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It is frequently argued that the existence of Private Military Security Companies (PMSC) is a proof of weakened state authority, and indeed strategies involving the hiring of PMSCs contribute to a change of the world order. Still, some decision-makers view such companies as a very useful and necessary extension of foreign policy. This article investigates the role of PMSCs by analysing the contract awarded to Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to train the Bosnian military in 1995. Even though the case investigated is well known, it is actually partly misrepresented in current scholarly writings. The subsequent analysis will shed new light on the MPRI contract with the Bosnian Federation Government by illustrating that the situation in Bosnia in 1992-95 had become the new battleground for a tug of war between America and Iran, and the hiring of MPRI to train the Bosnian military must be seen in that context. Drawing on personal interviews and previously classified telegrams between the US State Department and some of its embassies around the globe, it will be illustrated that the practice of using PMSCs gives world leaders a possibility to seem disconnected from specific regions when they, in fact, are deeply involved. Apparently, some world leaders regard private military firms as valuable tools, and while it is at times held that PMSCs undermine state authority, it is clear that they can strengthen states considerably. In the case investigated here, the US government would not have been able to thwart Iranian influence in Europe had it not been for the services of MPRI. In short, companies allow decision-makers to operate in the twilight space of world politics where they can participate in the reproduction of present global political and social power structures.

This book explores ‘lessons learned’ from the military intervention in Libya by examining key aspects of the 2011 NATO campaign. NATO’s intervention in Libya had unique features, rendering it unlikely to serve as a model for action in other situations. There was an explicit UN Security Council mandate to use military force, a strong European commitment to protect Libyan civilians, Arab League political endorsement and American engagement in the critical, initial phase of the air campaign. Although the seven-month intervention stretched NATO’s ammunition stockpiles and political will almost to their respective breaking points, the definitive overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is universally regarded as a major accomplishment. With contributions from a range of key thinkers and analysts in the field, the book first explains the law and politics of the intervention, starting out with deliberations in NATO and at the UN Security Council, both noticeably influenced by the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It then goes on to examine a wide set of military and auxiliary measures that governments and defence forces undertook in order to increasingly tilt the balance against the Gaddafi regime and to bring about an end to the conflict, as well as to the intervention proper, while striving to keep the number of NATO and civilian casualties to a minimum. This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, history and war studies, and IR in general.

The NATO led intervention in Libya has very often been described as consisting of navy and air forces and that they contributed to the winning of the campaign. Not fully recognised is the fact that many nations also sent contingents of special forces in support of operations. These special operations forces trained and advised many rebel groups that contributed to the outcome of the conflict.

Drawing from strategic theory, this study investigates the strategic roles of commercial companies providing military services, frequently referred to as private military companies.  

Theoretically, the thesis analyzes how states organize its military capabilities in order to be able to wield power within the international system while empirically, it examines the character and role of commercial companies that provide military training services to the United States Government and partner nations. The reason for this rather instrumental and functional, rather than critical, approach is that this work is written within the discipline known as War Studies.

Strategic theory is used first to logically organize the empirical findings in two case studies and then to develop an analytical framework with which the strategic roles of companies providing military services can be investigated.

The analysis has been conducted using both new and hitherto unknown sources in the shape of interviews as well as previously classified telegrams, but also draws on previous research and other secondary sources.

The main findings are that commercial companies have five typical strategic roles: first, they cloak the state by substituting traditional uniformed troops; second, they act as trailblazers by securing US influence in new regions and by breaking new ground by contributing to the build-up of new partners; third, they act as scene setters by preparing the ground for military exit out of a theater of operations or by facilitating inter-operability between foreign militaries and the US military; fourth, they can be used to infiltrate the security structures of foreign countries; fifth and finally, they can be used to provide offensive capabilities by providing either kinetic or cyber warfare effects. Another finding is that military service contracting is an important part of the US strategic culture.