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This thesis project consists of acomparative work on three different militarymegaprojects regarding Network CentricWarfare, in three different countries: theUnited States, France and Sweden. The aim ofthe comparison is to find similarities anddifferences with respect to why, and if, theprojects failed, or are failing, and if they failed - to what extent. The objectives of the militarymegaprojects were ambitious and a great dealof the involved technology was not yetdeveloped at the time and the technicalrequirements were incongruous. For thecomparative study a narrative case studymethodology has been employed, structuringand analysing the different militarymegaprojects.The result is three different descriptions of themilitary megaprojects reproducing the internaland external dynamics of two of the threeprojects. One project, the French one, has beenreproduced up to its present stage because it isplanned to continue to the 2030s. The result ofthe comparison between the militarymegaprojects has shown that such vast projectscan be managed like normal vast developmentprojects. On the other hand, these kinds of vastprojects are comprehensively complex. Suchprojects do also involve ideas leading to projectdevelopments of already known and unknownobstacles before and during the mega projectnot possible to manage and results in projectand development failure

Cette thèse est une étudecomparative de trois méga-projets militairesmenés aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Suède,dans le domaine du network centric warfare ouguerre réseaucentrique. L’objectif de cetteétude est d’observer les similitudes etdifférences dans le développement et la gestionde ces projets, de comprendre les raisons decertains choix stratégiques puis d’évaluerl’ampleur de leur réussite ou échec. Cesprogrammes étaient particulièrementambitieux puisqu’une grande partie de latechnologie répondant à ces besoins n’existaitpas encore et certains impératifs techniquesétaient proprement incompatibles. L’étude decas et la comparaison des méga projets sontprésentées sous une forme narrative.Le résultat en est la description des trois mégaprojets militaires reproduisant les dynamiquesinternes et externes à l’oeuvre pour deux destrois projets. Le projet français a été décritjusqu’à l’étape de développement actuel, ledéploiement du projet étant prévu jusqu’aumilieu des années 2030. Cette comparaison desméga projets militaires a montré que le type demanagement appliqué à ces vastes programmesn’est pas différent de ceux mis en oeuvre dansle cadre de projets de moindre envergure. Celadit, les méga-projets restent extrêmementcomplexes et ce type de développement doittenir compte de différents obstacles, déjàconnus ou non durant les différentes phases dedéploiement, lesquels se trouvant être danscertains cas impossibles à contrôler

Summary

Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective.

In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility: potentially significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility:

• Rapid field      identification of harmful microorganisms
• Hypersonic      propulsion

The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

• Non-line-of-sight      imaging
• Artificial      intelligence for military decision support

The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility:

• Structural      energy storage
• Triboelectric      nanogenerators

No technology was found to have negligible military utility.

The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

The objective of this text is to carry out a comparative analysis of the general features regarding System of Systems (SoS) in the books System of Systems Engineering: Innovations for the Twenty-First Century (Jamshidi, 2009) and Systems of Systems (Luzeaux & Ruault, 2010).

This review consists first of a brief description of the general features of Systems of Systems (SoS) through the book Systems of Systems by Luzeaux & Ruault (2010). The review then continues to address Chapter 4, written by Ruault (2010) on Human Factors within the context of SoS.

Ämnet militärteknik utgår från att tekniska system är officerens arbetsredskap och att en förståelse för och kunskap om dessa verktyg är central för att kunna utöva professionen framgångsrikt. Denna nionde volym av Lärobok i Militärteknik, benämnd Teori och Metod, behandlar centrala begrepp, teorier och postulat samt metoder för värdering av teknik och består av ett antal texter författade av 16 forskare och lärare vid den militärtekniska avdelningen. Volymen riktar sig främst till de som inlett sin officersutbildning och utgörs till stora delar av ett kompilat av publicerade och opublicerade militärtekniska texter och kan sägas utgöra militärteknikens ”state of the art”.

Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two internet based search reports from Recorded Future have been reviewed by staff at the Department of Military- Technology at the Swedish National Defence College (Note that there probably are other technology areas, equally interesting, but not included in this study). The task given by FMV was to assess the military utility of the chosen technologies in a time frame from 2025 to 2030, from a SwAF viewpoint.

We assess the military utility of a certain technology, as its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios.

The technologies were grouped in three classes; technologies with potentially significant, uncertain or negligible military utility.

The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for significant military utility;

• Alternative fuels
• High altitude platforms
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
• Cyber Defence
• The forecasting and analysis technology described in the report "Future of Cyber Threats" if the tool is combined with advanced artificial intelligence algorithms

The following technology was assessed to have uncertain military utility;

• The forecasting and analysis technology described in the report "Future of Cyber Threats" in its present form

The following technology was assessed to have negligible military utility;

• Walking machines

The method used was first to make a summary of each forecast report. The technology was then put into one or more scenarios that are assessed to be the best in order to show possible military utility as well as possibilities and drawbacks of the technologies. Based on a SWOT-analysis, the contribution to SwAF capabilities and the cost in terms of acquisition, C2 footprint, logistic footprint, doctrine/TTP, training, facilities and R&D were assessed. Conclusions regarding the military utility of the technology were drawn.

Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that the assessment is biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experiences from their own field of research. The scenarios that were chosen do not cover all aspects of the technology and their possible contribution to operational capabilities. It should be stressed that we have assessed the six technologies’ potential military utility within the presented scenarios, not the technology itself.

The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition (the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios) has been slightly modified from the one used in the Technology Forecast 2012. It is believed to be good enough for this report, but could be further elaborated in the future.

The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and the tradeoff that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used is believed to provide for a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies under study. This report provides executive summaries of the Fraunhofer and Recorded Future reports and helps the SwAF Headquarter to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

Given the limited quantitative base (only 2 reports) for assessing the potential value of using the tool Temporal Analytics™ used by Recorded Future, our conclusion is nevertheless that the overall value of using the tool for technology forecasting is rather poor. Our assessment is that Recorded Future at present can’t be used as an alternative to the Fraunhofer Institute. Overall, the quality of the Fraunhofer reports is considered to be balanced and of a high level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies. In the case of Recorded Future’s technology forecast, the sources that are relevant for making military predictions are considered to be ill-suited for aggregation in the form the tool in focus, Temporal Analytics™, provides. The tool requires further development to fit military purposes. Further use of Recorded Future in the technology forecast process is therefore not recommended, at least not until the tool has been combined with advanced artificial intelligence algorithms.

We propose that the Department of Military Technology at SNDC could be involved in the early phase of the Technology Forecast process giving support to FMV in choosing which technology areas that should be selected to be studied by the Fraunhofer Institute within the framework of the Technology Forecast project (Teknisk Prognos).

Modern military technology can often be complex and very expensive to develop; therefore it is imperative that the right technology is chosen in operations planning or in acquisition processes. To evaluate the military utility of a technology is a multifaceted problem that deserves attention, since the consequences of failure to do so may be severe. Aspects to consider are not only the technology itself, but also what effect it will have on tactics, who the enemy is, whether it is actually allowed to use the technology and how well it can support in achieving the objective of a military operation.

The scope of this paper is to present a method that can be used for evaluation and ranking of the military utility of different technologies. The method presented in the paper is called “The process for military utility evaluation” (PMUE). It is a framework for how to do such evaluations, for example identifying important considerations and addressing the complexity of the problem of assessing military utility. PMUE is designed to be flexible enough to address different sorts of technological systems, to forecast military utility and handle what-if analyses.

PMUE is a step by step evaluation of different aspects of military utility, such as technological availability, legal limitations and scenario dependency. In PMUE these aspects are assembled into one final measurement of military utility for ranking purposes only.

In PMUE different methods of evaluation are used for different sub-evaluations, ranging from, for instance, actual testing and simulations to operations research and brainstorming. The reason for such an approach is due to the complexity of evaluating military utility; depending on which aspect to evaluate, certain methods lend themselves to be more or less useful. Choosing the most appropriate method for each sub-evaluation is a key to success in PMUE.

It is found that PMUE could be used for the evaluation of military utility; however it must first be properly tuned. The strength with PMUE is its ability to give simple answers to very complex questions; however the result of PMUE will never be better than the worst sub-evaluation in PMUE.

In order for PMUE to work knowledge, insight and willingness to unconditionally include all possible techniques and different areas of usage have to be included in the assessment. This requires extensive knowledge of the subject and understanding among the evaluators. Also it requires an open climate in the sense that no internal or external ideas, interests, prejudges that are either aware or unaware focus on or sort out concepts for other reasons than just the military utility.

The ability to make unbiased and well informed decisions in acquisition processes or operations planning is essential, since both taxpayer money and even national security might be at stake. PMUE is intended as a support to be used by the decision makers when making decisions of that nature.

Obemannade farkoster används allt oftare, och i allt fler roller, i dagens kon- flikter. Denna rapport ger en bred överblick över området militära obemannade farkoster, samt rekommendationer för inriktningen av framtida FoU-satsningar inom området.

Överblicken över området har fokus på både system, förmågor och verksam- heter som är relevanta för Försvarsmakten. Genom att låta de insatsförmågor som definieras i FMUP (Försvarsmaktens utvecklingsplan) gå som en röd tråd genom rapporten, både när specifika system diskuteras och när möjliga scena- rier där obemannade farkoster kan vara till nytta beskrivs, har vi försökt hålla både bredd och relevans i dokumentet.

Rekommendationerna vilar på en genomgång av de inriktningsdokument som producerats i Försvarsmakten, t.ex. Perspektivplanneringen och FMUP, besök vid de enheter som dagligen använder obemannade farkoster, UAV-enheten i Karlsborg och Swedec i Eksjö, samt den områdesöverblick som nämns ovan. Slutsatserna är att den effektivaste kompetensuppbyggnaden och kunskapsöver- föringen fås om man skapar breda tvärvetenskapliga projekt inom respektive systemkategori (UAV, UGV, etc) med nära kontakter till materielförsörjnings- processen och perspektivplaneringen. Dessa kan samla kompetensen inom FHS och FOI, övervaka forskningsfronten genom att bevaka tävlingar, konferenser samt delta i internationella samarbeten, samt överföra det samlade resultaten till Försvarsmakten genom demonstrationer av verkliga eller simulerade delsy- stem och interaktiva simuleringar av hela system. Just systemsimuleringar kan göras särskilt realistiska, eftersom interaktionen med de riktiga obemannade systemen till stor del sker igenom kontrollstationernas datorer. På så sätt ska- pas en känsla för både hot och möjligheter med de nya systemen, vilket gagnar både taktikutveckling och materielprocesser.

Unmanned vehicles are being used in many conflicts around the world today. This report gives a broad overview of the field of unmanned vehicles, and includes suggestions of how a future research activity within the field might look like.

The overview is focussed on both systems and capabilities, as well as activities that are relevant for the Swedish Armed forces. By applying the capability areas defined in the armed forced development plan (FMUP) to both commercial systems and possible scenarios, we strive to limit the scope of the report to the most relevant topics.

The recommendations are based upon a review of the development documents of the Swedish Armed Forces, as well as visits to units operating unmanned systems today, and the overview described above. The suggestions are as fol- lows. Broad, cross-disciplinary projects focussing on system types, e.g. UAV, UGV etc, should be formed. These should be interacting with the procure- ment process, and different level of planning activities. They should also bring together competencies across FHS and FOI, survey current research state-of- the-art, through competitions, conferences and collaborations, and transfer the results to the armed forces through demonstrations and simulations of sys- tems and subsystems. Simulations in particular are well suited to illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of a particular unmanned systems, as the interaction with such systems is mostly carried out through the computers of the control stations, even for the real systems. In this way, participants from the armed forces can get a feeling for both threats and possibilities associated with the different future and contemporary systems, which will be of use to both tactic development and procurement activities.

Samhällets kritiska infrastrukturer är till stor del beroende av informations- och kontrollsystem för sin drift. Det finns standarder för hur organisationer ska arbeta för att upprätthålla säkerhet i sin informationshantering och dessa är även tvingande för statliga myndigheter genom Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskaps (MSB) föreskrifter. I MSB Strategi för samhällets informationssäkerhet 2010-2015 betonas vidare vikten av människans roll i informationshanteringen.

I krissituationer kommer samhällets informationssystem utsättas för stora belastningar, förutom rent fysiskt också på ett trovärdighetsplan, där tilliten till information och dess integritet blir mycket viktig. För att integritet och legitimitet hos krisinformation ska upprätthållas behöver informationssäkerheten vara effektiv. Detta innebär också att människa i informations-systemet måste vara pålitlig. Emellertid har inte hotet från insiders, det potentiella hotet från den egna personalen, något stort fokus i dagens informationssäkerhetsarbete trots att allt mer information hanteras av allt fler människor.

Mot bakgrund av ovanstående är en mer utbredd kunskap om insidern som hot är en viktig beståndsdel i trovärdig informationssäkerhet. I krissituationer är detta även av stor betydelse för kommunikationens trovärdighet och legitimitet. Detta papper diskuterar hur insiderhotet kan hanteras och hur informationssäkerhetsrutiner kan betona insiderkomponenten.