Swedish Arms Export

Idealistic goals with realistic means

- Three cabinet formations during 2002-2014

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Abstract

Swedish arms export is one of the world’s largest per capita in the world today, an export that occur to countries heavily criticized for a lack of human rights. Despite the strong support of the development of international control mechanisms to counter export to countries with poor human rights, support of arms control as well as the Swedish participation in international peace support operations, the policy has to a limited extent been affected. The study starts from the assumption that cabinet formations with varying degrees of idealism and realism, and if the cabinet has a majority or minority, should pursue a policy of arms export that differs and reflect this. An assumption based in fundamental ideological beliefs and scepticism or enthusiasm towards NATO. Three different cabinet formations during 2002-2014 are studied, focusing on bills and committee reports with the lenses of idealism and realism. The results of the study show that differences exist, albeit subtle ones. The overall result shows a policy justified in terms of economy and industry where no need to change the Swedish guidelines are considered to exist. Although such a desire occasionally is expressed, the result indicates difficulties to unite on a common bill. Arms export and the need of such is justified in terms of idealistic goals, with means of a realistic character to achieve them.
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1. Introduction
There are few Swedes who don’t know that Sweden is one of the major arms exporters per capita in the world. During the years 2006-2011 the total amount of arms exports (calculated in billion SEK) increased from 9.4 in 2006 to 13.9 in year 2011, the highest level ever. During 2012, the amount was 9.8 billion SEK. The major export destinations under 2012 were India (1.4 billion), Saudi Arabia (922 million), France (899 million), Pakistan (615 million) and Thailand (600 million).¹

In the first decade of 2000, not only the export of arms increased, also the recipient countries shifted from mainly European countries to countries in Asia and Middle East, countries heavily criticized for, among other things, the lack of human rights. Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated in a report from 2012 that Saudi Arabia has extensive lack of right for women, torture, detention and systematic violence of the rule of law.² In Freedom House’s rating for 2013 regarding freedom, civil liberties and political rights, Saudi Arabia was rated 7 on a 1-7 scale in all three categories.³ Pakistan received the same year a status of “partly free” with a freedom rating of 4.5.⁴

The directed criticism not only concerns the actual exports, political events have also been in the light of debate. In spring 2012 Sveriges Radio Ekot (the Swedish Radio) revealed Försvarets Forskningsinstituts, (the Defence Research Institute, FOI) plans to help Saudi Arabia to build a weapons factory, through the cover of a “front company”. Also highlighted in April this year, was a situation where staff from Försvarets Materialverk, (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, FMW), entered Kockums in Malmö and collected what was described as “top secret” defence equipment, under the patronage of the military police. After the unveiling of the front company in Saudi Arabia, the Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said in an interview with the Swedish Radio:

You will never get me to tremble on the cuff when it comes to providing jobs and export earnings to Sweden. Sweden has built its prosperity, its wealth, our ability to have good health care and a good welfare on the trade with other countries.⁵

In Sweden, arms export is in principle forbidden, but exceptions can be made if there are security or defence reasons for it. According to the Act (1992:1300) of military equipment that concerns materiel designed for military purpose, which according to the cabinet regulations constitute military equipment and technical assistance related to military equipment, license may only be given if there is a security or defence policy reason for it and are not in conflict with Swedish foreign policy.⁶ In other words, it seems problematic to justify agreements like the one with Saudi Arabia in terms of how it benefits the Swedish welfare and health care, when laws and policies say otherwise. Wilhelm Agrell, professor of intelligence analysis, criticized the Swedish actions with the words:

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⁵ Mats Eriksson (2012) ”Reinfeldt: Our welfare is based on trade”, Sveriges Radio.
This is a very big deal. What makes this deal so important is that it uncovers the condition in the Swedish political culture. This is how it works in Sweden.  

Despite the seemingly extensive arms export, Sweden has a tradition of support for international efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction and. Similarly, Sweden was behind the development of the European Code of Conduct of Arms Export, which includes a set of “minimum standards” for handling and restraint for arms export from European countries. The Code consists of eight criteria, aimed to work as a “checklist” when a decision of export of military equipment should be allowed or rejected. The Swedish organization Svenska Freds- och skiljedomsföreningen (Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society) states in a report that the Code in the beginning was a benchmark, but since the time are changing, a political-binding document is no longer enough. They argue for that the member states need to have the courage of their rhetoric responsibility. They also stress the need for the states to consider how to strengthen its implementation of the criterion of the Code.  

How can the Swedish policy development of arms export be understood? While Swedish policy support disarmament, arms control and demand for restraint of European countries (e.g. the Code of Conduct) the extent arms export and the number of criticized recipient countries are increasing. In the Cabinet Bill Shared responsibility: Sweden’s policy for global development, the former Social Democratic cabinet expressed that:

Armed conflict constitutes the most serious obstacle to development in many poor countries (…) poverty as a result of war, together with the availability of weapons, possess a dangerous breeding ground of terrorism and the emergence of new conflicts.

In the current cabinet’s annual strategic export control in 2012, the cabinet stressed the importance of taking the situation of human rights in the recipient country into account on every decision on arms export:

The situation of human rights must always be taken in.

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8 E.g. member of the Conference on Disbarment (CD), 1961. Support of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), support of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), aimed to establishing control for different weapons varieties, reducing the amount of weapons and the military spending.
9 The Code was adopted in 1998 and as a common position in 2008. Council common position (2008) 2008/944/CUSP. The eight criteria of the Code are: 1) Respect for international bond, 2) The respect of human rights in the country of final destination, 3) The internal situation in the country of final destination, 4) Preservation of regional peace, security and stability, 5) The national security of the member states, as well as of friendly and allied countries, 6) The behaviour of the buyer country regard to the international community, and respect for international law and their attitude to terrorism., 7) The risk of non-contractual of the equipment: diverted or re-exported, 8) The compatibility of the arms exports with the development in the buyer country.
11 Cabinet Bill (2002/03:122) Shared responsibility: Sweden’s policy for global development, p. 29.
Since export of arms have occurred regardless of the formations of cabinets, this thesis aims to study three different cabinet formations between the years 2002-2014. Does it matter for the policy outcome how the cabinet looks like? Is the need for comprehensive arms export so embedded in Swedish policy that politicians ignore traditional ideologies, visions and objectives?

1.1 Purpose of the study
The purpose with this thesis is to study three different cabinet formations policy on Swedish arms exports, to see whether the policy is different because of the cabinet’s ideological position. This is done through an analysis of three different hypotheses. Whether there are differences or not, the assumption that differences may exist can be made, based on the formation of the cabinet and the ideological roots.

The actors (the cabinets) in the study belong to different parts of the political spectrum and has a policy traditionally based (to varying degrees) in idealism and realism, where the Left Party is far left, and the Moderate Party is far right. Based on this knowledge, one reasonable assumption is that the political outcome should differ depending on the composition of the cabinet, and if the cabinet has a majority or a minority. Arms export will therefor be operationalized on three different cabinet formations, which will be described and compared in order to ascertain any differences in the policy of arms export, based on definitions of idealism and realism. The overall purpose is to contribute to an understanding of the Swedish political (seemingly contradictory) development in arms export, from a theoretical perspective – exploring the motives behind each different cabinet through the lenses of idealism and realism.

1.2 Disposition
The thesis is divided into nine parts. In this chapter, chapter 1, the overall problem is framed and the purpose of the study is clarified. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the definition of relevant terms as well as a comprehensive picture of the current state of research to ultimately culminate in the presentation of the three hypotheses set for the study. In chapter 3 the theories of realism and idealism are presented, as well as the operationalization of these. The selection of empirical data, the choice of cabinets and the methodological approaches to achieve the purpose of the study are presented in chapter 4. The following chapter, chapter 5, consists of the examination of the three cabinets followed by a summary analysis for each section. In chapter 6 the conclusions are presented and whether the hypotheses have a bearing or not. In chapter 7, an outlook for the next cabinet formation for the period 2014-2018, hypothesis (Y), are made. Here, a pure speculation on how such a cabinet might look like, and what potential outcome it could possibly have on arms export is presented. Suggestions for further research are discussed in chapter 8, followed by a bibliography in the final part, chapter 9.

2. Definition, previous research, hypotheses of the study
In this chapter a definition of arms export are presented. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the research on arms export. Based on earlier research’s call for the need not to
treat the subject inside the traditional political science research, a discussion to put the subject in international theory (IR) is followed. The chapter ends with three hypotheses for the study.

2.1 Definition of arms export
Arms export can be studied from various perspectives. Similarly, the concept itself is a variety of categories: different types of weapons, technological equipment and services. The focus of this thesis is how the exports of weapons are justified. In order to do so, a specification for what constitutes “arms export” for this thesis is in place.

Paul Levine and Ron Smith describe the different categories of weapons into five different categories: 1) weapons of mass destruction, 2) major weapons systems, 3) light weapons, 4) dual-use equipment and 5) services. The paper does not intend to treat weapons of mass destruction (nuclear-, chemical or biological weapons), since Sweden has none of these. Nor will this thesis study the trade of small and light arms, since the spread of these often occur on illegal basis and not in relation to the cabinet policies. This study concerns “major weapons systems” often referred to as conventional weapons. In the Swedish regulation of military equipment, the product must me “especially modified for military applications”. A product for civilian purpose is not classified as military equipment, although it can be used as such.

2.2 Previous research
The existing research can be seen to be divided in three different fields of research: studies that focus on why and how, studies of foreign military sales and studies focusing on the non-aligned nations. In the early studies, mathematical realistic models have been applied (Richardsson 1960), followed by theories with focus on self-generation forces within the nation, such as conflicts between interest groups, individuals, and economic and technological factors in the 1970’s (Halperin 1974, Rosen 1975). None of the early research was able to explain the inherent dynamics of the politics of arms exports. The grants of more contemporary research are focusing additional on extensive and technological models, and to some extent more emphasis on civilian sciences. An example of this is Wilhelm Agrell whose studies focused on the relationship between civilian and military sciences and technology. (Agrell 1981; 1989).

In Björn Hagelin’s Neutrality and foreign military sales: military production and sales restrictions in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, the concept of neutrality are treated in relation to country’s external military trade. In the study, Hagelin advances the thesis that the cost of pursuing such a policy (neutrality) has engendered real dilemmas for the countries in his study, since neutral countries are accepted to have a restrictive arms export policy. From this raises the paradox that more sales that are entered into, more likely will the neutrals become

14 Cabinet Bill (2013/14:190) Sweden’s adoption of UN’s Arms Trade Treaty, p. 11.
military suppliers to an aggressor nation. The French student Lucie Béradu-Sudrea’s extensive study *The supply of arms in a theoretical perspective* applies constructivism, liberalism and realism on the cases of Sweden, China and United States. Regarding Sweden, Béradu-Sudrea focus like Hagelin on the importance of Sweden’s neutrality in relation to arms export, and calls for the need to treat arms export in the context of IR.\(^{17}\)

Hagelin concludes that there is a dilemma for states how to support indigenous military production while fulfilling expectations of restrictive foreign military sales.\(^{18}\) He also expresses that the legitimacy of arms export may be undermined without a radical change in foreign military sales policies and implementation. The possibilities for international control of global armament are reduced, and the situation complicates and even contradicts the neutral foreign policy goals of peaceful conflict resolution and international arms control and disarmament.\(^{19}\)

### 2.3 Arms export as an isolated question? – The need of International Relation theory

Hagelin states that it’s not possible, or wise, to isolate foreign military sales from the surrounding context, which has been done, especially in the early literature. Moreover Hagelin argues for the need not to study foreign military sales with an extent focus upon the recipients, especially countries that lack of military research and development facilities.\(^{20}\)

The authors Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, state in their book *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, that too much literature focuses on the mechanisms of arms trade and that existing research often fails to integrate the phenomenon in a broader conceptual framework. Neuman and Harkavy present and analyse arms export from a variety of perspectives, both at international and national level. They deal with national-, subnational- and transnational actors. Their conclusion presents general trends in arms export and economic aspects. The contribution is substantive and relevant, but does not place the question in the context of political science and international theories.

In the book *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Andrew J. Pierre exposes the challenge of trying to contribute with an analytic order to what he calls “this amorphous phenomena”, and the complexity of global politics of arms sales in form of political motives, economic incentives and security perspectives of different nations in the world. Like most researches in the field, Pierre mentions the economic aspect but emphasizes that arms sales regardless of this, in the end is about a “political act”. His approach to the subject, as well as the captured picture over the major arms exporters in the world is solid. The final chapter makes clear that arms sales are a barometer of politics among nations, and are “fraught with policy dilemmas”\(^{21}\), where the significance not lies in the military impact or in their economic consequences.\(^{22}\) Instead, arms sales are instruments of diplomacy.\(^{23}\)

Power is another prominent concept in Pierre’s research, since arms may provide for example an access to political and military elites:

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18 Hagelin (1990) p. 103.
19 Ibid., p. 109.
20 Ibid., p. 13.
21 Ibid., p. 7.
23 Ibid., p. 276.
When countries are dealing with established allies, arms can give substance to treaty commitments. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are the most obvious case.\(^{24}\)

In *Arms and State – Patterns of Military Production and Trade*, Keith Krause analyse the structure and dynamic forces that shapes the trade of arms. He discusses it from political-, economic-, and military motivations and places the trends in a historical perspective, where the possession of military technology is a dimension of the relative capabilities of states. He argues for that one of the most progressive development is the changed relationship between technology and the state: \(^{25}\)

> Whatever the future outlines of the system, it is clear that we must link the study of arms transfers to an understanding of the underlying motivations and prospects for arms production.\(^{26}\)

Although many researchers highlights the need to understand arms export as a political phenomenon, a lot of research tend to place the subject outside the traditional political science framework and treat arms export as “an outside field”, something to be understood from perspectives other than in the context of IR. If it’s not only about economic impacts, research within mentioned framework should be carried out. If prominent democracies in the world (with political roots in realism or liberalism) are the world’s top arms exporters, while they at the same time act on the global stage as the worlds top peace defenders – how can this be understood, and how can this be studied? This does not mean that a “solution” is to be found in studies of national policy, the issue is in its nature, as mentioned, more multifaceted than that.

Pierre discusses arms export in a question of a “political balance ban”, regarding the policy process. He argues for that policies of arms export must address both long-term and short-term effects. What may seem “right” in a specific moment can generate the opposite in the longer term. In the multidimensional phenomenon of arms export no easy ways or “simple truths” exist to guide policymakers. A foreign policy objective to support an alliance or to develop a new foreign relationship, or to allow the state’s ability to self-defence, must be balanced against other objectives, for example in terms of human rights.\(^{27}\)

With this said the contribution of this study will not cover the whole picture of national policy’s importance for arms export. The contribution is however, to analyse Swedish arms export policy during three different cabinet formations, with a realistic and idealistic lens. Hagelin states in his research that one can expect neutral foreign policy to have a restrictive foreign arms sales policy – the different ideological differences and cabinet formations in Sweden, can exhibit different stance and policy development in the context of arms export.

The motive for the study of arms export within the framework of realism and idealism lies in the importance of arms export in world politics:

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\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 15.


\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 215.

Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms control challenge – arms sales are foreign policy writ large.

Some research highlights how arms export support local armies in developing countries, contributing to make on-going conflicts increasingly bloody and destructive. Other highlights the right of sovereign states to buy weapons that it deems to be in need of and that arms trade generates political influence and trade relations— that regional peace and stability can be promoted by the trade of arms. Regardless of these different philosophies, the phenomenon seems relevant to be studied in terms of international relations theory:

Arms sales must be seen, essentially, in political terms.\(^{28}\)

2.4 Three hypotheses of the study

Christine Agius describes in her article *Transformed beyond recognition? The politics of post-neutrality?* How the concept of neutrality gradually have disappeared from the official debate since 1990s and the end of the Cold War, and shifted to rhetoric in terms of military non-aligned. The shift has taken place to a security policy in context of a European security with contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the EU Battle Group. From a territorial defence to cooperation with EU and NATO.

The development is widely debated and examined in the academic literature. Explanatory models from the rationalist school describe the development of neutrality as a logical step, because of the end of bipolarity and the emergence of new security problems. Explanation models with roots in constructivist and identity-driven approach speak of “the dynamics of integration” and norms exchange between states, as well as shared values and goals within the EU. Agius highlights how the move from neutrality to post-neutrality is associated with the states identity, including which type of characteristics the state’s foreign policy should have.

As Agius, Charlotte Wagnsson examines the role of identity, when comparing the Swedish self-representation with NATO’s representation. Wagnsson compares the discursive difference between them, based on ideal types defined from realism and idealism. Swedish policy is considered as a traditionally idealistic. It has a base in humanitarian rights and democracy, as well as a strong commitment and support for UN. Wagnsson’s conclusion is that idealism dominates the Swedish discourse within the framework of international engagements, while realism is more tied to the regional story of security:

Sweden works to maintain its idealist image in the international arena.\(^{29}\)

Regarding NATO, Wagnsson clarifies how little attention is given to normative and idealistic underpinnings of security policy within NATO. How the spokesperson tended to emphasize traditionally realistic ideal types as threats and finances, instead of idealistic ideal types such as norms and values. The same occurred in the discussion about NATO’s future organization and

\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 3.

orientation – with the conclusion that NATO not only confirmed but also strengthened its realist profile.\(^{30}\) Wagnsson also states that Sweden converges easier with EU’s idealistic and normative values (humanitarianism, civilian means, gender and global equality), than NATO’s realist self-representation.

“NATO-enthusiastic”\(^{31}\) political parties should support the realistic core values as territorial integrity, the status quo and national security. The reference object is the state and the method used to achieve security is considered to be “hard power” by military means. The primary security actor is NATO. Such a policy does not take into account “norms and values”, but what favours their own state best. The international stability, regardless of how it affects the norms and values are predominant.

The opposite is a policy rooted in idealism with scepticism of a membership in NATO. Parties with a policy based on values such as human rights, global justice and human security. The reference object is in contrast to the state – the individual, with methods such as institutionalism, civilian means, soft power and democracy. The primary security actor is the UN. Norms and values are heavily weight and the policy seeks long-term goals in the international system.\(^{32}\)

Studies in the context of identity, neutrality and security community is interesting. There lies a specific interest in the paradoxical phenomenon where a Swedish idealistic politic in theory are the opposite of NATO’s realistic approach. At the same time, both the Moderate Party and Liberals are to be seen as “NATO-enthusiastic”. In the study of different NATO partnerships Håkan Edström focuses on the development and the potential future outcome of a Swedish partnership to NATO. Edström’s results are interesting and relevant in relation to the interest in studying the formations of cabinets. Edström concludes that with a red-green coalition in office, the NATO-led operations must have a strong ground in international humanitarian law and a clear UN mandate.\(^{33}\) In an extreme perspective, the Swedish participation could entirely cease if U.S. led operations occur in the same country as NATO operations. A possibility due to the Left Party’s expressed scepticism about the U.S. in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the party argued for not to send troops to NATO-led operations at all.\(^{34}\) With a centre-right coalition in office, it can be assumed that effort to assign SAF personnel at NATO’s staffs will increase, as well as participation in exercises and training activities. Edström summarizes his findings that the red-green coalitions base their design on idealistic norms, while the centre-right are of a realistic character.\(^{35}\)

Regarding arms export, and this study, similar attention can be given. A Swedish traditional idealistic politics should not theoretically strive to be one of the major arms exporters in the world, or to export arms to countries with a lack of democratic rights and risk for internal conflicts - because is contrary to the basic values of idealism.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 594.


\(^{32}\) Wagnsson (2011) p. 587.


\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 136.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., p. 158.
Below the three hypotheses for the thesis is presented. As in Edström’s study, it seems relevant to study how different types of coalitions influence the policy on arms export, since it is unlikely that one party will obtain a majority in the parliament, and therefore relevant to analyse how the different coalitions affect the policy outcome.  

The independent variable (x) gives the cabinet and the dependent variable (y) is arms export.  

**H1** A Social Democratic minority cabinet should exhibit high degree of idealism regarding arms export  
**H2** A majority Alliance cabinet should exhibit a high degree of realism regarding arms export  
**H3** A minority Alliance cabinet should exhibit a weaker realistic policy on arms export.

3. **Theory**  
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study, idealism and realism. After follows a description of the operationalization.

3.1 **Realism**  
Realism is a common theory in studies of state politics. The concept of power is of great importance within the theory. The political behaviour in international politics is based on interests defined by power, as an objective universal category. A state leader bases the policy decisions in terms of interest (defined by power), whereupon the leader’s action can be explained objectively, and are universally valid.

A rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits.

The most important actor in international relations is the state, and always the key-point reference within foreign politics. With the combination of power and states as the two important phenomena, realism portrays the current world order without an international authority, but rather an anarchic system. This means that the internal politics of a state takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above the individual collection of sovereign states. Realists argue that the structure of international politics includes independent and sovereign states that all consider themselves as the primary authority. States with a strong power, often in the form of strategic military terms, are expected to prevail in the anarchy...

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36 Ibid., p. 132.  
37 “Alliance” refers to the political coalition between the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Centre Party named ”The Alliance”. The coalition was formed in 2004 and won the parliamentary election in 2006. ”Alliance” in the study refers to this specific coalition.  
39 Ibid., p. 10.  
40 Ibid., p. 11.
better than states with less power.\textsuperscript{41} The \textit{military power} is central in realism, since no state can be sure of that help will come in the case of war or conflict. Because of this, no nation should be without military resources. The situation will in turn generate an on-going process of re-arm, where the need of \textit{balance of power} is important in order to avoid war and maintain the freedom of states. The concept refers to “a state of affairs” so that no power is in position where it is predominant and can lay down the law to others. The existence of balance of power prevents the system from being transformed by conquest unto a universal empire.\textsuperscript{42}

Bipolarity, which according to many realists is the most stable balance of power system, is a situation with only two great powers whose tensions are shaping international politics. Underlying smaller states, which by definition always will be in the shadow of larger states, will conform themselves to these strategies (or one of them) and thereby obtain benefits.\textsuperscript{43} Smaller states could also develop military alliances in order to cope with the higher power. NATO is a good example of this.\textsuperscript{44} Violence in war is necessary and legitimate since it seeks to secure the state’s survival and maintain power in an uncertain, anarchic system.

In this anarchy, with states that seek to consolidate their power and security, little room for universal principles and universal norms exists, except for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Interventions can though be justified if it greatly threatens the national security of a state or the internal order (modern examples include the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq).\textsuperscript{45} Obligations to the country and the individuals in the population are seen to be more important than morality. Though, realism is aware of the existence of a moral significance of a political action, as well as the inevitable tensions between the moral command on the one hand, and the need for a successful political action on the other. The “moral law” should not be seen as anything more satisfying, or less demanding, than it really is. A political morality cannot exist without caution, and a balancing between the policy implications and the outcome from a seemingly moral action. But, as Morgenthau states:

\begin{quote}
It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both the moral excesses and that politically folly. In this way, all nations can judge each other, in the same way that the nation judge itself.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

International institutions, and the need of these, are given little space and importance, and a general scepticism exists about the benefits and opportunities of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{47} Realism considers the perception of international institutions to have an independent influence of internal politics, to be wrong, since institutions are viewed to be a way for the major powers to cement their position of power. Since each state must ensure that they will be benefited the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 102.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Dunne, (2011) p. 88.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 94.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Morgenthau (2006) p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Hall (2006) p. 35.
\end{itemize}
same, or more, within a cooperation, it is considered difficult to establish international cooperation. Even if the absolute advantages can be guaranteed for all states in the cooperation, it is difficult to guarantee that no state will have more relative advantages than any other.\footnote{Ibid., p. 39.} Moreover, realists does not see any threat from globalization, as the economic interdependence as force to counter war, not are considered to happen. In a globalized world the state’s absolute existence is considered to dominate the world politics in the future.\footnote{Dunne (2011) p. 97.} One “strength” in realism is the ability to explain why the international system not appears to change. Unlike the economic- and democratic development, realism is characterized of war, conflict and suspicion, a condition that are considered to proceed. But, there also lies a weakness in these conditions, since the theory not consider economy or ideology to influence the situation of the states in the anarchic system.\footnote{Hall (2006) p. 35.}

### 3.2 Idealism

The basic idea of idealism is that humans have an innate morality itself and are political animals, whose political actions have an ethic importance. This inherent morality causes people not to accept power without morality.\footnote{Morgenthau (2006) p. 593.} The first attempt to implement the concept of human rights as a fundamental principle in international relations can be traced to the American President Woodrow Wilson’s initiative for the League of Nations. An initiative in order to create a global organization and international guidelines.\footnote{Marie Demker (2006) “Mänskliga rättigheter”, in Jakob Gustavsson et al. Internationella relationer, p. 340.}

Idealism is based on the idea that developed and expanded democracy can counter war. Human rights vary in importance on goals and means in policies. They can be seen most prominently in liberalism and constructivism, while it from a realistic perspective often is secondary to their policies.\footnote{Ibid., p. 345.} The liberal perspective in the context of IR strives to prevent conflicts of interests by institutions, (such of peace, growth and freedom) and prevent a political space between the domestic and international sphere. Idealism stresses the importance of norms and rights in international politics. Briefly, it’s about the existence of higher universal values in form of laws and rights and the absence of war, which can be maintained through mutual cooperation. Crimes against people’s right to freedom, is not align with democratic states.\footnote{Magnus Ericson (2006) “Liberalism” in Jakob Gustavsson et al. Internationella relationer, p. 53.}

Unlike realism, idealism believes that ethical and moral goals and considerations outweigh the national interest of the nation. Security, freedom and justice are core values that are able to be secured and protected when implemented in the context of international relations. Institutions shall be guided by norms that cater the human rights. War is never a solution, and the establishment of international organisations that may regulate the international anarchy can make the avoidance of such. The greatest threat to such a development is bilateral agreements and the balance of power. If conflicts though arise, international forces are able to step in and
resolve the situation. The basis of this lies in the thought of collective security, which is possible if each state in the system have the same view that the security for one state concerns all other states. This can be seen to stand in contrast with an alliance of states, aimed to be a response to a specific threat.

The basic liberal pursuit of open markets, the flow of goods and people are seen to decrease the state’s ability to solve problems. This calls for the need to counter in other important actors, such as interest groups, transnational cooperation and international non-governmental organizations.

3.3 Operationalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Referent-object of security</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Primary security provider</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>Human rights, equality, global justice</td>
<td>Individuals, humanity, other-regarding outlook on security</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Process-oriented institutionalism, international cooperation, predominantly civilian means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Territorial integrity, capitalism</td>
<td>States, self-regarding outlook on security</td>
<td>NATO, U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Short-term problem-solving, predominantly military means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Theoretical framework for idealism and realism

To allow the processing and analysis of the empirics of the study, idealism and realism are used for categorizing the material and highlight differences respectively similarities. With the theoretical framework, observations and result are categorized, structured and can be traced to theoretical concepts.

4. Empirics and methodology

In this chapter the selection of empirics are presented, how the choices of cabinets can be justified and which methodological approaches that have been used in the study.

4.1 Empirics

The material consists of mainly primary sources in form of official documents: Cabinet bills and reports from the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee respectively and,

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56 Ibid., p. 105.
occasionally, jointly. The reports from the committees do not express the Swedish policies by the cabinet, but the parties overall assessments. The reports give the opportunity to urge the cabinet to conduct surveys or the need of further clarification in a specific area. These reports are a useful contribution to the cabinet’s bills. However, it’s ultimately the cabinet bills that control the development of the Swedish arms export.

It can be seen as problematic that the current cabinet not yet has presented any defence bill. Desirable had obviously been that such was in place. Additional empirical is considered however to make the study feasible, even if the absence of the bill should be noted, during the process and in the final conclusions.

The texts that are used in the official documents are those related to arms exports in relation to the operationalization of the theory, which makes the material suitable for investigation. Since the “puzzle” of the study lies in the seemingly traditional idealistic foreign and security policy in relation to the major export of arms, the theoretical framework of realism and idealism and the operationalization adds an order and categorization of the material.

The texts used in the study would be able to answer questions of a different nature, for example in more detail how the cabinet deals with a specific weapon export, a specific guideline or the European Code of Conduct of Arms Export. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to present a general picture.

4.2 Three cabinets for the study
The three cabinets selected for the study is 1) Social Democratic minority cabinet 2002-2006, 2) Majority Alliance cabinet 2006-2010 and 3) Minority Alliance cabinet 2010-2014. The choice of these three cabinets is made based on two main factors. First, since the first single chamber elections to the Swedish parliament in 1970, Sweden has had three types of cabinets. Second, joining EU as well as the adoption of the Code of Conduct of arms export, in 1995 respectively 1998[^59], has in various ways placed the policy of arms export in different context and placed it “higher up” on the agenda, which can be seen to motivate the choice of cabinets.

The adoption of the Code of Conduct as a common position can be considered as the Swedish policy on arms export already has embraced a direction, whereupon the selection of cabinets can be criticized. However, since the Swedish arms export tends to increase and constantly encounter criticism for contributing the development of human rights in the recipient country, the choice of cabinets are considered to be relevant and important. It should also be emphasized that the purpose of this study is to examine the policies of the cabinets and how the degree of idealism and realism can be inferred based on type of cabinet. This includes the perception of the Code of Conduct itself.

4.3 Methodology
In order to fulfil the purpose of this thesis, the operationalization of the empirics takes support in existing theories in IR. A number of methodological choices have been made in order to utilize the theoretical framework.

The method used to study the relevant text material for the thesis, is a qualitative text analysis. The method discerns and explores the elements of a text and enables illumination,

[^59]: The Code was introduced on the agenda in EU in year 1998 and taken as a common position in year 2008.
examination and analysis. The concept “hermeneutic circle” is inherently indeed complex, but it’s fundamental aspects are relevant for this thesis, then “parts of a text are interpreted from the text as a whole, and the whole are interpreted of the parts”. A special term in a text must be interpreted from the larger context, where “arms export” is an example. The method enables to bring out the “essence” from a text, through a close reading process of the text parts, the whole and the context in which it is a part. The theoretical framework is used as a grid for the text material in order to connect the result to the theories and subsequently set these in relation to the hypotheses.

The validity of a study is about the study’s ability to actually measure what it intends to do, if the empirical data are considered to generate the response that the issue requires. Then the paper study the policy of arms exports and mainly focuses on the cabinet bills and reports from the Foreign Affairs- and Defence Committee, the validity of the thesis is considered to be provided. The aim is to capture the nuances and the bigger picture within the policies of the cabinets, as well as report from relevant committees, in order to facilitate the analysis of how the cabinet formations affect the political outcome. This type of triangulation can be seen to strengthen the validity of the study.

External validity concerns the ability to generalize the findings of the study to a greater context. With the focus on arms export, during a specific period, an external validity is not considered to prevail.

The degree of reliability in a study is based on the accuracy of the survey and how sources of error are eliminated wherever possible. In studies of a state policy in a certain area, available potential sources are large. One can study bills, motions, reports, opinions, debates, party programs, election manifestos, statements, conducted interviews, and so on. This thesis stays within the framework of bills and committee reports, which are largely the cabinets stated policy. It should though be emphasized that a textual analysis is interpreted by an individual whose knowledge and attitudes can be seen to affect the way the text is interpreted. The ambition and later the success to link the interpreted parts of the text to the theoretical framework is therefor of great importance. Example of this is records from the text and how these are linked to the theory. In this way the transparency can be seen to increase, as well as the ability of the reader to more easily dissect how the empirical data has been interpreted. By deriving the empirical analysis with records from bills and reports, which also includes the need for a well-founded argument, the inter-subjectivity can be seen as relatively good.

The study also includes an analysis of ideas, then ideal types based on the two theories of ideality and realism is used as an analytical tool. The study design ideal-typical notions of “arms exports” on the basis of the two theories. The method can be used as an analytical tool to refine certain elements and from this formulate hypothesis. It can also be used to create a system of ideas with the function as a grid that sorts the various formulations in a text, which is

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62 Ibid., p. 42.
63 Ibid., p. 43.
relevant for this study. The ideal types also allow determining which parts of the material that not can be classified in this way.

5. Cabinets
In this selection the three cabinets are presented. After each cabinet period follows an analysis how the empirics can be interpreted from the theoretical framework.

5.1 Cabinet I 2002-2006

Sweden should continue to have a leading role in promoting transparency and accountability in international trade of war material.64

The Cabinet Bill Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global development (PGU) puts security in relation to democracy, respect for human rights, gender equality, social progress and enhanced international cooperation. Peace and security are considered to be the precondition for development, where UN’s important role are of great importance.65

Sweden’s policy for global development’s goal is proposed to contribute to quotable and sustainable global development. This target is proposed to apply to all areas of politics (…) the Bill focuses on poor people and countries.66

The Bill also emphasizes the right for all countries to have a military defence, since prevention and the possibility of defence is a prerequisite for development. This is however in relation to the fact that extensive military spending and military intervention in civil power is considered as a serious obstacle to development. Based on this, the cabinet considers that the export of “defence materiel” must occur in an open and trustworthy form, where Sweden’s restrictive legislation and export controls, as well as the EU Code of Conduct of arms export, are viewed as good examples.

Sweden should continue to be driving force in the international dialogue about conflicts, security and development, with the aim to strengthening international control regimes and achieve agreements of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control.67

The bill also states that Sweden’s security policy as military non-aligned, as well as cooperation with other countries and support of UN and membership of EU, Sweden support a global solidarity and strive to prevent war on the European continent. A good defensive ability is an important part in Swedish security policy.

In the Cabinet Bill Our Future Defence the importance of supporting export is emphasized. The purpose of promoting export of military equipment is justified by the need to ensure a

64 Cabinet bill (2002/03:122) Sweden’s Policy for Global Development, p. 35.
65 Ibid., 34-35.
66 Ibid., p. 1. The Bill was adopted in 2003.
67 Ibid., 35.
The reform from armed forces towards a network-based defence with limited economic resources should generate good conditions of international partnership and exports. To ensure the operational needs for the Swedish Defence to ensure certain abilities, export opportunities should at an early stage be weighed as a factor in the supply of materials.

Due to the Cabinet Communication 2004/05:4 and 2004/05:161 *Sweden’s policy for global development*, the Foreign Affairs Committee shares the cabinet’s clarification that:

> The Swedish guidelines will be integrated with the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct of Arms Exports (…) the export should not interfere with the global development.

The committee highlights the importance of the statement, and assumes that future letters from the cabinet will present a comprehensive treatment of the subject, including goals and perspectives.

Due to the cabinet’s annual report on strategic export controls the committee shares the view that “sensitive considerations” within a decision of export, and the aim to safeguard Sweden’s long-term security are of great importance. The national interest in the balance between different guidelines for arms export should though always be the first priority. The Foreign Affairs Committee calls on the cabinet to appoint an overview over the framework of export control and its application. Such a committee are viewed to be necessary because of the increased internationalization of issues regarding to military equipment. The investigation should also, as the Committee states, focus on whether a democracy criterion should be included in the guidelines related to military equipment. The Foreign Affairs Committee assumes that the cabinet is in agreement with the tradition of parliamentary involvement that characterizes Swedish export policy, and therefore carefully will consider in what form an investigation should be conducted.

The decision of a review of the regulations of military equipment, *Krigsmaterielutredningen (Reformed regulatory framework for trade in defence equipment, KRUT)* was adopted in July 2003. The purpose was to investigate the prospects for the future Swedish export control based on the conditions of foreign-, defence-, and security policy, as well as the Swedish international commitments. The inquiry will review the legislation and guidelines and make suggestions on changes that might be needed. A review of how the EU Code of Conduct can be implemented in the Swedish guidelines is included.

In *The Foreign Affairs Committee report 2005/06:UU12* the cabinet’s potential willingness to lift the arms embargo against China is discussed. The Committee highlights that the current regulatory framework for Swedish arms export is a uniform policy applicable to all countries showing interest in military equipment, regardless of “the importance of the potential recipient

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69 Ibid., 126.
71 Presented annually followed by a report from the Foreign Affairs Committee.
74 EU arms embargo on China imposed after the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
country for Sweden’s overall interest”. Likewise, the Committee clarifies that KRUT is tasked to review the current export policy, of which conclusions can end up in a new bill. The Committee is awaiting the process.

The Committee notes that the embargo not is considered as “complete” or defines what type of military equipment it concerns. The result of this is that some EU countries export certain categories of material to China. Sweden interprets however, the embargo to be strictly and allow no exports. The Committee declares further that the issue was up for discussion in EU in 2004 and early 2005, which generated the conclusion that EU should work for an abolish of the embargo, which not necessary mean an increase export to China.76

In the report from the Foreign Affairs Committee the following year regarding the cabinet’s annual report on export control, the Committee sees “with satisfaction” that the cabinet has appointed a review (KRUT), aimed to explore the basis for a democracy criterion, and make an overall investigation of the legislation regarding military equipment. Though, the Foreign Affairs Committee stresses that the decision to export to a state involved in an armed conflict, must be balanced against the importance of an ambitious international defence industrial cooperation, in order to safeguard the Swedish defence procurement. And, nations self-interest will always have the highest priority.77 The investigation that the committee asked for, states that the current criteria should be complemented by further criterion that:

Specify that a permit of export should not be issued if there is an obvious risk that the export seriously hindering sustainable development in the recipient country.78

The Foreign Affairs Committee states that they will await the cabinet’s proposals in the matter.

Later on, the Committee express the need of the Code of Conduct of arms export to be strengthened, specifically the criteria regarding human rights, stability and security.79 The importance to strengthen the development of a consensus among EU countries regarding how human rights and development in recipient countries are also expressed. As well as the importance of avoiding a situation where Swedish arms export undermine efforts to achieve development goals or undermine the conditions for poor people in the recipient country.

For the Defence Committee the fundamental purpose of promoting export of arms is to ensure the supply of equipment and expertise to the Swedish defence. In a situation with less orders to the Swedish Defence, in combination of international cooperation and stronger competition in the market, conditions for the export of major defence project, e.g. JAS 39 Gripen, should proceed.

The Foreign Affairs Committee emphasizes the importance of multilateral agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation and UN’s promoting of peace and disbarment in the world. But, the goal requires supplements in form of a strict and effective export control at a national level. The new security situation in Europe, with some new and complex threats calls for further interaction between states. This requires a military capability, and a set of instrument of

76 Ibid., 26.
77 Ibid., p. 22.
78 Ibid., p. 17.
79 Ibid., p. 18.
“another nature”. Sweden’s contribution to peacekeeping operation with EU and NATO are considered to strengthen Sweden’s security and development of defence forces. This generates changes in assessment and priorities for the Swedish Defence industry. 

Through collaboration, Sweden makes sure that the nation’s foreign-, defence, - and security policy as well as the ability to participate in international security-building operations are met. In order to maintain as a leader in certain areas of technology, which are required in international operations, some export are necessary.

5.1.1 Analysis Cabinet I
At first glance, the cabinet’s bills as well as the reports from the committees are of a strong idealistic character. Values such as solidarity, equality, human rights and development are the general purpose with the Swedish security policy. Core values expressed are traditionally idealistic. On the other hand, the importance of countries to have an effective defence may be equated with realistic core values in form of territorial integrity.

Similar disagreement is found regarding referents-object: humanity and other-regarding outlook on security are emphasized as important, at the same time as Sweden’s interest always should be the top priority when “balancing the guidelines” of arms export. An export of arms that benefits Sweden’s ability to participate in peace support operations (idealistic) is the top priority in the choice of receipt country (realistic). However, the risk for a country to forsake development when the expenditure on armaments are too high, are mentioned. To counteract this, the need of restrictive export policies in all European countries is needed.

The prime security provider is thus EU, with means in form of institutionalism. Sweden’s international contribution, through UN and EU intends to promote Swedish basic values. The idealistic policy, is however, not entirely clear. The justification for arms export is described as fundamental to Sweden’s ability to buy necessary technological equipment – in order to participate in peacekeeping operations. For example the Defence Committee emphasizes the need for cooperation with NATO (realism) to ensure that Sweden’s security needs are met and creates opportunities to participate in peace operations – which require arms export.

Thus, an idealistic vision, but a realistic policy is to achieve it.

5.2 Cabinet II 2006-2010
The cabinet highlight in Bill A Useful Defence (2008/09:140) the development towards a developed support of export, where the support is a result of export efforts regarding JAS Gripen, which has called for a more coordinated campaign between the state and industry. The export promotion activities should be used as a mean to promote cost-effective supply equipment in order to ensure that the defence can buy modern cost effective armaments needed. The support of export is described as actions when authorities in form of visits and demonstrations to stakeholders or potential customers. Decision-making and calculating for the development of the Swedish defence should include the support of export. Increased exports are important from an industrial perspective as well, to ensure the ability for companies to

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80 Ibid., p. 8.
81 Ibid., p. 9.
82 Cabinet Bill (2008/09:140) A Useful Defence, p. 84-85.
maintain and develop technology and skills. Since the Swedish defence industry is increasingly foreign-owned, a future possibility is that the developed and produced military equipment are not considered to be in line with what the Swedish defence requires. The cabinet sees this as a positive development.

The support for arms export was intensified with the proposed establishment of a new agency, Exportstödsmyndigheten (The Authority of Export Support), established in December 2010. The Defence Committee supports the cabinet’s view on the need for such an authority, based on the requirement of a greater commitment of the cabinet and industry. With the authority, the division of responsibilities becomes clearer and that “conflict of interest” may decrease. The support for arms export may also be provided more efficiently than today.

Since the end of the Cold War, a domestic independent defence industry in Sweden, based on current security- and defence policy estimated not to be desirable or possible. Today’s security interest and activities are designed to interact with like-minded countries, in terms of both civilian and military resources. The new reality calls for cooperation of defence equipment procurement as well as the export of arms. Export of arms is considered essential in order to preserve Swedish skills, development and production in the defence industry. This is also a prerequisite for a credible military non-alignment. Important is that export don’t have a destabilizing effect in the world, and should only be permitted if there is underlying security and defence policy reasons for it, and that it are not in conflict with Swedish foreign policy. Sweden’s ability to contribute to international peace and security, characterized by peace support operations, required the best possible materials available for the defence. The Committee notes that Sweden compared to other countries have a restrictive export policy.

The Committee welcomes the cabinet’s contribution to UN’s work with a global legally binding treaty on arms trade control: Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The overall purpose of the treaty is to establish a broad international regulatory system with common criteria and principles regarding export of weapons. In April 2007, the Swedish cabinet reported their comments to the Secretary General, aimed hopefully to contribute to a legally binding instrument on exports. In 2009 the Committee noted that no concrete proposals for ATT had been presented, but that the process of establishing a binding treaty on conventional arms in UN is in progress. The Committee welcomed the continued work.

The politically binding Code of Conduct on Arms Exports were revised and clarified in 2005, after which the Committee agrees with the cabinet’s view that exports controls are strengthened and towards a more restrictive direction. The Committee, however, refers to the right to protect essential security interests, by national rules in terms of weapons and military equipment.

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83 Ibid., p. 95-96.
90 EG Treaty, article 296.
Though, the export policy is to some extent coordinated in the EU through the Code of Conduct.\textsuperscript{91}

In 2009 the Committee welcomed the fact that the Code of Conduct was adopted by the European Council as a Common Position in December 2008.\textsuperscript{92} Furthermore the Committee emphasize the importance of consistent guidelines at EU level about the categorization of “equipment for battle” and “other military equipment”, where for example “the risk of armed conflict” not is a criterion in an export matter of “other military equipment”. The division of these to categorization does not exist at the EU level, whereupon the Committee states that the Swedish regulations should be harmonized with the EU regulations.\textsuperscript{93}

Regarding the arms embargo against China, the Committee marks that Sweden was one country to consider that an abolishment of the embargo had no serious basis. The Committee also highlights that Sweden is preparing negotiations on a revised partnership between EU and China in order to further emphasize the basic principles of human rights and non-proliferation of weapons.\textsuperscript{94} The discussion of an abolishment continued in EU in the early 2007, which ended up in the conclusion that there were no reasons for an abolishment.\textsuperscript{95}

The Committee declares that the former Social Democratic cabinet’s decision on the review of the military legislation (KRUT), whose proposals presented in the report \textit{Reformed regulatory framework for trade in defence}, not led to proposal for a new legislation before the parliamentary elections in 2006.\textsuperscript{96}

\begin{quote}
After the change of cabinet there is now a process of preparing regarding, among other things, the result and proposals of KRUT, whereupon the Committee believes that the on-going work should be awaited.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Two years later the Foreign Affairs Committee commented the result of KRUT further. One conclusion from the study was that export controls are “effective and substantially works well”. Proposals on modernization and further development and clarification of the Swedish guidelines for arms export are though considered necessary.\textsuperscript{98} Based on these conclusion, the Committee shares the cabinets view that the dynamic development of the EU Cooperation has affected the conditions for the Swedish process of KRUT, process such as ATT and the Code of Conduct.\textsuperscript{99}

The conclusions from KRUT proposed that the Swedish term “military equipment” should me translated to “defence equipment” in order to better align with the terminology used at international level. The cabinet notes, however, that such a change could lead to confusion, and that:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} (2007/08:UU7) p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{92} (2008/09:UU14) p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{94} (2006/07:UU12) p. 12-13.
\item \textsuperscript{95} (2007/08:UU7) p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{96} (2006/07:UU12) p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{98} (2009/10:UU12) p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 10.
\end{itemize}
The concept of military equipment is well established and includes both defensive as offensive material. Shifting to another concept could be interpreted as an attempt to defuse the type of products it concerns.100

The Committee emphasizes the importance of policy coherence and the need to permeate PGU in the Swedish arms export.101 Though, the Swedish guidelines of arms export are expected to generate a small probability that export is granted to dictatorships.102

5.2.1 Analysis Cabinet II

The need of development of cooperation between the cabinet and the industry to promote and support arms export, are motivated as a mean to promote cost-effectively supply equipment in order to ensure that Swedish armed forces may purchased needed equipment. The industrial perspective is highly emphasized by the cabinet. The motivations behind it can be equated with the core value territorial integrity (the nation’s ability to maintain a national defence), where the state is the reference-object of security.

It should be noted that the cabinet concludes that a higher degree of foreign ownership of the defence industry in Sweden, results in a situation where produced material is not considered to be in line with the need of the Swedish defence. This development is considered to be positive.

The establishment of Exportstödsmyndigheten (The Authority of Export Support) can be considered as a realistic policy, in which relationship between export and support can be considered as an intention to expand exports (core value: capitalism). Moreover, the authority shall support more “effective support” of exports as well as reduce “conflicts of interests”. What these conflicts of interest are, more specifically, is not further developed. If these “conflicts of interests” is considered as an obstacle to an increased arms export, the establishment of the authority can be considered as a more clearly realistic mean.

The cabinet’s general view of security interests with the need to interact with other countries in terms of both civilian and military resources is idealistic (reference-object of security: humanity, means: process-oriented institutionalism and civilian-means). Collaboration in terms of military cooperation can also be considered as idealistic, if the sender, primary security provider, is UN.

However, the described need for cooperation as a way to facilitate arms exports, which in turn means the ability of Sweden to participate in international peace operations, it is like in cabinet 2002-2006, difficult to define whether there is a realistic or idealistic policy. It can be seen as twofold – the goal is idealistic but the mean’s to achieve the goal can be defined in terms of realism.

The Foreign Affairs Committee further emphasizes that Sweden, compared to other countries, has a restrictive export policy. It is difficult to further analyse the implications of this standpoint, since no further developed conclusion are spelled out. It may be noted that the Swedish laws and guidelines (probably compared to international standards) can be considered as restrictive, given Sweden’s support of Code of Conduct, PGU and ATT. However, whether

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these policies and ambitions result in a restrictive concrete policy is not discussed further. Regarding the Code of Conduct, the Foreign Affairs Committee states that the Code must not stand in contrast to “essential security interests”. This can be interpreted that the Code is a guideline, and nothing else, and that Swedish security interest always will prevail (reference object of security: the state).

It is difficult to analyse the process of KRUT. It can be noted that the cabinet of 2002-2006 appointed the inquiry by request of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The cabinet of 2006-2010 highlights that the previous cabinet didn’t resent a bill based on the proposals of KRUT. If this can be seen as a criticism of the previous cabinet or not is unclear. What is stated though, is that “the dynamic development” of the cooperation within EU as well as the ATT and Code of Conduct has changed the context of how the results of KRUT should be treated. This could suggest that the cabinet now believes that the review of the legalisation is considered to not have the same bearing – that the objectives are met. It can also be seen as the cabinet, like the previous, has a difficulty to agree on a common bill, whereupon the standpoint is a way to “go around the issue”. The cabinet’s decision not to implement KRUT’s suggestion of a change from the term “defence equipment” to “military equipment” can be placed in the framework of idealism.

The Foreign Affairs Committee moreover emphasizes the need for PGU to be consistent with Swedish arms exports is considered to be idealistic. This when PGU is based on a justice- and poverty perspective (core values: human rights, equality, global justice). However, it can be seen as problematic when the Committee also notes that the Swedish guidelines for arms export “are excepted to generate small probability that export is granted to dictatorships”. If that possibility is considered to be small, why then push for further implementation of PGU in the context of arms export?

5.3 Cabinet III 2010 – 2014
In the Cabinet Bill A Useful Defence the cabinet estimates the need of modern military equipment for the defence, whereupon export of arms is a mean in order to achieve that. The cabinet also justifies this from an industrial perspective – that exports are necessary in order to maintain the technical skills for the companies. In other words, the promotion of export is a part of the Swedish defence- and security policy.

In the Foreign Affairs Committee report (2010/11:UU3) regarding Strategic Export Control in 2010 the committee shares the cabinet’s view of the need for interaction with other countries for both imports and exports of arms:

The defence policy aspects is based, among other things, on the need for a cost-effective supply of equipment and other benefits for the defence, in order to have an effective defence industry in Sweden (...) Among the foreign and security policy interest, Sweden’s ability to contribute to international peace and security through effective participation in international peace support operations, are included.

103 (2008/09:140) p. 95.
As for the cabinet, the committee shares the perception of international organizations (UN, EU) and institutions as significant actors in the work against the spread of conventional weapons. Sweden’s internationally competitive level of technology is also considered to generate opportunities for Sweden to influence the international export controls in a desired direction.

For the first time the relationship between export control policy and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 regarding security for women and children in armed conflicts and sexual violence, are mentioned. The committee believes that the implementation of the resolution in decision of Swedish participation in international security building in for example Afghanistan, should have an equally importance in the context of Swedish control export policies.

Regarding PGU, aimed to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development, applied to all policies, the committee stresses the need for many forces to “pull in the same direction”, if a global sustainable development shall be achieved:

What Sweden says in one context must match Swedish actions in others.

This requirement, according to the committee, must also be applied on Swedish arms export, whereupon the committee emphasises the need of PGU to have an impact in the export policy. One particular challenge is raised– to achieve coherence between policy areas. Swedish export control policy can never be allowed to counter the Swedish and the international community’s efforts to develop a sustainable global development. Or counter efforts to achieve a global security, such as the operations in Afghanistan and Libya. The staff within the parliament, cabinet and authorities, must be trained on the goals and perspectives that PGU stands for, a training-process that must be accelerated. As a result of these expressions and exhortations, the committee approved (partly) the Social Democratic motion An Equal World is Possible (2010/11:U306) and expressed that:

The committee considers in the light of PGU that the cabinet will propose a new legislation in order to tighten export controls to non-democratic countries.

In June, over one year later, the Committee Directive Review of Export Control of Military Equipment, was presented. The Parliamentary Committee is assigned to propose a new legislation regarding a strengthening export control to non-democratic states. These concerns, among other things, to propose which consideration that should be applied in a decision of export, proposal of constitutional amendments and show how the Code of Conduct and PGU can be converted into practice. The committee are also commissioned to examine the impact for the Swedish bilateral relations with a more strengthen legalisation.

Also, the fact that the total Swedish export could decline highlights – a decline described in

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105 Ibid., p. 15.
106 Ibid., p. 23.
107 Ibid., p. 18.
108 Ibid., p. 35.
109 Ibid., p. 39.
110 Ibid., p. 1.
relation to the consideration of a country’s democratic situation. Potential economic impacts of the industry and the economy at large are mentioned as well.\footnote{Ibid., p 7-8.}

Furthermore, the committee will analyse how Sweden’s ability to cooperate with other countries can be affected and the Swedish material supply. Also Sweden’s ability to participate in international efforts for peace and security.\footnote{Ibid., p. 9-10.} The committee will present their analysis by 15 December 2014.

In the Bill Sweden’s adoption of UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) the proposal of Sweden to accede to ATT are presented. The overall purpose of the treaty is to establish a common norm-driven and responsible international “forms” to regulate trade of conventional arms.\footnote{Cabinet Bill (2013/14:190) Sweden’s adoption of UN’s Arms Trade Treaty, p. 5.} The cabinet see Swedish regulatory to be in line with the treaty’s general requirements for control\footnote{Ibid., p. 19.} whereupon there is no need for Swedish legislative changes when accessing to ATT:

The Treaty orders states in their national considerations to take certain specified criteria into account. According to the cabinet sentence, the ATT criteria will be considered parallel to the Swedish guidelines.\footnote{Ibid., p 1.}

No supranational element is included in the treaty, and it is entirely based on “national control over political responsibility”\footnote{Ibid., p 1.} since a supranational element are considered contrary to national security interests. The Treaty could enter force in late 2014 or early 2015. The decision of the adoption is based in the cabinet’s view of how serious conflicts impact’s on the civilian population. It notes that arms producing countries generally have a responsible export policy, but marks that trade of arms might have contributed to the magnitude and the duration of conflicts around the world.\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.}

The major problem is that some countries outside the circle of responsible export countries, more systematic let political and economy factors prevail over security issues and human consequences of the trade.\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.}

Moreover the cabinet believes that the extensive support for the ATT show an increased awareness for the “intolerable situation” and a greater focus on humanitarian factors in export control assessments.\footnote{Ibid., p. 12.}

### 5.3.1 Analysis Cabinet III

As previous cabinets expresses this one the relationship between the supports of exports as a mean to participate in international peace operations with necessary technical skills. UN and EU are significant international organizations (primary security provider: UN) whose efforts to
counter the proliferation of conventional arms is supported by the cabinet. The possession of high technical military equipment’s (purchases made possible by arms exports) are considered to increase the Swedish ability to influence the international export controls in the right direction. An approach with idealistic goals - influence international control, (core values: human rights, means: institutionalism, primary security provider: UN), but in one way realistic means to achieve it – exports of arms in order to influence.

The highlight of the need to implement resolution 1325 in the Swedish arms export is an idealistic position (core values: human rights, equality, referent-object of security: humanity, primary security provider: UN). How such an implementation or change should be conducted is not further concluded. Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s call for the need to “train” the staff of parliament, cabinet and authorities to better understand and be able to implement of PGU in all policy areas, can be seen as idealistic. Moreover, the committee urges the cabinet to propose new legislation, aimed to strengthen export-controls to non-democracies.

The cabinet in turn presented the parliamentary committee to examine proposals for a new legislation, with the task to examine how the Code of Conduct and PGU can be converted into practice. This also includes how a new legislation could impact the Swedish bilateral relations, as well as how a reduction of arms export can affect the Swedish industry and economy in general. The latter two tasks are of a traditional realistic character with the concern’s over industry and economy (core values: capitalism, reference-object: the state).

Regarding ATT notes that no change in the Swedish regulatory framework need to be done, since national considerations till outweighs ATT, whereas the ATT will be parallel to the Swedish guidelines. ATT may at first glimpse support the idealistic view of the need for international institutions. But, when no such elements are significant since ATT is based on “national control over political responsibility”, the national sovereignty remains.

The cabinet believes that ATT may counteract the affect of arms export on the civilian populations, noting that countries “outside the circle of responsible exporting countries” systematically allows economic factors govern, instead of the human consequences of arms export. This can though be problematized to the Swedish cabinet, when raising the problem of how a reduction of arms export may affect the Swedish economy and industry. The parliament committee tasks to do so cannot be classified as the economy outweighs “human consequences”, but the note should be made. The way the cabinet problematize that some countries are considering economic factors higher than human, is an idealistic view (core values: human rights, equality. Referent-object of security: humanity, other-regarding outlook on security). It is though not that clear how this idealistic view can culminate into an idealistic act. If the results of the parliamentary committee comes to the conclusion that the Swedish economy and industry will be affected by a reduced export (which is not an entirely unreasonable conclusion), how till the cabinet respond to that conclusion?

6. Conclusions and the bearing of the hypotheses
In this chapter the conclusions as well as the bearing of the hypothesis is presented.

6.1 A general idealistic rhetoric with a realistic outcome?
Regardless of the cabinet formation, the policy of arms export seems to be in a character of
idealism. All three cabinets emphasized that:

• Arms export shall not be allowed to non-democracies
• The importance of international cooperation\textsuperscript{121} as a way to contribute to international regulations aimed to decline exports to non-democratic countries
• The need for reviews on how the Code of Conduct as well as PGU can be implemented in the Swedish guidelines.

As the general idealistic picture, general common realpolitik elements exist:

• When balancing the guidelines when deciding on arms export, the national interest is considered as top priority.

The analysis also shows the occurrence of motives are hard to define as only idealistic or realistic, they rather seem to be twofold, regardless of the cabinet formation:

• Arms exports are necessary to enable the purchase of technological equipment, which in turn creates the ability of participations in international peacekeeping operations
  As mentioned in the previous analysis – the goal is idealistic, while the means are realistic
• “Sweden has a restrictive export policy and that potential exports to non-democracies are perceived as small”. This statement while exports to e.g. Saudi Arabia takes place, suggest an idealistic vision with a realistic outcome.

The general picture of all three cabinets is that both goals as well as the rhetoric can be placed within the framework of idealism. What is though clear is that each “idealistic stance” tends to result in a “but”, e.g. that national security interest and intentions always are predominant.

6.1.1 Hypothesis 1 A Social Democratic minority cabinet should exhibit a high degree of idealism regarding arms export

There are no explicit signs that the cabinet policies are of a more idealistic character than the other two cabinets. Admittedly, the comprehensive KRUT investigation can be perceived as a desire to change the Swedish legislations and guidelines with respect to factors such as human rights. But since the result of KRUT not resulted in a submitted bill of a new proposal, the degree of idealism is seen to decrease. Purely speculative, this could indicate that the cabinet (because of its minority position) not were able to agree on a common bill, whereupon the result of KRUT was transferred to the next cabinet.

Hypothesis 1 show no clear higher incidence of idealism compared to the other two cabinets.

6.1.2 Hypothesis 2 A majority Alliance cabinet should exhibit a high degree of realism

\textsuperscript{121} To some extent realistic since NATO is mentioned as security provider. EU is however emphasized as the primarily arena for international cooperation in all three cabinets.
regarding arms export

Two significant changes unlike previous cabinet can be seen. First, the stress of a greater cooperation between the cabinet and the industry, aimed to promote export can be seen as remarkable since the cabinet views on the increasingly foreign owned industry as positive. Possibly will this result in a situation where produced material not necessarily fits the needs for the Swedish defence. In other words, the produced material will more often be exported to other countries.

Second, the establishment of Exportstödsmyndigheten (The Authority of Exports Support) aimed to (as the name suggest) support the export more effective. A policy aimed to do this, are difficult to interpret in any other way than that the cabinet intends to remain the current export or increase it, with the creation of what could be considered as a “lobbying organization” for arms export. It does not further specify if extra attention should be given to some specific countries, whereupon no assumption that exports to non-democracies countries will increase can be made. However, the focus on the state- and economy perspectives should be considered as a high degree of realism. The support for export can be seen as more “focus-oriented”.

The cabinets approach to generally put the Swedish economy and industry in relation to arms exports is not only a traditional realistic policy, it is also contrary to the Swedish guidelines of arms export, as export motivated by the economic beneficial, not are allowed.

The establishment of the new authority can to some extent be seen as a result of the majority position, whereupon the hypothesis to some extent have a bearing.

6.1.3 Hypothesis 3 A minority Alliance cabinet should exhibit a weaker realistic policy on arms export

Like mentioned, the overall picture can be seen as idealistic. One conclusion that is in line with the third hypothesis is the appoint of a committee aimed to investigate how a new legislation can be developed, ordered to decrease exports to non-democracies. The Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Social Democratic motion in the matter, whereas the cabinet appointed a review, in other words - an agreement between the Social Democrats and the Alliance. The idealistic motive can though be seen to decrease, since the investigation also will examine how a decrease exports can affect the industry and economy.

Because of this, the hypothesis can to some extent have a bearing.
7. An outlook - The cabinet of 2014-2018 hypothesis (Y)

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<th>Minority cabinet</th>
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<td><strong>Alliance cabinet</strong></td>
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<td>(M, KD, FP, C)122</td>
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<td><strong>Social Democratic cabinet</strong></td>
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Table II Model for potential hypothesis (Y) 2014-2018

This final part of the thesis presents an outlook of a potential Social Democratic majority cabinet. It seems relevant since in the time of writing, only a few months are left until the next parliamentary election in Sweden, where a change of cabinet isn’t impossible. As a Social Democratic majority cabinet not are included in the study, the hypothesis (Y) will be a speculative such.

It should be emphasized that this concluding outlook is speculative and not follow the methodological considerations and the choices of empirical data used in the thesis “real purpose”.

As presented in the third cabinet of the study (2010-2014) a motion presented by the Social Democrats, which pointed out the need to make a review of the Swedish guidelines, was granted. The Swedish Minister of Defence, Karin Enström expressed short after that:

> It is important that the Alliance together with the Social Democrats or with as many as possible, agrees on these issues.124

Agreements of this kind are not new in the Swedish defence- and security policy. However, the question remains how a Social Democratic majority cabinet should agree on a common line on arms export. Neither the Green Party125 nor the Left Party was in favour of the agreement between the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party, based on the grounds that the claims were considered not to be strong enough, and that no guarantees existed in the agreement. The means ordered to strengthen the legislation was considered weak as well.126

In Cabinet Platform 2011-2014 the Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left Party

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122 The Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Centre Party.
123 The Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left Party.
125 The Green Party was in a coalition with the Social Democrats during 2002-2006.
126 Ridderstolpe (2011).
though states that:

Sweden should be more active in prevention of civilian conflicts. We therefore want to strengthen Sweden’s capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building operations. A red-green cabinet will draft a new law on military equipment, which among other things, will exclude the export of arms to countries that commit massive violations of human rights.127

Perhaps has the “red-green alternative” agreed on the issue? When looking back however, the Social Democratic line strongly differed from the Left and Green Party. For example the Former Social Democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson was questioned by the Constitutional Committee about his approval to lift the embargo against China. An approval that wasn’t shared by the Left and Green Party. The questioned was specifically about Persson’s behaviour, when instead of turning to the Parliamentary EU Committee, sought support from previous leader of the Moderate Party, Fredrik Reinfeldt (current Prime Minister).128

In an article from 2012, signed by the spoke-person of foreign policy and the main spoke person of the Green Party, the party “challenged” the Moderate Party and the Social Democrats, since these were considered to drive the exports of arms to dictatorships. They asked for support of three basic principles: a true democracy criterion, greater transparency and a proper political accountability.129

The Left Party has an ideological history of a permanent opposition to arms export. According to the party, the current guidelines are not followed, which requires a new legislation. In the long run, the Left Party consider that:

Swedish arms export shall completely come to an end. Arms trade contributes to armed conflict and money that should give people a better life goes to weapons.130

Like the Left Party, the Green Party states that:

The Green Party wants to stop arms exports, but unfortunately no political majority for a total settlement exist in the current situation.131

In an article in Dagens Nyheter in May 2011 the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats, the Green Party, the Social Democrats and the Left Party “promised” that rules on arms export should be tightened. This also concerned the export supporting agencies.132 The Centre Party was missing.

The parties various positions described above highlight a complex picture and difficult

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130 The Left Party, “Arms Export”.
131 The Green Party, “Sweden should not arm dictatorships”.
132 The Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, the Left Party, Amnesty, Diakonia, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society and the Christian Council of Sweden (2011) “We promise that the laws should be tightened”, Dagens Nyheter.
condition for a change in the current legislation. What can be noted is that the Social Democrats together with the Green Party and the Left Party exhibit a seemingly common line. Whether this is merely a rhetorical phenomenon will be unsaid, but the idea is not completely foreign. Both the Green Party and especially the Left Party, views of arms exports differ significantly from the Social Democrat’s actions on the issue in a historical perspective. One should remember that the Social Democrats are the party that has mainly been in cabinet position in the last hundred years, and thus also developed the arms export to what it is today.

It is conceivable that the result from appointed parliamentary committee (the agreement between the Moderate Party and the Social Democrats) will like KRUT, culminate in - nothing. If the Social Democrats not seeks support from the Moderate Party. The question in such a case is then how the Left and the Green Party will react on such a situation. Their view’s of arms export is strongly embedded in their ideology. A change in their position in the issue seems unlikely.

7. Final words and suggestions for further research

During the process of this study some fundamental problems in the Swedish arms export policy has been highlighted. The conclusion of the study shows a relatively idealistic rhetoric, idealistic goals but realistic means to achieve it. The seemingly fragmented policy among the various parliamentary parties (demonstrated in the previous chapter) calls for more studies in the interaction between the parties in question, and not only the cabinet itself. The backbone in Swedish defence- and security policy is that a broad agreement between the political parties should be sought. However as this study indicates, difficulties for such in the context of arms export exist. For example is the “non-result” of KRUT. Despite the fact that the report was presented nine years ago all three cabinets illustrates that the result are under process. If the “standstill” within the policy of arms exports is due to a non-majority cabinet, future studies may advantageously focus more detailed on the party positions, actions and settlements across the party lines to elucidate the problem. The issue could also be placed in a historical perspective in terms of the significance of previous cooperation between parties.

Another interesting possibility is to look closer at the “middle parties” tendencies of an inability to deliver the policies that the population can be seen to desire, both from a historical and ideological perspective.

Given that one of the smaller “right-wing” parties not being re-elected in the upcoming parliamentary election, the Swedish political arena will change and possibly require new formations and collaborations. Only the future will tell the outcome of such a change, which in turn will shape future studies.

Another problematic noting is that arms export to a large extent is motivated in the context of economy and industry, contrary to the existing regulations. Arguments for placing arms export in the framework of IR was initially argued in this thesis. The perception remains but a more refined theoretical framework could go deeper into the problem, since the legislation of arms export shows tendencies to be un-valid and out-dated in relation to the political action.
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