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Over the last thirty years, suggestions for how to develop defence capability have developed rapidly. However, supporting theory and structured concept development lag behind. Despite this imbalance, countries need to continuously spend resources on defence development. This study identifies central challenges in relation to the scientific perspectives and approaches needed to support the development of defence capability. The results show that the support for developing interactions between technology and social components is especially weak and that relevant supporting theories and methods from related fields are not considered. This study also shows that it is important to be able to address these questions from various perspectives and not to be limited by a specific scientific tradition. Finally, this study also identifies a possible emerging cluster of reports on capability-related research that provide a base for a much-needed cross-disciplinary approach to the development of defence capability.

How can we understand intelligence assessments and intelligence work? The intelligence literature offers several plausible causes of failures and the consequences of such failures. However, there is a direct lack of theories or frameworks that connect these variables, that is, there is an incomplete understanding of both how those variables interact and their underlying mechanisms. Failures as such do only give one part of the picture. Why intelligence succeed is equally if not more important to understand. The military intelligence service from an institutional perspective may help to give this understanding.

This study connects these variables with Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which yields a model to understand the mechanisms of institutional on the assessment and lays a foundation for a common terminology. The study uses the Swedish military intelligence institution active in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2012 as a case.

¿Cómo podemos entender las valoraciones de inteligencia y el trabajo de inteligencia? La literatura de inteligencia ofrece varias causas plausibles de los fallos de inteligencia y las consecuencias de tales fallos. Sin embargo, hay una falta directa de teorías o marcos que conecten estas variables, es decir, hay una comprensión incompleta de cómo esas variables interactúan y sus mecanismos subyacentes. Los fallos como tales solo proporcionan una parte de la imagen completa. Por qué la inteligencia tiene éxito es igualmente, si no más, importante de entender. Los servicios de inteligencia militar desde una perspectiva institucional pueden ayudar a proporcionar comprensión de esto. Este estudio conecta estas variables con el Marco de Análisis y Desarrollo Institucional de Ostrom (IAD) que ofrece un modelo para comprender los mecanismos institucionales en las estimaciones o valoraciones y sienta las bases para una terminología común. El artículo utiliza como caso de estudio la institución de inteligencia militar sueca activa en Afganistán entre 2008 y 2012.

Intelligence is vital for the outcome of battles. As long as humans wage war, there will be a need for decision support to military and civilian leaders regarding adversaries or potential adversaries. However, the production of intelligence is neither easy nor without pitfalls. There is a need to better understand the predicaments of intelligence analysis.

Intelligence is bureaucratically produced as well as socially constructed and created in a distinct cultural context. The ‘institution’ captures these three aspects of influence. Therefore, with a particular focus on military intelligence, this thesis aims to deepen the understanding regarding institutional influence on intelligence assessments. The literature regarding intelligence has grown steadily over the last three decades. However, theories and frameworks aimed to understand the phenomenon are still sparse. This is even more true for literature regarding contemporary military intelligence. This thesis intends to contribute to bridging these research gaps. This is done by studying the Swedish military intelligence institution from several different perspectives: its rules-in-use, shared beliefs, and the incoming stimuli primarily related to conducting threat assessments.

More precisely the thesis investigates the use of quantitative methods, doctrines (i.e. the formal rules), and shared beliefs connected to epistemological assumptions and threat assessments. The main contribution of this thesis is that it establishes and describes a casual link between a military intelligence institution and an assessment, by drawing upon rulesin-use and belief systems and their effect on the mental model and consequently the perception of the situation connected to a cognitive bias, and thereby its effect on a given assessment. The thesis makes an effort to render intelligence studies more generalizable, by way of adopting the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. The metatheoretical language of the IAD is a promising avenue for explaining and describing the institutional influence on intelligence assessments.

Underrättelse är en avgörande komponent för utfallet av väpnad strid. Så länge människor krigar, kommer det att finnas ett behov av beslutsstöd till militära och civila ledare angående dess motståndare och potentiella motståndare. Produktionen av underrättelse är dock inte lätt eller utan fallgropar. Det finns där för ett behov av att öka förståelsen för de predikamenten kopplade till underrättelseanalys.

Underrättelse som produkt är byråkratiskt såväl som socialt konstruerad och skapas i ett distinkt kulturellt sammanhang. Konceptet "Institution" kan ses fånga alla dessa tre aspekter. Därför handlar det speciellt om militär intelligens, som handlar om att förstå det institutionella inflytandet på intelligensbedömningar. Den tillgängliga underrättelselitteraturen har ökat stadigt under de senaste tre decennierna. Dock gällande teorier och ramverk på området som syftar till att förstå fenomenet är det emellertid fortfarande lite gjort. Detta gäller i än högre utsträckning för det specifika området modern militärunderrättelse verksamhet. Avhandlingen avser att bidra till att överbrygga dessa forskningsgap. Detta görs genom att studera den svenska militärunderrättelseinstitutionen ur flera perspektiv. Dess regler-i-bruk, delad trossystem/övertygelser samt den inkommande stimuli(data/information) primärt kopplade till hur hotbedömningar genomförs. Mer exakt granskar avhandlingen användningen av kvantitativa metoder, doktriner (dvs de formella reglerna) och delade föreställningar kopplade till epistemologiska antaganden och hotbedömningar.

Huvudresultatet av denna avhandling är att det etablerar och beskriver en länk mellan en militärunderrättelseinstitution och de bedömningar som görs. Det går att se en direkt länk mellan de regler-i-bruk samt institutionens trossystem och deras inverkan på individens mentalmodellen. Detta sker genom att de rådande reglerna påverkar förekomesten av kognitivt bias vilket där med påverkar analytikerns uppfattning av en given situation. Avhandlingen har där med en ambition att göra studier i underrättelseanalys mer generaliserbara, genom att applicera och utveckla ramverket för institutionell analys och utveckling (IAD). Det metadeteoretiska språket i IAD är en lovande aveny för att förklara och beskriva det institutionella inflytandet på intelligensbedömningar.

The anchoring effect is a well-studied subject. This article connects the effect with the rules-in-use within a military intelligence institution. Particularly the rules-in-use that dictate that an analyst takes his or hers starting point from recently conducted assessments of the specific area or threat. The threat assessment as well as the written assessment were affected. The results show that officers have an aversion to lower a previous given threat assessment. This gives that to understand risk assessment we not only need to understand the methods used, we also need to understand the institutions in which they are used. This is especially relevant for military intelligence as the assessments are conducted in an environment of high uncertainty.

Incidents are the key data for several of the statistical reports and analyses created within the military intelligence community. This paper discusses factors that affect the utility of quantitative methods in military intelligence analysis when used in a low intensity conflict. The first half of the paper presents the general critique of the use of quantitative methods. The second half applies this critique to the case of incident reporting in Afghanistan.

A concept called Military Utility is proposed for the study of the use of technology in military operations. The proposed concept includes a three-level structure representing key features and their detailed components. On basic level the Military Utility of a technical system, to a military actor, in a specific context, is a compound measure of the military effectiveness, of the assessed technical system's suitability to the military capability system and of the affordability. The concept is derived through conceptual analysis and is based on related concepts used in social sciences, the military domain and Systems Engineering. It is argued that the concept has qualitative explanatory powers and can support military decision-making regarding technology in forecasts, defense planning, development, utilization and the lessons learned process. The suggested concept is expected to contribute to the development of the science of Military-Technology and to be found useful to actors related to defense.

Five technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute have been reviewed by staff at the Department of Military-Technology at the Swedish Defence University. The task given by the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a time frame to 2040 from a Swedish Armed Forces’ (SwAF) perspective.

We assess the military utility of a certain technology based on its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, according to identified relevant scenarios. It should be noted that the military utility of the technology in this report is assessed solely in the presented scenario, not for the technology in any other scenarios. Since a new capability catalogue is under development at the SwAF Headquarters, we will only present general assessments of the capability impact from the technologies under study.

After the seminars, the technologies were grouped into three classes; technologies with potentially significant, uncertain or negligible military utility. The classification uncertain is given for technologies that are difficult to put into the two other classes, and not because a high technology readiness level (TRL) will not be reached by 2040.

The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for significant military utility;

3D Printers

Our overall assessment is that 3D printing has significant potential for military utility, possibly disruptive. Logistic concepts for both national and expeditionary missions will be affected in the 2040 time frame. The technology development will be driven by civilian industry, but a SwAF in-depth study is recommended as it could help form potential logistic concepts and determine what methods and systems are suitable for military adoption and what kind of application-specific issues have to be addressed in order to take full advantage of the new technology.

Deep Learning

The military utility for deep learning is assessed to be significant, primarily regarding SIGINT and IMINT, which is where the greatest utility can be seen. The driving force as regards research in the field is the private sector. We therefore recommend that the SwAF follow the research conducted and focus studies on how and where deep learning can be implemented within the organization.

Nanothermites

We suggest that a deeper study into the feasibility of nanothermite munitions and their possible military utility is carried out, since they are assessed to have a potential for significant military utility. Some of the remaining challenges include resolving risks and uncertainties pertaining to health, legality and material development. We also suggest that nanothermites should be incorporated as a future area of interest within the SwAF R&D projects.

Unmanned Surface Vessels

USV could be used for many tasks that are dull, difficult and dangerous. If employed to search for submarines they are expected to lower the cost of personnel, enhance the readiness level and increase the probability of finding hostile submarines. Therefore, we assess that USV have potential for significant military utility. The effectiveness of USV for the SwAF will depend greatly on how the platforms are incorporated into the organization. Research on how to use the USV tactically will likely be imperative if the technology is to reach its full potential. We recommended that the SwAF should follow the development and pursue research on USV before acquiring own platforms.

Structural Health Monitoring

Structural health monitoring is a key part when utilizing kinodynamic motion planning in automated and autonomous systems; therefore it will affect the capability of all systems that rely on kinodynamic motion planning. This technology has the capacity to enhance the capabilities of automatic and autonomous systems. Therefore, our assessment is that structural health monitoring has significant potential for military utility

No technology was assessed to have uncertain or negligible military utility.

The result of our technology forecast is different from previous years since all the technologies were assessed to have significant potential for military utility. The reason for this is assumed to be because these technologies have been selected by a board of experts from the SwAF and the Defence Materiel Administration, (FMV), as well as from a number of interesting, potentially disruptive technologies proposed by the Fraunhofer Institute. Furthermore, the Fraunhofer Institute estimates that all technologies in this report will reach high TRL levels, mostly 8 and 9 by 2035.

The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each Fraunhofer report to one reviewer in the working group. First, a summary of each forecast report was made. The Fraunhofer assessment of technical readiness level (TRL) in the time period to 2035 was held to be correct. The technology was then put into one scenario that was assumed to be suitable in order to assess the military utility as well as indicate possibilities and drawbacks of the technology. Based on a SWOT analysis, an assessment of the capability impact was made. An improvement this year is that the footprint table has been adjusted to the one used by NORDEFCO, presenting the assessed contribution to the factors DOTMPLFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities and Interoperability). Furthermore, the demands that are expected to be put on the SwAF R&D in order to facilitate the introduction of the technology were indicated. Finally, conclusions regarding the potential military utility of each technology were drawn. We believe that this information could be used as decision support for future R&D investments.

The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition of the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF within identified relevant scenarios and is the same as used in the Technology Forecast of 2013 and 2014. This definition is believed to be good enough for this

report but could be further elaborated in the future. An article that in-depth presents our concept of military utility has recently been published.1

Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that the assessment is biased because of the participating experts’ presumptions and experiences from their own field of research. The scenarios that were chosen do not cover all aspects of the technologies and their possible contribution to operational capabilities. It should be stressed that we have assessed potential military utility of the five technologies within the specific presented scenarios, not the technology itself. Any additional results found in the analysis are mentioned.

The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and not least the tradeoff that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide for a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies under study. This report provides executive summaries of the Fraunhofer reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

Overall, the quality of the Fraunhofer reports is considered to be balanced and of a high level of critical analysis regarding technology development. However, the report on Unmanned Surface Vessels was found to have a somewhat lower quality than the other reports, for instance, some parts of the text are copied and pasted from last year’s report on UCAV and some parts of the assessments are missing, e.g. in the TRL evaluation. Nonetheless, the reports are in line with our task of evaluating the military utility of the emerging technologies.

Today several nations utilise risk based approaches in military planning. However, the discussion on limitations with the approaches in regard to aspects such as uncertainties, the nature of the threat and risk to civilians is limited.

The aim of this work is to identify important challenges when applying risk based approaches to military activity. This article discusses risk based approaches in general and their military applications. Five generic quality requirements on risk analysis are presented from research in risk philosophy. Two military application areas for risk analysis: military intelligence, and risk management in legal assessments are analysed in relation to the presented quality requirements on risk analysis.

From the analysis it is clear that risk analysis is an integral part of the decision-making analysis and cannot be separated in time, space or organisationally from the decision-making process in general. Defining the scenario to analyse, including the time span, is a central task in risk analysis and will affect every aspect of the risk estimation. Therefore, the principles for scenario definition must be communicated and continuously updated throughout the organisation. Handling the uncertainties throughout the process is also important, especially if the aim is a resilient military system.

Ämnet militärteknik utgår från att tekniska system är officerens arbetsredskap och att en förståelse för och kunskap om dessa verktyg är central för att kunna utöva professionen framgångsrikt. Denna nionde volym av Lärobok i Militärteknik, benämnd Teori och Metod, behandlar centrala begrepp, teorier och postulat samt metoder för värdering av teknik och består av ett antal texter författade av 16 forskare och lärare vid den militärtekniska avdelningen. Volymen riktar sig främst till de som inlett sin officersutbildning och utgörs till stora delar av ett kompilat av publicerade och opublicerade militärtekniska texter och kan sägas utgöra militärteknikens ”state of the art”.