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In recent years we have faced huge uncertainty and unpredictability across the world: Covid-19, political turbulence, climate change and war in Europe, among many other events. Through a historical analysis of worldviews, Peter Haldén provides nuance to the common belief in an uncertain world by showing the predictable nature of modern society and arguing that human beings create predictability through norms, laws, trust and collaboration. Haldén shows that, since the Renaissance, two worldviews define Western civilization: first, that the world is knowable and governed by laws, regularities, mechanisms or plan, hence it is possible to control and the future is possible to foresee; second, that the world is governed by chance, impossible to predict and control and therefore shocks and surprises are inevitable. Worlds of Uncertainty argues that between these two extremes lie positions that recognize the principal unpredictability of the world but seek pragmatic ways of navigating through it.

 Argues that the co-existence, conflict and co-constitution of two principally contradictory worldviews are what define and shape modern Western cultureAims to decrease the anxiety and uncertainty many people feel about the world and provide a realistic picture of how much they can control and overcome crisesOffers added value to military students, analysts and planners who will become more aware of the activities in which they are engaged and of the limits and possibilities within different ways of thinking

This book demonstrates that elite families and political order evolved in symbiosis throughout European, Central Asian and Middle Eastern History. Noble families and royal dynasties were preconditions of stability and legitimacy of political orders. The state did not evolve in opposition to kinship-groups or to kinship-based principles of legitimacy. By re-telling the development of the state this book pinpoints exacly how kinship-based groups can both support and undermine political order. This book analyses Europe, the Middle East, Eurasian Steppe Polities, and the Ottoman Empire from the early Middle Ages to the present. The book pushes against conventional state-formation theory. Interdependence rather than conflict characterized the relation between powerful kinship groups and the political order. Hence, political science and sociology have overemphasised the coercive aspect of the state and the centrality of a monopoly of legitimate violence for the existence of political order. I offer a new understanding of successful political orders by emphasising co-operation with power elites in a common framework. Doing so in turn allows us to understand how to build stable polities today.

In October 2018, Armed Forces & Society published a special issue dedicated to broadening the perspective on military cohesion from the narrow focus on 20th and 21st Western state militaries and the microlevel. The special issue emphasized the need for a theoretical and methodological broadening of the study of cohesion: In order to understand the majority of armed groups in the world, it is necessary to investigate macro- and mesolevel preconditions of microlevel cohesion. Such preconditions include the existence of states, nations, and modern military organization. These are specific to modern, Western contexts, and rarely feature in historical or non-Western cases. In many cases, investigating these preconditions requires qualitative methods. In a critical response, Siebold contested some of the arguments of the special issue, claiming that our argument was exaggerated and our methodologies inadequate. In this reply, we seek to clarify some of the issues and arguments at stake.

Strategic studies deals intimately with the topic of power. Most scholars in the discipline work with a concept of power as an adversarial zero-sum competition. This is natural and necessary. However, other conceptions of power developed within political science and sociology could enrich strategic studies. Approaching two typical, traditional tasks of strategy – alliance building and war-fighting – this article demonstrates the heuristic mileage of theories of collective power. In particular, we can shed new light on the post-Cold War transformation of NATO as well as state-building as a strategy in counter-insurgencies with new ideas of power. Broadening the palette of theories of power is thus valuable if strategic studies is to prosper as an independent field of study.

Previous studies of the cohesion of organized armed groups (OAGs) have made great progress, but they have mostly focused on units fighting for modern Western states. I argue that the study of OAGs that contain their own legitimacy requires a broadened theoretical framework. Such groups may be conceptualized as “ruling organizations” in Max Weber’s terminology. Examples of such groups range from early medieval warbands to modern militias and guerrillas. Members of ruling organizations obey commands for a combination of three reasons: rational, traditional, and charismatic—these in turn form the basis of the legitimacy of the organization. Pinpointing the foundations of obedience in a group provides us with another way of emphasizing weak points that we want to either target or reinforce. This study contributes theoretically to the study of cohesion by linking it to theories of legitimacy in political orders.

Anarchy and hierarchy are two central concepts of international relations theory but as conventionally defined they cannot describe political life for most of Western history. Neither concept describes the structure of medieval politics well. Rather, many different principles of differentiation existed simultaneously, both stratificatory and segmentary. The situation was closer to anarchy as understood as the absence of overarching principles of order rather than as ‘anarchy’ in the conventional sense used in international relations and absence of government. The power of the Popes over temporal rulers was considerable, but it never corresponded to the concept ‘hierarchy’ as conventionally understood either. Between c. 700 and c. 1300, Europe became more heteronymous as time went by, not less. More principles of differentiation were developed, and both Popes and kings became more powerful. The reinvention of the papacy after the ‘Investiture Controversy’ (1075–1122) created a system of law and practices in which European monarchs and realms were embedded, but it did not create an all-powerful papacy.

Mod är en egenskap som hyllats i alla krigförande kulturer. Konsten, litteraturen och filosofin har ofta tagit upp modet som tema, både för att befästa ett militärt ideal och för att problematisera denna egenskap. Men vad är egentligen mod? Var går gränsen till övermod? Vad utmärker mod i strid, och kan man träna soldater att bli modiga? Dessa frågeställningar tar plats även i vår tid där krig och försvar diskuteras i dagens militära miljöer, och frågor om etik är lika aktuella som frågor om effektivitet.

I Mod i strid och filosofi studerar författarna historiska perspektiv på mod och dagsaktuell forskning kring strid och militär utbildning. Förr talade man om mod eller tapperhet som en av flera eftersträvansvärda dygder – idag talar man hellre om professionalism. Men hur mycket skiljer sig egentligen den moderna tidens militära ideal från de historiska? Kan vi lära oss något av den dygdetik som i århundraden användes för att forma modiga individer och tappra krigare?