FÖRSVARSHÖGSKOLAN

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Integrated or Comprehensive sharing?
Drivers, enablers and barriers to civilian-military information sharing

The UN and NATO have implemented separate approaches to civilian-military cooperation. Central in both approaches is a need for information sharing between civilian and military actors. Without shared information, cooperative planning becomes impossible. For military actors secret information makes sharing difficult and for civilian actors, principles hinder close cooperation. Scholars in the field of intelligence study have identified that states and organizations share information if the benefits of such, outweigh costs and risks.

This thesis examines institutional differences between the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali and NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan, in order to better understand how institutional factors, affect sharing of information. With an outset in Rational Choice Institutionalism and by use of Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Development and Analysis Framework, an analytical instrument is designed. Through inductive review of interviews, first-hand accounts and reports; factors that drive, enable and hinder civilian-military sharing are indicated. The thesis indicates that the institutional framework of MINUSMA forms interdependency between civilian and military actors, while sharing in ISAF was enabled only when common goals were agreed upon. Military and civilian actors, in both MINUSMA and ISAF point to unclear mandates and vague goals as primary barriers to civilian-military sharing.

Keywords: Integrated Approach, Comprehensive Approach, Information Sharing, MINUSMA, ISAF, Institutional Analysis and Development Framework,

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Abbreviations

- ACBAR   Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development
- ANSO   Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
- COIN   Counter Insurgency
- ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States
- EU   European Union
- ENNA   European Union External Action Service
- IASC   UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
- ISAF   International Security Assistance Force
- JMAC   Joint Mission Analysis Centre
- JOC   Joint Operations Centre
- MINUSMA   Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
- MSF   Médecins Sans Frontières
- NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- PRT   Provincial Reconstruction Team
- PRT MeS   PRT Mazar-è-Sharif
- SAK   Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
- SIDA   Swedish International Development Agency
- UN   United Nations
- UNDSS   UN Department of Safety and Security
- UNAMA   UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
- USAID   United States Agency for International Development
- OCHA   Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affair
- QIP   Quick Action Project

1. Introduction

1.1 Integrated and comprehensive

Both the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have recognized that combination of both military and civilian effort is crucial to success in peace operations[1]. While military forces primarily contribute to providing security, civilian organizations attempt to foster societal, political and humanitarian development[2]. This is to say; by providing increased security, developmental effect can be realized and by providing development the idea is to reduce the risk of threats and need for security. However, combining military and civilian effects has proved to be problematic in practice.

For military actors an identified problem is how to share information[3]. When decision-making to a large degree is based on information that is of a classified nature, integrating civilians becomes difficult. For civilian actors the humanitarian principles need to be upheld in order not to compromise the perception of being impartial in conflicts. In order to alleviate these problems, the UN and NATO have implemented "approaches" that aim at achieving structured fusion between civilian and military efforts. While the UN refers to an "integrated approach"[4] and NATO refers to a "comprehensive approach"[5] similarities can be found between the two. The ambition of both approaches is to create coherent efforts in peacekeeping by maximizing resource efficiency, creating common goals and thereby reaching desired end-states faster[6]. A question that has received limited academic attention since the establishment of the approaches, is how these approaches differ in ability to avoid identified pitfalls.

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[1] Haysom, Simone. 'Civil-military coordination: the state of the debate'. *Humanitarian Exchange.* Number 56. (2013); pp. 3-5.

[2] Nilsson, Claes. Hull, Cecilia. Derblom, Markus. Egnell, Robert. 'Comprehensive Approach i fredsfrämjande insatser, Den allomfattande insatsens beståndsdelar' FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—2804—SE. (2009); pp. 22-29

[3] For an overview of the discussion see: Lefebvre, Stéphane. 'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* 16:4, 527-542. (2003)

[4] United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (Capstone doctrine)*. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008.

[5] NATO. 1 Sept 2015. '*A "comprehensive approach" to crises'.* URL: See bibliography

[6] Nilsson, et al. 'Comprehensive approach…'. (2009); pp. 22-29

1.2 What are the pitfalls?

An integral part of both the Integrated- and Comprehensive approach is developed *cooperation[7]* in planning between civilian and military actors. Cedric de Coning proposes that this shift in ambition makes traditional concepts of civilian-military interaction poorly suited to understanding new multi-polar cooperative challenges[8]. When the proposed interaction between military and civilian sectors advances from *coexistence[9]* toward cooperation, De Coning proposes that new dynamics need to be identified. *Values and principles*, as well as *rules and resource management* are areas that De Coning suggests as especially likely to cause problems for cooperation.[10]

The principles of *humanity*, *neutrality*, *independence* and *impartiality*[11] guide most civilian actors' assistance with the aim of positioning humanitarian or developmental work outside any potential hostilities. By doing so civilian actors are proposedly more likely to be able to conduct work with all parties in conflict, and limit their own risks. In sum the principles can be understood as: Providing assistance where it is needed in a respectful manner, without discrimination and guided solely by priority to most urgent needs. Assistance is neutral in the meaning that no sides are taken and independent in a manner that deems it autonomous from political or military objectives[12]. Any close relationship between civilian and military actors threatens to sully the credibility of adherence to the principles.

In order to achieve cooperative planning, civilian and military actors need to be able to share information. Access to relevant information is central to reducing uncertainty when

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[7] **Cooperation***: "*Joint planning and execution of action"*.* See theory chapter for further discussion regarding central concepts and definitions.

[8] De Coning, Cedric. '*The United Nations and the Comprehensive approach'.* DIIS, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2008:14. (2008); p. 3

[9] **Coexistence***:* "Geographical proximity, without joint planning or action". See theory chapter for further discussion regarding central concepts and definitions.

[10] De Coning. 'The United Nations and the Comprehensive approach'. (2008); pp. 24-26

[11] General Assembly resolution 46/182. '*Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations',* United Nations, A/RES/46/182. (1992)

[12] OCHA. 'OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles', *OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance*, Version 1. (2010). URL: See bibliography

making decisions[13]. This is equally important in matters of humanitarian aid[14], as in military planning of operations[15]. With information, plans can potentially be adapted to a broader range of contextual factors that may not have been known otherwise. In a cooperative setting, where planning is conducted by military and civilian actors, this need for information is unquestionably present. If the military and civilian actors in the cooperative setting cannot or will not share the information with which they hope to further decision-making, the potentials for cooperative planning will intuitively be affected in a negative manner.

However, sharing of information and intelligence between intelligence organizations and military actors is, in itself problematic. The process of producing intelligence is often strictly safeguarded by the organizations that create them. Sharing of intelligence creates a risk of compromising the methods used to gather and analyze information[16]. Björn Fägersten finds that cooperative arrangements between intelligence actors, despite this, have increased in the last decade. Fägersten finds that intelligence organizations have more to gain today from cooperating, than from acting independently, but that a fine balance separate costs and benefits.[17]

When recapitulating the necessity of civilian-military cooperation, a question emerges. If cooperation between intelligence agencies, with similar missions, structures and guiding principles is difficult, how do UN and NATO approaches to civilian-military fusion solve these problems? If the cooperative arrangements that have been designed cannot overcome the problems of sharing information, which potentials are there for cooperative planning?

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[13] Marklund, Jenny. Wiklund Hull, Cecilia. '*Ledning i Multifunktionella Insatser*'. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3355—SE. (2011); p. 59

[14] Åkerström, Janne. '*Militär planering och beslutfattande – en översikt'.* FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3224—SE. (2011); pp. 7-10

[15] Hull, Cecilia. Derblom, Markus. '*Vad är Comprehensive Approach – Tolkningar och definitioner?*' FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3195—SE. (2011); p. 26

[16] Fägersten, Björn. '*Sharing Secrets – Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation*'. Lund: Lund Political Studies. (2010); p.42

[17] Fägersten. '*Sharing Secrets...*'. (2010); pp. 207-208

1.3 Aim of thesis and possible contribution

The principal aim of this thesis is to examine and compare structural features of the UN Integrated Approach and the NATO Comprehensive approach. This aim is in turn reduced to factors in each approach that affect information sharing between civilian and military actors in peace operations. With both the UN and NATO, adapting separate approaches to achieving fusion between development and security, it becomes ever more interesting to understand how potential pitfalls are managed in the different approaches.

Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon state that there is relatively limited analysis into how the relationship between military and civilian actors has been affected by the development towards closer cooperation in international peace operations[18]. While a range of studies have focused on conceptual issues and questions of principles, Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon point to a lack of understanding of how relationships work on a practical level[19]. In a report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), authors Cecilia Hull and Markus Derblom describe a need for studies into variances between different cooperative arrangements. They note that while integration of civilian and military efforts has increased in extent, separate arrangements have different dynamics, of which there is limited scholarly understanding.[20]

Understanding of how cooperative arrangements affect dynamics between military and civilian actors should also be of importance to research in the field of intelligence study. With cooperative decision-making putting a high demand on shared information between civilian and military actors, factors that affect the possibilities of such are of value to identify. Fägersten describes the field of intelligence study as one that is under-theorized and the understanding of intelligence cooperation as under-studied[21]. By examining cooperative sharing of information or intelligence, in a setting with limited previous academically attention, empirical findings could shape an interesting basis for further studies and policy development.

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[18] Metcalfe, Victoria. Haysome, Simone. Gordon, Stuart. 'Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination – A review of the literature'. *Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Group,* [Working paper]. (2012); p. 1

[19] Ibid. p. 29

[20] Hull & Derblom. 'Vad är Comprehensive Approach?...'. (2011); p. 34

[21] Fägersten. *"Sharing Secrets…"*. (2010); p. 38

1.4 Research questions

The research questions that this thesis aims to answer are:

1. *Which contributory factors affecting civilian-military information sharing can be identified in:*
   a. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Comprehensive Approach*
   b. *The United Nations - Integrated Approach*

2. *What differences in contributory factors do these two approaches suggest?*

1.5 Limitations

The UN and NATO serve as interesting organizations for analysis because of differences in organizational configurations. NATO, a military organization in design, has limited capacity to provide civilian components for its comprehensive approach[22]. Reversely, the UN is a civilian organization in design, dependent on security force contributions from member countries[23]. The chosen setting to study the Integrated Approach is the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). For studying the Comprehensive Approach, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan has been selected. These are chosen because they are deemed to represent the two approaches to the furthest degree, which contributes to possible generalization of results.

The UN mission in Mali has been reported as the UNs "[…] *most dangerous peacekeeping mission*.".[24] As such, it is more similar to the NATO mission in Afghanistan than other possible choices. It is also the first UN mission in which a designated intelligence collection unit is included[25], adding possibilities of interesting analytical results. For ISAF

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[22] ISAF. 'Commander's *Initial Assessment'.* Report by: General Stanley McChrystal, Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 30 August (2009); pp. 2, 21 URL: See bibliography

[23] Hull & Derblom. 'Vad är Comprehensive Approach?...'. (2011); p. 17

[24] Leithead, Alastair. 'World's most dangerous peacekeeping mission'. *BBC News*, 20 November. (2015) URL: See bibliography

[25] Tham Lindell, Magdalena. Nilsson, Claes. '*FN:s stabiliseringsinsats i Mali – Resultat och utmaningar för MINUSMA'*. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3940—SE. (2014); p. 17

it is important to note that implementation of a Comprehensive Approach did not happen until 2009[26]; analyzed material is thus from between 2008 and 2014 after which the mission transitioned into a different form[27].

1.6 Material

Both secondary written sources and key-person interviews constitute the empirical material for this thesis. Because the mission in Mali is closer in time than the already terminated ISAF mission in Afghanistan, it is also harder to find written empirical material with acceptable centrality. During and after the mission in Afghanistan, FOI produced several interview studies with Swedish civilian and military actors in ISAF. Other countries and actors also presented reports to evaluate their respective operations. These studies and reports are used as empirical material for analysis of the Comprehensive Approach. For studying the Integrated Approach, key person interviews with civilian and military actors constitute the primary empirical material.

1.7 Outline of thesis

Following this introductory chapter, the theoretical basis for analysis is presented. Herein New Institutional Theory and Rational Choice Institutionalism are described and discussed. These serve as a basis for the analytical instrument that is constructed for the purpose of this thesis. The theory chapter also includes a discussion about central concepts and definitions of these. The theory chapter is proceeded by a chapter on methodological design and how the analysis is conducted by a combination of secondary source literature and key-person interviews.

Analysis for answering the research questions is comprised of two parts. The initial part is devoted to descriptive analysis of institutional characteristics and the second, to classifying analysis of identified factors from the first part. Analysis is followed by summary of research findings and conclusions. The thesis is concluded with discussions concerning possible contributions, identified faults and possible continued research.

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[26] Williams, M.J. 'Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State building in Afghanistan'. *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 18, No. 1, 64-78. (2011); p. 66

[27] ISAF was replaced with the 'Resolute Support Mission' in 2014.

2. Theory

2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism

For the purpose of this thesis, Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) is chosen to serve as a primary theoretical perspective. On a foundation of RCI, an analytical instrument is shaped with aim of providing answers the questions posed in herein.

RCI stems from New institutionalism (NI) which is a field within social sciences that focuses on institutional effects on behavior of individuals. An 'institution' in this context, and as defined in this thesis, is a; *societal construct that affects individual actors behavior*[28]. A central claim in NI is that institutions as societal constructs affect action by providing rules and barriers by which individuals are made to act[29]. It is the effect of the institution on individual action that is of interest to NI theorists. A fundamental epistemological position in the field is that institutional effect is studied through individuals within or in contact with institutions[30]. By looking at an individual's desires and motivation, it can be determined what change occurs when these are regulated through an institutional setting. Guy Peters describes that NI builds this epistemological foundation from an idea that collectives as a social function do not make decisions, rather that individuals make choices that are then shaped by institutions[31].

The focus of RCI is how established rules and regulations of institutions affect individuals 'bounded rationality'[32]. Bounded rationality is a central part of RCI as it explains that an actor will always act rationally within the bounds of information that is available[33]. The central claim in RCI is that institutional norms regulate actor behavior by affecting the bounded rationality of the actor. This regulatory effect can be understood in two parts. Firstly, an actor perceives it to be rational to join or be included in an institution because

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[28] With inspiration from: Peters, Guy B. '*Institutional Theory in Political Science – The New Institutionalism*'. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. (2012); p. 19

[29] Ibid. p. 2

[30] Ibid. p. 14

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid. p. 69

[33] Polski, Margaret M. Ostrom, Elinor. 'An institutional framework for policy analysis and design.'. *Indiana University,* Workshop in political theory and policy analysis, [Working paper W98-27]. (1999); p. 22

collective benefits of inclusion outweigh those of remaining independent. Secondly, the actor follows institutional norms as a means of maintaining the maximized gain that inclusion involves.[34]

In its explanation of cooperation, RCI makes little difference between arrangements of individuals, companies, organizations or states. The governing idea is that norms adjust action within institutions in the same way. In explaining cooperation, within the setting of an institution or between actors of differing institutional forms, the same logics are applied.[35] This means that mutual interest that further individual actors' possibilities of gains is also a rational ground for cooperation.

Besides RCI, another prominent sub-perspective in NI is Normative Institutionalism (NormI). In NormI formal rules and regulations in an institution are seen as second to normative values that are attached to them. NormI claims that the individual's actions are affected not by rational costs and gains, but rather by the 'normative appropriateness' perceived by the individual.[36]

2.2 Analytical instrument

While cooperative arrangements are abundant in social interaction of humans, these arrangements are difficult to grasp in their entirety. For the purpose of producing a tool that enabled the RCI-field to analyze institutional effect in greater depth, Elinor Ostrom devised the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). The framework is an advanced construction of analytical components which encompasses contextual factors, interaction of actors, formalized and informal rules together with institutional outcomes.[37]

In this thesis, the IAD-framework is deconstructed to better represent the posed research questions. This is done for reasons of constraints in the scope of the thesis as well as to

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[34] Peters. '*Institutional Theory in Political Science…*'. (2012); p. 51

[35] Ibid. p. 50

[36] Ibid. p. 45

[37] For a complete description of the IAD-framework and the components, see: Ostrom, Elinor. 'Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework'. *The Policy Studies Journal.* Vol. 39, No. 1. (2011)

increase reliability of the results. Although a complete analysis with Ostrom's framework would undoubtedly provide significant explanatory power into the differences between the UN and NATO approaches, such an analysis is not possible in this thesis. By focusing on several segments of IAD, a more thorough, although narrow, analysis can be conducted in the allotted time-frame and scope of this thesis.

The elements of Ostrom's IAD-framework that have been chosen to answer the posed research questions are:

- *Characteristics of the institutional setting.*
- *Benefits and costs that actors in the institutional setting link to collective action.*
- *Environmental factors that affect perceived benefits and costs.*

The idea of this limitation is that a wide array of factors that affect the potential of information sharing, can be identified despite limiting the scope of the conducted research. Ostrom writes that the ambition of the IAD-framework is to: "[...] *identify the major types of structural variables that are to some extent present in all institutional arrangements*[...]".[38] Retaining several parts of the IAD-framework limits the scope but still contributes with descriptive power for analysis.

In order to better understand the chosen elements from the IAD-framework and how these will aid in providing answers for the research questions, the central concepts in these need to be defined. Beginning with the first element; *characteristics*, should be understood as factors in the actor's basic interest that affect the actors bounded rationality. With *institutional setting* a cooperative arrangement with expressed or subjective norms, is intended. *Benefit*s and *cost*s are in this thesis defined as dichotomies where both concepts effect an actor's rational utility equation. Where benefits make action more rational, cost make the same action less rational. *Environmental factor*s are lastly; unstable conditions in the physical or institutional surrounding that affects either costs or benefits.

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[38] Ostrom. 'Background on the Institutional Analysis...'. (2011); p. 9

Using these definition, the chosen elements are understood in this thesis as:

- ***Characteristics of the institutional setting***: In-tangible normative or tangible structural conditions that affect the ways actors interact. For the posed questions, this means either of the approaches studied and how information sharing is conducted within these.

- ***Benefits and costs that actors in the institutional setting link to collective action***: Which effects of cooperative action that civilian or military actors perceive as positive or negative. Such factors are linked to the structural shape of the cooperative arrangement.

- ***Environmental factors that affect perceived benefits and costs:*** Unstable conditions in the physical or institutional surrounding that affect perceived costs or benefits.

To provide an answer for the research question; "*which contributory factors affecting civilian-military information sharing can be identified*?", the above defined elements are described in each studied organization and institutional setting.

To answer the second research question; "*what differences in contributory factor do these two approaches suggest?*" - indicated factors from the first step are categorized into what Fägersten calls *drivers*, *barriers* and *enablers*. With inspiration from the work Fägersten has conducted on intelligence sharing, Fägersten's definitions for these concepts are applied. The concepts are defined as:

- ***Driver***: Factors making actors more inclined to seek cooperative gains*.*
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- ***Enabler:*** Factors that help actors to contain, manage or mitigate costs and benefits.
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- ***Barrier***: Factors that increase the losses and/or reduce the gains of cooperation.[39]

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[39] Fägersten. '*Sharing Secrets…'*. (2010), p. 81

Drivers are to be understood as factors that make an actor more inclined to pursue a cooperative arrangement. In the studied approaches, such factors could stem from actor characteristics or environmental factors that make cooperation more enticing than independence. Enablers and barriers are subsequently, factors that affect the rationality of cooperation. This logic, which is also inspired by Fägersten's model[40], is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1: Rationality of cooperative arrangements

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[40] Fägersten. "*Sharing Secrets…*". (2010), p. 80-81

2.3 Central concepts and relevant considerations

Intelligence and information

An essential question for this thesis is how to define shared products between actors. A process with which intelligence production is said to revolve is called the *intelligence cycle*[41]. In this cycle intelligence organizations plan what needs to be produced, collects vital elements, analyze these and disseminates the product to designated actors. If *information* is not differentiated from *intelligence*, there is no certain way to distinguish between the information that goes in to the intelligence cycle, and what comes out of it. Information and Intelligence must therefore be defined for the purpose of not losing explanatory power in analysis. Including a definition that implies that intelligence is always secret is however not necessary. As such the two concepts are defined as:

- *Intelligence***:** A value-added product, derived from the collection and processing of all relevant information relating to client needs, which is immediately or potentially significant to client decision-making.[42]

- *Information*: Knowledge about someone or something.[43]

Intelligence should be understood as a product with the specific goal of furthering a client's decision-making that is the result of a planned process, whereas information does not need to have an inherent purpose nor a planned process of creation. Intelligence is based on information, but has been analyzed for a specific reason.

Civilian-Military interaction

Metcalf Et al. discuss a complexity of navigating the wide array of definitions that exist when describing interaction between civilian and military actors. Actors have different goals with interaction and definitions that are used often reflect ambition[44]. This means that the actors and institutional settings that are analyzed, likely revolve around differing

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[41] Fägersten. '*Sharing Secrets...*'. (2010); p. 35

[42] This definition is found in: Ratcliffe, Jerry H. 'Intelligence-led policing'. *Trends & Issues in crime and criminal justice.* No. 248. (2003)

[43] See: Jones, Calvert. 'Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing'. *Intelligence and National Security,* 22:3, 384-401. (2007); pp. 388-389

[44] Metcalfe, Haysome & Gordon. 'Trends and challenges...'. (2012); p. 1

definitions of civilian-military interaction. In order to define central concepts of civilian-military interaction, care needs to be taken to not include normative or subjective dimensions in these definitions.

The definitions that are used in this thesis are inspired by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). While a UN agency, the IASC represents a broad range of UN actors. The definitions used by the IASC should be understood as an acceptable common ground for many actors, rather than just the IASC. In this thesis central concepts in civilian-military interaction are understood as:

- *Civilian actors*: Actors with mutual goals of developing humanitarian, political or social conditions.

- *Military actors*: Official military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organization.

- *Collaboration*: Varying degree of interaction that civilian and military actors find mutually acceptable.

- *Cooperation*: High degree of collaboration; joint planning and action.

- *Co-existence*: Low degree of collaboration; limited to acting in the same geographical area or location.

- *Coordination*: Essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors that aims at identifying appropriate level of collaboration.[45]

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[45] IASC. '*Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies*'. New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. (2008); pp. 7-9

3. Research method

Both *comparative descriptive* and *classifying* – analysis is used in order to answer the research questions. In this method chapter, the design will be argued for and clarified by tying together the research problem presented in the introductory chapter and the analytical instrument described in the theory chapter. The chapter also includes a presentation of the used empirical material and methods used to attain this.

The aim of the research is to compare the UN Integrated Approach and the NATO Comprehensive approach, in terms of factors that affect civilian-military information sharing. In order to do this, contributory factors are sought in both approaches, limited to the defined cases of MINUSMA and ISAF. As a recap, the relevance of this contribution is argued to be; better understanding of the relationship between military and civilian actors, as affected by closer cooperation in international operations. By indicating drivers, barriers and enablers in the chosen cases, the aim is to provide a grounds for further research inquiry.

The methodological and analytical steps for achieving the stated aim, can be described as an initial preparation process and a subsequent two-fold analytical process. In the preparatory process empirical material is attained from a mixed array of sources. Interviews were conducted with experts on civilian-military cooperation, as well as practitioners from military intelligence. Further material was granted by relevant organizations and reports were gathered from open sources. In the first step of descriptive analysis, the analytical tool, developed in the theory chapter, is used. In this step empirical material from both cases is subjected to identical review. In the last step of classifying analysis, results are categorized into drivers, barriers and enablers.

3.1 Comparative description and classification

The main argument for using qualitative descriptive analysis design for this thesis is based on the general lack of previous descriptive research conducted on information sharing in new cooperative arrangements. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue that a major advantage of qualitative case studies is the ability to inductively identify

additional variables for further generation and testing of hypotheses[46]. The authors also note that a qualitative design allows the researcher to identify variables that are not readily quantified[47]. Esaiasson et al. describe that prior to any question that contains a quantifiable measure it is necessary to define the central concepts and the values that these can assume. But to be able to define a concepts shifting values, the concept itself and factors in its environment need to be described[48].

Classifying analysis is a descriptive method found in the category of *comparative descriptive research design*[49]. The aim of such studies are generally to define the occurrence of a specific phenomenon or factor in a studied area. More specifically, the aim is to decide of which type studied phenomenon or factors are. Classifying analysis, as described by Esaiasson et al. is highly dependent on a theoretical foundation from which an analytical instrument can be constructed[50]. The authors also note that the ground for classification need to be clearly identifiable and not ambiguous[51].

The analytical instrument constructed from the IAD-framework serves the purpose of linking analysis to the theoretical foundation, as stressed by Esaiasson et al. The three chosen elements from the IAD-framework serve to focus description. Each element is complemented with several *descriptive questions* that serve as a basis for the initial analysis. By asking the same descriptive questions of every empirical source, *descriptive results* are produced. The descriptive results then serve as the basis for classifying analysis. In the classifying analysis, findings in descriptive results are sorted into the classes of; barriers, enablers and drivers. Classification is done using Fägersten's definitions of the concepts in order to retain further theoretical grounding and precision.

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[46] George, Alexander L. Bennett, Andrew. '*Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences',* Cambridge: MIT Press. (2005); p. 54

[47] Ibid.

[48] Esaiasson, Peter. Gilljam, Mikael. Oscarsson, Henrik & Wängnerud, Lena. '*Metodpraktikan – Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad'.* Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB, 4th Ed. (2012); p. 135

[49] Ibid. p. 136

[50] Ibid. pp. 136-137

[51] Ibid. pp. 138-139

In the descriptive analysis, reliability is strengthened by differentiating descriptive results that are corroborated and those that are not. Because of the small number or empirical sources, primary attention is given factors that more than one source indicates. Differences in perceived institutional conditions, created by the experience in different temporal frames of either case, are intentionally disregarded in analysis. This fault is argued to be complemented by focusing on descriptive results that are corroborated by more than one source.

In figure 1. below the descriptive questions of each IAD - element are listed.

Figure 2: IAD – Elements with Descriptive questions

3.2 Material sources

The two studied cases offer significant differences in both volume and types of accessible empirical material. Because of this, mixed empirical material is used. By mixing material sources a wide and arguably, sufficient level of reliability is achieved. Since the ambition is to indicate factors in the institutional setting, relevant empirical material is selected based on two characterizing factors. Firstly, based on 'institutional perspective'. That is to say, where in an institution individuals perceived the institution from. For both the interviews and written material, this means using individual accounts or documents that originate from varied parts of the studied institution. Secondly, based on centrality. For written sources it means using reports that have limited previous interpretation and for interviews, that the informants actually have insight into the questions that are asked of them.

In the case of Afghanistan and ISAF, several written sources that describe and evaluate problems of civilian-military collaboration that fit the above described criteria can be found. For Mali and MINUSMA, this is not the case, where proximity in time to the mission's initiation means that limited written, unclassified sources exists as of yet. The empirical material for ISAF can thus be described as dominated by written sources, complemented by interviews. The material for MUNISMA is instead dominated by interviews and complemented by written sources. All material is described below and illustrated in figure 3.

Written material

Five separate sources of written material are used in analysis, all of which cover the case of ISAF. Of these, there are two interview studies, two reports based on interviews and a personal memo. The two interview-studies are about information sharing in Afghanistan, conducted with both civilian[52] and military actors[53]. One of the reports are from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in which the author

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[52] Norén, Anders. '*Humanitära organisationers förutsättningar för civil-militärt informationsutbyte*'. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3304—SE. (2011)

[53] Norén, Anders. '*Civil-militärt informationsutbyte vid PRT Mazar-e Sharif*'. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—3366—SE. (2011)

compiles more that 100 interviews with USAID staff[54]. The second report is by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SAK), a major non-governmental aid organization in Afghanistan[55]. Lastly, the memo is by Helene Lackenbauer who served as political advisor at the Swedish PRT in Mazar-é-Sharif (PRT MeS) in 2010[56].

Interview material

Interviews were conducted with six informants. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach in the sense that guiding questions were addressed with the informants.[57] The questions were designed to guide informant responses to the areas under inquiry, while not limiting informants from addressing issues that they themselves thought had value. The questions are included in Annex 1.

Interviews were conducted over a VOIP service with audio recording. After the interviews the recorded audio was transcribed, with modifications only to the text in order to improve possibility for reading. The transcribed texts were then sent to the informants and after approved review the texts were used as empirical material for analysis.

Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann describe ethical considerations when conducting interview studies. They note that the informant needs to grant informed consent, with the meaning that the informants are are informed of what the study is about, where it is published and what participation may imply. If necessary, the informants also need to be granted sufficient confidentiality to limit possible harmful consequences that participation may imply. If there is a risk of harmful consequences for the participants, action must be taken to limit these.[58]

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[54] Parker, Norma. '*Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives on the Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*'. USAID Report, (2013)

[55] Kristiansson, Bengt. '*Om de svenska och internationella insatserna i Afghanistan 2001-2014 – ett SAK-perspektiv*'. SAK Report draft, retrieved through personal correspondence with the author.

[56] Lackenbauer, Helené. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan i Afghanistan*'. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI MEMO 3793. (2011)

[57] Kvale, Steinar. Brinkmann, Svend. '*Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun'.* Lund: Studentlitteratur AB. (2014); pp. 172-173

[58] Kvale & Brinkmann. '*Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun'.* (2014); pp. 103-105

All informants were introduced to the thesis both in written form and in discussion prior to interview. They were informed of the recording procedure, and how any material pertaining to the interviews would be handled in analysis and after completion of the thesis. To provide acceptable confidentiality all informants were given two randomized letters to substitute their real names. These letters are combined with a brief description of relevant background that the informant has, to prove centrality and to make distinction possible. Audio files were deleted following transcription, and any information in the transcriptions that was deemed sensitive or identifying was excluded. All material used in analysis is approved by informants. The informants, with cover-letters and brief descriptions are found below.

ISAF
- **RY:** Substantial experience of information gathering and intelligence analysis. Recent work with production of analytical products for the UN in Mali.

- **KJ:** French officer; experience from deployment as CIMIC liaison officer at US PRT.

MINUSMA
- **KM:** Swedish officer. Experience from service as chief of military intelligence (U2) in MINUSMA.

- **PB:** Swedish officer. Experience from service as chief of military intelligence (U2) in MINUSMA.

- **RY:** Substantial experience of information gathering and intelligence analysis. Recent work with production of analytical products for the UN in Mali.

- **DQ:** Swedish officer with experience of collection coordination and development of coordination structures in MINUSMA. Experience from more than one rotation.

- **CI:** Previous experience from both military and humanitarian work in several international operations. Recent experience from work with the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Figure 3: Composition of empirical material

4. Descriptive analysis

4.1 ISAF – Characteristics of the institutional setting

How did information sharing take place?

USAID note two main levels of civilian-military interaction in the ISAF organization. At four Regional Commands (RCs) high-level civilian personnel from USAID was tasked with coordination with the military so that the military was informed of regional activities by civilian actors. Each RC was in turn responsible for several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which served as the primary coordination level between civilian and military.

USAID write that PRT organizations differed significantly. Different countries were responsible for PRTs and three different "PRT-concepts" were identified. Differences in how the PRTs worked is concluded to have hindered broad understanding of between the provinces of work conducted elsewhere.[59] RY states that sharing, even between different PRTs and RCs was made difficult in ISAF because the different components had multiple internal layers. RY describes that information that was passed from one PRT to another, would have to pass though many layers before reaching the intended point. RY describes this as time consuming and in the end detrimental also to sharing from civilian actors to military.[60]

SAK notes that they repeatedly denied any requests for direct cooperation with military actors in Afghanistan[61]. SAK describes that most collaboration was handled through civilian organizations in which several NGOs or humanitarian actors were represented. These included the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR) and the European Network of NGOs for Afghanistan (ENNA). Through these organizations SAK notes that discussions were regularly arranged with ISAF and NATO command in Brussels.[62]

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[59] Parker. '*Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives…'*. (2013); pp. 7-8
[60] Interview RY, 2016-05-10; 74-89
[61] Kristiansson. '*Om de svenska och internationella insatserna…'*. (2015); p. 7
[62] Ibid.

Military actors interviewed by Norén describe that interaction with United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), was arranged at weekly to biweekly meetings. The informants note that the exchange was partly productive with UNAMA and ISAF contributing with some information to the other. Several informants point out that contact with UNAMA, outside these meetings was easier for PRT civilian staff than for military officers.[63] Lackenbauer writes that UNAMA should have been a natural civilian partner for ISAF, but that effective coordination and information sharing was inconsequent due to UNAMA reluctance to work with ISAF. Lackenbauer states that this was because of ISAFs Counter-Insurgency strategy (COIN).[64]

What was done to facilitate sharing of information between actors?

In 2009 the revised ISAF strategy for Afghanistan demanded a 'surge' of military presence to curb rising violence. The new strategy also highlighted the need for cooperation between civilian and military elements[65]. To enable increased civilian work, USAID was asked to provide civilian development experts to a wide array of positions in RCs, PRTs and DST-levels[66]. This is referred to as the "civilian surge" by USAID[67]. Both USAID and Lackenbauer note that the roles of USAID in creating better collaboration was lacking of plan, structure and agreements of how interaction should take place and with what goal.[68]

4.2 ISAF – Benefits and costs in the institutional setting

What contributed to military actors wanting information?

SAK note that they were repeatedly approached by military intelligence parts of ISAF forces, wanting access to area specific information and contact with SAK affiliated persons or contacts.[69] Military informants in Noréns study state that they had two major needs of information which they perceived that civilian actors could provide. Firstly, the military intelligence parts of ISAF are stated as having limited knowledge about what they call soft

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[63] Norén. '*Civil-militärt informationsutbyte vid PRT Mazar-e Sharif*'. (2011); pp. 18-19
[64] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 11
[65] Parker. '*Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives…*'. (2013); p. 10
[66] Ibid. pp. 10-11
[67] Ibid. p. 9
[68] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 11. and Parker. '*Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives…*'. (2013); pp. 17-18
[69] Kristiansson. '*Om de svenska och internationella insatserna…*'. (2015); pp. 8-9

knowledge, that is to say information about the societal situation and attitudes of the Afghan population. The second need was for local information in areas where the military wanted to conduct Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). A big problem that was identified was lack of information could lead to detrimental results of finished QIPs.[70]

What made military actors more willing to share information?

Lackenbauer describes a will in PRT-MeS higher command to increase information sharing to reduce duplication of efforts and to decrease fragmentation in development work[71]. Military informants in Noréns study state that there was a will from the military's side to include civilian actors in planning of operation, to achieve better fusion. They explain that this on few occasions lead to shared information. However, the instances of cooperative planning were few, mainly because civilian actors perceived the goals as military and not developmental.[72]

What made military actors less willing to share information?

USAID write that military personnel were generally uninformed about what USAID staff did in Afghanistan. They write that cooperation was hindered by military personnel not sharing information because of beliefs that USAID was not a governmental actor but an NGO.[73]

Lackenbauer writes that military actors in ISAF had unreasonably strict precautions when regarding classified material. She notes that a lot of the material that was classified could be found in open sources and that it still wasn't shared with civilian actors. Because of reluctance to share information, cooperative possibilities were hindered.[74]

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[70] Norén. '*Civil-militärt informationsutbyte vid PRT Mazar-e Sharif*'. (2011); pp. 14-15
[71] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 11
[72] Norén. '*Civil-militärt informationsutbyte vid PRT Mazar-e Sharif*'. (2011); p. 18
[73] Parker. '*Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives…*'. (2013); p. 17
[74] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 13

What contributed to civilian actors wanting information from military actors?

Norén writes that civilian actors had a need for information from ISAF military forces about current or coming military operations. They needed this information to be able to provide security for their own staff because of a risk of collateral damage in operation areas. Further information about long term operational plans was something that the civilian actors wished they had, but did not receive.[75]

What made civilian actors more willing to share information?

The SAK describe that motivation to share information with military was furthered if there was an apparent developmental goal with the actions taken. While some PRTs exclusively worked with QIPs, the SAK note that other PRTs, with civilian leadership were more inclined to reach longer lasting effects. Such signaling is noted by the SAK as a factor that made the organization more willing to provide information.[76] Informants in Noréns interviews state that the information that they were positive to sharing was such that regarded general understanding of Afghanistan and basic conflict dynamics. By providing some information the hopes were to limit duplicated efforts[77].

In Noréns interviews with civilians, informants state that information was regularly shared with ISAF military forces about the work that the civilian actors were conducting. The purpose of this was to make sure that military forces were aware of where the civilians were to contain risk of collateral damage or confusion.[78]

What made civilian actors less willing to share information?

SAK write that long lasting negative implications were identified from PRTs using QIPs to achieve short term effect. This reduced SAK trust for such PRTs further actions.[79] KJ compounds this picture and states that US PRTs would seldom review effect of initiated QIPs, rather they would pay large amounts in cash for projects with varied effect.[80]

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[75] Norén. *'Humanitära organisationers förutsättningar…'* (2011); pp. 14, 16

[76] Kristiansson. *'Om de svenska och internationella insatserna…'.* (2015); pp. 7-9

[77] Norén. *'Humanitära organisationers förutsättningar…'.* (2011); p. 16

[78] Ibid. p. 15

[79] Kristiansson. *'Om de svenska och internationella insatserna…'.* (2015); p. 9

[80] KJ, 2016-05-16; 20-25

There is general consensus between the civilian actors in Noréns study, that duplicity in the role of ISAF made contact between military and civilian actors difficult. They state that because ISAF acted both as a conflict party with offensive operations, and as a peace building party, it was hard to separate the two roles.[81] Lackenbauer notes that the ISAF focus on COIN-tactics through implementation of the comprehensive approach, lead many civilian actors to distance themselves from ISAF. By stating military ambitions, civilian actors feared that information granted to military actors could be used in military operations.[82]

4.3 ISAF – Environmental factors that affected perceived benefits and costs

Which external factors made actors less likely to share information?
Lackenbauer writes that a major problem to the work of the Swedish PRT MeS was that Swedish political guidelines were unclear and ambiguous. Because it was difficult to interpret the ambition of the Swedish force contribution, military planners could adapt plans, not to an overarching aim, but to personal preference.[83] Noréns military informants state that national guidelines for military, humanitarian and developmental goals lacked clarity and that cooperation was hindered by conflicting agendas.[84]

Which external factors made actors more likely to share information?
Lackenbauer writes that cases where civilian-military sharing of information worked best, was when there was a clear situation in which a common goal could be accomplished. One example of such a situation is prior to provincial elections, in which military forces had clear missions of providing security and civilian actors were tasked with facilitating the actual election. Lackenbauer writes that it probably worked in that case because a shared understanding of the situation made military and civilian actors forgo otherwise hindering factors.[85]

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[81] Norén. '*Humanitära organisationers förutsättningar…*'. (2011); p. 20
[82] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 10-11
[83] Ibid. p. 8-9
[84] Norén. '*Civil-militärt informationsutbyte vid PRT Mazar-e Sharif*'. (2011); p. 23
[85] Lackenbauer. '*Reflektioner kring civil-militär samverkan…*'. (2011); p. 17

4.4 MINUSMA – Characteristics of the institutional setting

How did information sharing take place?

KM describes that work on information or intelligence products took place in three difference 'pillar bodies' of the MINUSMA organization. These three were the civilian Joint Mission Intelligence Centre (JMAC), the military intelligence cell (U2) and a police intelligence cell.[86] On the military side there was also an All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) tasked with collection and analysis in a separate tract, for MINUSMA commanders. KM notes that there were competitive problems between U2 and ASIFU that limited the ability of sharing between them.[87]

A Joint Coordination Board (JCB) was introduced with the purpose of coordinating intelligence work between the three pillar intelligence bodies, ASIFU and other important actors. One such actor was the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) which was responsible for security of UN staff in the mission area.[88] PB describes that collaboration in the JCB revolved around both sharing information, but also proposing information needs that separate intelligence functions would focus work on. Each week the U2 would compile information or intelligence products they had, along with needs that they had and bring this to JCB.[89]

RY describes sharing as simplified between actors on the operational level because all of these were co-located to Bamako. This created ease of contact between actors and also aided in building personal trust between staff from different organizations.[90] PB describes that daily contact was established between individual analysts from different structures because of the proximity.[91]

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[86] KM 2016-05-11; 3-5
[87] KM 2016-05-11; 81-96
[88] KM 2016-05-11; 68-77
[89] PB 2016-05-16; 24-30
[90] RY 2016-05-10; 4-7
[91] PB 2016-05-16; 20-22

What was done to facilitate sharing of information between actors?

During the time PB was in Mali, the UN started implementing an information database system aimed at facilitating sharing between actors in MINUSMA, as well as other UN-missions in Africa.[92]

4.5 MINUSMA – Benefits and costs in the institutional setting

What contributed to military actors wanting information from civilian actors?

PB notes that because the mandated mission was primarily civilian, there was a clear purpose in providing capabilities to civilian developmental or humanitarian objectives. What PB notes was problematic was getting civilian actors to realize that they had to inform the military components of what they wanted accomplished.[93] PB further notes that because most military personnel were new to Mali, civilian information was needed to understand what was relevant to do. Because the UN had personnel that had worked in Mali for much longer time, these had information that was crucial for the military in order to avoid counterproductive actions and duplicated work.[94]

What made military actors more willing to share information?

KM states that there was an obvious trade system in MINUSMA that controlled sharing of information between military and civilian actors. KM notes that if a civilian actors within MINUSMA had information that U2 needed, U2 would be more willing to trade for this with their own products.[95]

KM describes trust between individuals as the most important component to reducing perceived risks of sharing information. KM notes that personal contacts made sharing more effective, but also collaborative intelligence work. When close contact was knit, it was possible to foresee information that other actors needed.[96] By building personal relationships with members of the JMAC and ad UNDSS, DQ states U2 was able to receive daily information, something that was not otherwise possible[97].

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[92] PB 2016-05-16; 14-16
[93] PB 2016-05-16; 33-46
[94] PB 2016-05-16; 55-58
[95] KM 2016-05-11; 50-53
[96] KM 2016-05-11; 130-141
[97] DQ 2016-05-19; 41-52, 91-99

What made military actors less willing to share information?

RY describes that military actors were more reluctant to share information that could expose technical capabilities of systems and sensors. DQ describes a situation where a shift in objective for the military actors no longer necessitated civilian information to the same degree; following this the resolution of shared images from military image sensors was greatly reduced.[98]

Despite the implementation of an information database system, PB means that secrecy is always a concern in UN missions. Because there is nothing 'secret' in the UN, anything that leaves U2 could end up anywhere. This was always a risk that PB says that they had to think about. With the new system the practical possibility to share and get information grew, but also the risk of unintentionally spreading sensitive information[99].

What contributed to civilian actors wanting information?

Both PB and KM note that, while the civilian actors had independent intelligence functions, with their own strengths, the collection power and analytical routine of U2 and ASIFU was hard to beat.[100] RY describes that military actors had significant means of collecting information for a wide array of sources. RY exemplifies that they could collect soil samples for ground analysis, conduct aerial photography and more. Such information was unheard of for many civilian actors and was greatly appreciated.[101] For OCHA, CI states that information was needed to avoid accidents and to limit misunderstandings[102].

What made civilian actors more willing to share information?

DQ stresses that building of trust was essential for civilian actors to share more information with the military. To further trust-building DQ, and several analysts moved into the same building that personnel from JMAC lived in to get closer ties with them. This proved fruitful because information flowed better between U2 and JMAC some weeks later.[103]

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[98] RY 2016-05-10; 120-125
[99] PB 2016-05-19; 141-159
[100] KM 2016-05-11; 85-96 and PB 2016-05-16; 75-82
[101] RY 2016-05-10; 21-27
[102] CI 2016-04-20; 153-161
[103] DQ 2016-05-10; 41-52

RY states that civilian actors, who were often veterans in Mali, grew tired of new military personnel continuously being exchanged in six month rotations[104]. To bridge this problem, RY and PB both state that military actors needed to be the ones that took contact and tried to build relationships. PB describes that U2 would invite the important actors to dinners and bridge gaps by getting to know each other[105].

What made civilian actors less willing to share information?
PB describes that cultural differences caused common problems in interaction between civilian and military. PB notes that some civilian actors were wary of close interaction because of mistrust. Such problems were compounded by military actors using terms that were 'militaristic'. One such example, that PB describes is that if U2 said "key-leader engagement" - civilian actors would be less inclined to cooperate than if they said "building contact with the local community".[106] DQ states that UN civilian organizations that were not part of the direct mandate, were more careful of sharing information with the military components[107]. CI argues in line with this and that OCHA prefers interaction through intermediaries like UNDSS to gain security information[108].

4.6 MINUSMA – Environmental factors that affect perceived benefits and cost

Which external factors made actors less likely to share information?
DQ notes that there was a protective attitude stemming, not from the mission but from home nations wanting to claim political point by having the units that conducted the most 'advanced tasks'. DQ exemplifies that two European states that were both competing for prestigious international roles, would define military mandates that conflicted with the tasks of MINUSMA. Because of these mandates military forces were confined by national regulations regarding sharing of information.[109] In line with this PB describes that when the ASIFU was designed, national interests caused 'confidentiality problems' to be integrated in the design. ASIFU was therefore unable to share certain information with U2 because several officers and staff in the U2 were from countries that information could

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[104] RY 2016-05-10; 138-164
[105] PB 2016-05-16; 166-172
[106] PB 2016-05-16; 99-104
[107] DQ 2016-05-10; 71-87
[108] CI 2016-04-20; 117-129
[109] DQ 2016-05-11; 111-118

not be shared with. PB means that this was a serious problem that in the end caused both U2 and ASIFU to have information that civilian actors needed, but that they could not be provided because of national secrecy demands.[110]

Which external factors made actors more likely to share information?

DQ describes that the ECOWAS battalions that were intended to serve U2 with field information, were underqualified to complete the task. DQ states that only one out of seven ECOWAS force contributions reached UN minimum requirements for military forces. As such, their ability to collect information was greatly reduced, leaving U2 without collection capability in large areas of the country.[111] RY states that this military force composition possibly aided military intelligence components like U2 and ASIFU in sharing with civilian actors. Because ECOWAS troops constituted an absolute majority of the military forces in MINUSMA, RY argues that military intelligence actors were more inclined to share information with civilians, than they would have been if the ECOWAS troops could also collect information in the field.[112]

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[110] PB 2016-05-16; 175-183
[111] DQ 2016-05-11; 12-23
[112] RY 2016-05-10; 94-116

5. Results - Classifying analysis

> **Drivers**: *Factors making actors more inclined to seek cooperative gains.*
>
> **Enablers**: *Factors that help actors to contain, manage or mitigate costs and benefits.*
>
> **Barriers**: *Factors that increase the losses and/or reduce the gains of cooperation.*

Figure 4: Drivers, Enablers and Barriers

5.1 ISAF – Drivers, enablers and barriers

> **ISAF - Drivers:**
>
> Military: Motivation to improve effect of own efforts.
>
> Civilian: Need to provide own security by limiting potential hazards.

Both the military informants in Noréns study and the SAK state that ISAF forces wanted societal information and improved contextual understanding to better conduct QIPs. SAK note that they were repeatedly approach by military actors that wanted information that the SAK had. Lackenbauer describes a military need for information to decrease duplication of efforts and to achieve better long term effects. Norén notes that civilian actors had some need for information from military actors regarding operations to provide own security.

> **ISAF - Enablers:**
>
> Mutual: Achieving shared understanding of goals
>
> Civilian: Intermediary organizations enable alternate sharing

The SAK describe that PRTs signaling long term goals were given more information that could assist. Lackenbauer also notes a case where high level of collaboration was achieved through a common goal. In this case, military and civilian actors shared information because both actors benefited from the others actions. Civilian informants in Noréns report describe that a preferred method of coordination otherwise was through intermediary organizations such as ACBAR and ENNA.

> **ISAF - Barriers:**
>
> Military: Skepticism of sharing with unknown actors
>
> Mutual: Unclear missions and mandates
>
> Civilian: Concern about providing information for military activities
>
> Civilian: Differing PRT structures hindered trust building

The most prominent barrier indicated in the case of ISAF was the duplicity of military actors conducting both offensive military action and attempted developmental work. The differences in PRT design and methods was the next most apparent factor that seems to increase perceived costs. Both civilian and military informants described problems with the PRTs that hindered establishing of trust. Further negative effects were described by USAID, Lackenbauer and Noréns informants, in that unclear national mandates and missions caused grounds for individual interpretation and diverging objectives.

5.2 MINUSMA – Drivers, enablers and barriers

> **MINUSMA – Drivers:**
>
> Military: Civilian guidance needed to perform own missions.
>
> Military: Military incapacity to collect information hindered independence.
>
> Mutual: Civilian and military actors needing information from each other.

Several informants noted that the overall developmental goal contributed to military objectives being reliant on civilian guidance and support. Informants also described a situation where access to information was made difficult because of insufficient military collection capability. Military actors were also new to Mali, whereas many civilian actors had local knowledge. Civilian actors are described as gaining new sources of information through military intelligence, which has not been available before.

> **MINUSMA - Enablers:**
>
> Mutual: Designated structures for information sharing and collaboration.
>
> Mutual: Trust between actors.
>
> Mutual: Geographical proximity.

Several operational-level structures are described as facilitating multilateral sharing of information and intelligence between relevant actors. A level of collaboration is noted in the JCB where the three pillars would cooperate in focusing coming work. Informants note trust building as a key to creating personal contact between actors and that being able to provide information to each other was important to achieving this. It is also noted that geographical proximity aided in creating personal contact.

> **Indicated barriers:**
>
> Military: Lack of ways to limit spread of shared products.
>
> Military: Home-countries restricting sharing of information.
>
> Civilian: Rotation frequency of military actor's limits building of trust.
>
> Civilian: Cultural reservations.

Differences in rotation times of military and civilian actors is noted as having detrimental effect on building of trust. Whereas some civilians are present for many years, military personnel rotate every six to twelve months. Civilian actors are described as having cultural inhibitions to interact with military actors. Military actors state that secrecy is a concern in UN missions because of a lacking way to limit spread of information. At the same time secrecy demands from home-countries is described as a limitation, making situational solutions difficult.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of analytical results

As stated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis was to examine and compare structural features of the UN Integrated and the NATO Comprehensive approach. This aim was in turn refined to indicating institutional factors in MINUSMA and ISAF that have affected information sharing between civilian and military actors. With an outset in RCI and elements from Ostrom's IAD-framework, factors were described through primary and secondary material. With a focus on factors that were corroborated by at least two empirical sources, indicated factors were lastly classified as either; drivers, enablers or barriers.

The first research question in this thesis is: *Which contributory factors affecting civilian-military information sharing can be identified in the two approaches?* The corroborated factors that have been indicated are compiled below in figure 5.

	Drivers	Enablers	Barriers
ISAF	**Military**: Motivation to improve effect of own efforts. **Civilian**: Need to provide own security by limiting potential hazards.	**Mutual**: Achieving shared understanding of goals. **Civilian**: Intermediary organizations enable alternate sharing.	**Military**: Skepticism of sharing with unknown actors. **Mutual**: Unclear missions and mandates. **Civilian**: Concern about providing information to military activities. **Civilian**: Differing PRT structures hindered trust building.
MINUSMA	**Military**: Civilian guidance needed to perform own missions. **Military**: Military incapacity to collect information hindered independence. **Mutual**: Civilian and military actors needing information from each other.	**Mutual**: Designated structures for information sharing and collaboration. **Mutual**: Trust between actors. **Mutual**: Geographical proximity.	**Military**: Lack of ways to limit spread of shared products. **Military**: Home-countries restricting sharing of information. **Civilian**: Rotation frequency of military actors limits building of trust. **Civilian**: Cultural reservations.

Figure 5: Indicated factors; drivers, enablers and barriers

In answering the second research question; *what differences in contributory factors do these two approaches suggest?* - answers are divided into the separate classifications.

Drivers indicated in the two cases differ remarkably, primarily in terms of institutionally formed interdependence. The institutional framework of MINUSMA makes both civilian and military actors dependent of the other in a way that is not the case in ISAF. In MINUSMA, military actors expressed that they needed civilian guidance to complete their mission, while ISAF military forces acted independently with QIPs, expressing that civilian expertise was needed to improve effect of these. It was indicated that both civilian and military actors in MINUSMA perceived benefits of information sharing to aid cooperation. In ISAF civilian actors could be understood to share information only to maintain a minimal level of functional co-existence. That military incapability's drive sharing of information in MINUSMA, is noted as an especially interesting effect. From a rationalist approach, this effect could be understood as making independence less favorable, rather than making cooperation more so. This driver is the only one indicated that can be understood in this way.

In the case of ISAF, sharing of information seems to have been enabled when there was a common goal for which both civilian and military actors could strive. Otherwise, as indicated by the functions of ENNA and ACBAR, costs of of direct interaction were managed by intermediary organizations. A notion that structural conditions in MUNISMA were similar, may seem strange, but at a closer look a comparable rationality is possible to discern. Information sharing between civilian, military and police component are described as taking place primarily at an operational level between intelligence components and in the JCB. As such, military and civilian actors were both 'represented' in matters of information sharing, and it is possible that this minimized costs otherwise perceived in direct interaction between actors on a tactical level. Establishing of trust and geographical proximity were also indicated as drivers in MINUSMA, neither of which were indicated in the case of ISAF.

There is no way to readily quantify the significance of barriers identified in the two cases. It can however be argued that the barriers identified in ISAF are at a more fundamental level that those found in MINUSMA. Indicated barriers in MUNISMA show that both

civilian and military actors perceived costs of sharing information; civilian actors because of values and military actors because of a lack of ways to limit spread in a UN structure. The MUNISMA case also indicated military deployment length and home-country limitations as barriers. The barriers indicated in ISAF could be interpreted as civilian and military actors not sharing, at even close to the same level. Both military and civilian actors pointed to unclear mandates and missions in regard to collaboration. Civilian actors further noted an unwillingness to provide information to military activities and that differing PRT structures made building trust difficult.

6.2 Discussion

Conducting this thesis in a limited scope, could have had negative implications in terms of reliability and academic contribution. Several choices were made in design which aimed at limiting unfavorable implications and strengthening positive attributes. By grounding the analytical instrument closely in NI and RCI, the findings are more likely to bear weight in falsifying or replicating studies. Adapting already tried and tested elements from Ostrom's IAD-framework not only provides the thesis with boundaries but also further grounds results to an established theoretical foundation. A noteworthy possible alternative theoretical approach is found in Normative Institutionalism which, as noted understands actor behavior not in terms of costs and benefits but from a perspective of normative appropriateness. It is highly possible that questions of *right* and *wrong* rather than *cost* and *benefit*, could have presented interesting alternative results.

Despite combining material sources, interesting results were produced. However, any critic of the thesis would be right to note that a preponderance of military interview informants in MINUSMA paired against primarily secondary written material from civilian actors in ISAF, twists possible inferences. For this reason, the thesis is lacking in well-defined conclusions – the grounds for making any are just not sufficient. The indicated factors should be viewed as glimpses into the institutional frameworks that MINUSMA and ISAF represent. Every individual affected by the structural or un-structural dynamics of these institutions could provide unique insight into their workings. Because interviewing everyone just wasn't an option, the approach in this thesis is argued be sufficient in reaching the stated goal.

A further recognized fault is of transparency in interviews and information regarding the informants. Several of the informants requested anonymity while others agreed to having their names published. Revealing some names would unfortunately have made deducing the identity of other informants possible, which caused a precious balancing act. Concern for the informants has been constantly prioritized over possible research finding. The information included herein is thus what informants have consented to, nothing more.

6.3 Relevance to policy, research and the military profession

The indicated factors were sought in order to provide better understanding of how civilian and military actors share information in cooperative arrangements. Metcalfe, Haysome and Gordon argued this to be an area of limited scholarly understanding[113] and Fägersten pointed out a need for further studies on intelligence sharing[114]. The differentiation between MINUSMA and ISAF that this thesis provides, along with indication of affecting factors, should arguably provide substance to such broadened understanding. This understanding could provide policy-makers with information aimed at adapting future cooperative conditions, so that drivers and enablers are promoted while limiting identified barriers.

For military personnel, officers and soldiers alike, improved ability to adapt with shifting cooperative settings should be seen as essential. With cooperation between military and civilian actors becoming more important in international missions, the ability to achieve military goals needs to be weighed against achieving shared goals. Many smaller countries, like Sweden, contribute with military and developmental aid to international, multinational missions. This thesis indicated that lessons learned of civilian-military cooperation in one institutional framework, may be poorly suited to understanding problems involved in another.

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[113] Metcalfe, Haysome and Gordon. 'Trend and challenges...'. (2012); p. 29
[114] Fägersten. '*Sharing Secrets...*'. (2010); p. 38

6.4 Possible future research

Future research drawing from this thesis should set out to either describe specific indicated factors or to describe other cooperative arrangements. Further research should be conducted with care taken to provide uniform empirical material. The identified faults in this thesis could with relative ease be managed in a planned process, possibly with a longer time-frame. Study into single factors could provide depth of understanding into how these affect actor rationalities. If interviews are conducted, a desirable goal should be to have informants represented from both civilian and military actors, to an equal extent. With such research, a further understanding could be granted to the fields of which this thesis aimed to contribute.

6.4 Possible future research

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Interview: CI –   20-April-2016

Annex 1 - Interview guide

Questions

What structural conditions where there for civilian-military information sharing?
- *For example: Organizational components, scheduled meetings…*

What contributed to (civ/mil) wanting to have or share information?
- Military actors
- Civilian actors

What made (civ/mil) more willing to share information?	
	- Actor characteristics?
What made (civ/mil) less willing to share information?	- Factors internal to the organization?
	- External factors?

What was done to facilitate easier sharing of information?

Other information that the informant would like to add: