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Command and control (C2) activities are conducted in various domains such as defence, emergency response, police and crises management. The problems in these domains are often characterized by complexity, i.e. having a high degree of variety. According to cybernetic theory, the variety of the controller (the C2 system) must equal or exceed that of the controlled system in the operational environment. The degree of variety sufficient to control a particular system is defined as requisite variety. 

In this paper we aim to operationalize both external and internal variety, closing the gap between high level abstract descriptions and concrete solutions, in order to suggest practical propositions when designing C2 systems. C2 systems are composed by methods, technology, personnel and organization. In this work we focus on the aspects of personnel and organization. A particular interest is dedicated to the competence variable within the personnel component. We discuss, based on previous research on e.g. diversity, what dimensions of the competence variable may be of most importance when performing C2 activities to cope with complexity.

However, a substantial amount of C2 research, also suggests that making fast decisions is important to cope with problems stemming from an adversary. We elaborate on the potential cost of high internal variety in that it may delay decisions in the C2 team because of a raised need for team communication. We conclude by presenting an investigative method, which includes simulated external complexity requiring dynamic decision-making that is handled by C2 teams with different types of competence (internal variety).

Both academics and professionals often claim that individuals in defense enterprises with access to the most relevant information and who possess the best situation awareness should decide upon what to do. This claim is typically interpreted as the person closest to the situation should decide, inferring that closeness automatically provides the best situation awareness. This interpretation is problematical however, partly because the term “situation” is undefined and partly because the individual would have to always be provided with information regarding the whole enterprise and also have the possibility to assimilate this information.

This interpretation is probably influenced by prevalent descriptions or models of command and control (C2). The field of C2 research has developed models of C2 covering several different perspectives. Two distinct classes of models are represented in this paper. First, models stemming from an individual perspective, typically focused on decision-making are highlighted. Second, models focused on a systemic and activities perspective on C2 are presented. We refer to these as reference models. This paper provides a  relational analysis between the models of individual decision making and the C2 reference models. The analysis relates key features from the models of individual decision making to cornerstone aspects of the C2 reference models, especially aspects such as centralized/decentralized decision-rights. The discussion covers arguments to why it is important to avoid unreflected and noncritical transfer of features from one class of models to the other.

For many years, we have noticed that different courses of action (COA) developed by Joint Operational Planning Groups (JOPG) for solving the same mission seldom rarely differ more than marginally. This can lead to plans that are predictable for an opponent. If we want to be able to expose an opponent to surprise and complex problems, predictable plans are not good.Planning doctrine only based on the past experience is most often not the best when preparing for missions in future operations, therefore more creative and divergent thinking is needed.In this paper we discuss conditions for COA development that stimulate creative and divergent thinking. We also discuss how planners continually alternate between divergent and convergent thinking before and during execution of operations.

The world we live in is a complex system tinged with constant change. In order to cope with this fact, a defense mission system needs to adapt to these challenges. The command and control (C2) system is the component of the defense mission system that is our system of interest, our unit of analysis, in this paper. We present a first attempt to use a method based on design logic complemented with scenario driven exercises, to extract requirements and more fine-grained design criteria to enhance design of future C2 systems.

As a starting point, three scenarios were developed that intended to reflect key features of future potential conflicts. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs) participated representing strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The SMEs were asked to state their C2 requirements in each of the scenarios. The resulting set of C2 requirements were analyzed to find design criteria pertaining to the general C2 functions (Data Providing, Orientation, Planning, Influence, and Communication) in Brehmer´s design-logic hierarchy (Purpose, Function and Form). The results indicate that the method can be usefull to find requirements and design criteria for future C2-systems.

Since no plan survives contact with reality, during the execution of a military operation it might be necessary to re-plan the operation. In order to decide whether, and when, re-planning should be initiated a feedback process is needed that provides the commander with information about the progress of the operation, and an assessment of whether the operation is leading towards the overarching goals or not. The operations assessment process is part of such a feedback process.

The current method (in e.g. NATO) operations assessment is focused on the accomplishment of planned actions and on the effects in the operational environment system. A data collection plan is established during development of the operational plan which specifies which and how data should be collected. Thus the “questions” the operations assessment process poses towards the environment are tightly connected to critical elements of the operational plan.

If the plan, however, starts to become obsolete due to unforeseen changes in the operational environment, there might be a risk that the assessment process, grounded in the plan, neglects information that is critical for decisions about re-planning. This paper suggests an alternative approach to operations assessment that is based on an idea of separating the operations assessment plan from the operational plan. Such a separation would focus the assessment process on the evolving operational environment, thus reducing the risk that unanticipated threats, or opportunities, will be overlooked and re-planning is overdue.