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Publikasjoner (10 av 24) Visa alla publikasjoner
Lundqvist, S. (2023). Maktspelet om Arktis ökar spänningarna i Nordkalotten. Stockholm: Officerstidningen
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Maktspelet om Arktis ökar spänningarna i Nordkalotten
2023 (svensk)Annet, Policydokument (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [sv]

Rysslands anfallskrig mot Ukraina och de smältande isarna i norra ishavet ökar spänningarna i Arktis. Med ett försvagat Ryssland flyttar Kina fram sina maktpositioner och de nordiska länderna har all anledning att stärka skyddet i de norra delarna av den skandinaviska halvön.

sted, utgiver, år, sider
Stockholm: Officerstidningen, 2023. s. 4
Serie
Officerstidningen 2023, ISSN 0280-2759 ; No. 5
Emneord
Arktis, Nordkalotten, Säkerhet, Sverige
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-11996 (URN)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2023-12-05 Laget: 2023-12-05 Sist oppdatert: 2023-12-14bibliografisk kontrollert
Lundqvist, S. (2023). Réapprendre les leçons de la Guerre froide: le « retour dans le futur » de la Suède dans sa politique de sécurité et de défense. NAQD, N° 41-42(1), 206-229
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Réapprendre les leçons de la Guerre froide: le « retour dans le futur » de la Suède dans sa politique de sécurité et de défense
2023 (fransk)Inngår i: NAQD, ISSN 1111-4371, Vol. N° 41-42, nr 1, s. 206-229Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [fr]

Cet article examine comment la Suède est en train de réapprendre trois leçons de la Guerre froide à la lumière des transformations en cours dans ses conditions de sécurité régionales. Il compare et met en contraste les dynamiques et les politiques de sécurité de trois ères distinctes : la Guerre froide, la période d’après-Guerre froide, et la période d’après 2014. Il identifie dans l’évolution de l’environnement sécuritaire de la Suède les changements qui expliquent le calendrier et l’enchainement de ces adaptations. Cet article examine également les fondements de la politique de neutralité ambiguë de la Suède pendant la Guerre et pourquoi elle différait des politiques de la Finlande, du Danemark et de la Norvège. Il conclut que la Suède réapprend trois leçons de la Guerre froide : a) les conflits armés sur son territoire vont dégénérer en une guerre sur toute la péninsule scandinave et la Finlande ; b) elle a besoin d’évaluations réalistes pour planifier sa défense ; et c) le concept de « défense totale » est la clé pour maintenir le niveau de résilience sociale nécessaire afin de décourager des tentatives russes visant à attaquer, contrôler ou exploiter son territoire. Alors que la période d’après-Guerre froide est souvent considérée comme un vide et une anomalie dans l’histoire de la politique de sécurité de la Suède, cet article établit que le processus qui a fait abandonner à la Suède sa politique de neutralité dans les années 1990 sert en fait de pont stratégique pour l’implémentation actuelle d’un élément de transparence dans sa politique de sécurité. Si la sécurité sur le flanc nord de l’OTAN devait se détériorer, la Suède se rapprocherait sans doute davantage de l’OTAN.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Algeria: , 2023
Emneord
Guerre Froide, Dissuasion, Sùede, Évaluation Des Menaces, « Defense Totale »
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-11509 (URN)10.3917/naqd.041.0206 (DOI)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2023-04-12 Laget: 2023-04-12 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-12bibliografisk kontrollert
Lundqvist, S. (2022). A Convincing Finnish Move: Implications for State Identity of Persuading Sweden to Jointly Bid for NATO Membership. Studia Europejskie, 26(4), 73-110
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>A Convincing Finnish Move: Implications for State Identity of Persuading Sweden to Jointly Bid for NATO Membership
2022 (engelsk)Inngår i: Studia Europejskie, ISSN 1428-149X, Vol. 26, nr 4, s. 73-110Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

This article examines the consequences for Sweden’s state identity by the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO. Taking its starting point in Sweden’s shattering loss of its easternmost provinces in the 1809 Treaty of Fredrikshamn, it explores Sweden’s initial formulations of a policy of neutrality and its evolution until the end of the Cold War. The article then directs attention to how Social Democratic leaders managed to institutionalise a Swedish “active foreign policy”, exerting a lasting, formative influence on Sweden’s state identity. It also addresses the rapprochement of Finland and Sweden after the end of the Cold War and the consequences of the bilateral dynamics that characterised their EU-membership applications. The article critically discusses how Sweden reformulated its concept of neutrality into a nebulous concept of nonalignment and adopted a security policy rooted in a cooperative security approach. Based on key findings drawn from this historical account, this article addresses the processes that lead to Finland and Sweden unexpectedly deciding on jointly applying for NATO membership. It concludes with a forward-looking assessment of how a Swedish NATO membership will ultimately stabilise Sweden’s adaptable state identity and its implications for the Nordic countries’ regional military strategy.

Emneord
Sweden, Finland, State Identity, Neutrality, Non-Alignment, NATO Membership
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-11448 (URN)10.33067/se.4.2022.3 (DOI)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2023-02-08 Laget: 2023-02-08 Sist oppdatert: 2023-05-03bibliografisk kontrollert
Nilsson, D. & Lundqvist, S. (2022). Identifying weaknesses of CLIL in the military higher education classroom. The Journal of Teaching English for Specific and Academic Purposes, 10(2), 217-243
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Identifying weaknesses of CLIL in the military higher education classroom
2022 (engelsk)Inngår i: The Journal of Teaching English for Specific and Academic Purposes, ISSN 2334-9182, Vol. 10, nr 2, s. 217-243Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

Due to the ever-increasing expansion of English language integration into content courses within higher educational institutions (HEIs), this study seeks to gain insights into how domestic students, as well as content and language lecturers perceive integrating English for Specific Academic Purposes (ESAP) in an academic/vocational military university using Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). We investigate firstly on how mostly domestic, non-native English speaking students perceive learning academic military content in an English Educational Environment (EEE), and secondly, how content and ESAP lecturers perceive collaborating within CLIL at the Swedish Defense University. Using a mixed-methods approach with data gathered from students and lecturers, the results are useful for HEIs looking to increase their English integration. Our results indicate that NNES students indeed learn content and language knowledge simultaneously using CLIL because communicative ESAP tasks enable them to process, and increase content knowledge. However, as this article will show, students prefer drastically different CLIL methods for reasons that we argue can be traced to varying L2 proficiencies. Meanwhile, lecturers had different expectations of, and perceived, interdisciplinary collaboration differently. This study concludes by suggesting that CLIL step 3 is inherently flawed due to a mismatch of implicit methods and explicit expectations of language proficiency, which consequently complicate lecturer roles and interdisciplinary collaboration.

Emneord
ESAP, CLIL, Military English, EEE
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-11090 (URN)10.22190/JTESAP2202217N (DOI)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2022-10-03 Laget: 2022-10-03 Sist oppdatert: 2022-10-04bibliografisk kontrollert
Finlan, A., Danielsson, A. & Lundqvist, S. (2021). Critically engaging the concept of joint operations: Origins, reflexivity and the case of Sweden. Defence Studies, 21(3), 356-374
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Critically engaging the concept of joint operations: Origins, reflexivity and the case of Sweden
2021 (engelsk)Inngår i: Defence Studies, ISSN 1470-2436, E-ISSN 1743-9698, Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 356-374Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-10000 (URN)10.1080/14702436.2021.1932476 (DOI)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2021-06-16 Laget: 2021-06-16 Sist oppdatert: 2021-11-18bibliografisk kontrollert
Berbrick, W., Saunes, L., Cobb, R., Greaves, W., Friis, A., Riber, J., . . . Shvets, D. (2020). Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks of the Future. USA: Newport; Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks of the Future
Vise andre…
2020 (engelsk)Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

This report, Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks for the Future, captures consensus of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative 2020 scholars. Building upon the 2018-2019 NASI work on the limitations of the current cooperative security fora in the Arctic region, this cohort explored existing international frameworks and assessed their abilities to ensure freedom and security in the Arctic through political-military means. NASI 2020 also examined existing frameworks to determine whether they enabled increased dialogue and maritime security cooperation in the region. The frameworks were further evaluated for their abilities to prevent and manage conflict and enhance cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests in the region. Scholars were tasked to identify new frameworks that could be useful in establishing – and maintaining – open channels of communication, preventing conflict, and enhancing cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests among nations and navies in the Arctic region. Finally, the group sought to identify practical arrangements for a future meeting or summit that could bring together states to enhance dialogue on security and cooperation in the Arctic region.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
USA: Newport; Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 2020. s. 82
Serie
Newport arctic scholars initiative report
Emneord
Arctic Security, Cooperation, Dialogue, Conflict Prevention, Multilateral Frameworks
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9537 (URN)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2020-12-09 Laget: 2020-12-09 Sist oppdatert: 2023-02-02bibliografisk kontrollert
Lundqvist, S. (2020). Jointly Navigating the Baltic-Arctic Strategic Space: The Case of Sweden and Finland. In: Tom Guy, Todd Bonnar, Jose Garza (Ed.), 2020 Cutting the Bow Wave: Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (pp. 23-27). Norfolk, Virginia: Combined Joint Operations from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Jointly Navigating the Baltic-Arctic Strategic Space: The Case of Sweden and Finland
2020 (engelsk)Inngår i: 2020 Cutting the Bow Wave: Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence / [ed] Tom Guy, Todd Bonnar, Jose Garza, Norfolk, Virginia: Combined Joint Operations from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence , 2020, s. 23-27Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

Small states have always been at risk when great power competition intensifies in a region, those in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the Arctic being no exception. Sweden and Finland are located at a strategic cross-roads between Russia and NATO, which “Northern Flank” once again receives serious attention from defence planners. Russia is pursuing a strategy of military dominance in the BSR and the European Arctic, and its perceived assertiveness is a major concern among its neighbours. China, for its part, pursues a multilateral approach as a “near-Arctic state”, seeking to make the BSR a strategic springboard to the Arctic by invest-ing in joint ventures with small states. The U.S. more competitive stance on China globally, and on China and Russia in the Arctic, has implications for the security dynamics in the BSR. In the resulting Baltic-Arctic Strategic Space, Finland and Sweden opts for navigating jointly.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Norfolk, Virginia: Combined Joint Operations from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, 2020
Serie
Cutting the Bow Wave
Emneord
Baltic Sea Region, Arctic Region, Strategy, Finland, Sweden, Defence Cooperation
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9538 (URN)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2020-12-09 Laget: 2020-12-09 Sist oppdatert: 2021-11-03bibliografisk kontrollert
Klein, R. M., Lundqvist, S., Sumangil, E. & Pettersson, U. (2019). Baltics Left of Bang: the Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence. Washington DC: National Defense University Press (301)
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Baltics Left of Bang: the Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence
2019 (engelsk)Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military contribution to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic region should begin with an overall strategic concept that seamlessly transitions from deterrence through countering Russia’s gray zone activities and onto conventional war, only if necessary. NATO should augment its ongoing program to enhance the denial-based deterrence for the region with threats of punishment that demonstrate to Russian leaders they cannot achieve their aims at acceptable costs. Rather than forward-position military forces in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), NATO should consider keeping forces further back to take advantage of strategic depth to limit vulnerability to Russian attack and increase operational flexibility. To support the overall denial-based deterrence concept, the Baltics must commit wholeheartedly to the concept of total defense including significant increases to their active and reserves forces.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2019. s. 20
Serie
Strategic Forum ; 301
Emneord
Baltic Sea, deterrence, NATO
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-8806 (URN)
Merknad

Policy Brief

Tilgjengelig fra: 2019-11-08 Laget: 2019-11-08 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-16bibliografisk kontrollert
Lundqvist, S. & Engelbrekt, K. (2019). Reintroducing the Great Power Gaze: The Case for a Baltic-Arctic Security Complex. In: : . Paper presented at 44th British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 12-14 June 2019, London, England.
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Reintroducing the Great Power Gaze: The Case for a Baltic-Arctic Security Complex
2019 (engelsk)Konferansepaper, Oral presentation with published abstract (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

The Baltic Sea and the Arctic have once again become scenes for geostrategic great power competition, influencing regional economic, military and environmental security. Here, international relationships span a spectrum from friendship to fear. We observe that a host of different units of analysis currently compete for our attention in this part of Europe. But while “Scandinavia”, “the Nordic area”, “the Baltic Sea region”, “the High North” and “the Arctic” help focus strategic analysis on important and sometimes overlapping components of this area, security complex theory prescribes that we must adopt a broader, multi-layered view in order to understand how great and small power interests play out in this part of the world today. Such analysis must consider China’s global role, NATO’s increasingly elaborate military planning and the Russian Federation’s perception of vulnerabilities and opportunities, in an area that stretches from the Suwalki gap in East-Central Europe to the Barents Sea. In addition, security complex analysis benefits from including the perspectives of small states that control key territories – such as resource-rich continental shelves and exclusive economic zones – and from taking relevant international bodies into account as enabling and constraining factors. As part of a larger project, this paper reviews several sets of open source documents indicative of the incentive structure of such key players, published over the past five years. We delve into the political, economic and military dimensions of aims and actions by three categories of actors, namely: i) China, Russia, the United States; ii) Denmark, Norway; Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada; and iii) the EU, NATO and the Arctic Council. We conclude that, while smaller units of analysis still make sense for limited research purposes, the concept of a Baltic-Arctic security complex is necessary for meaningful strategic analysis.

Emneord
regional security, regional security complex theory, Arctic, Baltic Sea, great powers, small states
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Statsvetenskap med inriktning mot strategi och säkerhetspolitik; Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-8881 (URN)
Konferanse
44th British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 12-14 June 2019, London, England
Tilgjengelig fra: 2019-12-19 Laget: 2019-12-19 Sist oppdatert: 2020-01-17bibliografisk kontrollert
Lundqvist, S. (2018). Uppföljning och utvärdering av operationer. In: Peter Thunholm; Jerker Widén; Niklas Wikström (Ed.), Militära arbetsmetoder: En lärobok i krigsvetenskap (pp. 163-192). Malmö: Universus Academic Press
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Uppföljning och utvärdering av operationer
2018 (svensk)Inngår i: Militära arbetsmetoder: En lärobok i krigsvetenskap / [ed] Peter Thunholm; Jerker Widén; Niklas Wikström, Malmö: Universus Academic Press , 2018, s. 163-192Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [sv]

Uppföljning och utvärdering av militära operationer utgör ett sammanhängande system som spänner över alla ledningsnivåer. Behovet av detta system har sitt ursprung i de ökade krav på spårbarhet och mätbarhet av resultat och progression vid genomförandet av militära operationer som ställs i Sverige, EU och Nato. Identifieringen av de parametrar som skall mätas med därför avsedda verktyg under den militära operationens genomförande är en process som tar sin början i de högre ledningsnivåerna, det givna uppdraget, samt operationens slutmål. Genomförandet är däremot en process som föds från de förband som är insatta i operationen, vars insamlade information samman­ställs enligt förberedda riktlinjer, aggregeras och tillvaratas på de olika militära ledningsnivåerna. Denna text beskriver inte bara uppbyggnaden av Sveriges och Natos system för uppföljnings- och utvärdering av militära operationer, samt introducerar de analysverktyg som används på olika ledningsnivåer för att mäta framdrivning och framsteg, den diskuterar även de utmaningar som är förknippade med att implementera en effektiv uppföljnings- och utvärderingsprocess.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Malmö: Universus Academic Press, 2018
Emneord
uppföljning, utvärdering, systemtänkande, framdrivning, framsteg, effekt, effektmått, prestationsmått
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Krigsvetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-8151 (URN)978-91-87439-47-6 (ISBN)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2018-09-10 Laget: 2018-09-10 Sist oppdatert: 2019-02-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Organisasjoner
Identifikatorer
ORCID-id: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-8073-5581