Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

This article examines Sweden’s successful 2016 bid to serve at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and shows that the subsequent 2017–18 tenure relied on a formula with three key elements. One was to mobilize the competitive advantages of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and a second to systematically highlight Africa-related priorities. A third element was to boost the standing of the E10 category of members in day-to-day diplomatic practice. After securing a plurality of votes in the General Assembly, Swedish diplomats went to work with a unique constellation of concurrently serving likeminded countries, generally receptive to Stockholm’s priorities. The formula appears to have contributed to a solid performance in 2017–2018. That said, the UNSC is not conducive to individual E10 members having a lasting impact on its institutional memory.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is primarily an existential threat to the Ukrainian society and its institutions, and furthermore an enormous challenge for neighboring countries, the EU and NATO. Yet beyond the European continent, one can also discern the contours of an alternative world order, in that today’s rule-based system anchored in international legal principles of national sovereignty, formal equality and territorial integrity are less respected. The article examines how the international community, and especially the most resourceful actors, have responded to the war in Ukraine as an indication of levels of support for a rules-based world order with or without “liberal characteristics”, or for a system where regional great powers wield greater impact in their immediate neighborhood. To arrive at a nuanced analysis, a range of concepts and methods from the study of international relations and foreign policy decision-making are employed.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

Nowadays, it is already a truism to state that digital media are effective tools used by citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) and social movementsto protest, to demand, to push and (sometimes) achieve social and political change. No question, they are. This has been observed and registered time and again in a luminous series of academic contributions (some notable examples include Castells 2012; Cottle 2011; De Luca. Lawson and Sun 2012; Howard and Muzammil 2011; Tremayne 2014; Tufekci 2017). Exactly how these media have been taken up by civic actors in specific contexts has been studied and discussed in fascinating detail (Cammaerts, 2018; Gerbaudo 2012; Treré 2019). This book goes one step further to ask a broader question: Has the use of digital media by civic actors improved (or depleted) the quality of democratic life understood as broad and effective citizen participation in public affairs and decision-making? 

Thirty years after Bulgaria’s democratic breakthrough, this book provides a “balance sheet” of the country’s democratic institutions through a number of interdisciplinary contributions. The volume is organized around three themes—democratic institutions, civil society, and European Union (EU) processes—and examines such topics such as voting, political parties, populism, media, civil society organizations, identity, and the rule of law. While the contributors argue that Bulgaria’s democracy is successful in terms of the procedural norms of democracy, civic participation, and compliance with EU rules, they also identify serious problem areas. Bulgaria’s democratic institutions struggle with obstacles such as populist Euroscepticism, political elitism, corruption, and a lack of political accountability, though this volume fully acknowledges the historical development of Bulgarian democracy, including its achievements and continuing setbacks.

This book explores the multilayer nexus among inter-related international and regional security parameters that critically define the EU's rapidly changing security environment. In terms of intensity, complexity and urgency these changes constitute challenges that threaten the very core of European security - both internal and external. In a fluid and transitional international environment of diversified needs and polymorphic threats the space dimension acquires a novel unified meaning. The book closely examines the EU's current strategic, organisational and defence capabilities regarding global, regional and domestic challenges such as terrorism, systemic instability, global order and a number of crucial hindrances to transatlantic cooperation. The chapters offer not only valuable theoretical insights, but also unique perspectives on operational and organisational elements of EU applied policies based on the testimonies of field experts. The combination of theory-based approaches and the demonstration of the EU's operational capabilities and weaknesses as externalized through its global strategy choices provide an overall evaluation of adopted policies and their effects. This is crucial in a global transition period that will define the EU's role and its potential to produce desired outcomes through synergies with its strategic allies.

The Baltic Sea and the Arctic have once again become scenes for geostrategic great power competition, influencing regional economic, military and environmental security. Here, international relationships span a spectrum from friendship to fear. We observe that a host of different units of analysis currently compete for our attention in this part of Europe. But while “Scandinavia”, “the Nordic area”, “the Baltic Sea region”, “the High North” and “the Arctic” help focus strategic analysis on important and sometimes overlapping components of this area, security complex theory prescribes that we must adopt a broader, multi-layered view in order to understand how great and small power interests play out in this part of the world today. Such analysis must consider China’s global role, NATO’s increasingly elaborate military planning and the Russian Federation’s perception of vulnerabilities and opportunities, in an area that stretches from the Suwalki gap in East-Central Europe to the Barents Sea. In addition, security complex analysis benefits from including the perspectives of small states that control key territories – such as resource-rich continental shelves and exclusive economic zones – and from taking relevant international bodies into account as enabling and constraining factors. As part of a larger project, this paper reviews several sets of open source documents indicative of the incentive structure of such key players, published over the past five years. We delve into the political, economic and military dimensions of aims and actions by three categories of actors, namely: i) China, Russia, the United States; ii) Denmark, Norway; Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada; and iii) the EU, NATO and the Arctic Council. We conclude that, while smaller units of analysis still make sense for limited research purposes, the concept of a Baltic-Arctic security complex is necessary for meaningful strategic analysis.

This article outlines a general history of the intellectual origins and development of geopolitical thought. It provides categories for assessing contemporary expressions of this phenomenon, and then discusses the applicability of these tools to the Baltic Sea region. The article focuses on eliciting and juxtaposing contrasts between the three classical bodies of literature that evolved largely in parallel, and ends up briefly commenting on a fourth, partly “critical” approach. The main takeaway is that considering all four geopolitical approaches before applying any of them to the Baltic Sea realm encourages analysts to embrace a more holistic and dynamic viewpoint than each of the alternatives individually can offer. Such a conceptualization promises to forge analytical linkages between a series of relevant, geographically contingent circumstances including resources, arenas and communities that represent prerequisites and opportunities incrisis, conflict, or war.