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This handbook provides a comprehensive survey of US foreign policy throughout the Indo-Pacific. Home to around 60 percent of the world’s population; most of the world’s largest and fastest-growing economies; around half of the world’s states with full nuclear capabilities; and a complicated web of unresolved tensions, disputes, and conflicts, the Indo-Pacific is arguably the most diverse, dynamic, and contested region on Earth. US strategy there has evolved over centuries, with its physical presence going broadly unchallenged since at least the middle of the last century. However, the rapid development and expanding influence of China – alongside the growth of India, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others – as well as political and economic crises and disruptions within the United States itself, mean that in recent times the US has come to occupy a newly uncertain position and perceive a range of highly unfamiliar challenges.

To explore how the US has managed, and continues to manage, its regional history, and how it approaches the modern-day landscape of an Indo-Pacific only recently normalised within international political discourse, the book contains 33 newly commissioned chapters from leading experts in the field. It does so partly with help from the more traditional realms of International Relations theory as well as more critical realms. It also unpacks US policy and strategy as it pertains to regional governments, states, and multilateral institutions, as well as to pressing issues including inter-state security, human rights, trade, artificial intelligence, and cyber strategy. It does so in four parts:

History of the US in the Indo-PacificTheorising US Policy and Presence in the Indo-PacificThe US and Indo-Pacific States and InstitutionsThe US and Indo-Pacific IssuesThe book is designed to be of interest to students and scholars of the US in the Indo-/Asia Pacific; the international relations of the Indo-/Asia Pacific; and US foreign policy.

This article revisits and revives the concept of ‘the Stranger’ in theorising international relations by discussing how this figure appears and what role it plays in the politics of (collective) identity. It shows that this concept is central to poststructuralist logic discussing the political production of discourses of danger and to scholarship on ontological security but remains subdued in their analytical narratives. Making the concept of the Stranger explicit is important, we argue, because it directs attention to ambivalence as a source of anxiety and grasps the unsettling experiences that political strategies of conquest or conversion, including practices of securitisation, respond to. Against this backdrop, the article provides a nuanced reading of the Stanger as a form of otherness that captures ambiguity as a threat to modern conceptions of identity, and outlines three scenarios of how it may be encountered in interstate relations: the phenomenon of ‘rising powers’ from the perspective of the hegemon, the dissolution of enmity (overcoming an antagonistic relationship), and the dissolution of friendship (close allies drifting apart). Aware that recovering the concept is not simply an academic exercise but may feed into how the term is used in political discourse and how practitioners deal with ‘strange encounters’, we conclude by pointing to alternative readings of the Stranger/strangeness and the value of doing so.

This book has four main objectives: to bring the thus far almost entirely neglected historical case of ‘the rise of Japan’ into the literature on power shifts in general and ‘the rise of China’ in particular; to propose a discourse-based conceptualization of identity for the study of economic policy that engages theoretical and methodological debates on how to overcome the dichotomy between ‘ideational’ (identity) and ‘material’ (economic) factors; to address the tendency to focus on the ‘radical Other’ in poststructuralist IR scholarship, by highlighting how heterogeneity disturbs exclusive and binary articulations of identity and difference; and to propose a method for putting political discourse theory (PDT) into practice in empirical research by drawing on rhetorical political analysis (RPA). US congressional debates on economic policy on Japan and China in 1985–2008 are analysed as examples of official US elite public discourse. The book shows that the ‘new era’ in US-Chinese relations that scholars and policymakers have been announcing since the beginning of the Trump presidency was long in the making, as it rests on longstanding discourses on the USA’s main economic competitor.

Under 2017 och 2018 ökade Kinas direktinvesteringar i Sverige avsevärt till följd av ett antal stora förvärv, mestadels i fordonsindustrin. Samtidigt har den svenska offentliga debatten kring kinesiska investeringar blivit mer kritisk sedan 2017, då investeringarna överlag talades om i positiva ordalag. Under 2018 och 2019 har en rad aktörer inom statliga myndigheter, politiska partier, media och civilsamhället beskrivit Kinas investeringar som ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Näringslivsrepresentanter är mindre synliga i debatten men även här finns det en tydlig trend av ökad uppmärksamhet på potentiella säkerhetsrisker kopplade till kinesiska investeringar. Den svenska synen på Kina tycks konvergera allt mer med vad EU har kallat för sin nya ”mer realistiska” hållning gentemot Peking. Ett antal policyprocesser har inletts, vilket sannolikt kommer leda till att svensk lagstiftning stärks på flera områden för att öka kontrollen av Kinas investeringar och engagemang i Sverige, särskilt i kritisk infrastruktur såsom telekommunikationsnät men även vad gäller företag vars verksamhet anses som säkerhetskänslig i mer generell bemärkelse.

China’s direct investment in Sweden surged in 2017 and 2018 due to a number of large acquisitions, mostly in the automotive industry. At the same time, the public debate on Chinese investments has become more critical since 2017, when they were typically seen in a positive light. Throughout 2018 and 2019, a number of actors in government authorities, political parties, the media and civil society have described China’s investments as a potential security threat. Although less prominent in the public debate, business representatives have also become increasingly vocal about potential security risks associated with Chinese investment. The Swedish view of China seems to be aligning with what the EU has called its new “more realistic” approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, a number of policy processes have been launched which are likely to lead to the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to scrutinise Chinese investment and activity in Sweden, especially concerning critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, but also more generally concerning companies whose activities are regarded as sensitive from a security perspective.

Existing research on exceptionalism in foreign policy suggests a number of confrontational features making it a threat to peaceful international relations. Largely based on US and European cases, and hardly ever taking a comparative approach, this literature overlooks a variety of exceptionalisms in non-Western countries, including so called “rising powers” such as China and India. A comparison between exceptionalist foreign policy discourses of the United States, China, India, and Turkey shows that exceptionalism is neither exclusive to the United States, nor a “new” phenomenon within rising powers, nor necessarily confrontational, unilateralist, or exemptionalist. As a prerequisite for comparative work, we establish two features common to all exceptionalist foreign policy discourses. In essence, such discourses are informed by supposedly universal values derived from a particular civilization heritage or political history. In order to systematize different versions of exceptionalism, we then propose four ideal types, each of which reflects exceptionalism's common trait of a claim to moral superiority and uniqueness but diverges across other important dimensions, with implications for its potentially offensive character. The article concludes by formulating a research agenda for future comparative work on exceptionalist foreign policy discourses and their repercussions for great power relations and global politics.