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As shown by the developments after the full-scale Russian attackon Ukraine in 2022, the EU is a weak strategic entity. The chapter discusses this circumstance and elaborates on what could bedone in defense cooperation among European states, primarily from a Swedish perspective as part of a Nordic-Baltic setting. As a consequence of shifting strategic patterns among its major powers, the international system is increasingly marked by power political entanglements. As shown in the chapter, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly an arena where these entanglements (mainly between Russia, China and Iran) are played out. Thisis currently a militarized period of history and there are several signs of a potential evolving hegemonic war. In the Nordic-Baltic region, as caused by this deteriorating security situation, several subregional initiatives for security and defense cooperation have developed over the last decade. All states in the regionidentify Russia as a central threat and, in Sweden, CHOD has made a public call for war preparation, and the defense budget has increased dramatically. Further, as the region is interlinked in a case of war, Article 5 is the main regional priority. Hence, to Sweden, the EU is secondary to NATO in the defense dimension Sweden and Finland, as allies in NATO, have created a new northern flank. This means that there is a Nordic dimension to defense planning (something between national plans and Article 5), and all countries in the region have defense cooperation agreements (DCA) with the U.S. Indeed, the new northern flank is integrated in defense via Washington rather than Brussels.

Geopolitical analysis and geostrategy are vital parts of the Scandinavian realisttradition. It is not a clearly defined academic school, and its connections tovarious forms of realism is often undefined or implicit, but it tends to be unitedby its policy relevance and empirical emphasis. More specifically, in the ColdWar period geopolitical studies in Scandinavia was characterized by a small-stateperspective, focus on state strategies, and the power of history. State strategieswere explored as various forms of small-state adaptation in classic concepts likethe Nordic balance, the Swedish double policy, and Finlandization. Even if criticshave pointed out explanatory shortcomings, the return of Russia as regional threathas also reinforced the use of geopolitical analysis. Future issues in Scandinaviangeopolitics are both conceptual (what is it?), theoretical (what can it explain?),and empirical (the impact of shifting power structures in international relations)

The article discusses historical enlargements of NATO in order to explore possible explanatory frameworks useful for ongoing research on the enlargement to Sweden and Finland. With the exception for Greece and Turkey 1952, the Cold War “southern and western enlargements” were characterized by a mix of idealist and liberal impulses as well as realist and military considerations. NATO was a military pact with a liberal soul, or a guardian of liberal society with a military toolbox. In the post-Cold War enlargements there were assumptions about no risks for inter-state war, relative European stability and the ability to keep Russian protests under control. In research, NATO’s “eastern enlargements” were controversial because of its contested consequences for European security, but after 24 February 2022 it is clear that the issue of the European security order must also be part of the analysis, not least to understand the drive for membership in Sweden and Finland. The fact that Sweden was a non-member of NATO has been explained both as a consequence of a “Nordic balance”, as well as internationalist norms. The striking impression after the Russian escalation in Ukraine 2022 is that most explanations of NATO’s eastern enlargements are irrelevant to the Swedish and Finnish “northern enlargement”. Further, NATOs northern enlargement has three distinct Swedish and Finnish features: the integrated relationships with NATO prior to membership, the EU memberships and the interconnectedness of the membership applications. Three explanatory frameworks are sketched in the article: a realist perspective of a “reversed Finland factor”, a liberal perspective of an interconnected and iterative application process with pluralist input from elite and general public, and a constructivist perspective of changing Western- or small state identity.

Political scientists are often asked to make public assessments about strategic events.The tendency to rely on historical analogy is problematic as method, while academicmethod proper is to slow, and the problem addressed in this article is how to improveanalytical assessments in strategic affairs. I use and develop an analytical frameworkintroduced during the Cold War by Sovietologist Michael MccGwire in order to systematizeexpert assessments. In the empirical section I illustrate it with an inquiry into theprelude to the escalation in Ukraine 2022. The inquiry shows that the Russian actionsto subordinate Belarus in the Spring of 2021 is key to the understanding of the ensuingmilitary and diplomatic events that often was mistaken as Russian coercive diplomacy.The empirically grounded assessments show that the framework could have improvedprecision in assessments in the run-up to the approaching war.