is easy to implement and widespread use of that model could strength robustness in national security. 

An extended number of people still risk their life today, while illegally crossing the Mediterranean and/or the Aegean Sea as part of an effort to reach a European country. Border management constitutes a crucial tool for effectively dealing with illegal and irregular migration via sea. However, migration and border management literature is lacking studies that address the genuine drivers of migrant crisisfrom a (geo)strategic viewpoint, or rely on the theoretical underpinning of border management from that same angle. This article aims to examine the root causes of a specific national security challenge currently faced by Greece and the EU in large part, namely mixed migratory flows in the Aegean Sea. It explores the theoretical(geo)strategic underpinning of border management at the external EU borders inthe Aegean Sea; merely desk research was used for the collection/analysis of the data. Relevant results suggest that (geo)strategic considerations provide improved understanding not only of the root causes of seaborne migration that are identified as heightened status of insecurity and extreme poverty in the States of origin, but also of strategy formulation in the field of border management at European and national level (Greek sea borders). Results are discussed in terms of existent (geo)strategic theories and models, with a special focus on the ‘strategic thinking in 3D’ framework, the ‘Heartland’ and ‘Rimland’ theses, as well as topographical features and demographics.The aim is to shed light on strategic thinking and planning in the wider domain of security and provide recommendations to improve the current situation.

Within the globalization era, the conduct, resolution, and impact of international conflicts are frequently not limited solely to the belligerent states involved. Conflict influences distant countries and often illustrates the vulnerability of sea access to the security of coastal and landlocked nations, by factoring in that: import/export commodities are impacted; access to vital energy resources is undermined; and/or international resource distribution is threatened. Therefore, the maritime domain (and its military, legal, and commercial components) represents a Russia/Ukraine conflict cornerstone and the epicenter of this analysis. This conflict highlights maritime trade importance and re-establishes the strategic significance of protecting multi-polarity, the “rule of law”, and freedom of the seas within the Black Sea region (BSR), which today represents a very large concentration of power (involving actors like Russia, USA, NATO, EU) and has been the site of ten post-Cold War conflicts. Resultantly, maritime domain objectives and tactical events (on, above, and below the seas) require detailed analysis as hostilities continue, the norms and principles of international law are threatened and/or undermined, and prospective combat end-state(s) are considered. Such will define Russia’s and Ukraine’s future(s), as well as economic-diplomatic stability and the future of rules based international order across the BSR, which is a vital maritime transport corridor.

Amidst increasing maritime emphasis, this conflict also illustrates transformational warfighting facets. In addition to troops, ships, and aircraft, modern battlefields now include issues like: Information Warfare outlets; “lawfare”; cyber threats; and adversaries with unprecedented Artificial Intelligence capabilities. The international community must acknowledge these skills yield warfighting capability to nations lacking capacity. As naval warfare equipment and tactics change, protecting sea lanes, preventing maritime hegemony, and upholding the “rule of law”,  -and are enhanced by globalization.

This article analyses the application of the legal provisions established in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to streamline and reorganize cooperation between Government agencies with maritime security tasks and responsibilities. 

It highlights the difficulties raised by the existence of a multiplicity of actors involved in maritime security and identifies barriers in attempts from the Designated Authority and Administrations to assign duties among all stakeholders to cope with maritime security threats and ensure compliance with maritime security guidelines. 

Three obstacles for an effective and efficient allocation of duties will be discussed within the framework of maritime security, focusing on the requirements of the mentioned Code, which was incorporated into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended, through chapter XI-2 on “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security”, that entered into force on July 1, 2004. These are: a) absence of public official and fully up-dated maritime security incident statistics; b) lack of awareness and knowledge about types of security incidents versus safety accidents, or the so called safety near-misses and; c) poor collaboration among State agencies concerning information sharing about specific security duties, a situation often generating duplication of tasks and preventing relevant work to be considered into maritime security management at different levels. 

The authors conclude that the production and official publication of maritime security incident statistics, as well as the establishment of procedures and processes for effective information sharing, along with clear specification for each agency involvement and necessary distribution to carry on the constant responsibility of managing security risks, are necessary to improve compliance of maritime security guidelines and give a step forward into securing the territorial sea and our oceans. 

Finally, the authors highly recommend that Governments and international institutions, including the European Union (EU) and particularly Eurostat, as the statistical office of the EU, starts the production and official publication of relevant statistics, with a clear distinction between maritime security incidents and maritime accidents.

This paper examines piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Mexico, under the framework of maritime security. The results indicate that piratic attacks are most likely underreported by the Government of Mexico. The research findings documented fourteen attacks on supply vessels and offshore platforms for the first half of 2020; only three relevant attacks were officially reported in the same period by the vessel´s (foreign) flag jurisdiction. However, the Maritime Authority of Mexico did not change the security level at any of the ports or territorial sea during the incidents. The maritime security level remained the same (level 1) during 2020, despite several alerts launched by the international maritime community. Recommendations by the respondents (shipmasters, SSO, CSO and PFSO) included that a permanent increased security level (level 2) should be implemented in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico until this specific problem is resolved. Participants suggested additional special measures to tackle the problem including the evaluation to class the area as a High Risk Area (HRA) and the establishment of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), for international cooperation and capacity building with the US Coastguard authorities to promote necessary collaboration towards effectively dealing with these security threats.

This paper aims to improve port security measures in developing countries via integrating the procedures of incident reporting and the associated follow up investigation, hinging on the Mexican experience. The analysis examined port security at Mexican ports, where stakeholders were interviewed on the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities for security incident reporting, updating of security incident records and facilitation of the follow up investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this new framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the re-assessment of security threats through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and the necessary modifications to the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) were all integrated. These subjects were all incorporated into a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was implemented at all ports in Mexico, where the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) applies, by the National Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research”, the improvement of port security framework in the country. Measurements were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success. In addition, 56% of those reported maritime incidents were also associated with recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and respective PFSP. Collecting accurate and immediate information/evidence material while reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident investigation and continuous improvement of the PFSP.