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The authors' goal was to understand how defense supply chains can better withstand unanticipated and highly impactful disruptions whose probability and impact cannot be readily calculated or quantified. Specifically, the project team set out to identify the current state of the research on supply chain risk management (SCRM), supply chain disruption management (SCDM), and supply chain resilience, both within the defense sector and across the broader commercial landscape. The project team explored the unique characteristics of defense sector supply chains and the ways in which practices from other sectors might or might not be applicable. The team also sought to identify knowledge gaps or broader questions that might not appear in the literature. This study was co-led by RAND and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut).

The authors found that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense, as well as to identify how supply chain specialists and defense and security policymakers might implement these strategies across both the private sector and government. The authors therefore created a research agenda to help fill existing gaps in understanding how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption.

Key Findings

The authors determined that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense. The main gaps in understanding also represent some of the key enablers for effective defense SCDM.The authors propose a research agenda with the following five areas to help fill gaps in understanding of how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption: (1) Improve understanding of supply chain disruption, including the composition of defense supply chains and its associated stakeholders and actors. (2) Determine which commercial sector approaches to SCDM can be adapted for or adopted by defense. (3) Recognize and tackle challenges for SCDM stemming from the multisectoral nature of defense supply chains. (4) Clarify and distinguish between SCRM and SCDM to understand the benefits and challenges of each. (5) Define what resources are needed to enable implementation of defense SCDM.

The article outlines the first steps towards creating the foundations for further research into the logistical aspects of warfare in the context of societal resilience. The possibility of achieving seven basic indicators of national stability, the organization and network of using the strategy of rapid response to threats to achieve efficiency, reliability and stability of the state are considered.

Layered resilience has received increased attention in recent years. This paper addresses an important subset of layered resilience, which is resilience in defence supply chains. The paper reports on findings from two studies, conducted in the Swedish defence sector. The purpose of the two studies is to identify feasible solutions for how the Swedish defence sector can redesign its supply network to meet the new challenges of a re-established Swedish Total Defence. The first study used a modified Delphi technique and concluded that two Delphi panels constitute a useful modification to the Delphi technique. Two panels increase the validity of the results and can potentially lead to interesting outcomes that a traditional design is less likely to produce, particularly if combined with presenting the panels with statements from different perspectives and using workshops to discuss the findings. The second study used a survey to investigate which tactics for resilience in defence supply chains defence authorities and defence industry prefer in peace, crises, and war. Though inconclusive, the findings indicate that authorities and companies agree that multiple sourcing and pre-storage of supplies are important tactics to achieve resilience in defence supply chains. This is in line with previous research in commercial supply chains, which identifies increased safety stock and multi-sourcing as two of the most commonly used tactics to address disruptions.

The lacking Russian progress in war in Ukraine is often attributed to failing logistics, yet the logistics and its eventually failure is not explained. The purpose with this paper is to present some logistics principles that can be used to describe the Russian way of logistics planning, and to infer whether failing logistics slowed down the military operations or if failing operational conduct led to revised operational plans that could not be sustained logistically. The initial Russian Course of Action (COA) to take Kyiv was probably well supported logistically. When the COA failed, contingency plans most likely did not take into consideration the logistical challenges of supporting another type of operation, partly because of the logistics vacuum resulting from the preceding exercises. In the southeast the logistical concept seems to build on the echelon principle, which fits poorly with the lack of operational success. Adding to this is successful Ukrainian tactics of targeting Russian logistics resources which significantly reduces the Russian fighting power. This assessment is based on openly accessible information about the Russian campaign. Reporting from an ongoing war poses challenges of verifying data. Both warring parties and other stakeholders pursue their own interest through strategic communication. Yet, by combining different sources we believe that our findings are quite robust. For future research, archival studies both in Ukraine and Russia, combined with interviews with logistics personnel at both sides would add new dimensions to the research. We realise though that such data sources will not be accessible for quite some time.

This study explains the constructs of a purchasing portfolio model (PPM) that defence authorities can use in practice in defence procurement and designs a segmentation model. We identify open PPM design and application questions in the literature and conduct a Delphi study with twenty experts from Swedish defence authorities to design a segmentation model that is fit-for-purpose. The paper addresses the open design and application questions discussed in the literature and satisfies the operational requirements of the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF). The proposed segmentation model builds on three dimensions: the operational requirements of the SwAF, the market's ability to deliver supplies on time, and limitations in the SwAF operational capability if the market does not deliver supplies on time. To reduce complexity, we propose a two-stage model in which we use one dimension as a precursor to a two-dimensional model. In the latter, we merge sixteen elements into one square along with three other segments which users should treat differently. The paper contributes to extant academic knowledge on PPMs by eliciting practitioners' views on open design and application questions. We develop the proposed segmentation model in cooperation with practitioners and believe that it will be of value in defence procurement practice.

Purpose – Defence supply chains (SCs) aim at operational outcomes, and armed forces depend on them to provide availability and preparedness in peace and sustainability in war. Previous research has focussed on strategies for SCs aiming at financial outcomes. This raises the question of how suitable commercial supply chain strategies (SCSs) are for supply chain design (SCD) in defence. The purpose of this paper is to explain the constructs of SCSs that satisfy military operational requirements and to propose SCSs that are appropriate in defence. 

Design/methodology/approach – This paper reports on a Delphi study with 20 experts from Swedish defence authorities. Through three Delphi rounds, two workshops and a validation round, these experts contributed to the reported findings. 

Findings – The findings demonstrate that commercial SC constructs are acceptable and applicable in defence but not sufficient. An additional strategy is required to satisfy requirements on availability, preparedness and sustainability. The paper shows that different requirements in peace and war make it challenging to design suitable defence SCs and proposes eight SCSs that satisfy these requirements. 

Research limitations/implications – The results emanate from the Swedish defence context and further research is required for generalisation.

Originality/value – This paper extends theory by investigating SCs aiming at operational outcomes. For managers in companies and defence authorities, it explicates how the unique issues in defence must influence SCD to satisfy operational requirements.