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The Manipur conflict, which began in mid-2023, highlights deep-seated ethnic tensions between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, escalating into a humanitarian crisis with over 225 deaths and the displacement of 60,000 people. Amid the violence, improvised weapons like "pumpi guns" have gained prominence. Rooted in historical resistance movements, pumpi guns are crafted from locally sourced materials, reflecting resourcefulness and resilience. Their widespread use underscores the challenges of regulating non-industrial weapons in conflict zones. These weapons are pivotal for community defense and symbolic of local craftsmanship and identity, especially in the hill districts. Pumpi guns have evolved in design and utility, serving both defensive and offensive roles, including ambushes and territorial control. Despite their efficacy, they pose risks such as misfires and injuries. The conflict's dynamics are further complicated by cross-border exchanges with Myanmar, including the trafficking of precursor materials and 3D-printed arms. Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach, combining stricter arms control, enhanced stockpile security, and regional cooperation. Socio-economic measures, such as vocational training and economic integration, are critical to offering alternatives to illicit weapons production. However, sustainable peacebuilding efforts must address underlying grievances, foster trust between communities and authorities, and integrate rebel groups into state structures to ensure a holistic resolution.

Due to the increased reliance of governments on digital data, it is probably safe to suggest that, without it, there would be no state left to defend. Because, without data, there might not even be a continuity of government, and consequently no state, in a time of crisis. Hence, this paper looks at critical national digital data as a key feature of national security.

This paper shows why and how the protection of digitalised critical national data is important for a country’s defence at different levels of conflict, both below and above the threshold of armed conflict. This issue can be studied from a number of perspectives. The focus in this report is on the relevance and role of intelligence services in relation to the protection of critical national data.

The choice of focus is a consequence of the following four points. First, in the current decade, digitalisation is deepening. Consequently, digital data will become even more pervasive. Various datasets will be needed for all sorts of applications. Not all data will be equally important to everyone, whether private individuals, businesses or nation-states. It will most likely still be important for intelligence services to keep their own data secret. However, critical national datais not concerned primarily with highly classified state secrets, although intelligence data can be labelled a sub-category of critical national data. While critical national data certainly is sensitive, it rarely becomes state secrets. This is simply because most of the critical national data is such data that is needed in the day-today functioning of society. For a government, critical national data is the data needed to run the county.

Second, critical national data must be protected during all types of conflicts. Keeping it safe requires abilities to perceive threats, issue warnings and then manage these threats. Unlike other defence capabilities, such as military forces, intelligence is necessary to be able to manage threats at all levels of conflict, not 17 Intelligence and data resilienceonly during an armed conflict. Hence, the relevance of the intelligence services to the protection of critical national data.

Third, the national security implications of critical national digital data are also significant. Not least, since intelligence services are consumers of open as well as public data and not only specific intelligence data. Foreign intelligence data is perhaps not essential in the ordinary – non-defence-related – day-to-day running of a democratic country, such as collecting taxes and handling welfare payments, but it is required in the defence of the country also in peace time. Nevertheless, it is necessary to discuss whether intelligence data is a sub-category of critical national data.

Fourth, the ongoing digitalisation is changing how we live, work and defendour countries. All major institutions, private and public, are experiencing or will experience these societal changes. For intelligence services, a key concern is the extent to which new digital technologies necessitate fundamental adaptation. In any case, it is likely that a digital adaptation will involve discussions on the optimal ways to protect and access intelligence data, and such deliberations are likely to be related to the overall concerns about safeguarding critical national data.

For both intelligence services and their governments, critical national data is about the same thing: the information into which it can be translated. Even if all data is not equally valuable to everyone, it should, from a national security perspective, be regarded as a strategic resource. All kinds of data can become the target of hostile cyberattacks, which can include disruptions of services as well as data theft. Data is also desirable since it has become the fuel needed to train key technologies of the future such as artificial intelligence (AI).

As always, fundamental technological shifts, such as the increased digitalisation of the 2020s, create uncertainties both among the public as well as among nations. The current wave of new digital technologies is already having an impacton international relations. Hence, the digitalisation of the 2020s and the need to protect critical national digital data is a national security concern.

The Russian war in Ukraine is a humanitarian disaster for the Ukrainian people. However, the people, and indeed the whole society, has demonstrated a remarkable resilience. There is consequently much that other countries can learn by studying how Ukraine has been able to muster such resilience in the face of the Russian full-scale invasion. This report focuses on what Swedish authorities in the communications, energy and transportation sectors can learn from what academics, organisations, and nations have already published regarding resilience in critical infrastructure systems.

Judging by the war in Ukraine, modern warfare is hybrid warfare, which combines kinetic and cyberwarfare. Between 2014 and 2022 Ukrainian critical infrastructure systems were frequently targeted by cyberattacks. This learning experience, together with help from, among others, NATO, enabled Ukraine to be well prepared for cyber warfare. Ukraine also received crucial help from multinational Big Tech companies in the early stages of the war, which helped the nation to withstand the cyberattacks on its critical infrastructure systems. However, Ukraine was not equally well prepared for kinetic warfare against these systems. This is illustrated by the lack of air defence and the fact that nuclear power plants were guarded against terrorist attacks, not kinetic warfare. Consequently, Ukraine has had to address the consequences of kinetic warfare with impromptu, reactive solutions, rather than with proactive preparedness.

Based on a meta-analysis of 132 research articles, books and reports, this report primarily analyses the impromptu, reactive solutions against kinetic warfare. The report identifies several different areas of reactive solutions, which could have been part of proactive preparedness to a larger extent: legislation, learning, staffing, decentralisation, redundancy, adaptability, layered protection, low-tech technologies, changing consumption patterns, repair planning, international and public-private cooperation, and differentiated energy production. To address these challenges in its preparedness planning would make Sweden better prepared for the type of war that is now taking place in Ukraine, than Ukraine was on February 24, 2022.

Prior to trying to emulate Ukraine’s impromptu, reactive solutions against kinetic warfare there are several considerations to be made by Swedish authorities. Ukraine had a well-developed cyber defence, unmodernised infrastructure systems, and received significant international aid. Furthermore, because of its size, geography, population, and natural resources, its infrastructure systems have different network structures than the Swedish ones and are dimensioned for much larger requirements.

Förord

Dagens krig påbörjas, genomföras och avslutas i informationsmiljön. Hur omvärlden uppfattar händelsen, konflikten eller kriget kommer i framtiden att bli viktigare än det fysiska kriget.

Informationsmiljön, med dess fysiska, kognitiva och virtuella dimensioner, kommer att öka i betydelse för framtidens krigföring. Kan man påverka motståndarens uppfattning om läget eller befolkningens vilja kan ett slutmål uppnås enklare eller snabbare. Smarta mobiltelefoner eller dess framtida ersättare med tillhörande verktyg innebär att även befolkningen är med och påverkar informationsmiljön.

Viljan, både folkets och Försvarsmaktens, har alltid varit viktig. Tidigare utgjorde den fysiska striden, huvudaktiviteten. Idag och i framtiden kommer de psykologiska och digitala verktygen att öka i betydelse för gemensamma operationer. Förmågor som strategisk kommunikation, cyber och telekrig kommer att bli än viktigare i framtiden, både när det gäller militära operationer och civila aktörers stöd till dessa.

Jag har valt ut de åtta mest unika essäerna från det examinerande momentet i Grundkurs Informationsmiljön vid Försvarshögskolan. Urvalet är från åren 2020 till 2024 och har skett utifrån kriterierna att de antingen är heltäckande och har bra exempel eller att författaren har kommit med nya perspektiv eller användnings-områden.

Syftet med essäsamlingen är att inspirera andra att studera informationsmiljöns betydelse för moderna kriser, konflikter och krig. Den ger också många bra exempel på litteratur att använda vid dessa studier.

På bokens baksida finns en dikt om informationsmiljön idag - Bortom horisonten. Dikten är skapad och framförd av kursdeltagare fältpastor Andrew Holm vid kursens avslutande och examinerande seminarium vårterminen 2024.

Trevlig läsning,

Johan Rodensjö

Kursansvarig för Grundkurs Informationsmiljön under åren 2018 till 2024

This study examines how a small state like Sweden could develop its special forces fight in support of joint service partners in large-scale combat operations. The U.S. previous emphasis on fighting insurgencies is replaced by a focus on conventional war. To this end, the armed forces of great powers are preparing themselves for conducting large-scale combat operations in a multi-domain environment. To this end, their Special Forces must adapt and develop new strategies to enable them to thrive in a new technologically enabled combat environment. This means that the capabilities of special forces of a small NATO member state like Sweden must undergo similar transformation. Our societies' reliance on electronic communications, open-source information via radio, television, and the internet, has increased the spectrum of domains through which an adversary may attack or be attacked. Electronic warfare and capability to exploit cyberspace to launch malicious attacks a significant influence on the modern battlefield. As a result, special forces should reassess their ca-pabilities to penetrate and disable areas an adversary’s deployed long-range weapons systems and missile defense systems. To this end, a small state like Sweden should consider organizing SOF as an independent branch of its armed forces and equip it with the necessary means to fulfil the new role. Ultimately, special forces must reanalyze how they are positioned and used in large-scale com-bat operations. By providing a small state perspective, this study highlights, how special forces can adapt their capabilities and organization if they are to remain relevant and effective in future con-flicts.

Trots att det är 50 år sedan USA lämnade Vietnam finns det fortfarande divergerande uppfattningar bland forskare om varför USA misslyckades. Det finns många åsikter om vad USA kunnat göra annorlunda, särskilt med sina starka luftstridskrafter. Denna studie undersöker hur modern luftmaktsteori kan bidra till förklaringen av Vietnamkrigets utgång, med fokus på hur en militärt underlägsen part lyckades besegra en numerärt och teknologiskt överlägsen motståndare. Studien utgår från två moderna teorier om luftmakt för småstater: Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlous Underdogs Model och Sten Arves Air Power Considerations for a Small State. Genom att tillämpa dessa teorier på Vietnamkriget analyseras hur Nordvietnam, med stöd från Sovjetunionen och Kina, kunde stå emot USA:s överlägsna luftstridskrafter och uppnå sina politiska målsättningar. Studien fokuserar på två strategiska interaktioner mellan USA och Nordvietnam åren 1965–1973 och analyserar ett antal faktorer för att undersöka hur de bidrog till att förklara utfallet. Resultaten visar att teorierna delvis kan förklara hur USA, trots sina överlägsna resurser, misslyckades med att nå sina mål med hjälp av sina luftstridskrafter. Vilket på sikt möjliggjorde att Nordvietnam kunde uppnå ett enat kommunistiskt Vietnam.

Studiens slutsats är att moderna luftmaktsteorier med viss anpassning kan bidra till att öka förståelsen för utfallet av Vietnamkriget.

In military operations, the integration of emerging technologies into Command- and Control systems (C2-systems) presents anurgent issue. The introduction of potentially disruptive technologies such as AI, machine learning, and unmanned systems has thepotential to significantly enhance operational efficiency. However, such technologies come with ethical dilemmas and challengesconcerning their integration into C2-capability containing legacy doctrinal and organizational components. This paper is part of aresearch project following the Design Science research (DSR) process. The main goal of the research project is to develop aconceptual framework, with models and methods, that can help designers and commanders in assessing and understanding C2-systems from a socio-technical perspective. It also aims to provide insights into how individual subsystems influence the SoS as awhole. In previous articles, the authors have discussed the challenges associated with integrating new technology into military C2-systems. This paper further elaborates on findings indicating the need to shift focus from optimizing individual components orsubsystemsto considering the entire, large, and complex system (aka System of Systems, SoS). This shift highlights a comprehensiveand holistic approach which is crucial for ensuring that C2-systems are effective, precise, and adaptable to changing conditions andrequirements. However, currently there is a gap in existing research and methodologies that can explain and predict the dynamicsbetween information systems, methods, processes, and organizational development in a SoS. To bridge this gap, it is necessary toadjust the existing frameworks for capability development to adopt a broader, more adaptable, and exhaustive scope. Additionally,a socio-technical focus in system development would facilitate a deeper understanding of the interdependencies betweenorganization, processes, and technical system evolution. Previous surveys, conducted as interviews of stakeholders, identified arefined perception of the challenges encountered within specified domains, such as, operational and development. Thestakeholders' needs were analyzed and modeled as goals for the envisioned framework. The stakeholders communicated how anadjusted framework of methods should function to tackle the challenges with the emerging technologies. By employing DSR andEnterprise Modeling, this paper proposes (i) a concepts model that outlines the principles and the overarching construction of a C2-system. This concepts model provides the foundations to goal modeling ensuring coherence and interoperability among differentmodels. We also propose (ii) a goal model for C2-systems representing the objectives for what the envisioned framework needs toaccomplish. The study results indicate that the framework is to be useful in systematically identifying and aligning the goals of anartifact with the overarching objectives, i.e., for designing military C2-systems and understanding the integration of thetechnologies. This research project contributes to ongoing research on military innovation, offering insights into the systemicchallenges and opportunities that new technologies present within the complex ecosystem of military operations.

The rapid development of information and communication technologies has resulted in profound changes in Russia's understanding of warfare, with information warfare being considered a key part of its security policy arsenal. Sweden has regularly been targeted for malicious information influence as part of Russian information warfare, and the targeted activities are expected to continue in the coming years. The aim of this study is to contribute to the knowledge of Russian information warfare in the Swedish context through an exploratory approach with semi-structured interviews. By studying organizational resilience and collaboration in relation to malicious information influence, the study has sought answers to what challenges Swedish authorities perceive they face in relation to Russian information warfare, as well as what strategies are considered beneficial to counteract the challenges. 

The empirical data consisted of seven individual, semi-structured interviews, which were then analyzed using inductive thematic analysis. The results show that challenges and favorable coping strategies can be summarized in the themes "restrictiveness or transparency", "distrust or trust", "neglect or expect" and "isolation or collaboration". The study concludes that authorities without expectations of malicious information influence and experiencing distrust from the public, initially tend to react with restrictiveness of information and isolation from other authorities. Organizations that do expect to be exposed to malicious information influence and that have high public trust can successfully maintain transparency and good inter-organisational cooperation. 

The Harmonization Emergence Model emphasizes that the emergence of a ‘real’ team with truly interdependent members, hinges on their ability to co-create 'Stimmigkeit' or Congruent Shared Meaning, which is an effective shared cognitive representation of the external environment. This increases the likelihood that a team's engagement in languaging would yield the intended effects. In this paper, we explore the effect of using a foreign language (L2) on team members’ ability to engage in participatory sense making (PSM) to reach congruent shared meaning. The study is based on the self-assessments of 31 participants during a multinational exercise as part of the Joint Advanced Command and Staff Programme (JACS-P) at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). It explores participants own reflections on their ability to mediate information and to engage participatory discourses when sense-making. It concludes that the participants’ ability to develop a nuanced shared meaning or model of the external environment is constrained when using an L2.  We suggest that in multilingual contexts a 'Constructive-Decoherence Approach' could be used. This would allow team members to use of their first (L1) language in the sense-making process, enabling a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the situation, while simultaneously facilitating the integration necessary in multinational or multicultural organizational efforts. 

Cybersecurity in national and international security is frequently discussed in an existential register. However, most cybersecurity activities are normal and routine, including diverse practices of cyber risk management. The intricacies of cyber risk and its connection to security and threat politics have received surprisingly little attention in the cyber politics literature. This article addresses this gap through a twofold theoretical proposition. The first argues that cyber risk in policy and practice inhabits a continuum between ‘classical’ risk and security postures. The second proposes the existence of multiple risk logics, located at different points along this continuum. To illustrate this, we outline two distinct cyber risk logics: ‘risk as potential threats’ and ‘risk as uncertainty’. Through an exploratory case-study of cyber risk policy and guidance in the United Kingdom, we find indications of the simultaneous existence of these risk logics, including in specific organizational contexts. We propose that the ‘risk as potential threats’ logic, in particular, acts as a ‘bridge’ between conventional risk and security. We conclude by discussing how differentiating cyber risk logics facilitates a more finely grained appreciation of cybersecurity policy and practice and provides opportunities for disciplinary engagement with the organizational and institutional politics of cybersecurity and ‘the international’.

Although grey zone and hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, infor-mation campaigns, and sabotage against critical infrastructure, are becoming increasingly common in the contemporary world, rela-tively little attention has been directed to similar threats in the maritime environment. The recent global pandemic, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Nord Stream sabotage in 2022, the sabotage of the Finnish-Baltic pipeline in 2023 in the Baltic Sea, as well as drone attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf arebut a few examples that illustrate the fragility of international maritime communications. The present article explores the topic of grey zone and hybrid threats within the maritime environment. Based on an analysis of recent security events, particularly hybrid threats in the maritime environment, the article proposes that it isessential to seek a broader role for naval forces in supporting national sovereignty and international law and order regarding the Open Seas. The article aims to conceptualize and explore the foundations of maritime grey zone threats and the new roles of naval forces operating within this new context, asking whether the UN, through the International Maritime Organization, NATO, and the European Union, suffer from “sea blindness” concerning how they are preparing for the new world order.

2022 initierade regeringen Sveriges materielförsörjningsstrategi SOU2022:24. Denna materielförsörjningsutredning redovisade strategier och rekommendationer för att stärka Sveriges försörjningssäkerhet av försvarsmateriel på kort och lång sikt. Efter att strategin implementerats har den säkerhetspolitiska kartan ritats om, främst på grund av Ukrainakriget vilket medfört nya säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka och skapa förståelse hur Sveriges materielförsörjningsstrategi (SOU2022:24) omhändertar de säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar som uppstått till följd av Ukrainakriget. Målet är att identifiera om Sveriges materielförsörjningsstrategi (SOU2022:24) fortfarande är aktuell och relevant eller om det föreligger ett behov att utarbeta en ny strategi. För att analysera hur materielförsörjningsstrategi möter Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar använder sig författaren av internationella relationsteorier såsom realism, liberalism och konstruktivism, samt Teeces teori om dynamiska förmågor. Studiens sammanfattande slutsatser är att Sveriges materielförsörjningsstrategi måste balansera nationell suveränitet och egenintresse med internationella samarbeten samtidigt som dynamiska förmågor måste förbättras.

Den här studien syftar till att undersöka svenska officerares erfarenheter och upplevelser av militär profession och krigföringsförmåga efter internationell tjänstgöring. Därtill syftar studien att undersöka om det föreligger skillnader i synen på krigföringsförmågan utifrån olika typer av internationella tjänstgöringar.

Studien är kvalitativ och bygger på intervjuer med tio officerare (OF3-OF4) med erfarenhet av internationell tjänst i olika grad. Resultaten visar tydligt att internationell tjänstgöring bi-drar till en utveckling av samtliga krigföringsförmågor. Analysen stärker och vidimerar in-ternationell tjänst som en förutsättning för officerares professionella utveckling.

Denna utveckling är avgörande för att möta kraven på Sverige som Natomedlem och säker-ställa att svenska officerare har den militära expertis som krävs både nationellt och internationellt. Därmed BÖR officerare tidigt i karriären tjänstgöra utomlands; och därefter, som en naturlig del av avancemanget mot högre grader, bekläda stabstjänster internationellt.

Krigföring utvecklas ständigt, där teknologiska innovationer påverkar både taktik och materiel. I Ukraina har användningen av FPV-drönare förändrat stridsfältet, vilket gett Ukraina fördelar mot Rysslands överlägsna styrka. Drönarnas inverkan belyser hur moderna konflikter kan accelerera utvecklingen av militära förmågor som eld, rörelse och skydd.

Studien syftar till att undersöka dessa förändringar och dess betydelse för krigföring i Ukraina, samt svara på frågan: Hur har de markoperativa förmågorna eld, rörelse, och skydd påverkats av introduktionen och användningen av FPV-drönare i krigets Ukraina?

Undersökningen genomfördes genom att gå igenom dokument och videomaterial från öppna källor och därefter genomfördes en tematisk analys och kategorisering av utfallen i analysen. I resultatet presenterar sig tre teman; eld, skydd och rörelse. Studien visar att faktorn eld utmärker sig mest av de tre, då nytänkande medfört att en FPV-drönare för 1000 dollar kan slå ut ett system för 6,5 miljoner dollar.

Den teknologiska utvecklingen har medfört att taktiker och stridstekniker är i ett behov av att omvärderas. Sensorer har medfört att lägesbilden hos soldaten förändrar dynamiken i att slå mot högvärdiga mål, men även i hur de opererar och rör sig på stridsfältet. Vikten av förståelse för komplexiteten på stridsfältet är av vikt för att förstå människans centrala roll i kommande konflikter.

Flera militära teorier uttrycker behovet av flexibilitet, antingen som den viktigaste faktorn för framgång i krigföring, eller åtminstone som starkt bidragande till framgång. I militära sammanhang är således flexibilitet eftersträvansvärt. Om våra förväntningar sedan inte bara ska utgöras av förhoppningar, behöver dessa förväntningar jämföras med våra förutsättningar, för att självinsikt och förståelse för våra utmaningar ska finnas.  Sveriges militära luftfart har en lång, stolt och till stor del konfliktmässigt oprövad historia av att placera flygsäkerheten i första rummet, men hur är det med flexibiliteten? För att öka vår förståelse av hur svensk flygsäkerhetskultur möter växande krav på militär flexibilitet värderas i denna studie flexibilitetsdimensionen av Reglemente Ledning av militär luftfart 2021 utifrån en idealtypisk förståelse av dess flygsäkerhetsåskådning. Föreliggande studies analys visar att detta reglemente till övervägande del präglas av en klassisk säkerhetsåskådning. Reglementet har, om ändock i begränsad omfattning, inslag av modernare flexibilitetsbejakande säkerhetsåskådning. Reglementets idealtypiska tyngdpunkt mot en klassisk säkerhetsåskådning begränsar den militära luftfartens flexibilitet. Reglementet, och därmed ledningen av Sveriges militära luftfart, har dock goda förutsättningar att omfördela den idealtypiska balansen och öka verksamhetens flexibilitet, och säkerhet.

Denna uppsats syftar till att testa hur väl Henåker och Thunholms idealmodell för taktisk seger kan förklara framgångar i både moderna och historiska militära konflikter. I denna studie har en teoriprövande fallstudiedesign använts. Målet är att utvärdera modellens användbarhet och relevans i olika krigföringsmiljöer genom en analys av Andra Nagorno-Karabach-kriget 2020 och slaget vid Suomussalmi under finska vinterkriget 1940. Genom att inkludera både ett modernt och ett historiskt fall undersöker uppsatsen hur väl modellen fungerar under olika teknologiska förhållanden. Jämförelsen gör det möjligt att analysera om modellens principer är tidlösa eller om de behöver justeras för att möta nya krigsförutsättningar. Teorier om hur seger uppnås på taktisk nivå bygger på studier och praktisk erfarenhet, men då krigföringen ständigt utvecklas, särskilt med teknologiska framsteg, finns ett behov av att kontinuerligt pröva och förbättra dessa teorier. Analysens resultat visar att modellen till stor del kan förklara framgångar i både moderna och historiska konflikter, där de flesta av modellens ingående sekvenser kunde identifieras som bidragande till seger.