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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a surge in demand for defence materiel, prompting significant adaptations in manufacturing logistics to meet the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces; donor nations, meanwhile, were prompted to bolster their own military capabilities. This heightened demand for defence materiel has reached levels sufficiently unprecedented as to exceed available supply capacities. This study investigates the factors influencing the evolving dynamics of interactions among states, companies, and supranational agencies within European ammunition and grenade manufacturing supply chains. Grounded in theoretical frameworks on supply chain and of state-defence industry, it explores changes in the defence industry structure, the institutional context, the perspectives of the companies and inter-institutional and corporate relationships. Empirical data were drawn from a range of sources, including official EU and state documents, published analyses, as well as interviews and focus group discussions with Swedish defence industry representatives. Our findings indicate a shift from transactional contracts to trust-based agreements aimed at fostering supply chain resilience and enhancing dynamic capabilities. This study contributes to a deeper understanding and theoretical advancement in managing military and security challenges, with particular emphasis on enhancing readiness, resilience, and the scaling of military capabilities across cross-border defence supply chains.

The critical role of artillery is underscored by Ukraine's ongoing efforts to defend its territory. The artillery ammunition used by the Ukrainian defense forces is supplied by countries that donate from their own defense depots. Consequently, as these countries donate to Ukraine, they must replenish and expand their own ammunition stocks in response to the deteriorating security situation. This has led to an unprecedented demand for grenades and ammunition, far exceeding the available supply capacities. In response, the European Union has initiated the "Act in Support of Ammunition Production" (ASAP) to enhance ammunition production within Europe. This initiative permits states to invest in grenade and ammunition manufacturers without such investments being classified as state subsidies. Additionally, it allows for direct procurements, circumventing the regulations associated with public procurement processes. European grenade and ammunition manufacturers have long had their order books filled, preventing them from meeting the immediate demands of various defense forces and states wishing to donate/supply ammunition to Ukraine. These predominantly privately-owned manufacturers have shown reluctance to invest in increased production capacities without a guarantee of long-term demand that would ensure financial viability. Furthermore, manufacturers face challenges beyond investment hesitancy, including shortages of raw materials and critical components such as primers, gunpowder, and explosives. Thus, any increase in ammunition and grenade production volumes necessitates a corresponding expansion in the supply chain capacity. Additional concerns include securing a skilled workforce and obtaining permits and land for new manufacturing facilities. In essence, while the EU's initiative is essential for establishing the conditions for increased production capacity, tangible results from this investment will take time to materialize. Ongoing instances of forced ammunitions manufacturing have resulted in subpar quality, underscoring the need for stringent quality control and highlighting the demanding nature of ammunition manufacturing. Two critical considerations arise when states provide support to enhance ammunition and grenade manufacturing capabilities: the specific requirements and specifications of their own defense forces and the unique specifications of the ammunition required by Ukraine. The purpose of this study is to delineate the current state of ammunition production and the various limitations encountered. Empirical data for this research was gathered from a diverse array of sources, including official documents, published analyses, public service news, interviews, and focus groups. The findings indicate a need for greater robustness, resilience, and flexibility to adequately respond to significantly deteriorating security situations. Nations must re-establish close relationships with defense firms, partially reconstructing long-standing, strategic, trust-based relationships that existed prior to the New Public Management (NPM) transformation in the defense market. To manage this transition effectively, ammunition manufacturers and their associated supply chains must significantly enhance their dynamic capabilities and devise innovative yet stable solutions. The insights from this research will benefit political decision-makers, procurement authorities, defense forces, and ammunition manufacturers by providing a deeper understanding of the conditions necessary for grenade and ammunition manufacturing.

This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command and control. The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions.  In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration. 

The Military Utility Assessment of Future Technologies (MUAFT) method was developed as a cost-efficientalternative to methods such as NATO’s Disruptive Technology Assessment Games, to be used as a part of theSwedish Armed Forces’ long-term capability development process. The question addressed in this study iswhether MUAFT can be considered to have validity in its context and thus if it has potential to be useful to othersmall to medium size states. The analysis was based on an operationalization of Clark’s framework for scienceand technology intelligence analysis, combined with a military capability centric view of military utility. MUAFTreports from 2012 to 2018 were reviewed in terms of how they satisfy five key criteria. The study shows thatMUAFT provides utility, if used by a suitably composed group of experts, who are aware of the method’s limitations.The limitations mainly originate from a lack of explicit support for assessing the impact of forces forchange, other than technological forces, on military capability development. The expert group serves as thesynthesizing bridge between technology forecasts and military utility assessments. Therefore, comprehensiveexpertise is needed in various military technology specialisations, in the sponsor’s military capabilities and insubjects necessary to master in order to assess other influential societal forces for change.

Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective. The assessment centred on 5G has the perspective 2030, due to the rapid development of telecommunication standards.

In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility potential: significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

The following technology was assessed to have a potential for significant military utility:

• Cognitive Radar

The following technology was assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

• 5G technologies in military applications

The following technology was assessed to have an uncertain potential military utility:

• Multi-Domain UxS

The following technologies were assessed to have negligible military utility.

• Blockchains
• Optical Atomic Clocks

The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

The article describes the present development and status regarding the Swedish fighter aircraft Gripen.

The purpose of this report is to describe the Swedish Defence University (SEDU) Military Utility Assessment Method for Future Technologies (MUAFT). The report describes the actions taken in each step of the process and ends with references and a template for the technology memos used as basis for assessment.