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For several years, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), M. Bydén, has acknowledged the significance of digital security threats (Bydén, 2017). Even now, he continues to stress the importance of taking such threats seriously; ‘Sweden is attacked everyday by means that harm our society today and in the more long-term. We are not in a military conflict on and about Swedish territory, but we are in a conflict about the values we want to uphold and interests we want to be handled in a democratic way’ (Dagens Nyheter, 2022).

This article aims to discuss how a state could best use its resources in resisting an aggressor when joint operations have failed. Focusing on the potential role of special operations forces (SOF) in resistance operations, the article examines scenarios where small states are attacked by a superior opponent. Based on the example of Sweden, currently still a militarily non-aligned country that nevertheless has adopted a security policy based on cooperation with other states, we explore how a small state not belonging to NATO might plan and prepare for alternative scenarios. Not being covered by Article 5, Sweden needs to be prepared to fight the war on its own. A better, but less likely, scenario would be fighting together with partners, at home, or in the near abroad. Since Ukraine shares similarities with Sweden in terms of its status as an enhanced NATO-partner, it will serve as an additional, and highly relevant, point of reference in the discussion. The developments in this war indicates that for a non-NATO member the primary alternative will be to conduct the fight on its own. Based on the above, the article will go on to investigate a number of old truths from the late 20th century as well as flipped lessons learned from twenty years of counter insurgency, primarily in the Middle East, South Sahel and South East Asia. Small states tend to have very limited size SOF which indicates that mission prioritization will be a key factor for the utility of SOF in resistance operations. There are, however, ways of finding other relevant roles, than the traditional ones, for SOF in resistance operations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military contribution to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic region should begin with an overall strategic concept that seamlessly transitions from deterrence through countering Russia’s gray zone activities and onto conventional war, only if necessary. NATO should augment its ongoing program to enhance the denial-based deterrence for the region with threats of punishment that demonstrate to Russian leaders they cannot achieve their aims at acceptable costs. Rather than forward-position military forces in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), NATO should consider keeping forces further back to take advantage of strategic depth to limit vulnerability to Russian attack and increase operational flexibility. To support the overall denial-based deterrence concept, the Baltics must commit wholeheartedly to the concept of total defense including significant increases to their active and reserves forces.

This exploratory study investigates the social and cultural significance of creative nonfiction books about Special Operations Forces. It makes three arguments. First that these volumes are constructed along the classic lines of “hero” narratives that center on the experiences of protagonists overcoming adversity and danger to succeed. Second, with the advent of “post-heroic” warfare. SOF operatives function as a sort of compensatory heroism that at once harks back to classic hero stories and places them within contemporary circumstances. Third, that the importance of cultural entrepreneurship at the base of many publications is aimed at creating and cultivating the unique reputations of SOF.

The rationale behind this paper is to explore and conceptualize the dynamics taking place when bottom-up influenced management meets top-down influenced management in spontaneous reactive first response operations. We employ an interdisciplinary approach based on theoretical perspectives from Systems science, Command & Control science, and Disaster sociology.

In order to stimulate a discussion on theoretical gaps and practical challenges, a model illustrating what we call Command & Control dynamics in spontaneous reactive operations is suggested. The model is applied as a conceptual tool for analyzing the response of the Swedish Police to a terror attack in Stockholm 2017. Both primary data from interviews and secondary data from official investigations are utilized as a basis for the analysis.

We then continue the analytical discussion regarding Command and Control dynamics, and suggest that spontaneous reactive operations give rise to quite different prerequisites for Command & Control compared to planned operations. There is a risk that both academic and practical discussions on how to improve capability do not acknowledge these differences.

Spontaneous reactive operations are likely to initially generate strong bottom-up influences in the Command & Control arrangement of a single organization. Initial decision makers will make rapid decisions and generate a direction that the superior commanders, who are not present from the beginning of the operation, must adapt to. We argue that the intent of the subordinates “restrict” the solution space for commanders on higher levels. Furthermore, we argue that in a spontaneous reactive response there is no specific Commander’s Intent from the start, only a doctrine. This leads us to suggest that the idea on mission tactics in civil operations must be problematized.

Abstract—Collection of information after incidents is regularly done through pre-printed incident report forms. These tend to be incomplete; frequently lack essential information. One consequence is that reports with inadequate information, that do not fulfil analysts’ requirements, are transferred into the analysis process. To improve, we used theory in design science and designed a new incident reporting form, based upon witness psychology, interview and questionnaire research and with focus on analysts’ within safety science requests. We have previous conducted three experiments to evaluate the new form, built upon a design science hierarchy. The new form can capture knowledge, regardless of the incidents character or contex. The aim in this paper is to describe how design science viz. a design hierarchy was used to construct a new collection form, in purpose to improve a minor artefact frequently used in safety science.

The current state of geopolitical affairs has radically changed the security environment for both small and large states.  A changing strategic security environment has drawn many states, connected by treaty and other cooperative obligations, into conflicts that may appear to be distant from direct national concerns.  The nature of many of these conflicts – terrorist tactics, indirect warfare, cyber attacks – has led many of these states to search for and develop different tools for their military toolboxes than had historically been emphasized.  These and other changes in national security environments have led both large and small states to increase their dependence on special operations forces (SOF) proportional to other military options.  However, smaller resource pools and different positions on the geopolitical stage may lead small states to use SOF differently than they are utilized by large states.  This discussion will use a cross-national, comparative approach, looking primarily at the ways in which Sweden and the U.S. have strategically positioned SOF and organizationally configured special operations within their respective militaries.  Examples from other states will be used as appropriate.