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Command and control (C2) activities are conducted in various domains such as defence, emergency response, police and crises management. The problems in these domains are often characterized by complexity, i.e. having a high degree of variety. According to cybernetic theory, the variety of the controller (the C2 system) must equal or exceed that of the controlled system in the operational environment. The degree of variety sufficient to control a particular system is defined as requisite variety. 

In this paper we aim to operationalize both external and internal variety, closing the gap between high level abstract descriptions and concrete solutions, in order to suggest practical propositions when designing C2 systems. C2 systems are composed by methods, technology, personnel and organization. In this work we focus on the aspects of personnel and organization. A particular interest is dedicated to the competence variable within the personnel component. We discuss, based on previous research on e.g. diversity, what dimensions of the competence variable may be of most importance when performing C2 activities to cope with complexity.

However, a substantial amount of C2 research, also suggests that making fast decisions is important to cope with problems stemming from an adversary. We elaborate on the potential cost of high internal variety in that it may delay decisions in the C2 team because of a raised need for team communication. We conclude by presenting an investigative method, which includes simulated external complexity requiring dynamic decision-making that is handled by C2 teams with different types of competence (internal variety).

Both academics and professionals often claim that individuals in defense enterprises with access to the most relevant information and who possess the best situation awareness should decide upon what to do. This claim is typically interpreted as the person closest to the situation should decide, inferring that closeness automatically provides the best situation awareness. This interpretation is problematical however, partly because the term “situation” is undefined and partly because the individual would have to always be provided with information regarding the whole enterprise and also have the possibility to assimilate this information.

This interpretation is probably influenced by prevalent descriptions or models of command and control (C2). The field of C2 research has developed models of C2 covering several different perspectives. Two distinct classes of models are represented in this paper. First, models stemming from an individual perspective, typically focused on decision-making are highlighted. Second, models focused on a systemic and activities perspective on C2 are presented. We refer to these as reference models. This paper provides a  relational analysis between the models of individual decision making and the C2 reference models. The analysis relates key features from the models of individual decision making to cornerstone aspects of the C2 reference models, especially aspects such as centralized/decentralized decision-rights. The discussion covers arguments to why it is important to avoid unreflected and noncritical transfer of features from one class of models to the other.

The command and control (C2) research community mainly agree upon the overall purpose of C2 – to generate desired effects in an operational environment thereby fulfilling stated goals. This purpose indicates an action oriented approach that focuses on the C2 process and its constituent activities. This paper inquires the persistently elusive question of when the C2 process starts and ends. This question has a strong linkage to whether the C2 process begins by a top-down and beforehand need or if it is commonly initiated as a reaction to a, more or less sudden and unforeseen, situation or event. These two different approaches have significant impact on C2 theory, for instance how much effort should be dedicated to preparation before an operation/mission, and indeed if these approaches are compatible within the same theoretical framework at all. Further, this paper surveys the often mentioned need for speed in regard to the C2 process – to get inside the enemy´s decision cycle. This line of thought is in turn related to the choice between an analytical or intuitive decision making approach in the C2 process. This paper applies a literature review method that compares a national C2 process standard with an international equivalent.

What is effective and efficient command and control (C2)? One way of answering this question is to measure the quality of products generated within the C2-process. The main product from the C2-system, in purpose of directing and coordinating the execution system, is undoubtedly the order. One might think that the quality of orders directly correlates to effects generated in the operational environment. However, because of the unforeseeable and unavoidable events in the operational environment, such a causal relation is not necessary true. This paper presents a concept method for experimentally testing relations between order quality and outcomes, by using a simulated microworld in which such events are controlled.

One particular aspect of order quality is the representation of the actual tasks and goals. This work propose an approach that connects to earlier work on operational pictures as a requisite for situation awareness in general and mission understanding in particular. Further, this paper suggests that orders could be adapted to the situation at hand by complementing the textual order with visualizations of military tasks and goals. This line of investigation owns its specific timeliness to the escalating focus on, and need for, mission command in multi-domain C2 in a context of both military and civil defence.

The world we live in is a complex system tinged with constant change. In order to cope with this fact, a defense mission system needs to adapt to these challenges. The command and control (C2) system is the component of the defense mission system that is our system of interest, our unit of analysis, in this paper. We present a first attempt to use a method based on design logic complemented with scenario driven exercises, to extract requirements and more fine-grained design criteria to enhance design of future C2 systems.

As a starting point, three scenarios were developed that intended to reflect key features of future potential conflicts. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs) participated representing strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The SMEs were asked to state their C2 requirements in each of the scenarios. The resulting set of C2 requirements were analyzed to find design criteria pertaining to the general C2 functions (Data Providing, Orientation, Planning, Influence, and Communication) in Brehmer´s design-logic hierarchy (Purpose, Function and Form). The results indicate that the method can be usefull to find requirements and design criteria for future C2-systems.

This paper presents an introduction to why it is difficult, and still desirable, to integrate the perspectives of structure and behaviour when modelling command and control (C2). We use basic systems theory in combination with theories from the field of C2 as underpinning for our arguments. The structural perspective is necessary to describe the organization of, and relation between, entities relevant for C2. The behavioural viewpoint is necessaryto put focus on the purpose of C2, which is to enable an adequate response to a problemor a situation at hand. The various problems are typically of a complex character, which includes dynamic changes and therefore has to be handled with feedback, or cybernetic, approaches. However, structure and behaviour are not easy to integrate, as will be evident in this paper.

The representation of the operational environment is crucial in all military operations because it is a necessity for the command and control (C2) function that provides the operation with direction and coordination. The representation, typically in the form of a common operational picture (COP), is considered the key element for establishing situation awareness and understanding for the commander and his/her staff. This article begins by presenting a theoretical overview of the COP concept. Thereafter, empirical support is given that officers conceptualize the COP differently, relating it to different stages of the C2 process and referring to the COP as sometimes an artifact and sometimes a mental state or a product in the human mind. For example, some officers may focus on the representation of the current operational environment; others may focus on representations of courses of actions whereas others may focus on future planned events. This may cause severe misunderstanding when officers use the COP concept in communication.

This article provides a proposition to make the COP concept more specific – connecting the different stages in the C2 process to specific instantiations of the COP. Moreover, regardless of which stage in the C2 process the instantiations of the COP relate to, it has to be adapted to that specific stage in order to be a powerful enabler. This article concludes by introducing a new concept, the Prepared Common Operational Picture (PCOP).