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This paper discusses and reviews some previous research concerning what we denote as ‘goal-management’, in other words how to set, apply and evaluate goals when conducting military operations planning. We aim to explain and answer the following question:

• In what way could a review of previous philosophical thoughts on goal-management, decision theory and ethics improve contemporary military operations planning concerning goal-management?

We suggest a guideline (a planning tool) for how to conduct goal-management when planning military operations and exemplify our guideline with two fictive examples concerning the development of an Operational advice and Appreciation of Rules of Engagement. The paper concludes that the application of decision theory and ethics, i.e. important parts of philosophy, can contribute to military operations planning by focusing on three perspectives: an axiomatic, an ethical and a deliberative perspective.

U.S. doctrines have introduced a third approach within Operational Art, called the design approach, which has evoked military professional and academic debate as well as influenced NATO doctrines. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning (AJP 5) states that a Force Commander should choose one out of three approaches when conducting Operational Art and conducting operational planning: a traditional (causalist), a systemic or a design approach. The difference between the causalist- and the systemic- approach concerns the clash between reductionism and holism, but the difference between the design- and the systemic- approach is methodologically vague. Hence the following question concerning methodology and Operational Art arises:

What methodological implications could constitute an argument for choosing the design approach when conducting Operational Art within a battlespace?

Neither NATO doctrine, planning framework nor previous research offer any explicit methodological argument for choosing, or preferring, the design- over the systemic- approach. This article concludes that one possible argument for preferring a design approach is adherence to value-focused thinking, but this requires that the Force Commander can and is willing to focus on stakeholders’ values within the battlespace. This conclusion is implied by two methodological implications identified and discussed in this article. If the design approach is to be a relevant option, then further conceptual development, experimentation and education is required. To conclude, NATO should review the description of their approaches within Operational Art since the argument for preferring one approach over another is lacking and this could hamper the Force Commander’s management of the battlespace.

Parts of NATO’s contemporary planning framework called the comprehensive operations planning directive (COPD), and parts of the operation-level planning process should be revised since they suffer from methodological inconsistency. This claim is defended by discussing contradicting methodological properties and heuristics applied when framing and managing a military problem in accordance with the COPD. The methodological inconsistency within the COPD; in other words, simultaneously applying contradictory methodological properties, implies one theoretical and three practical implications. The theoretical implication is summarised in a meta-theoretical framework and explained by discussing five methodological properties: non-linearity, emergence, independently changeable generalisations, invariance and boundaries. The three practical implications of methodology imply that methodology is guiding: the problem-frame, conceptual development and action. To improve military planners’ understanding and management of these four identified implications, NATO is recommended to develop a “handbook of methodology.” The purpose of such a handbook should be to emphasise the utility of methodology when planning military operations