



Guns n' roses

– The Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Saudi agreement

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Abstract

In this study I examine the decisions to sign and later terminate the so called Saudi agreement, a military memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Sweden and Saudi Arabia, understood as a gateway agreement for future arms deals as well as exchange of defense technology knowledge. Comparing statements from the Social Democratic Party (SAP), who held government both in 2005 when the agreement was signed as well as in 2015 when it was terminated unilaterally by Sweden, I examine the ideological preferences of Swedish foreign policy. Could the shift in policy be explained by ideology?

Keywords:

Social democratic party; Sweden; Saudi Arabia; Arms exports; Ideology; Foreign policy

Abbreviations

ACSD	Association of Christian Social Democrats
CSFP	Common Security and Foreign Policy
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FXM	Swedish Defense and Security Export Agency
IR	International Relations
ISP	Inspectorate for Strategic Products
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
SAP	Social Democratic Party
SEK	Swedish Kronor
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollars

1 Introduction

Sweden has a longstanding tradition of an active foreign policy, as a human rights advocate and a mediator for peace. Since the beginning of the post-World War II-era the country has fostered the image of a moral superpower, a global conscious that righteously stands up for the rights of small nations. Starting with Prime Minister Olof Palme's (SAP) doctrine of active internationalism during the Cold War the ideas still reverberates to this day, deeply embedded in Swedish national identity and self-image.¹ Like any national epos, it is only partly true. Perhaps the most commonly cited crack in Sweden's self-image is the country's arms exports. Against the idea of a peace promoting state that puts moral principles first, stands the fact that Sweden is one of the largest arms exporters in the world, per capita.

A part of the explanation has been Swedish neutrality, practiced during both World Wars, and formalized as a doctrine by the SAP government after World War II as "Non-alignment in peace aiming to neutrality in wartime".² For non-alignment to remain credible, Sweden had to rely on a strong, independent and self-sufficient defense. Instead of procuring arms from others, like most small states do, Sweden had to produce its own defense materials. The need for large production volumes to keep unit costs down, made Swedish arms exports a necessary and embedded part of the country's defense policy.³

This inevitably put forward the question of whom to sell to. According to Swedish regulation, arm sales to states that violate human rights or are involved in armed conflict should not be authorized.⁴ Even so, Swedish arms have regularly been sold to non-democracies, states at war as well as human rights violators.

After the end of the Cold War, Sweden started downsizing her armed forces and gradually moved away from non-alignment, but continued to support the arms industry, leading to an increase in arms exports. In 2011 Sweden was the world's largest arms exporter per capita, exporting for 13.9 billion SEK (1.7 billion USD in 2015 prices) – 56 percent of which went to

¹ Agius, C., *The social construction of Swedish neutrality: Challenges to Swedish identity and sovereignty*, Manchester University press, 2006, pp. 90-1, 120.

² Ottosson, S., 'Svensk självbild under kalla kriget: En studie av stats- och utrikesministrarnas bild av Sverige 1950-1989', [Swedish self-image during the Cold War: A study of the Prime- and Foreign Ministers view of Sweden], The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 2003, p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 582-3.

⁴ The government, 'Exportkontroll av krigsmateriel' [Export of war materials], 2015.

non-democracies. Among them were notorious dictatorships and human rights violators such as Brunei, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.⁵

When in 2012 it was revealed that the government was planning to help Saudi Arabia to establish an arms factory, a new debate quickly sprung up about the legitimacy of the arms exports. How could Sweden – a country that considers itself a moral superpower – be helping to arm Saudi Arabia – a dictatorship notoriously infamous for violating human rights?

The rhetorical answer given was partly new. Since the old independence argument had largely become obsolete without non-alignment, it had been replaced by either economic or general security arguments. When questioned in parliament, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (Moderate Party) defended the arms exports saying “It give jobs and finances welfare in Sweden”, while giving other states the means to defend themselves.⁶

The formal answer lied within the so called Saudi Agreement, a seven years old MoU between Sweden and Saudi Arabia regarding military cooperation, until then practically unknown to the public. The MoU had first been signed by the SAP government led by Prime Minister Göran Persson in 2005, primarily as a step towards getting the Saudi regime to invest in the Saab-Ericsson airborne radar system Erieye, and had passed through Swedish news media largely unnoticed. For Saudi Arabia the agreement was part of a broader plan to acquire the knowledge and technology needed for developing an own arms industry.

The idea for the arms factory had started in secret in 2008. In 2010 the agreement was prolonged by the Center-right government and the plans continued on track until in 2012 Swedish public radio exposed them, causing a public outcry that ended up with the resignation of the Swedish Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors (Moderate Party).⁷

The public demanded stricter regulation and in 2013 the national convention of the SAP sharpened the official party line by voting through a proposition to forbid arms exports to dictatorships.⁸ In the election campaign of 2014 both the SAP and the Green Party campaigned for a ‘democracy criteria’ in the law regulating arms exports. After the election when they joined in the red-green coalition government, the parties confirmed that “control on

⁵ Kellström Froste, E., ‘Vapenexport till icke-demokratier dubblerad’ [Arms exports to non-democracies doubled], *Svenskafreds.se*.

⁶ Reinfeldt, F., The Prime Minister’s Question time, March 29th, 2012.

⁷ Bodin, B-G., Öhman, D., *Saudivapen*, Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, 2014.

⁸ SAP, ‘Ingen vapenexport till diktaturer’ [No arms exports to dictatorships], April 5th, 2013.

arms exports against non-democracies would be sharpened, including subsequent deliveries and consulting services”⁹

All of this was put to the test in early 2015, when the arms agreement with Saudi Arabia was up for renewal. On January 29th the leader of the Left Party, Jonas Sjöstedt pressured Prime Minister Stefan Löfven (SAP) on ending the agreement, in line with his promises. But Löfven hesitated and on a direct question he refused to call Saudi Arabia a dictatorship, which created headlines in the media.¹⁰ Löfven stated that he wanted to re-negotiate the deal before it was automatically renewed in May. Instead it was unilaterally terminated by Sweden after Saudi Arabia had laid a veto, blocking Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström’s (SAP) speech before the Arab League. The Saudi government also issued a statement condemning a critical remark that Wallström had made months earlier against the flogging of a Saudi human rights activist. The actions of the Saudis seemed to finally put the nail in the coffin for the Saudi agreement, and on March 11th, Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist (SAP) declared that Sweden would be terminating the agreement.

Throughout these 45 days of public anguish, the Prime Minister kept his line of reasoning, that the agreement was to be renegotiated and that the government would return in the matter after looking into the details. This inevitably put the spotlight on how torn the government and the SAP in particular was on the issue. The agreement that had already caused a major political scandal for the previous government became an internal affair that risked causing a governmental crisis in the next.

1.1 State of purpose and research questions

In Sweden, the notion of the arms exports as a conflict between moral principles and national interest is not new. But the case of the Saudi agreement is perhaps the best example of this conflict within the SAP to date. My attempt with this study is to examine the role of ideology in Swedish arms exports, in foreign policy and in the SAP by analyzing how the SAP as a key actor has dealt with the case of the Saudi agreement. Could the shift in policy between 2005 and 2015 be explained by a shift in ideological preferences?

⁹ SAP and the Green Party, Government agreement, 2014.

¹⁰ Öhman, D., ‘Regeringen vill inte säga upp Saudi-avtal’ [The government does not want to terminate Saudi agreement], Sveriges Radio, January 29th, 2015.

The research questions are as follows:

- What ideological preferences were apparent within the SAP around the Saudi agreement in 2005?
- What ideological preferences were apparent within the SAP around the Saudi agreement in 2015?
- What ideological similarities and differences can be found between 2005 and 2015?
- How can these similarities and differences be explained?

1.2 Assumptions

Choosing the SAP as a starting point comes from the assumption that the SAP is a key actor, effectively controlling the level and direction of restrictions on arms exports. This is based on the fact that nearly all other parties, with the exception of the Sweden Democrats and to some extent the Centre Party have taken a clear stance, pro or against stricter regulations. With the Moderate Party against and the Green Party, Left Party, Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats for, this has given the SAP a swing vote on regulation.¹¹

The support for the arms exports have historically come from the two larger parties - the SAP and the Moderate Party. The Moderate Party has often emphasized free trade over restrictions, whether having to do with workers' rights, environment, tolls or human rights. One example of this was their strong opposition to the Swedish trade boycott on South Africa over apartheid.¹² The SAP has long seen arms exports and a strong Swedish arms industry as a prerequisite for a strong national defense, in connection to the neutrality doctrine as described above.

The Green Party, which was founded partly out of the peace movement, criticized the arms exports as early as 1982.¹³ But The Left Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party have also criticized the arms exports on several occasions. For example they promised together with The SAP and the Green Party to sharpen regulations on arms exports in a joint article with the peace movement in 2011.¹⁴ The right-wing populist Sweden Democrats have

¹¹ Senneby, J., 'Vapenexport till diktaturer – S är vågmästare' [Arms exports to dictatorships – SAP holds swing vote], DagensArena.se, March 2nd, 2015.

¹² Sällström, T., Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Solidarity and assistance, 1970-1994, Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm, 2002, pp. 784-5.

¹³ Green party program, 1982.

¹⁴ Widman, A., Malm, F., Pethrus, D., Oscarsson, M., Wetterstrand, M., Ahlin, U., Ohly, L., Bergh, L., Forsberg, B., Ek, A. & Molin, L., Dagens Nyheter, May 17th 2011, 'Vi lovar att reglerna om vapenexport ska skärpas' [We promise to strengthen the regulation on arms exports].

said that they are against stricter regulations, yet spoke out against the Saudi agreement, just before it was terminated.¹⁵

1.3 A pilot study

Because this study is part of a master thesis course of two months, it will be shaped as a smaller pilot study that could support a larger more complete study later on. A more extensive study should be made under less time constraint and with larger access to primary source material, such as interviews with key decision makers.

The point of a pilot study is to test definitions and variables, to make a limited analysis that could give indications for a larger general conclusion on the subject. While my results may be limited to this particular case, the conceptual framework with its variables should prove useful for future research within the field of Swedish foreign policy.

1.4 A case study

This study is also a case study, meaning that instead of holistic analysis of the whole subject, I have carefully chosen a case that shows as an illustrative example of a larger phenomenon: in my case the role of ideology in Swedish arms exports and foreign policy. I have already touched upon the reasons why the Saudi agreement is a good case but here is a short summary:

1. Saudi Arabia is one of the worst dictatorships in the world and one of the largest buyers of Swedish arms, making it a strong symbol of Swedish duality.
2. The SAP, holding the swing vote on arms export, have actively advocated both stricter regulation *and* arms sales – the SAP originated the Saudi agreement in 2005.
3. Even after the major a major political scandal in 2012 in which the SAP criticized the Centre-Right government, and after campaigning on and reaffirming its support for stricter regulation and prohibition of arms exports to non-democracies like Saudi Arabia, the SAP was publicly and painfully divided on the issue for 45 days, before feeling compelled to terminate it.

¹⁵ Martikainen, R., Expressen, April 14th 2012, 'Jimmie Åkesson: Reglerna om vapenexport bör inte förändras' [Jimmie Åkesson: the rules on arms exports should not be changed]; Olsson, L. & Runblom, K., Sveriges Radio, February 20th 2015, 'SD vill avsluta Saudiavtalet' [SD wants to terminate the Saudi Agreement].

4. This gave insight into the SAP and created an ideological debate about the ends and means of Swedish foreign policy, the role of Sweden in the world and the conflict between self-interest and moral principles.

In this study, I hope to improve the understanding of the role of ideology in the SAP, of Swedish arms exports and Swedish foreign policy.

1.5 Earlier research

Much of the earlier research that has been done about Swedish arms exports have touched upon the tension between advocating human rights with one hand, and arming human rights violators with the other. In 1979 Göran Sahlberg wrote about the historical grounds for a Swedish arms export as well as how it operates and the arguments around it.¹⁶ After the Bofors scandal in which Swedish arms illegally and through bribes were sold in secret to India, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (SAP) demanded a grand commission to get all the cards on the table. In 1988 the “Citizens commission’s report on Swedish arms exports” (SOU 1988:15) was published recommending tougher restrictions, controls and end user agreements for sales.¹⁷ More recently Masako Ikegami has analyzed the systemic needs for a Swedish defense industry, foreseeing the end of a national defense industry as the arms industry outgrows the Swedish needs.¹⁸

Many candidate and master level theses have also been written about Swedish arms exports. Like myself, Josephine Rosengren and Nina Landtblom both analyze the arguments on Swedish arms exports from an ethical point of view.¹⁹ Ian Sirelius takes a historical perspective on Swedish arms export policy.²⁰ Stefan Lachmann analyzes the Swedish press opinion on arms exports.²¹ Lina

¹⁶ Sahlberg, G., *Svensk vapenexport – Begränsningar, praktik och argumentation*, [Swedish arms export – Limitations, practice and argumentation], Uppsala University, 1979.

¹⁷ Rydbeck, O., Fredga, K., Stjernquist, N., Vallquist, G., Wieslander, B., Romare, J., Blixt, K. & Ljungqvist, R., *SOU: 1988:15 Medborgarkommissionens rapport om svensk vapenexport* [The citizens commission report on Swedish arms exports], pp. 241-56.

¹⁸ Ikegami, M., ‘The end of a ‘national’ defense industry?: Impacts of globalization on the Swedish defense industry’, *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 38:4, p. 436, 2013.

¹⁹ Apel, E., *Vad är det för moral? En utredande etisk analys av svensk krigsmaterielexport*, [What kind of moral is that? An investigative ethical analysis of Swedish war material export], University of Gothenburg, 2010; Rosengren, J., *Svensk vapenexport – varför (inte)? En undersökning av för- och motargument till Sveriges export av krigsmateriel*, [Swedish arms export – why (not)? An inquiry about the arguments for and against Swedish export of war materials], Örebro University, 2012;

Landtblom, N., *Swedish Arms Export: An Evaluation from an Ethical and Human Rights Point of View*, Uppsala University, 2014.

²⁰ Sirelius, I., *En vapenexport i förändring: En studie i svensk vapenexportpolitik*, [An arms export in change, A study of Swedish arms export policy], Uppsala University, 2012.

²¹ Lachman, S., *Den svenska vapenexporten i nyhetspressen – En studie i pressopinion*, [The Swedish arms exports in the news press], Södertörn University, 2011.

Ericsson tests if Swedish arms exports to Russia and Pakistan in 2006 were in violation to human rights and existing regulations.²² And similarly Pia Andersson and Anja Skoglund compare the Swedish regulation and actual political practice on the issue of arms exports to Saudi Arabia.²³

Finally Carin Hubbe analyzes the practice of the SAP government's arms exports to the US during the Iraq war in relation to existing regulation on arms exports. That analysis is the closest I have found to the subject of this study. However it focuses more on the role of the controlling body, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) as the government's tool for distancing itself from unpopular (and unlawful) arms deals, outsourcing responsibility and accountability.²⁴

In this study I will instead look explicitly at the statements made in by SAP representatives in 2005 and 2015 in relation to the Saudi agreement in order to explore the ideological dimensions of Swedish arms exports and foreign policy.

1.6 Contribution

Much has already been written about the conflicting values of the Swedish arms exports. We know a great deal about the arguments for and against it, the principles regulating it, the history behind it and the public opinion surrounding it. However, very little has been said about the actors and the power dynamics involved, nor the role of ideology. My contribution will be to explore the role of ideology and to look into the SAP – a complex actor that inhibits both sides of the debate while at the same time holding the swing vote on arms exports. An increased understanding of this subject is of particular democratic value, since polls show that Swedish arms sales to non-democracies, states at war and human right-violators, not only goes against the principals of existing regulation, but against the will of the public.²⁵

²² Ericsson, L., *The Swedish Arms Trade and the Politics of Human Rights: A comparative Case-study of Swedish Weapon Exports to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Russian Federation in the year of 2006*, Jönköping University, 2008.

²³ Andersson, P. & Skoglund, A., *Svensk vapenexport till Saudiarabien: En granskning av skillnaderna mellan regelverk och reell politik inom svensk vapenexport till Saudiarabien*, [Swedish arms exports to Saudi Arabia: an review of the disparity between regulation and real policy within Swedish arms exports to Saudi Arabia], Lund University, 2013.

²⁴ Hubbe, C., *A Study of Swedish War Materiel Export; the Paradox between Rhetoric, Law, and Practice of the Swedish Government*, Malmö University, 2007.

²⁵ The government, 'Exportkontroll av krigsmateriel' [Export of war materials], 2015;

Lindblad, L., 'Över hälften av svenskarna vill förbjuda vapenexport' [Over half of swedes want to forbid arms exports], *Fria Tidningen*, December 11th, 2009;

Benigh, L., 'Svenska folket: Ingen vapenexport till diktaturer' [Swedish people: No arms exports to dictatoships], *SVT*, March 9th, 2012;

Ekström, J., 'Majoritet mot svensk vapenexport' [Majority against Swedish arms exports], *Svenska Dagbladet* June 25th, 2014.

2 Theory

My theoretical starting point consists of two theoretical fields: the concepts of *foreign policy arenas* and *foreign policy ideologies*. After explaining them I will go on to develop my own theoretical framework out of the two.

2.1 Foreign policy arenas

In 1950 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan introduced the concept of *power arenas* to contextualize how actors adapt their behavior in different situations in order to maximize power within the political system.

“The arena of power is the situation comprised by those that demand power or those within the domain of power. [...] The political man (*homo politicus*) is one who demands the maximization of his powers in relation to all his values. [...] We use the term ‘arena’ to refer to any situation in which power is sought and persons are brought within that domain of power. [...] When states, parties, pressure groups, or political individuals affect one another in the power process, we describe the interaction as an encounter. [...] Manifestly an arena is a pattern of encounters.”²⁶

This concept was further developed in 1968 by Gunnar Sjöblom who identified three *policy arenas* within multiparty systems. Since each arena facilitates encounters with different audiences, they have different means for parties to maximize their power, in turn producing different patterns of behavior. In the *electoral arena*, parties encounter the voters and try to maximize power by maximizing the number of votes; In the *parliamentary arena*, parties interact and try to “maximize parliamentary influence” over decisions made and in the *internal arena* parties face their own members and try to maximize support from the internal party organization.²⁷

Ulf Bjereld and Marie Demker have used Sjöblom’s framework on Swedish foreign policy. They write:

“...The ranking of ideological goals is not the only choice a party faces. In their quest to gain influence over public decision-making political parties must also act in relation to the electorate, in relation to other parties and in relation to members.”²⁸ [My translation]

²⁶ Lasswell, H. & Kaplan, A., *Power and Society. A framework for political inquiry*, Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 78-80.

²⁷ Sjöblom, G., *Party Strategies in a Multiparty System*, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 1969, pp. 206, 254, 183.

²⁸ Bjereld, U. & Demker, M., *Utrikespolitiken som slagfält* [Foreign policy as a battlefield], Santérus förlag, Stockholm, 1995, p. 18.

Bjereld and Demker rename the electoral arena the *voter arena* and add the *implementation arena*, where parties “maximize influence over the implementation of decisions”; the *media arena* parties use mass media to “maximize voter support on the voter arena”; and the *international arena* where parties tries to “strengthen its position” internationally.²⁹

They point out that the media arena can be considered subordinate to the voter arena, since parties use the media arena to act within the voter arena, since so much of political communication happens through the media channel.³⁰ In this regard, the media itself could also be considered powerful actor within politics. However, since my focus lies on SAP alone, the arenas are merely a tool for analyzing and comparing the behavior of the SAP. For that reason I have decided to treat the voter arena and the media arena as one, calling it the *media/voter arena*. I will also use the parliamentary arena and the internal arena, however I have decided to disregard the implementation arena, since it is irrelevant to the research question and the international arena, since the debate on the Saudi agreement happened within the domestic sphere. Saudi Arabia may still have played a role in the SAP’s policy shift, but that lies outside my research questions.

Bjereld and Demker examines why some foreign policy issues becomes politicized while others do not. Does it depend on ideology or tactical reasons? Their conclusion is “both”. Party ideology is “necessary, but not enough by itself” – *favorable settings* in policy arenas are also needed for issues to become politicized.³¹ For example, if there are no votes to be won, if the media does not care, or if there is no real prospect for success in parliament, settings are unfavorable. The same goes for internal opposition – few rise up to criticize their own party leadership if there is no chance at success in changing the party line.³²

If foreign policy ideology will be the tool for comparing statements in 2005 and 2015, foreign policy arenas will be used to find the empiric material and compare the structural factors. By looking at what happened in each arena, how actors within the SAP acted, it will be easier to see why the debate took off in 2015 and not in 2005.

2.2 Foreign policy ideology

Kjell Goldmann has written about the ideological connection between domestic and foreign

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-20.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 359-61.

³² Ibid.

policy in Sweden. He argues that certain internationalist issues, such as foreign aid, promotion of human rights, global disarmament and criticism towards other states “may perform special kind of domestic-political functions” in Swedish foreign policy.³³

“Internationalist questions are unusual in combining three features: they have ideological overtones; they are unimportant in the sense that one’s impact on developments is likely to be so small that the question of success or failure need not be an important consideration; and there are no strong and well-organized domestic interests with which one must bargain.”³⁴

Or as Bjereld and Demker puts it:

“... Everyday politics have come to lack ideological power and that parties therefore use internationalist foreign policy issues as profile issues or ideological symbolic issues. By politicizing internationalist issues the parties could sharpen their ideological profile, without Sweden’s national security interest being put at risk.”³⁵ [My translation]

This essentially means that foreign policy becomes a cheap substitute set of issues for parties to profile themselves ideologically. As much of foreign policy lies outside of national security and is not happening “at home”, foreign policy is easier to politicize and harder to evaluate for voters than other policy areas.

In International Relations (IR) it has long been recognized that foreign policy is often used to cadre to the home crowd. As the saying goes: “Foreign policy is domestic policy”. This insight is especially important to remember when looking at the Saudi agreement. More than an international issue, it was an intense domestic debate that left no Swede unaware. And since ideology was at the heart of the debate, it is worth examining if it played a part in the outcome.

Foreign policy ideology can be analyzed from different theoretical frameworks. IR is one of them. Another is foreign policy analysis (FPA), which deals with the development, implementation and outcome of foreign policy. It shares some elements with IR, but differs in the respect that FPA concerns itself more with the reasons behind and effect of policy, rather than the nature of power and the international community.

I have used the theoretical framework of Douglas Brommesson and Ann-Marie Ekengren, which shares elements of both IR and FPA. Brommesson and Ekengren compare the effect on

³³ Goldmann, K., ‘Line in the water: International and domestic politics’, *Cooperation and conflict*, 1989, p. 112.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Bjereld & Demker, p. 363.

foreign policy in Sweden and the United Kingdom when a new government enters, by formulating ideal types of foreign policy ideology. They build upon Judith Goldstein’s and Robert Keohane’s definition of ideology as “a system of coherent beliefs on three different levels” and their three categories of ideas to form ideal types: *world views*, *principled beliefs* and *casual beliefs*.

According to Goldstein and Keohane, ideas “define the universe of possibilities for action” and world views are at the most fundamental level about what kind of world we live in. Principled beliefs are normative ideas or “criteria distinguishing right from wrong”. They speak about what *ought* to be, as opposed to what *is*. Finally there are causal beliefs about cause and effect “for the attainment of goals”.³⁶

Brommesson’s and Ekengren’s definition of a foreign policy ideology borrows from Goldstein’s and Keohane’s concept.

“At these different levels, ideology taps into different dimensions, including the role of the individual, the structure of society and the logic of the international system. Of special concern here is what can be described as foreign policy ideology, i.e. a coherent system of worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs that relates to foreign policy. According to this view, foreign policy ideology refers to how a government would like its country to act in relation to the surrounding world.”³⁷

They establish four ideal types of foreign policy ideology: realism, rationalism, Marxist revolutionism and liberal revolutionism. Each ideology has its own goals, assumptions and logic and corresponds to indicators, or *code words* that highlights the differences between ideal types. The code words are a sort of special signifiers or symbolic dividing lines that distinguishes one ideal type from another. They consist of the most important words to each ideology such as *peace*, *sovereignty*, *freedom*, *democracy*, *equality* etc.³⁸

Table 1. Brommesson’s and Ekengren’s four ideal types of foreign policy ideology ³⁹

	Realism	Rationalism	Revolutionism: Marxian	Revolutionism: Liberal
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³⁶ Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R., *Ideas and Foreign policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 8-10.

³⁷ Brommesson, D. & Ekengren, A-M., ‘What happens when a new government enters office? A comparison of ideological change in British and Swedish foreign policy 1991-2011’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, March 2013, 48(1) p. 5.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Worldviews	Anarchy defines the international system and leads to insecurity and state-centricity . There is reason for a gloomier worldview.	Anarchy defines the international system, but its consequences are eased by the existence of common stabilizing norms and collective security .	The international system, with its relations between center and periphery , is characterized by inequality and exploitation .	Actors such as states and individuals are rational and learn to cooperate and defend democratic values . The new globalized world order will build on democracy and human rights. Individuals have universal rights .
Principled beliefs	Self-help : states should not trust anyone but themselves. Sovereignty : states should try to <i>survive</i> and <i>defend</i> their <i>territory</i> .	International law : states should respect common norms and rules . International society : states should cooperate through multilateral institutions .	Peace : states should respect the principle of non-violence . Equality : states, individuals and other actors should try to eradicate inequalities and dependency relationships.	Peace : states should respect the principle of non-violence . Freedom : individuals as well as states should be free and respected. Human rights : states are responsible to respect this norm.
Causal beliefs	Military power is a prerequisite for survival. Uncertainty leads to increased violence.	Norms can affect state behavior in a peaceful direction. International law creates stability .	Poor actors who are united can act together to change the behavior of the rich.	Promoting democracy , extensive trade and links among people can affect the world in a peaceful direction.

Categorizing and identifying the ideologies present in 2005/06 and 2014/15 could help explain if any ideological changes within the SAP led to the party changing their mind about the Saudi agreement. The idea is simple: If a statement from a text matches a code word, it should fit within that ideal type. However, there is a problem. Brommesson's and Ekengren's table is built for a general FPA, comparing states and governments on the most basic presumptions and principles of foreign policy ideology, whilst my aim is to analyze the SAP and the effect of ideology to the Saudi agreement and arms exports. For the framework to be useful in answering my research questions I will have to modify the table using different variables. This brings us to how the variables will be operationalized.

2.3 Operationalization of variables

The unit of analysis is the SAP and its representatives. The dependent variable is the foreign policy ideology of these representatives, identified by their operational indicators: the code

words that they express. This variable will be operationalized into three sub-variables: *identity (role)*, *prioritized interests (ends)* and *method (means)*.

The independent variable is the context, the *foreign policy arena* where a statement is expressed by a representative. The use of arenas connects agency, with context and the bureaucratic position. I will look into three so called foreign policy arenas: the *media/voter arena*, the *parliamentary arena* and the *internal arena*.⁴⁰

For statements in the media/voter arena I will look primarily at news coverage and articles, for statements in the parliamentary arena I will look for parliamentary protocols and for internal arena I will look at all public statements by internal representatives of the SAP whether by press release statements, news coverage or debate articles. See the material and method part for how texts and statements have been gathered.

The first variable, *world view* is central to foreign policy ideology, because it tells you how the proponents of a certain ideology see the world. In Brommesson's and Ekengren's framework, it is a question of the use of power in the international community, whether states are isolated from each other (*anarchy*) or whether the international community is governed to some extent by hierarchy and power structures affecting states (such as a *society of states*, *polarity*, *center and periphery*)? In my analysis however, it is not only a question of how the actors see the world, but how they see Sweden *within* that world. Demker's definition of identity touches upon this.

“Identity is a collective phenomenon [rooted] in what we could call a narrative [...] It describes who we are and why. [...] For an identity to be accepted there needs to be a story about ourselves and our relation to the surroundings [...] Before we can want something, we need to be someone. We cannot be attributed an interest without being someone. [...] In identity explanations, as well as idea explanations, it is the interpretation of the world that is the reason for acting” [My translation]⁴¹

Action presupposes identity and identity presupposes world view. And since I am interested in the actions of the SAP I have used *identity* or *role* instead of world view. The second variable in Brommesson's and Ekengren's framework is *principled beliefs*. According to Goldstein and Keohane, principled beliefs are “criteria for distinguishing right from wrong

⁴⁰ Bjereld & Demker, pp. 18-19.

⁴¹ Demker, M., 'Ideer, normer, identiteter och diskurser i utrikespolitiken' [Ideas, norms, identities and discourses in foreign policy] in Brommesson, D. & Ekengren, A-M. (eds), *Sverige i världen. Om utrikespolitiskt beslutsfattande* [Sweden in the world. About foreign policy decision making], Gleerups, 2011 (2nd ed), p. 57-8.

and just from unjust”.⁴² But since I am interested in the *conflict* of values, not only do I need to know what beliefs are important and how they are expressed in policy, but also *how* important, the prioritization of principled beliefs. Goldstein’s and Keohane’s explanation of how beliefs can be concretized on a lower level of abstraction is of use here.

“Principled beliefs mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions: they translate fundamental doctrines into guidelines for contemporary human action.”⁴³

Just as world views exist on a higher level of abstraction from principled beliefs, *prioritized interests* exists on a lower level. They are the translation of principled beliefs into the prioritization of long term foreign policy ends to be strived for. In the case of the Saudi agreement, a central ideological issue is how the SAP prioritize between trade and human rights. In order to be able to answer such questions I have simply lowered the level of abstraction and used the variable *prioritized interests* or *ends* instead of *principled beliefs*.

Brommesson’s and Ekengren’s third variable, *causal beliefs* are beliefs about how causal relations fulfill principled beliefs, i.e. what leads to what in order to attain what is essentially good or desirable. For instance, liberals believe promoting democracy and upholding good trade relations can lead to upholding human rights, and realists believe that military power leads to security and ensures sovereignty. Here my problem is the opposite – the variable is too specific. On causal relation is too little to indicate a whole foreign policy ideology. Again, Goldstein’s and Keohane’s is of use.

“[...] Casual beliefs are beliefs about cause and effect relationships. [They] imply strategies for the attainment of goals”⁴⁴

This means that on a more general level, the question is no longer “what leads to what” but “how can Sweden best attain her foreign policy goals (or in my case prioritized interests)?” To answer I have elevated the level of abstraction, and used the variable *method* instead of (*means*).*causal beliefs*. This is how the theoretical framework have changed.

⁴² Goldstein & Keohane, p 9.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Goldstein & Keohane, p. 10.

Table 2. Adapted theoretical framework for Swedish foreign policy ideology

	Ideology A	Ideology B
Identity (role)	Code word a1	Code word b1
Prioritized Interests (ends)	Code word a2	Code word b2
Method (means)	Code word a3	Code word b3

3 Method

In this study I explore ideological perspectives of foreign policy in the case of the Swedish SAP and the Saudi agreement. Looking at statements from SAP representatives, I want to see what ideological perspectives were apparent when the agreement was signed in 2005 and terminated in 2015. Instead of creating new material by doing interviews, I have decided to use textual material that already exists in the form of protocols, policy documents and news articles, and to make a comparative qualitative text analysis. The big advantage of this is that it saves time and avoids many of the methodological issues that have to do with interviewing a subject, such as building trust, asking the right questions, getting honest answers and interpreting them correctly.

To find texts with relevant statements, I have systematically searched through the press coverage, parliament protocols and policy documents within both time periods. I have used the website of the Swedish parliament to find protocols of debates and the websites of both government parties to find policy documents. For press coverage I have used the web tool ‘Media archive’ (Swedish: *Mediearkivet*) where nearly all Swedish press is indexed and searchable. I have looked through all documents relating to the keywords ‘Saudi Arabia’, ‘arms exports’ and ‘the Saudi agreement’ in the Riksdag sessions of 2005/06 and 2014/15.

The texts will be analyzed from two theoretical viewpoints: foreign policy ideology and foreign policy arenas. After going through both years, variable by variable I will construct ideal types of foreign policy ideology and compare them, discuss where different actors and

their statements belong ideologically and make an assessment of how the settings for each policy arena changed between 2005 and 2015. This will help illustrate what ideological perspectives stood against each other and what changed inside the SAP between the 2005 and 2015.

3.1 Qualitative textual analysis

There are many ways to examine texts. For instance, discourse analysis is a useful tool for highlighting language and power structures; argumentation analysis highlights the principles behind arguments; and there are also normative approaches like idea criticism. But since my effort is to identify and compare ideological perspectives, I have chosen comparative qualitative textual analysis instead, using ideal types to classify ideological perspectives apparent in the texts.

Qualitative textual analysis is about finding meaning in the texts. Peter Esaiasson et al describe how the method starts out by simply reading the texts thoroughly, many times over:

“What the researcher is out to capture is assumed to be larger than the sum of its parts. In less mystical wording this means that some passages in the text are considered more important than others. [...] The sought-after content can only be brought out through intense reading of the text.”⁴⁵ [My translation]

In other words, I am not only after what the text is literally saying, I also want to know what it says between the lines. Language is important in this regard, but also the broader context of the text itself. Questions like “Who is writing, what kind of text is it, to what audience and for what purpose?” are important. All these are addressed through the tool of policy arenas.

3.2 Ideal type classifications

The German sociologist Max Weber defined ideal types as a development or a pattern which “brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system.”⁴⁶

Easier put, ideal types is a tool to help determine the basic characteristics of a certain phenomenon in relation to others, a method of classification. By finding relevant variables and putting them in a classificatory analysis scheme – usually a table of rows and columns – essential differences are highlighted and the subject becomes more easily understood. Setting

⁴⁵ Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, H. & Wängnerud, L., *Metodpraktikan*, [The method practica] (3rd ed), Nordstedts Juridik, Stockholm, 2007, p. 237.

⁴⁶ Weber, M., *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949, p 90.

up indicators for each variable, the researcher can operationalize the categories of the analysis scheme into concrete properties – easier put, knowing what to look for when determining where something belongs. In my case I will use code words for each variable that signifies and exemplifies the differences between ideological perspectives in Swedish foreign policy.⁴⁷

3.3 Methodological criticism

One criticism that can be directed against qualitative textual analysis is that the methodological framework can be quite loose. Interpreting texts are by definition a subjective undertaking. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it has to be acknowledged, in order for my conclusions to be credible. Demonstrating the text and being clear on how interpretations are made will be important for building credibility towards the reader. I use quotes extensively to show what words I interpret in what manner. This makes the study easier to repeat and it enables it to be critiqued accurately, as in interpreting a certain passage or texts differently etc.

Concerning ideal types, it is important to note is that they are not representations of reality, but merely stereotypical extremes that helps to identify essential boundaries that separates one thing from another. Esaiasson et al write:

“[...] Ideal types do not exist in reality, but are though out extreme representations of the phenomenon in question. The ideal types aim to clarify important properties of the phenomenon. [...] What is *typical* for the phenomenon examined?”⁴⁸

This means that I am looking for the “purest” form of different ideological perspectives apparent, not a perfect or holistic description of reality.

3.4 Source criticism

Looking within the three arenas, I have chosen texts with statements that are relevant for the case – they all texts have SAP statements about the Saudi agreement or Swedish foreign policy. I have practically scanned through all material available during both time periods. Finding a relevant quote in the parliamentary arena was easy, since each statement is available in its entirety by record. In news articles, where the author has interviewed or quoted a representative, the challenge was to find the longest version of each quote (newspapers do re-writes of each other and often use the same news agencies) by double checking similar articles from different papers. Using only the actual quotes and disregarding the rest of

⁴⁷ Esaiasson et al. pp. 158-160.

⁴⁸ Esaiasson et al, p. 158.

articles lessens the risk of distorting the meaning by adapting the media narrative. That being said, one still has to take into account the different context of each statement. I do this primarily by having in mind what arena each text comes from. Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey put it elegantly.

“...Documentary reality does not consist of descriptions of the social world that can be used directly as evidence about it [...] [Texts] construct their own kinds of reality. Rather than ask whether an account is true, or whether it can be used as ‘valid’ evidence about a research setting, it is more fruitful to ask ourselves questions about the form and function of texts themselves”⁴⁹

3.5 Validity problems

A research challenge is the fact that in 2005 the Saudi agreement was signed by a purely SAP government, but in 2015 it was terminated by a red-green coalition government. Perhaps the most obvious explanation as to why 2005 was different from 2015 exists in the parliamentary arena: in 2005 the SAP governed alone, but in 2015 they shared power with the Green Party in a coalition government. Renewing the agreement, in effect forcing the Green Party to stand by it, would either have come at a very large political cost in return, or the risk of braking the an already historically weak minority government. I am very aware of this fact. However this is not what this study is about. This study is about exploring if there could have been another factor that played in as well, namely what happened ideologically within the SAP.

By widening the perspective from just the parliamentary arena, other factors within the SAP become visible. For instance, conflicting statements to the media/voter statements by different SAP ministers and members of parliament, or the internal uproar from SAP organizations and members of parliament. It might be that these factors were in turn influenced by the actions of the Green Party, the public, or the media coverage, but the fact that something seems to have happened within the SAP, makes it worth examining if that “something” was a part of the explanation for the shift in policy.

Using only statements by the SAP enhances the internal validity and makes sure my conclusions are to the point.⁵⁰ Choosing two time periods with 10 years apart, but with the SAP in government, also strengthens the internal validity, because it puts the party in the same position, making it easier to see the changes *within* the party.

⁴⁹ Atkinson, P. & Coffey, A., ‘Analysing documentary realities’ in Silverman, D., *Qualitative research: Theory method and practice* (2nd ed), London, 2004, p. 73.

⁵⁰ Esaiasson, et al, p. 100.

It is also important to talk about the external validity, i.e. to what extent my conclusions on the SAP and the Saudi agreement can be applied to other cases.⁵¹ I would argue that the strength of my study primarily lies in the case selection. As Saudi Arabia is one of the largest receivers of Swedish arms exports, while being notorious for violating human rights, the agreement is not only representative of how arms exports work in Sweden, it is also representative of the ideological conflict within the SAP and in Swedish foreign policy.

On top of that the Saudi agreement is particularly suitable to research, because it had the SAP *publicly* debating itself, explicitly questioning the basic assumptions of their stance and disclosing some of the ideological building blocks of Swedish foreign policy. This does not make my conclusions applicable for the entirety of Swedish arms exports, foreign policy nor the SAP, but it should shed some light on the ideological aspects of all three.

3.6 Limitations

As mentioned above, this study is a limited pilot study that focuses on the SAP and its leading representatives on the issue of arms export regulations through the case of the Saudi agreement. The analysis is focused on two times periods: the Riksdag session [*Swedish*: Riksmöte] of 2005/06 from mid-September 2005 to mid-September 2006, during which the agreement was signed and brought up in parliament; and in the Riksdag session of 2014/15, specifically from September 2014, when the new government entered, to the 10th of March 2015, when government announced they would terminate the agreement.

3.7 Material

The material will consist of relevant texts containing statements from each arena during the two time periods. For the *media/voter arena* and the *internal arena* the texts are mainly news- and debate articles. In the *parliamentary arena* they are protocols from parliamentary debates. The statements will be presented in detail in the analysis parts below. For an overview of each text, actor, statement and arena, see the appendix.

4 Ideologies and arenas in 2005/06

By the early 2000's Saudi Arabia had a military expenditure nearly 10 percent, but was still without an own defense industry, making it one the largest arms importers of the world. To

⁵¹ Ibid.

cut costs and lessen US dependence the Saudis were going to have to learn how to manufacture their own arms.

In Sweden the SAP government and SAAB-Ericsson were looking to find a buyer to finance the new Erieye radar system. After a period of intense lobbying, it soon became clear for the Swedes that the Erieye system was just a stepping stone to something larger. Sweden would get steady sales and consultant money. In return, Saudi Arabia would come on their way to getting its own arms industry.⁵²

When the MoU was signed in 2005 negotiations had been in the works for years. The level of secrecy had been so high that according to government sources, even Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds (SAP) had been kept in the dark until the very end, and was faced with a fait accompli. As the agreement had already been negotiated, it fell upon her and Defense Minister Leni Björklund (SAP) to carry the agreement for the SAP government.⁵³

4.1 Identity (role)

When announcing the agreement to the press, Defense Minister Björklund talked about the role of Sweden in relation to the world, especially Saudi Arabia.

“That country has a central position within the Muslim world. In Saudi Arabia is Mecca and Medina. We as a part of the Western world needs to an exchange with the Islamic world. If you have an exchange, there is opportunity to discuss those issues where we do not have agree. It is not like we are changing our view about human rights.”⁵⁴ [My translation]

Sweden is a part of the Western world, Björklund argued. In that capacity, it was necessary and only natural that Sweden had ties with important states within the Muslim world, such as Saudi Arabia. Sure, there were differences, but that was fine – just as Sweden could keep its tradition on human rights, so could Saudi Arabia. But it was not in Sweden’s place to tell the Muslim world what legal traditions and constitutional rights to follow. That seemed to lie outside the capability and realm of Swedish foreign policy.

Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds was on the same page when defending the agreement in parliament.

⁵² Bodin, B-G. & Öhman, D., *Saudivapen*, Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, 2014.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Eriksson, K., Dagens Nyheter, March 12th 2015, ‘Kritiken kom – men när avtalet slöts var det tyst’ [The criticism came – but when the agreement was struck it was silent].

“Saudi Arabia is our most important export market in the Arab world. [...] The government is hoping for increased Saudi investments. [...] Cooperation and open channels offer the possibility to exchange views and experiences, [...] to least regarding the respect for human rights.”⁵⁵

[My translation]

Freivalds hinted that Sweden was too small to afford the risk of upsetting a regional great power like Saudi Arabia. Swedish welfare depended on jobs and growth, which in turn depend on exports that could not be risked.

This view was contrasted within the SAP only by the Association of Christian Social Democrats (ACSD) who published a press statement protesting the agreement.

“Swedish arms exports must comply with the cornerstones of Swedish foreign policy, i.e. the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development.”⁵⁶ [My translation]

4.2 Prioritized interests (ends)

As described above, both Björklund and Freivalds emphasized Sweden’s need for exports as a small country, which implicitly put limits on any Swedish criticism of other states. In parliament Freivalds went on to talk about the prioritization of interests of Swedish foreign policy.

“I read this interpellation as about the balancing between different goals in Swedish foreign policy. [...] Trade and investment promotion is part of the government’s program for more jobs and sustainable growth. The trade policy interests is *one* part of many parts of the foreign policy. Development, migration and security are other central elements of Swedish foreign policy. So is also, [...] the effort to promote the respect of human rights. The protection of human rights is a priority within Swedish foreign policy that must affect and permeate all its parts. [...] Saudi Arabia is an economic, religious and political great power with significant influence in the region. [...] Altogether Saudi Arabia is a country with which cooperation and exchange on all levels within different areas gain Swedish foreign policy interests in a wide sense.”⁵⁷

[My translation]

Human rights was merely *one* part among many in Swedish foreign policy. Other interests like trade, development and security also had to be taken into account, Freivalds argued. And while human rights *was* a priority and *was* being considered in the case of the Saudi agreement, other factors carried more weight.

⁵⁵ Freivalds, L., Protocol of parliament 2005/06:56 January 17th 2006:

’Answer to interpellation 2005/06:150 about Sweden’s relations with Saudi Arabia’

⁵⁶ Association of Christian Social Democrats, Press release, November 19th 2005.

⁵⁷ Freivalds, L., Protocol of parliament 2005/06:56 January 17th 2006.

Again, this view was only contrasted within the SAP by the ACSD (also known as “The Brotherhood movement”).

“Industrial policy reasons should never be the basis for licensing [of arms exports]. Swedish arms exports to Saudi Arabia should these reasons firmly rejected”⁵⁸ [My translation]

4.3 Method (means)

At her press conference, Defense Minister Björklund explained Sweden’s stance concerning the Saudi agreement and human rights.

“By having an exchange, we also have respect for each other, so that we also can win respect for each other’s views.”⁵⁹ [My translation]

And in parliament, Foreign Minister Freivalds elaborated on the means for affecting other states.

“Mr. Speaker! How we should relate to the countries that are dictatorships and countries where human rights are violated every day is a recurring issue that we have to take a position. Sometimes it leads us to conclude that it is best to isolate the country as much as possible, cut off all relations and not to have any contacts with the country concerned. During decades of trying by different types of policies we have come to the realization that isolation seldom leads to a positive development in a dictatorship, and in a country where human rights are violated. On the contrary, [it is] by continuing to maintain relations, develop relationships, [...] that changes may eventually happen.”⁶⁰ [My translation]

Not only did deals like the Saudi agreement lead to jobs and growth, Freivalds argued – they were also good for human rights. In fact, according to Freivalds, it was *only* through interactions such as the Saudi agreement, that real democratic change could be achieved. The alternative, she said, would have been to cut off all relations, to isolate the country as much as possible. The Foreign Minister made no distinction between military cooperation and arms exports on the one hand, and general trade agreements with civil goods on the other – trade was trade. That point that was criticized by the ACSD.

“The Brotherhood Movement welcomes the government for political dialogue even with dictatorships, because isolation and boycott, only in exceptional cases is effective foreign policy means. [...] However, we found it hard to see how a deepened military cooperation and an extensive

⁵⁸ Association of Christian Social Democrats, Press release, November 19th 2005.

⁵⁹ [Editorial], Aftonbladet, ‘Var finns konsekvensen?’ [Where is the consequence?], November 19th 2005

⁶⁰ Freivalds, L., Protocol of parliament 2005/06:56 January 17th 2006.

arms trade to Saudi Arabia in any way could be positive for the development of events in the Middle East nor the forces that courageously and steadfastly working for democracy in the Arab world.”⁶¹

Freivalds’ finishing point in parliament was that Sweden were already criticizing Saudi Arabia through the EU, a much better method in her view.

“With the worrying situation for human rights in mind, Saudi Arabia is important in our and the EU’s engagement in human rights and democracy. [...] Sweden is on the forefront of addressing the lack of respect for human rights in Saudi Arabia, both bilaterally, through the EU and UN context. The EU has on several occasions publicly expressed its condemnation of the use of the death penalty, torture and restrictions on freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia. The same applies to our concern for the status of women. With Swedish support, there is currently a debate within the EU on how to more systematically examine and call to attention both deficiencies and progress on human rights in the Arabian Peninsula.”⁶² [My translation]

Altogether Freivalds and Björklund argued that rather than acting alone and in the open, it was wiser to act together with others and backstage. Real change would come from “respectful talks” as Björklund said, not at the barricades of the world press. This view was further confirmed as the SAP government’s official position in the committee of the constitution.

“It is the view of the administration that cooperation gives unique opportunities to talks about development in different aspects of society. Good and confident relations create better settings for submitting rightful criticism, for example in the area of human rights.”⁶³

4.4 Pragmatic Realpolitik

In the dominating ideal type of 2005, Sweden was seen as limited by its size, creating a need for carefulness in its foreign policy. Small states like Sweden had to mind the fact that we were vulnerable to the actions of larger states, such as Saudi Arabia and therefor had to play along best they could, without hurting their core self-interests: real results at home, such as export revenue and keeping a strong defense. This was a classic realist approach to foreign policy, keeping idealism and moral principles aside of realpolitik gains.

However, there was also a focus on institutions such as the EU and UN. This signaled the importance of the international society. In fact, the method for change that was talked about had to do with norms and tying states together by trade – classic rationalist values. This view,

⁶¹ Association of Christian Social Democrats, Press release, November 19th 2005.

⁶² Freivalds, L., Protocol of parliament 2005/06:56 January 17th 2006.

⁶³ 2005/06:KU20 Konstitutionsutskottets granskningsbetänkande [Committee of the Constitution’s General Examination], June 14th 2006.

that both realist self-interest and rationalist norms had be taken into account, was above all a pragmatic stance. If the world used both, then Sweden would too. I have called this a mixture of realist and rationalist principles *pragmatic realpolitik*.

The stance was similar to the pragmatic flexibility of the Swedish neutrality during both World War 2. Formally Sweden had a policy of strict neutrality, but depending on where the winds of battle where blowing it could allow herself to make exceptions when necessary, balancing between the risk of appeasing the winning side (Germany in the beginning of the war, and the Allied powers at the end of it).⁶⁴ Here Sweden was formally a human rights advocator working for disarmament, but happy to bend its principles when it inflicts Swedish defense or export interests.

Table 3. Identity (role), Prioritized interests (ends) and Method (means) of Swedish foreign policy in 2005.

	Pragmatic Realpolitik (2005/06)
Identity (role)	Sweden is a small and vulnerable Northern European actor with limited capability and influence, minding its own business, working with others , acting within the limits of its authority.
Prioritized Interests (ends)	Rational realist self-interests: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade over human rights. - Status: Gaining within existing int. system - Getting in center of EU & CSFP
Method (means)	Pragmatism: Silent diplomacy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence internally - Get behind rather than in front - Better safe than sorry

4.5 Arena settings

In the media/voter arena hardly any attention was given to the Saudi agreement in 2005. The SAP government solidly held their party line and apart from a few questions the agreement passed relatively calmly through the media news cycle. All in all the agreement was described loosely and in general terms, instead of a detailed military cooperation agreement. And

⁶⁴ Andren, N. & Möller, Y., *Från Undén till Palme: Svensk utrikespolitik efter andra världskriget* [From Palme to Undén, Swedish foreign policy after the second world war], Norstedts, Stockholm, 1990, p. 39.

without any real media attention and the issue just did not seem controversial. All in all the reporting concentrated around the day the agreement was announced.

In the parliamentary arena, there were protests from the Liberal Party who wrote an interpellation and filed a complaint to the Committee of the Constitution. The Left Party and Green Party joined in this criticism. But these parties only gathered roughly a quarter of the mandates in parliament, meaning there was no real prospect at success in parliament.

In the internal arena, the SAP managed to stay clear of any internal opposition, with the exception of the ACSD, not the most powerful of the party’s organizations. Like the other parties had no real prospect at success in parliament, the internal SAP organizations had no real prospect at success in changing the party line, nor did they attract any real media attention. All in all the conditions for politicizing the Saudi agreement by speaking out against it were unfavorable in all three arenas.

Table 4. Foreign policy arena settings for politicizing the Saudi Agreement in 2005/06 and 2014/15

	2005/06
Media/voter arena	<p>Unfavorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No media attention -No public outrage -No knowledge of the details
Parliamentary arena	<p>Unfavorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Protesters in minority -Government united and determined -No government actors protesting
Internal arena	<p>Unfavorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No votes to be gained -No real prospect of success

5 Ideologies and arenas in 2014/15

In 2015 the memory of the Saudi arms factory scandal in 2012 was fresh, both in the public and in the media. The story then, had ended with the resignation of the Swedish Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors (Moderate Party) and a promise from several parties that new regulation would be set up, so that Sweden would no longer be able to export arms to dictatorships like Saudi Arabia. A parliamentary inquiry was set up to investigate how new regulation could be formulated and implemented, and in the election of 2014 both parties

renewed their promises for a democracy criteria. When Prime Minister Stefan Löfven declared he wanted to keep the agreement in renegotiated form, it was a clear break from earlier pledges, and therefore highly controversial.

5.1 Identity (role)

In 2014 the government agreement between the SAP and the Green Party – the joint policy document on which they were to base their policy for the next four years – the parties spoke about Sweden’s role in the world.

”Sweden shall be a strong voice in the world for freedom, peace, human rights and solidarity. Sweden’s voice shall always be clear and distinct when human dignity is violated. Human rights, international law, global disarmament and the effort against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction shall be cornerstones in Swedish foreign policy.⁶⁵ [My translation]

Here, Sweden was no longer regarded a small state among others that needed to think carefully before speaking its mind. On the contrary, Sweden would stand up, speak out when human rights were violated, her voice *always* clear and distinct. This reverberated the idea of a moral superpower or global conscious version of Sweden. The fact that disarmament and human rights were considered cornerstones, said something about Sweden’s view on arming dictators. In the next paragraph, three points were lined up.

- “Arms exports regulation to non-democracies shall be strengthened, including subsequent deliveries and consulting services.
- The arms exports agency (FXM) will be closed down.
- The Swedish Policy for Global Development must get a fresh start. All political decisions must take into account human rights, democratic participation, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability.”⁶⁶

Not only would the government speak out for human rights and disarmament – *every political decision* also had to take human rights, poverty and democracy into account. “Policy for Global Development” was a groundbreaking policy document when it was presented in 2003. The idea was for all policy areas to pull in the same direction when it came to human rights, development and sustainability, as a response to earlier strategies where trade policy oftentimes conflicted with aid, environment or foreign policy. Recalling the commitment to the policy also spoke in the direction of a ‘moral’ foreign policy.

⁶⁵ SAP and the Green Party, Government agreement, 2014, pp. 13-14.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

The same theme was repeated when Foreign Minister Wallström presented the Foreign Policy Statement [Swedish: *Utrikesdeklarationen*], the yearly declaration on Swedish foreign policy, only two weeks after the debate about the Saudi agreement had started.

“Safeguarding human rights is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy. A strategy for human rights, democracy and the rule of law is now being drafted. [...] We cannot stand idly by while freedom of speech is threatened, or while journalists are imprisoned, kidnapped and killed. [...] Sweden will be a bridge-builder and have a strong voice in international development policy. [...] In these unsettled times, it is crucial that we take resolute action for disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [...] Atrocities must be recognized for what they are. ISIL’s violence and terrorism are of the most pervasive and heinous kind. [...] The insecurity in our region, the ruthlessness of terrorism, the irrefutable fact of climate change, the vulnerability of the cyber society and the injustice of inequality all serve as a reminder. It is precisely at this moment – in unsettled times – that we must not hesitate. [...] The Government is determined that, in these unsettled times, Sweden will take global responsibility by being a strong voice in the world.”⁶⁷

While the Statement also emphasized cooperation within the EU and the UN, and “building security with others”, there was still a strong focus on virtues in this view on foreign policy; the righteousness of standing up, the courage of speaking truth to power etc. When Sweden, a few months earlier, had announced that it would become the first EU-member state ever to recognize Palestine, it was an example of this new turn. Both Israel and the United States criticized the decision, to which Foreign Minister Wallström replied:

“It was expected that we would get criticism for this, but it is not the USA that decides our policy. We will continue to have a constructive dialogue with the USA and explain our motives and reasons.”⁶⁸

The move to recognize Palestine was partly seen in light of Sweden’s new focus towards the UN and its candidacy to the Security Council. The Swedish slogan, somewhat controversial to the right-wing opposition parties, read “Global solidarity – independent voice”, and signaled a step back from the EU CSFP and Western consensus.

5.2 Prioritized interests (ends)

To repeat from the government agreement and the Foreign Policy Statement, human rights and disarmament were seen as “cornerstones of Swedish foreign policy”. Human rights would even be taken into account “in every political decision”. This indicated something about the

⁶⁷ Wallström, M., Statement of Foreign Policy 2015, p. 7.

⁶⁸ Makar, M., ‘Wallström: USA bestämmer inte vår utrikespolitik’ [Wallström: The United States does not decide our foreign policy], SVT, October 5th 2015.

priorities, should trade and human rights policy come into conflict. Although Wallström in the foreign policy statement did point out trade and export promotion as important, she also emphasized that such trade be sustainable.

“Promotion of exports, imports and investment in Sweden is an integral part of foreign policy and thus the responsibility of the entire Government. [...] A presence in new growth markets requires active efforts on sustainable business practices. We want to see the innovative capacity of Swedish companies mobilized so as to contribute to more jobs, greater growth and sustainable development.”⁶⁹

These views were absent when Prime Minister Löfven stated that the government wanted to renegotiate the Saudi agreement. Like Björklund and Freivalds had done ten years prior, Löfven pointed to the value of trade and the risk of the alternative – isolation.

“We should also remember that contact with other countries is important for many reasons. Even the countries that we think have the wrong policies and do not stand up for human rights, are good for democratic countries have contact with, not least through trade. There are other countries where we do not have the same view when it comes to human rights we still have a trade in. I mean to make sure we maintain that.”⁷⁰ [My translation]

This signaled a division between two priorities, and two preferences of foreign policy, but judging from the internal response, Wallström fronted the dominant one. The youth league wrote in a debate article:

“Sweden's stance on international issues of human rights should be crystal clear. Sweden's military cooperation with a harsh dictatorship must not be allowed to continue.”⁷¹ [My translation]

On a similar note three SAP members of parliament in another debate article wrote:

“Arms trade and arming of rogue states can hardly be legitimized by the argument that trade is good - or the fear of reduced Swedish exports. [...] The only argument remaining for continuing arms cooperation with Saudi Arabia is that we would otherwise lose significant export revenues. That is not sustainable. In the choice between money and human rights the answer should be simple.”⁷² [My translation]

⁶⁹ Wallström, M., Statement of Foreign Policy 2015, p. 7.

⁷⁰ Löfven, S., Protocol from parliament: ‘The Prime Minister’s question time’, January 29th 2015.

⁷¹ Eriksson, E. & Rasmusson, M., ‘Nu krävs klarspråk om Saudiarabien’ [Plain language now needed about Saudi Arabia], Svenska Dagbladet, February 11th 2015, ‘Nu krävs klarspråk om Saudiarabien’ [Plain language now needed about Saudi Arabia]

⁷² Büser J., Karlsson, S. & Redar, L., ‘Sveriges militära avtal med Saudiarabien måste brytas’ [Sweden’s military agreement with Saudi Arabia must be broken], Dagens Nyheter, February 20th 2015.

This view was consistent with the message of the government agreement between SAP and the Green Party as well as the Foreign Policy Statement, that human rights would have priority before trade.

5.3 Method (means)

The statements above also gave an indication as to how Sweden best could best attain its foreign policy goals and could go about promoting human rights. Contrary to the view of the Prime Minister, most of the SAP statements in 2015 pointed to speaking out and cherishing Sweden's reputation as "a strong voice for human rights", having the courage to act independently – even if it meant running the risk of criticism or loss of exports revenue.

Sweden would best achieve its Foreign Policy goals by acting front stage, profiling and identifying itself against others as an entrepreneur for human rights. A lot of the language in the Foreign policy doctrine signaled this:

“We cannot silently watch as... [...] In troubled times, it is crucial to act vigorously... [...] Abuses should be called by their correct names. [...] It is precisely now - when times are troubled - that we should not hesitate. [...] It is the Government's firm resolve to Sweden, in troubled times, to take global responsibility by being a strong voice in the world.”⁷³

5.4 Active Internationalism

In the dominating ideal type of 2015, Sweden was considered a moral superpower and global conscience with its own independent foreign policy. The Swedish voice for human rights would be strong, not hesitant to speak out against violations. All Swedish political decisions would take human rights into account and human rights would be prioritized before trade. These were core internationalist principles. As Goldmann describes it:

“Such matters are related to Sweden's national interest only indirectly: by virtue of the fact that a better world for everybody is a better world also for Sweden. The essence of this kind of international-political action is a desire to improve conditions generally by the application of norms thought to be universally valid rather than to further one's own immediate national interests to the best of one's ability. The term “internationalist” policy is used here to denote this phenomenon.”⁷⁴

Sweden could achieve its goals by using the discursive power that comes with being part of the international community. This was an activist stance, getting in front of rather than behind

⁷³ Wallström, M., Foreign Policy Statement, 2015.

⁷⁴ Goldmann, K., ‘Line in the water: International and domestic politics’, *Cooperation and conflict*, 1989, p. 112.

a policy for change, transforming the system from without rather than gaining position within the existing system.

In 2011, Bjereld wrote that the active internationalism of Olof Palme would no longer be possible in our time, because the international community is so fundamentally different. Intertwined with others through the CFSP, it is no longer possible for Sweden to be neutral nor have an independent foreign policy.⁷⁵

While it is true that the world has changed, and that the conditions today are radically different than during the cold war, there is no reason why the principles of active internationalism couldn't be applied through these new settings. As evident from the empirical results, active internationalism is more than just a certain historical period of Swedish foreign policy. Like pragmatic realpolitik it is a foreign policy ideology built on principals rather than specifics.

Table 5. Identity (role), Prioritized interests (ends) and Method (means) of Swedish foreign policy in 2015.

	Active Internatonalism (2014/15)
Identity (role)	Sweden is an independent moral superpower, a 'conscience of the world', a peace-loving, diplomatic force for good , taking the side of the smaller, poorer and non-aligned states unable to fend for themselves.
Prioritized Interests (ends)	Identity interests: - Human rights over trade. - Transformation : Gaining by transforming the int. system -Getting in center of UN
Method (means)	Activism : Speaking out: - Influence externally - Get in front rather than behind - Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

5.5 Arena settings

In 2015 the media/voter arena was buzzing with opinions and outrage over the Saudi agreement. The story about whether the government would renew the agreement or not for a time practically dominated every news program, social media platform and editorial in the

⁷⁵ Bjereld, U., 'Svensk utrikespolitik i ett historiskt perspektiv' [Swedish foreign policy in a historical perspective] in Brommesson, D. & Ekengren, A-M. (eds), *Sverige i världen. Om utrikespolitiskt beslutsfattande* [Sweden in the world. About foreign policy desicion making], Gleerups, 2011 (2nd ed), pp. 47-8.

country. All parties were asked to take a stand. With the arms factory scandal of 2012 in fresh memory, both the media and the public – not least via social media – created immense pressure on the government, and the SAP in particular to terminate the agreement. Not only was the government divided between parties, but the SAP themselves seemed torn and hesitant on the matter.

In the parliamentary arena protests quickly grew once the opposition realized where the wind was blowing, and saw a chance to criticize the divided government. The last days before announcing the termination of the agreement, all parties had taken a stand against renewing it. There were votes to be won here, and there was a real prospect of success.

That must have also been felt by the internal opposition which had grown to practically every notable internal SAP organization, including not only the Religious Social Democrats of Sweden (formally the ACSD), but also the SAP youth league, the student union and the women’s federation. In 2015, even SAP members of parliament and dared to speak out. With support both from the outside and inside, there was a real prospect at changing the party line.

Table 6. Foreign policy arena settings for politicizing the Saudi Agreement in 2015

	2014/15
Media/voter arena	<p>Favorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Large media attention -Massive public outrage -Good knowledge of the details
Parliamentary arena	<p>Favorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Protesters in majority -Government divided and hesitant -Government actors (Green Party) protesting
Internal arena	<p>Favorable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Votes to be gained -Real prospect of success

6 Conclusions

I have shown that at the time when the Saudi agreement was signed in 2005, as well as when it was terminated in 2015, there were two main ideological perspectives apparent within the SAP: pragmatic realpolitik and active internationalism. So much for the similarities. The biggest difference was that the former was dominant in 2005/06 and the latter in 2014/15.

Table 7. Ideal types of Swedish foreign policy ideology in 2005/06 & 2014/15.

	Pragmatic Realpolitik (2005/06)	Active Internationalism (2014/15)
Identity (role)	Sweden is a small and vulnerable Northern European actor with limited capability and influence, minding its own business, working with others , acting within the limits of its authority.	Sweden is an independent moral superpower, a 'conscience of the world', a peace-loving, diplomatic force for good , taking the side of the smaller, poorer and non-aligned states unable to fend for themselves.
Prioritized Interests (ends)	Rational realist self-interests: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade over human rights. - Status: Gaining within existing int. system - Getting in center of EU & CSFP 	Identity interests: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human rights over trade. - Transformation: Gaining by transforming the int. system - Getting in center of UN
Method (means)	Pragmatism : Silent diplomacy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence internally - Get behind rather than in front - Better safe than sorry 	Activism : Speaking out: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence externally - Get in front rather than behind - Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

To the extent that ideology matters, this shift in ideological preferences can explain the shift in policy outcome: in 2005 when the agreement was signed, the party line of pragmatic realpolitik favored trade and good relations with everyone before speaking out against human rights violations, but in 2015 when the agreement was terminated, active internationalism dominated the SAP, a foreign policy ideology that makes a point out of actively and loudly protesting, even if it puts trade interests at risk.

However, my empiric results show that there is more to it than that. Opening up the SAP and looking at the actors within, it becomes clear that rather than everyone simply changing their mind, there were two other main reasons for the ideological shift.

The first reason was that the composition of actors had changed within the SAP leadership. By outlining what actor represented what foreign policy ideology in what year, we get a good overview of how the actor-ideology landscape changed within the SAP from 2005/06 to 2014/15.

Table 8. Actors, arenas and ideal types of Swedish foreign policy ideologies in 2005/06 and 2014/15.

	Pragmatic Realpolitik	Active Internationalism
2005/06	Björklund (Defense Minister) Freivalds (Foreign Minister)	ACSD
2014/15	Löfven (Prime Minister)	Wallström (Foreign Minister) SAP members of parliament SAP youth league SAP student union SAP women's federation SAP religious association

In 2005 the SAP leadership was solidly in majority, only opposed by a small internal organization and a few small opposition parties in parliament. In 2015, the Prime Minister was basically on his own against the Foreign Minister, and all of the internal party organizations. Those pertaining to active internationalism had moved forward their positions and tipped scale in their favor in 2014/15. This changed the party line.

The second (and related) reason why the shift in ideology was possible comes from what changes outside of the party: the settings inside each of the foreign policy arenas. In 2005/06 the settings were solidly unfavorable for politicizing (i.e. openly opposing) the Saudi agreement. In 2014/15 the complete opposite was true.

Table 9. Foreign policy arena settings for politicizing the Saudi Agreement in 2005 and 2015

	2005/06	2014/15
Media/voter arena	Unfavorable -No media attention -No public outrage -No knowledge of the details	Favorable -Large media attention -Massive public outrage -Good knowledge of the details
Parliamentary arena	Unfavorable -Protesters in minority -Government united and determined -No government actors protesting	Favorable -Protesters in majority -Government divided and hesitant -Government actors (Green Party) protesting
Internal arena	Unfavorable -No votes to be gained -No real prospect of success	Favorable -Votes to be gained -Real prospect of success

It is my conclusion that the change in the SAP internal actor-ideology landscape interacted with the changed foreign policy arena settings, mutually reinforcing each other. Without the right settings, voices that were silent in 2005 would not have dared to speak out in 2015, and without them speaking out, the settings on the outside would not have been as favorable. Once the protests reached a critical mass, the pragmatic realists within the SAP, personified by Prime Minister Löfven, found themselves in minority, with more to lose from standing their ground than from giving in.

6.1 Future research

There has already been a great deal written about the different arguments for and against exporting arms. However the structures and power dynamics affecting what arguments become policy, have not been equally explored. My aim has been to explore ideology within Swedish arms exports, Swedish foreign policy and the SAP. Hopefully the conclusions says something about all three. But this being a pilot case study, there is certainly more work to be done.

Future research could explore more examples of arms exports and foreign policy, a longer time period and more actors – either Social democratic parties in neighboring countries, or other parties in Sweden. Is there a similar pattern to be found or is Sweden and the SAP unique? Are there other examples where foreign policy ideologies conflict so visibly?

In the coming months the future of the Swedish arms export will be set as the parliamentary inquiry presents its report and suggestions for new regulation. If the loopholes and contradictions of the current regulation still stands, then it is not unlikely that the ideological conflict will start again – the question is, will the outcome be the same?

Finally, my conclusion leaves another questioned unanswered: what would have happened if only one or two arenas had favorable settings? – How much of political mobilization is needed for a critical mass be reached? Hans Abrahamsson and Gene Sharp are examples of researchers that have explored these types of questions, but to my knowledge their theories have not been tested on foreign policy nor arms exports. That could be a topic for further research.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Abrahamsson, H., *Det gyllene tillfället. Teori och strategi för global rättvisa* [The golden opportunity. Theory and strategy for global justice], Leopard förlag, Stockholm, 2002; Sharp, G., *From dictatorship to democracy*, Serpent's tail, London, 2012.

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Appendix

Note that not all statements have been cited, but all have been part of the material. Some statements overlap arenas.

DATE of statement	ACTOR	TEXT & QUOTE	ARENA		
			M/V	P	I
Nov 15, 2005	Leni Björklund (SAP), Defense Minister	'Sverige inleder försvarssamarbete med Saudiarabien, GP' [Sweden starts military cooperation with Saudi Arabia], TT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The agreement is aimed at us to get to know each other better in the defense sector and examine where we can work together more closely. (...) We do not write agreements if we do not think they have a positive value for Sweden.</i> [My translation] 	X		
Nov 15, 2005	Leni Björklund (SAP), Defense Minister	Kritiken kom – men när avtalet slöts var det tyst' [The criticism came – but when the agreement was struck it was silent], Dagens Nyheter <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>That country has a central position within the Muslim world. In Saudi Arabia is Mecca and Medina. We as a part of the Western world needs to an exchange with the Islamic world. If you have an exchange, there is opportunity to discuss those issues where we do not have agree. It is not like we are changing our view about human rights.</i> [My translation] 	X		
Nov 15, 2005	Leni Björklund (SAP), Defense Minister	'Var är konsekvensen?' [Where is the consequence?], Aftonbladet <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>By having an exchange, we also have respect for each other, so that we also can win respect for each other's views.</i> [My translation] 	X		
Nov 19, 2005	Swedish Association of Christian Social Democrats	'Stopp för svensk vapenexport till Saudiarabien!' [Stop Swedish arms exports to Saudi Arabia], Socialdemokraterna.se <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The Brotherhood Movement welcomes the government for political dialogue even with dictatorships, because isolation and boycott, only in exceptional cases is effective foreign policy means.</i> (...) <i>However, we found it hard to see how a deepened military cooperation and an extensive arms trade to Saudi Arabia in any way could be positive for the development of events in the</i> 			X

		<i>Middle East nor the forces that courageously and steadfastly working for democracy in the Arab world. [My translation]</i>			
Jan 17, 2006	Laila Freivalds (SAP), Foreign Minister	<p>'Answer to interpellation about Sweden's relations with Saudi Arabia'</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Saudi Arabia is our most important export market in the Arab world. [...]The government is hoping for increased Saudi investments. [...]Cooperation and open channels offer the possibility to exchange views and experiences, [...] to least regarding the respect for human rights. [My translation]</i> 		X	
June 14, 2006	Committee of the Constitution (SAP, M majority)	<p>2005/06:KU20 Committee of the Constitution's General Examination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>It is the view of the administration that cooperation gives unique opportunities to talks about development in different aspects of society. Good and confident relations create better settings for submitting rightful criticism, for example in the area of human rights. [My translation]</i> 		X	
Oct 5, 2014	Margot Wallström	<p>'Wallström: USA bestämmer inte vår utrikespolitik' [Wallström: The United States does not decide our foreign policy], SVT.se</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>It was expected that we would get criticism for this, but it is not the USA that decides our policy. We will continue to have a constructive dialogue with the USA and explain our motives and reasons.</i> 			
Oct 24, 2014	SAP and Green Party	<p>Government agreement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Sweden shall be a strong voice in the world for freedom, peace, human rights and solidarity. Sweden's voice shall always be clear and distinct when human dignity is violated. Human rights, international law, global disarmament and the effort against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction shall be cornerstones in Swedish foreign policy. [My translation]</i> 		X	
Jan 29, 2015	Stefan Löfven (SAP), PM	<p>Protocol from parliament: 'The Prime Minister's question time', riksdagen.se</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>We should also remember that contact with other countries is important for many reasons. Even the countries that we think have the wrong policies and do not standing up for human rights, are good for democratic countries have contact with, not least through trade. There are other countries where we do not have the same view when it comes to human rights we</i> 		X	

		<p><i>still have a trade in. I mean to make sure we maintain that.</i> [My translation]</p>			
Feb 11. 2015	Margot Wallström	<p>Foreign policy statement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Safeguarding human rights is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy. A strategy for human rights, democracy and the rule of law is now being drafted. [...] We cannot stand idly by while freedom of speech is threatened, or while journalists are imprisoned, kidnapped and killed. [...] Sweden will be a bridge-builder and have a strong voice in international development policy. [...] In these unsettled times, it is crucial that we take resolute action for disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [...] Atrocities must be recognized for what they are. ISIL's violence and terrorism are of the most pervasive and heinous kind. [...] The insecurity in our region, the ruthlessness of terrorism, the irrefutable fact of climate change, the vulnerability of the cyber society and the injustice of inequality all serve as a reminder. It is precisely at this moment – in unsettled times – that we must not hesitate. [...] The Government is determined that, in these unsettled times, Sweden will take global responsibility by being a strong voice in the world.</i> - <i>Promotion of exports, imports and investment in Sweden is an integral part of foreign policy and thus the responsibility of the entire Government. [...] A presence in new growth markets requires active efforts on sustainable business practices. We want to see the innovative capacity of Swedish companies mobilized so as to contribute to more jobs, greater growth and sustainable development.</i> 		X	
Feb 11. 2015	Margot Wallström (SAP), Foreign Minister	<p>Protocol from parliament: 'Foreign policy debate', riksdagen.se</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>It is obvious that politics in Saudi Arabia is far from a feminist politics. In particular the rights of women are violated. They may not even drive a car. Bloggers are flogged, and the royal family have absolute power. Hence, it is clear that we cannot use any other word than dictatorship, and that runs very poorly with what are our intentions with export in this case military equipment.</i> [My translation] 		X	
Feb 11, 2015	Youth league of SAP	'Nu krävs klarspråk om Saudiarabien' [Plain language now needed on Saudi Arabia], Svenska Dagbladet:	X		X

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>We want a clear statement from the government that it will suspend cooperation with Saudi Arabia when possible in May this year.</i> 			
Feb 20th, 2015	Three SAP members of parliament	<p>'Sveriges militära avtal med Saudiarabien måste brytas' [Sweden's military agreement with Saudi Arabia must be broken], Dagens Nyheter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Arms trade and arming of rogue states can hardly be legitimized by the argument that trade is good - or the fear of reduced Swedish exports. [...] The only argument remaining for continuing arms cooperation with Saudi Arabia is that we would otherwise lose significant export revenues. That is not sustainable. In the choice between money and human rights the answer should be simple. [My translation]</i> 	X		X
March 10, 2015	Stefan Löfven (SAP, PM)	<p>'Löfven bekräftar: Saudiavtalet förlängs inte' [Löfven confirms: the Saudi agreement will not be renewed], Aftonbladet</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>It is true that the contract is terminated. He says that the decision has nothing to do with the last days of controversy surrounding Wallström to do. (...) Because there is a clause in the contract that it can be stopped, it is Sweden's right to exercise the clause.</i> 	X	X	
March 10, 2015	Peter Hultqvist (SAP), Defense Minister	<p>Försvarsministern: "Vi vill avveckla det militära avtalet med Saudiarabien" [The Defense Minister: We want to terminate the military agreement with Saudi Arabia], svt.se</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>We want to dismantle the military agreement and then we want to continue working with the civil agreements we have with Saudi Arabia. [...] The military cooperation is not underway in practice. Our agencies have no projects together with authorities in Saudi Arabia. [...] So today no ongoing operations. [...] There is a possibility to modify and terminate contracts, and that is what we are doing now. Both parties have from the beginning been agreed that the possibility exists. The government's position is that we are prepared to develop civil, working with trade issues, but dismantle the military is not any activity in practice.</i> <p>Prime Minister Löfven has said that this agreement should be renegotiated. The Green Party has been pushing the line that it should be terminated completely. Is the Green Party who has won in the negotiations?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>No, I do not think you can see it that way. There are several parties in parliament who represent the old government which</i> 	X		

		<p><i>could at that time would have terminated the contract in 2010, which now wishes to terminate it. At the same time, we see a general debate in which many pressing on in this issue, and I can only conclude that it is not going on any business, and therefore it is quite natural to question the part and say we settle this agreement, but we want to go on with the civil part. I do not see that in this context there is any deep fundamental disagreement.</i></p>			
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