Change and Continuity

Tracing the structure of the Swedish crisis management system on a national level by its advocacy coalitions 2001 - 2014

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Abstract
This essay is an analysis of the Swedish crisis management, as a policy subsystem using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. By applying a Causal Process Tracing method, the main issues of division within the policy subsystem will be examined, and the effects of the 2004 South East Asian tsunami as an incitement of policy change. The major finding is that the reforms that followed the tsunami investigations, to a large extent were planned prior to the tragic event, the main changes seem to have been halted by the 2006 election and change of Office. The cross-party coalitions that were found have theoretical implications for the ACF research.

Keywords

Abbreviations

ACF - Advocacy Coalition Framework
(C) – Centre Party
CON – Congruence analysis
CPT – Causal- Process Tracing
CVA – Co-Variational Analysis
(Fp) – Liberal Party (Folkpartiet)
(Kd) – Christian Democrats
KU – Constitutional Committee
(M) – Moderate Party
(Mp) – Green Party (Miljöpartiet)

MSB - Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency aka SCCB
(S) – Social Democratic Party
SAP – Swedish Social Democratic Party
SDC – Swedish Defence Commission
SEMA – Swedish Emergency Management Agency
(KBM in Swedish) discontinued at the creation of MSB
SOU – Statens Offentliga Utredningar, Government Report
(V) – Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)
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1:1 Introduction

10 years ago a tsunami struck the shores of South East Asia, affecting Swedish citizens and Swedish society at large with 543 dead and tens of thousands affected. The impact on society was probably immense, but what about the policy subfield of crisis management? As Nohrstedt and Weible (2010) state: it is easy to imagine that the bigger the magnitude of the event, the greater the policy impact (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, p.4). However that does not seem to be the case. The processes of change are a little bit more intricate than so.

The main division of policy preferences was on the issue of a lead agency and an extended mandate for that agency, at least during crisis. It might be expected that there would be concerns on transparency and a debate on the scope of governmental control (such as the FRA debate\(^1\) in Sweden or Patriot Act in the US). Rather surprisingly that was not an issue, from what can be discerned in official records and contemporary news, the key debates were on the merits or disadvantages of such an agency on grounds of efficiency and public policy tradition.

1:2 Aim

By applying the chosen framework (ACF) we will be able to process trace the creation of the crisis management system of today. We will be able to discern the factors that have been necessary for the outcome as well as establish how these factors have been instrumental in the outcome -the crisis management structure of today.

By using a functional approach\(^2\) and focus on the outcome, we will actually contribute to the theoretical advancement of the ACF. The societal benefits of this essay, is that we in a scholarly and non partisan environment can bring clarity into the policy legacy of the 2004 tsunami, as well as gain a deeper understanding of the processes in the crisis management subsystem.

1:3 Research Question and Puzzle

The assumption alluded to above on disasters being change generating, or that an external event ought to instigate reform is probably somewhat drastic. Nevertheless, external shocks are one of the key factors in explaining major policy changes, enough for there being concern that one might start looking for an external event whenever a change is to be explained (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, p.4).

This puzzle is therefore part of a greater research field on why only some crises lead to change. Our

\(^1\) There were other issues of civil rights versus counter terrorism measures and other matters of legal concern. These were part of an adjacent and related but still separate debate.

\(^2\) The functional approach will be expanded upon in the Theory chapter.
endeavour is actually two, first we need to establish and analyze the actual course of events (How), secondly we can assess the factors that were at work and thus analyze the reasons for the outcome (Why). What specific traits of the Swedish crisis policy subsystem were conditional in the policy outcome 2001-2014?

2:1 Theory

The theoretical approach of this essay is the Advocacy Coalitions Framework. We will first get a presentation of the theory by contextualising it in its scholarly field, by a short literature review. Then the theoretical framework as well as its key concepts will be presented. Finally the applicability of the theory on the empirical case will be addressed as well as other issues that may concern the operationalization of the concepts. Finally the choice of theory in favour of others will be explained as well as probable difficulties in application addressed.

ACF was proposed as a theoretical framework by Paul Sabatier and put forward as an explanatory framework of policy change in the Co-written 1993 Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Framework Approach (Sabatier, P & Jenkins-Smith, H. 1993). It can be described as a part of a new wave of public policy research, pioneered by works like Kingdon’s (1995) and reacting against the policy cycles, or stages heuristics paradigm of earlier studies (Cairney, 2012, p 241). The main concern of Sabatier was the inability to explain changes in policy and the shifts between radical change and relative stability. Other theories of similar ambitions are Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) and as mentioned earlier the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon, 1995). The framework has been applied to both quantitative and qualitative analyses, and used to explain changes (or lack thereof) on different political systems on grander as well as very particular policy levels (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p.189, p. 199 and p. 207), spanning from water policy in Washington State (Leschine, Lind & Sharma, 2003) to Multilevel analysis on Health Policy in EU (Carboni, 2012). Here in Sweden ACF has been applied to a wide scope of topics ranging from policy towards predator control (Jordansson, 2013) to nuclear policy (Nohrstedt, 2008). The latter is of great importance to this research since it has methodological similarities in the case study form rather than survey or interview based. The focus on policy change and crisis is also of resemblance to this endeavour.
The main concepts will now be presented and issues of modifications addressed.

The ACF had as its prime object, as stated earlier, to explain the shifts in public policy changes that the more static or cyclic theories failed to address satisfactorily. This discrepancy between theory and reality that the framework meant to remedy, could however be an effect of changes in the decisional context. As stated by Cairney (2012, p. 234f.), changes within the public policy elites (what he terms “the clubby days”) also meant changes in the palette of actors and consequently even in behaviour. Be that as it may, new theories appeared. The ACF, as originally proposed, was based on an assumption that political behaviour is founded on beliefs and values. The individual actors’ beliefs are then crucial in determine her actions, particularly in creating or joining an advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Weible 2007, p.190 ff.) An advocacy coalition is constituted of stakeholders such as politicians, experts, bureaucrats, journalists and others concerned (depending on the policy issue there can be a varying stakeholders involved such as interest organisations, lobby groups, companies, government agencies)3. These Advocacy Coalitions operate within different subsystems. A subsystem can be defined by its geographical scope, topic and/or its influencing actors such as bureaucrats, elected and appointed officials, and experts (Sabatier & Weible, p. 192-193). These subsystems are characterized by stability and the distribution of power within the subsystem is rarely challenged. Sabatier claims that defining the subsystem is one of the main tasks in conducting an ACF analysis (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193). Defining the subsystem is essential in order to isolate the analysis unit from related or intertwined (nested) subsystems (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p.193). Our subsystem is the crisis management structure on a national level. We shall not dwell on that at the present stage of the analysis, but address it separately under the Delimitations heading of the essay. Beliefs are the fundamental motivator for political actors; the policy subsystem is the locus of events for policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 192 f.). Even if changes occur within the subsystems, the natural state is one of relative stability where the majority coalition can go about their business more or less unchallenged. This is based on the assumption that the actors are guided by their beliefs and that those beliefs are rarely changed. This is also the reason for the undisturbed distribution of power within the subsystems, which vouches for the system stability (Sabatier & Weible 2007, p. 196). These our beliefs are then organized in a belief system of varying degrees of profoundness of conviction. At the deepest level are those beliefs on which we form our perceptions on human behaviour and human nature. This belief system can be described as follows:

3 The can also depend on the level of the policy subsystem; it seems likely that there might be more stakeholders on a national or international level. On the other hand a lower level issue might get people’s passion for the subject up and thereby increase the amount of stakeholders.
• **Deep Core Beliefs**
  Our most fundamental beliefs such as ideas regarding human nature, these are strictly normative. Even basic issues on a left-right scale belong here, for instance regarding the size of the state or definitions of freedom. There is a low probability of change of these issues.

• **Policy Core Beliefs**
  These can also be described as ideology in practice. They contain priorities of policy related values such as the causes of problems in subsystem. This is the actual basis for participation in coalition\(^4\). These beliefs concern the subsystem as a whole.

• **Policy Core Policy Preference**
  This is more of an intermediary state, constituted of: “Normative beliefs that projects an image of how the subsystem ought to be […] guides coalition strategic behaviour, and helps unite allies and divide opponents” (Sabatier & Weible 2007, p. 195). The impact of propositions can be ascribed to this type of preferences. For instance; if coalition A. claim that their proposal strengthen the biological plurality, the opposing coalition, B, might claim that the proposal will hurt farming interests. If the issue gets more heated, the likelihood of the debate being one of policy core beliefs is the greater and the polarisation less likely to be broken. However the preferences can be transferred into the least entrenched part of the belief system:

• **Secondary Beliefs**
  These can relate to a specific instrument or proposition, for example on how to realize a proposal, in a practical sense (introducing a fee, make something tax-deductable or demand special permits for instance). This is often what’s actually debated. The probability of change is at the highest in these sorts of beliefs. The more the topic of debate can be viewed as a technicality the higher the probability of change or at least cooperation (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 194 ff)\(^5\).

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\(^4\) According to ACF, we will get back on the issue of beliefs as incentives of policy participation. For now it will suffice to state that the assumptions on beliefs are not the main focus of this essay. If not for other reasons, so for remaining non-speculative on hard to prove assumptions on behavioural motivations.

\(^5\) This reference is valid for all four points.
As noted earlier the belief systems within the policy subsystems are fairly stable, nevertheless, changes do happen. The identified main reasons for change within a policy subsystem are four: Policy Oriented Learning, Internal or External shocks and Negotiated Agreement.

- **Policy Oriented Learning**
  This is a slow change process since it obviously demands a previous chain of events to learn from. The basic idea is that information and feedback from previous decisions affect secondary beliefs. Change in sublevel perceptions travels slowly to system level (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 198-199).

- **External Perturbations or Shocks**
  This can consist of changes in socioeconomic conditions, regime change, outputs from other systems or disasters. Such an event may cause a shift in agenda and changes in resource allocations. It is the redistribution of resources (public opinion is a resource according to ACF) that may shift balance between minority and majority coalition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 198-199).

- **Internal Shocks**
  A shock within the subsystem may tip the power balance between the majority and the minority coalition. It could presumably even cause division within the majority coalition and hence instigate change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 204-206). This would be in line with Sabatier’s claim that an internal shock serves as an indicator of the failings of the current policy and, therefore infuses doubt within the majority coalition and strengthens the support for the minority and galvanizes their resolution (Weible & Sabatier, 2007, p 192 ff.).

  Within coalitions there seems to be a tendency to overstate information that confirms the coalition policy beliefs and disregards information that supports the opposing view. This plus the “Devil shift” logic – we tend to remember losses more than gains and therefore opponents are perceived as more “evil” and powerful than they actually are. This fortifies positions since it rallies the troops as well as accentuates differences in opinion.

- **Negotiated Agreement**
  This is a later addition to the ACF, designed to address issues of policy change in the absence of shocks and perturbations. Especially in instances when previously warring, or at least clearly opposing, coalition have been locked in a stalemate for some time, only to solve the issue by negotiating. One of the main reasons for negotiation is an insight in the costs of the perhaps hurting, stalemate. Other factors are leadership, finding alternative venues, issues being of secondary beliefs, i.e. technicalities and
trust building. The latter can be achieved by familiarity, for instance between union and employers, that are used to negotiate with each other and a certain mutual trust may have developed. 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 204-206)

Daniel Nohrstedt challenges some of the fundamental ACF assumptions when using the theory on an empirical case; the decision to call for a referendum regarding the future of Swedish nuclear power. The referendum was a result of the changes in public opinion towards nuclear power in the wake of the Three Mile Island Incident in 1979 (Nohrstedt, 2005). He concluded that strategic objectives such as vote maximization, party cohesion and public relations to the electorate seemed more viable as explanations to the Social Democratic Party’s actions, more than core beliefs such as ACF theory would suggest (Nohrstedt, 2005, p. 1055). He later extended the research by applying ACF to the post-Chernobyl policy changes.

A crisis or focusing event of that magnitude should cause perturbation and spark an incitement of change. The actual changes in policies were however only incremental. Nohrstedt claims that the lack of change could be ascribed to SAP’s (who were in office at that time) actions when they opted for a path of broader compromise in the energy policy subsystem (Nohrstedt, 2008) thus bringing the potential adversaries on board. Another important piece to the puzzle may be that the pro-change actors never quite managed to exploit the situation and mobilize support. The catastrophe did not open up for any new actors to enter the policymaking process. Some changes were however implemented in spite of this. Nohrstedt explains this by claiming that it was in SAP’s interest to appease the “green” opinion. Their objective was in that sense strategic; making some changes in order to avoid the environmentally concerned voting for the newly established Green Party in the upcoming election (Nohrstedt, 2008, p. 272). Once again strategic objectives seemed to be primary motivators rather than actual beliefs, which contradicts one of Sabatier’s fundamental assumptions. Both agree however that the actors are rational and act in accordance with a main objective of realizing their goals. They may be suffering from a bounded rationality – actors do not have complete knowledge, their judgment can be clouded by exterior factors, but they are always rational in the sense that they have a clear intent, an endgame that they pursue. The difference is therefore in defining the goal, Sabatier claims that realizing beliefs is the end; Nohrstedt on the other hand sees vote maximization and keeping office as the end or at least as short term goal. It is of course not to be read as if Nohrstedt suggests that the actors’ only aim is vote maximization, they probably seek office in order to implement policies based on their beliefs, but the foremost explanation of their actions were of strategic reasons.
In this essay, the focus is on the actual outcome rather than the motives. This means that the speculations on the actors’ inner incentives will not be addressed. Whether they are rational or not, is off topic and we will assume that the actors wanted the policies they propagated for during the 14 year time span of the essay. The main reason for not speculate on the inner lives of the actors, is just that, it would be speculative and very hard to verify. Interviews could help, but then the focus would go from the empirics of the case to psychological evaluations of the actors and application of theories on cognition and memory.

On the application of the theoretical framework, the focus will be on the coalitions based on their stance on the subject of a lead agency in the crisis management structure, and secondary the idea of creating emergency laws. The main division line will not be as in Nohrstedt’s research along party lines, but on the particular topic of lead agency and the implications of the inauguration of such an agency.

There are other theories on change and continuity that could have been used. A very brief summary of the argument in favour for using the ACF is that for instance Punctuated Equilibrium theory do not supply the researcher with the tools needed to study the stakeholders. The main idea is who are on the inside and who is on the outside. The constitution of the different groups are outside focus as well as the “normal” policy making away from the punctuation (True et al. 2007, p. 157f. 165f. and Walgrave & Varone, 2008, p. 367f). Nevertheless, the PE theory’s assumption that change will be resisted for institutional reasons as well, that most agencies will prefer the current order of things to changes in their policy field or even structure, will be regarded as a possible alternative explanation of the actions of the stake holders (True et al. 2007, p. 166).

We also have the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon, 1996), but even here the practicalities are in the way, interviews with key stakeholders are too hard to come by, and the operationalization of such an endeavour nightmarish. Also the Multiple Streams Theory focuses on the policy entrepreneurs and the seemingly chaotic nature of the (modified) Garbage Can model (Kingdon 1995, p.87f), whereas ACF supports a more structured analysis. So, we use ACF because it is neat, suitable in addressing our topic and known to have worked in a similar context (Nohrstedt). It is also worth noting that this essay will show the policy process rather than the pure agenda setting, why the ACF applied on a causal process tracing is the chosen way forward.
2:2 Design

I will establish the temporal unfolding of events and identify the main actors and their views; this will be done by dividing the time period 2001 to present into four main segments:

- 2001 – 2004 Background, setting the stage.
- 2004 – 2006 South East Asian Tsunami and its immediate aftermath
- 2007 – 2008 Reform and implementation
- 2009 – 2014 Continued debate

Each segment has been chosen because they contain certain crucial events. The segments will be analysed while described in what is referred to as a comprehensive storyline. The analysis will be done by applying the tools of the ACF, for instance in regards to the types of change or level of beliefs (as to the actors commitment to their causes). The conclusion proper will address the answers on the case, what happened and why? The result is known, the crisis management structure of today, it is the process of how we got here that is the focus and, as stated earlier, the puzzle of the impact of the 2004 Tsunami on the policy subsystem.

2:3 Delimitations

The temporal confinements of this essay is the period 2001-2014, the period 2001 -2004 will serve as context and setting of the stage for the later analysis. Actors will be presented and the main features of the advocacy coalitions on a basis of topics will be identified. The period 2005 through to 2008 is the most turbulent period where the actual drama will play out, the post tsunami debate and the 2006 election. It is also the time of the debate, investigation and subsequent proposition, and finally the implementation of the new crisis management structure. The 2009 to present will serve as the continuation of the coalition as well as establishing the normalcy of the subsystem. It will also make it possible to draw conclusions on the longitudinal behaviour within the subsystem. The Idea is that the causal processes only can be discerned when studying them over time, a sample or snippet may create a false picture of the actual processes.

We have also narrowed the scope of the analysis to only include issues concerning the crisis management structure on a national level (not regional or municipal). Adjacent debates and subfields such as the FRA debate, overall reform work of the defence system and investigations regarding the new constitution of 2011 will not be addressed; these are issues of a wider debate and as stated in
chapter 2, the ACF theory stipulates that the analysis unit should be identified and as well defined as possible from other intertwined subfields (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193). Only stakeholders within the subsystem that have been actively participating in either coalition will be presented. The aim is not to present every actor within the subfields, only those with coalition participation.

The most adventurous modification of the theory used is also an issue of delimitation; actors will be regarded in relation to their stance on the subject matter of the debate –not by party affiliation (even though that will also be considered, but as secondary in importance). This will also be reflected in our approach towards beliefs and values: what the actors say they want will be taken as their belief (rationally grounded or not), their commitment and resolve in sticking to the argument over time will be interpreted as corresponding to the level in the ACF belief system (as presented earlier). If the actors show a more cooperative approach, the issue will be considered to be of a secondary belief, if the coalitions are more entrenched a policy core belief situation is more likely at hand. The ACF theoretical levels will thus be used in a rather pragmatic, or more accurately, functionalistic standard. If the actors behave in a way that corresponds to a certain type of belief system level, that label will be used. Not necessarily to ascribe the specific actor certain beliefs, but to operationalize the data, thus making it more of an explanatory device than projecting beliefs on people.

2:4 Ethical Considerations

The discussion above calls for some clarification on ethical deliberations behind the design choices. Since the actors that will be named and identified by their actions and public speeches, it is necessary to keep in mind that we do not know their inner motives for these actions. If they acted as part of a collective, on their own firm beliefs, for personal strategic reasons, as a career choice or for any other reason is not for us to know and no pursuit to describing that will be endeavoured. I do not presume to know or expose any such reasons; we will only consider the actions in regards as to their function. It may also be worth mentioning that in using statements and secondary interviews, the actors do not get an opportunity to correct or comment on the use of those statements. However, as stated earlier, the idea is not to accuse anyone, but to establish a course of events and analyse a process.
3:1 Method

The methodological choices in this essay are based on two main aspects; the theory and the empirics. I will first give a brief summary of the methodological context, as in the previous use and academic status of the chosen method. We will then zoom in on the methodology of this particular essay by both problematize on the applicability on our case as well as lay out the actual operationalization of the method on the empirics at hand. Lastly we will address the issue of alternative methods, thus accentuate the fitness of the chosen method to the purpose of this academic endeavour.

Since the 1994 book Designing Social Inquiry by King, Keohane and Verba, which proposed the merit of applying quantitative-inspired standards on qualitative methods, there has been a movement of the discourse towards a qualitative methodology on its own premises, with different rules and scientific goals than the quantitative or large n studies (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 15, George & Bennet, 2005, Beach & Pedersen 2012 and Beach & Pedersen 2013 p. 2). There has been a surge in literature concerning qualitative studies and case-studies in particular. The main themes have been the very definition of a case study as well as the main merit and tasks for such a method. The nature of the process tracing method of case studies has been the crucial element in this debate. We have one camp that regards the process tracing with an aim towards finding and explaining causal mechanisms (George & Bennet, 2005, Blatter & Haverland 2012). In fact the 2005 book by George & Bennet has been presented as the igniting spark in the debate about causal mechanisms and process tracing (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The later contributions have either focused on designing and applying a diagnostic stance in submitting the empirical observations to certain tests in order to evaluate potential causality (Bennet, 2010, Mahoney, 2012, Collier, 2011 and Goertz & Mahoney 2012). These tests include; Hoop tests, smoking gun tests and straw in the wind tests, however the tests were criticized for being too focused on deductive application of logic rather than structured evaluation with temporality and, perhaps more importantly, timing as genuine factors (Blatter & Haverland 2013, p. 9). This latter stance focuses on stressing the unique methodology of process tracing in general and causal process tracing in particular. The idea is that causal mechanisms are not necessarily best manifested in the application of a test matrix, but rather a succession of events and combinations of actors and structures (Blatter & Haverland 2012, 2013 in Adcock, ed. & 2014).

This scholarly debate has also been termed the third wave of qualitative methods; it was also the topic of a symposium. The first wave was constituted of case studies based on comparable methodology during the 1960-70’s, for instance Lijphart 1971, Sartori 1970, and Verba 1967. The second wave was, as stated earlier, sparked by King et al. in 1994, and the subsequent responses such as Gerring, 2007,

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6 Symposium: A New Wave of Qualitative Methodology, spring 2013 by the American Political Science Association, Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research.
This second wave concerned a debate as to the role of qualitative vis-à-vis quantitative methods and the applicability of quantitative research standards on qualitative methods. The third wave, do have certain differences concerning the qualitative versus quantitative methodology, but are more concerned with the content of the qualitative methods and the distinction between different approaches on similar methods. For instance the causal process tracing (Blatter & Haverland), the explaining outcome PT (Beach & Pedersen), within-case analysis (Mahoney) have similarities in the fact that they are all Y centred, but their methodological definitions vary in as how they should be operationalized as well as the merit of their application. There seems to be a consensus among all the different takes that a Y centred approach have a low (Blatter & Haverland, 2012) or no (Beach & Pedersen, 2014) immediate generalizability. This is rather self-evident that the more case-specific the conclusions, the less general the implications. Nevertheless, it is the aim of this paper to draw conclusions from the specific case that may be partly applicable to the general research, both in application of the theory and within the research field. The results will hopefully provide us with a deeper understanding of the events as they unfolded as well as a more profound knowledge in the applicability of the ACF on Swedish crisis management as a policy field.

As stated in the previous part (2:1 in this essay) the theoretical framework of this essay is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Paul Sabatier used a case study himself for the book Policy Change and learning, an Advocacy Coalition Approach (1993) applying what Blatter & Haverland terms congruence analysis (2012). The characteristic research question for such an analysis is: which theory is best equipped to explain a certain phenomenon, in Sabatier’s case long term policy changes (Blatter & Haverland 2012, p. 151). A common approach of a congruence analysis is, according to Blatter & Haverland, to choose two contesting theories, and test their relative merit of explanatory fitness by applying them to one or more cases. However the main focus of this essay is not the applicability of the theory but explaining the empirics, the case. The theory is the lens through which the empirics make sense, as well as our provider of the necessary tools, in terms of key elements and terminology. Our investigation is thus mainly focused on the outcome of certain events, or Y-centred to use the Blatter and Haverland terminology. According to their thorough presentation on case studies, three different approaches can be discerned, even though combinations also occur. The three approaches of small n case studies are; co-variational analysis, causal process tracing and congruence analysis. The co-variational approach focuses on studying the causal effect, by choosing multiple cases and study the effect of the independent variable. Typical topics for this strain of X centred research are along the lines of does X matter? are X effective? CPT focuses more on the Y variable, assuming that the outcome can be dependent on a variety of causes. The outcome is given, but the process leading up to that outcome is the main target. These investigations are often applied to one or very few cases, while the variety is in the empirical material. Multiple sources are required and a

Brady & Collier7 2004 or George & Bennet 2005. For which Collier will be awarded the Swedish Johan Skytte Award in September 2014, (SvD. April 24 2014)
A longitudinal approach is needed as regards to causal mechanisms manifest themselves over time (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 24). The final approach is the congruence analysis that we touched upon earlier on the Sabatier angle. As stated earlier the congruence analysis focuses on the theories and the empirical case is more of a projection surface on which theoretical elements and their applicability can be scrutinized and compared. The main feature is thus not a variety of cases to test a causal variable (COV), nor a heterogeneous and covering empirical material to explain and describe the outcome of a sequence of events (CPT), but a duality of competing or complementing theories tested on a limited set of cases (Blatter and Haverland 2012, p. 24). The different approaches serve completely different purposes and can therefore not be given a ranking of appropriateness other than in applicability to the very research topic, question and theory.

As the ACF is geared towards a longitudinal analysis, meaning that the results are discernible and fit for analysis only when played out over a time period of at least ten years (Sabatier & Weible, 2007 p.92f.) we need a method that allows for such a perspective. The ambition of the essay is to go farther than merely the restraints of the theoretical framework, but to try to get as full a picture of the events as possible, and give a good account for events as they unfolded, in particular to find out what mechanisms were at work and how they affected the policy outcome. It is fully possible that some of the ACF assumptions will prove to be less fit for this very investigation, there will be a part dedicated to these issues after the empirical conclusions titled Theoretical implications. The applicability of the theory as well as possible modifications will be addressed in that section, as well as some further discussions on what benefits could be awarded when applying another framework or for that matter even a different method.

We have already stated that a longitudinal investigation is essential to do a causal process tracing analysis. We will now go deeper into the specifics of the method in order to operationalize them to fit the purpose of the analysis.

The CPT approach is characterized by a search for sufficient and/or necessary conditions that lead to a specific outcome. The focus is on understanding and exploring theory-based mechanisms (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 79-83 see also Norman, 2013, p. 55)). That ontological foundation of the theory is a configurational thinking, meaning that one acknowledges a plurality of factors and that social outcome is the result of a combination of causal factors rather than a single general variable. This also means that the effects of causal factors can vary and differ depending on the context and combination of factors at work. The gains are that the case gets thoroughly assessed and more possible causal factors be taken into account in comparison to other methods. However it also means that the generalizability of the findings is lower (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 79-83). In short: when zooming in on the particulars of a case, you get a within-case analysis, explaining the case in its uniqueness.
rather than as a case of a general phenomenon. The configurational thinking also means that equifinality, the notion that there can be multiple or divergent paths to a common end state or social outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 79-83), is an incorporated part of the methodological discourse. When carrying out a CPT analysis, the observations do not have to be aggregated into tables or scores, but the observation should be processed and presented as causal inferences based on three concepts Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 20); Comprehensive storyline, Smoking gun and confession. Comprehensive storyline is executed by ordering the observations in a temporal sequence, thus stressing the process and identify periods of activity (crucial moments) and those of relative stability (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 111). The observations are ordered in segments based on this principle of activity versus stability. A narrative is established and the analysis is applied in the sense that the empirics are analysed in order to be fitted into the temporal flow and regarded as crucial moments or not. The causality can be substantiated by evidence such as proximity in time and sequentiality of events. The smoking gun, which also has been described as the smoking gun test (Mahoney, 2012), is when a certain piece of evidence is found amongst the manifold observations, that provide a high level of certainty of the causality (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 115 f.). As the metaphor of the smoking gun suggests however, the observation itself may not be sufficient as evidence, but a spatial contiguity is needed (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 116). That is to say that someone holding a smoking gun in Gothenburg does not point to that person being proven guilty of murder in Berlin. The suspect has to be placed at the crime scene. In this investigation party membership or active participation in an advocacy coalition would be such an example. The third concept, confessions, could be either established by psychological theory adaptations, by which an actor’s motives can be discerned. It can also be obtained by interviews and statements (Blatter and Haverland 2012, p. 117 f.). The evidence value of the confession is to increase the certainty of the inferences made on the causality that the smoking gun points at.

“The analyst attempts to reveal the various steps that lead to an outcome, he reflects on the role that causal factors played in each sequence within the identified causal pathways and focuses on those situations when a plurality of causal factors come together and shape further pathways in decisive ways” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 106). Identify specific institutional factors of crucial importance to the outcome. These are to be termed necessary conditions within a causal configuration that in its turn is proven to be sufficient (on its own or in combination with other factors) for the turnout (Blatter and Haverland, p. 98).

George & Bennet (2005) stress the importance of transparency in an endeavour such as a case study. The researcher should be as open as possible with her sources and argue against the inferences made in order to eliminate any suspicion of bias towards a particular explanation. They also recommend that

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8 Author’s own interpretation.
the researcher should indicate how her initial expectations and analytical choices has been revised or at least challenged during the course of the study (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 93 ff.). This will be addressed in the *Theoretical Implications* chapter in this assessment. In using public records, as intended with this study, they also suggest that contemporary news sources and interviews are suitable for verification of events (George and Bennet, 2005, 99 ff.). Furthermore, cases may not be as “clean cut” as they first appear. Scholars should give pause for concern if complex patterns of decision-making seem easily portrayed and evaluated. More often than not, policy decisions are the outcome of a number of causes (George and Bennet, 2005, p. 98 f.). However the configurational thinking, as stated earlier does facilitate such a multiple cause aspect. The CPT method is Y-centred and the researcher focuses on the many and complex causes of a specific outcome rather than the effects of a particular cause.

When applying the ACF on this case there is an immediate problem concerning the ontological assumptions of the theory and the operationalization within the case. Namely the basic assumption that actors engage in politics and form coalitions based on their beliefs (Chapter. 2:1 in this essay, Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p 192f.). We have addressed this issue in regards as to theoretical basis of this essay, and considered the Nohrstedt- approach of using parties as coalitions. However the methodological implications must also be addressed and stressed.

A key to evaluate the suitability of the method is to delve deeper into the considerations of the theme for the essay and thus further specify what the exact target of the investigation is. For this reason it might be advisable to re-establish the *Why*? of this essay.

*Why* as in what did they want as actual policy, endgame as an implemented policy. Not why as in what were their inner motifs and possible strategic, psychological, ideological or other more or less aware reasons. *We focus on the outcome, the Y*. That means that *change* in the crisis management field on a national level is in focus. We will then perform a causal process tracing analysis of the policy field within the time period of 2001 through to present. The crucial moments have been identified as 2001-2002; the investigation and subsequent reformed crisis management structure. The themes as well as the actors of the coalitions were presented. The next crucial event was the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia, the aftermath of which is the most crucial moment. The 2006 to 2008 period was the period post the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, but also the period of intensified debate on crisis management. It was also a period of political change due to the 2006 elections which saw the SAP lose office to the Alliance for Sweden (constituting of the four parties of the Right Bloc). 2008 marks the inauguration of the crisis management function in the Prime Minister’s office as well as the creation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The period 2009 to present is important to balance the analysis, in the sense that the longitudinal perspective is key to understand and present the mechanisms of the process. If only the period 2006-2008 would be included, we would get at sample
without any comparable data of the fuller picture, the comprehensive story. Furthermore we would have great difficulty in defending the application of ACF, since the shorter time-span would make ad hoc constellations and actual advocacy coalition hard to tell apart. The actors’ responses to the 2008 reforms are also crucial in establishing their determination towards the preferred outcome. If there would be no objections to the policy that favours one coalition’s goals, the commitment of the losing fraction would be rather weak. That would in turn imply a low level of engagement or at the best secondary policy beliefs to use the ACF vocabulary. The entrenchment of the coalitions can thereby be verified by their commitment to the cause even after the implementation of the debated policy. This will be further elaborated upon in the 2009 to present chapter at this time it will suffice to state that, the actors commitment to their causes can be discerned by reading statements, interviews and their political actions such as calling for investigations or signing proposals in parliament. It is very probable that this behaviour is based upon core beliefs, it is also possible that psychological explanations such as wanting to belong or some completely different variable might be more accurate, however that is outside the scope of this investigation. We will assume that the actors want what they say that they want. In short that the proposed policy outcome that they advocate is something they actually want to see implemented in the real world. If the reasons for this are erratic or presumable sane, is outside the parameters of this study.

The choice of method must of course also be justified in terms of reliability as well as validity. The reliability issue may seem rather obvious, but need to be stated nonetheless. Since the method chosen (CPT) involves selecting, arranging and then presenting empirical observations within some theoretical restraints, it is imperative that the researcher justifies and declares the data available and also takes the counterarguments into account (Blatter & Haverland, 2013, p.48 and p. 119 f.). The fact that official records and government propositions are the core data for this study means that there is a certain amount of transparency in the fact that these records are public and that their impact is rather well documented. If the documents would be classified or otherwise unpublished the reliability would be at the lowest, this is also true for interviews of anonymous actors. The openness of sources is actually one of the reasons for using news sources such as interviews and articles that were published at the time. The other reason is that it is more likely that the actors’ statements at the time reflect their reasons for their actions, rather than their recollection of said events ten years after. The focus is on the advocacy coalitions and the actual outcome. That means that the statement the make do not necessarily be in line with their inner beliefs, as long as it proves their fealty to a certain coalition. If they state an opinion in one direction and work towards the implementation of that notion, the reasons for that commitment is off the radar for the investigation. If there is a discrepancy between statement and actions, however, it is of great importance since it challenges the theoretical framework. The need to include results that challenges and surprises is paramount in retaining an acceptable scientific standard.
in using a less constrained method, such a fixed data set into which information is entered and analysed (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 30)

The external validity of the conclusions could be rather easily increased by further research bringing in more cases in order to study if the same causal processes seem to be at work (Blatter & Haverland, 2013, p. 209). Such an expansion would however not be viable in this format with a temporal as well as quantitative restraint.  

As to alternative methods, we could go for a more text oriented analysis where the process and context would play a minor role and in-text elements would be of greater importance. Such a text analysis could also explore differences in arguments and perhaps even explore changes in attitudes (see for instance Bergström & Borèus, 2005). We would risk losing track of the actual case as well as the theoretical context (ACF) and up with a completely different research paper. Another option would be a more interview based approach where the key participants would be interviewed in order to substantiate any claim of advocacy coalitions. There are some concerns with interviews, some of which have already been addressed. The aftermath of a crisis or catastrophe tends to ignite a blame-game (Peters et al. 2011, p.19); this means that key participants may have a slightly biased recollection of events. One should not underestimate the influence of time on memories. New interviews have therefore been omitted as method in favour for articles and interviews that were contemporary to the events described.

3:2 Material

The material used for this research project is based on official records such as official inquiries and investigation (publicly available at the Parliaments homepage) as well as government propositions and other official documentation. A great advantage in using this sort of sources is that they are publicly available and never get out of print or hard do find. That actually gives the research a higher level of replicability or at least more reliability as opposed to pure interviews, especially with protected sources or for that matter semi- or unofficial documents.

When newspaper articles are used, it is foremost to substantiate claims and, especially illustrate the opposing coalitions’ reactions to the propositions and investigations. It will also be used to establish the constitution of the different coalitions. For instance; if someone writes an Op-ed in the competence of head of a certain agency, the view presented will be regarded as representative of that agency (at least so deemed by the author. Analyzing multiple cases in this format would mean that each case would be too condensed, which would impair the analytical strength of the method. Allowing events to play out over time and construct a comprehensive storyline is as stated earlier essential to the explanatory virtues of the method chosen.

There is of course a vast amount of academic literature on this; however the fact that we tend to have a somewhat inaccurate recollection of the weather during childhood summers might suffice in proving this point.
that particular time at least). The idea is that all claims, should in some respect be related to an official document and thereby be open for public or scholarly scrutiny.

4:1 Literature Review

The literature review will solely consider the current research situation on the empirics of the case. Theoretical and methodological research issues have already been addressed under their respective headings. Research on general crisis management, or for that matter, very specific cases that are not immediately applicable will not be considered. The literature contexts of the theory and method chapters addressed more international debates; this review will stay closer to home and mainly focus on the Swedish research. Research on decision making in crisis and crisis communication will not be addressed, neither will studies on defence issues or legal matters.

At CRISMART, at Swedish National Defence Collage, crisis management is the main focus of the research, however the policy angle is but one field of many. Recent studies on policy learning have focused on learning from crisis as well as learning in crisis (Deverell, 2010). Even SCCB have funded research on crisis management, mostly towards operative concerns, but also on crisis management structure such as Ivarsson Westerberg, & Nilsson, (2011), which compares the national crisis management structure in Sweden and four other countries along the dichotomies horizontal – vertical; centralized and decentralized. The Government has the own research program FORBE, within which Jenny Lundgren (2010) has studied the crisis management system.

Daniel Nohrstedt has a special importance to this essay as pointed out earlier in the fact that he has studied crisis and change in Swedish politics by applying ACF theory. He has also pointed out certain areas of the research field that would merit from further research (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). The application of a geographical proximity as well as policy proximity aspect on evaluating crisis impact would increase the universality of the theory. The hypothesis was that the closer the crisis, the more likely a policy change would be (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, p. 10). However, the South East tsunami occurred on foreign shores, but there were Swedish citizens immediately affected, as well as the handling of the crisis was a domestic affair. There was no evidence found during the research for a geographical aspect on our case, why it was omitted. The fact that there was a domestic event with the storm Gudrun, just weeks after the tsunami, making the two somewhat intertwined further blurs out the geographic distinction. This is because much critique on the crisis management structure concerned the handling of both events.

There have also been formal investigations such as the 2005 special commission report SOU 2005:104 as well as public hearings on the handling of the events. These are however part of our research material as sources from within the subsystem.
5:1 Swedish Crisis Management Structure 2001-2014

The development of the Swedish crisis management policy subfield will be presented in what is termed a comprehensive storyline\textsuperscript{11}. The idea is that by allowing the events to be described over time, the processes at work will be discernible as well as patters and actors.

5:2 2001-2004

In 1999 the Swedish government (SAP was in office at the time) ordered an investigation on the future of Sweden’s security policy challenges. The background was the vast changes in the policy field of security and defence as well as the perceptions of security in the post-Cold War Era. The focus of the investigation was to identify and prescribe against vulnerabilities and challenges for the military and civilian security structures. The person in charge of this investigation was Åke Petterson of the Centre Party. The investigation led to the government report: SOU 2001:41 Säkerhet i en ny tid - Betänkande av sårbarhets- och säkerhetsutredningen. The report served as the foundation on which the government’s two propositions: Prop. 2001/02:10 Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret and Prop. 2001/02:158 Samhällets säkerhet och beredskap were based upon. The latter contained the basics for the Swedish crisis management structure as we know it. The three founding principles were introduced; the principle of vicinity, the principle of responsibility and the principle of similarity. The principle of vicinity is a principle of subsidiarity in the sense that it implies that an issue should be addressed by the closest agency, both geographically and systemically speaking. It could also be phrased as the lowest level should address the issue (but is also duty bound to report and inform other agencies, especially on the national level). The system is based on the same three levels of governance as the Swedish government system in general; municipal, regional and national level. The vicinity principle thus stipulates that a crisis should be addressed on the corresponding level. The similarity principle aims at keeping the structure as intact as possible, even under events of severe stress as a crisis. The basic idea is that an agency should keep their tasks as in normal circumstances as in crisis. And last, but definitely not the least is the principle of responsibility. This principle means that an agency that is responsible for a certain issue or task is responsible for that issue even under crisis, but it is also responsible for having well implemented and updated crisis preparedness. This responsibility covers communication (both external to the citizens and internal to other agencies and offices). The notion of a special Crisis agency was also introduced; its main purpose would be planning and coordination of crisis management. It was also proposed that it could serve as a leading agency in times of crisis, a suggestion that was scrapped from the actual proposition. This was mainly because

\textsuperscript{11} See Method chapter, this essay, for definition.
other agencies had objected to the idea. For instance Swedish Rescue Services Agency found the idea less than appealing, and deemed the lead agency structure an obsolete and impractical solution (Christina Salomonson, *Sirenen*, nr 4 2001)\(^\text{12}\). On a legislative note, the Pettersson, investigation was clear on the topic of emergency laws; even though a formulation that expanded the existing constitutional frame for wartime to be applicable during severe crisis in peacetime as well was advocated, the creation of emergency laws and expansion of the governments legal room of manoeuvre was “out of the question” (SOU 2001:41, p. 307)\(^\text{13}\). The responsibility principle was elaborated upon to include an *area principle* that implied that an agency on every level had the main responsibility towards coordinating the crisis management. This responsibility also included analysing possible cascading effects of a crisis, and alert the agencies that could be affected. On a national level it should, as stated in the constitution, be the government that have the ultimate responsibility.

However, the new crisis agency could be appointed by the government to implement decisions and be given a mandate to direct the managing of the crisis. The normal tasks for the new agency should be on planning, execute trainings and perform evaluations on crisis preparedness. It should be equipped with a special crisis chamber that would be activated in times of crisis or distress (SOU 2001:41, p. 146 ff.). It was to be placed under the Prime minister’s office. The area principle implied that there would be a *leading agency*, with certain status and mandate to tell other agencies what to do and how to do it.

The leading agency part of the investigation was dropped in the propositions that followed; however, we did get a new crisis agency called Swedish Emergency Management Agency (*KBM*) but this agency did not have a mandate to lead other agencies. No formal crisis management function in the Prime Minister’s office was introduced either. Critique was voiced for not adapting the lead agency part of the investigations recommendation, for instance the Swedish Defence Commission\(^\text{14}\) backed up the idea (Ds 2001:44). Eva Flyborg and Runar Patriksson (fp), claimed that a “refusal front” amongst some agencies coupled with bureau political “turf mentalities”, even at the Prime Minister’s Office, were the causes of the scrapping of the lead agency idea\(^\text{15}\) (Motion 2001/02:Fö20). The all-Moderates motion (Motion 2001/02:Fö18) contained some objections to the governments proposition, however, they stress the importance of the Prime minister’s Office as the correct location of the crisis management centre, no agency should assume a leading role.

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\(^\text{12}\) Christina Salomonson was the Director General of Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Räddningsverket) *Sirenen* is their official magazine; the statements in the editorial (the article in question) are to be regarded as their official stance.

\(^\text{13}\) “Någon form av undantagslag bör inte komma i fråga”

\(^\text{14}\) In which all of the parliamentary parties are represented. However the Moderate Party had boycotted the committee 1999 – 2002 since the felt left out by the Center-SAP defense policy agreement (Sveriges Radio November 23, 2002)

\(^\text{15}\) “Kritik mot Sårbarhetsutredningen kom dock från en ”vägrarfront” av i huvudsak fem myndigheter, som i olika konstellationer uppvissade en provkarta på hur gamla organisationer slår vakt om egna revirgränser även när verkligheten för länge sedan sprungit ifrån denna indelning. ”Vägrarfronten” har tillsammans med motsvarande revirkamp inom Regeringskansliet satt regeringen under hårt tryck” (Motion 2001/02:Fö 20).
In ACF terms, the normalcy is stated in the three principles that henceforth have been the main guidelines in the crisis management structure. As for advocacy coalitions we have the Investigator, Åke Petterson, the Swedish Defence Commission and Eva Flyborg and Runar Petterson on the pro lead agency coalition. The Government (SAP), Christina Salomonson of Swedish Rescue Services Agency and –according to Flyborg – unnamed bureaucrats at the Prime Minister’s Office and other key agencies where on the opposing side with sovereignty of the agencies as prime objective. So in addition to the appearance of some of the key actors in the subsystem, we also get an introduction to the topic of division.

The period 2002-2004 saw tragic events such as the 2002 Bali bombing and the murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, however they left no immediate impact on the crisis management subsystem i.e. no debates in Parliament or news articles. The SOU 2003:32 report on preparedness and terrorism post 9/11 was mainly concerned with matters of police and military counter measures to address potential terrorist threats and was thereby part of an adjacent debate with somewhat different actors. The government did present its view on the future development of the general crisis preparedness in the proposition 2004/05:5, it also announced that they would present a new proposition on the progress of the crisis issues in the autumn 2005. The changes in the security and defence policy field at large, on an international as well as domestic scale were to be addressed. The basis for this proposition would be the SDC security analysis and a continued trust in the responsibility principle. A continued reformation work on the crisis structure and peace-time capabilities would also be suggested (SOU 2004:134 p. 59-60).

5:3 The Tsunami and its Aftermath 2004-2006

A catastrophe occurred on December 26, 2004, when a tsunami struck the shores of South East Asia killing and affecting Swedish nationals on a grand scale. The handling of the events by the government later rendered a special commission to assess the actions of the key agencies and actors as well as the crisis management structure in large. The opposition parties also called for hearings in the Committee on the Constitution chaired by Göran Lennmarker (M). Mr Lennmarker even demanded that the Committee should use its influence to force through the inauguration of a crisis management competence at the Prime Minister’s Office, a suggestion only Gustav Fridolin of The Green Party

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16 There was of course enormous news coverage, especially of the Anna Lindh murder, however, crisis management was not the issue, rather issues of close protection of politicians and such.
17 By Johan Munck
18 543 Swedish citizens died (Sveriges Radio, June 23, 2005), tens of thousands Swedes where in the affected area
19 The residents of the area where obviously worst affected, but the scope of this essay is Swedish Crisis Management.
20 Konstitutionsutskottet (KU)
wholeheartedly supported, while the remaining parties where more cautious in their response and referred to the ongoing investigation (Göteborgsposten, January 17, 2005). The investigation performed by the especially assigned Crisis Commission\textsuperscript{21}, was reported in the SOU 2005:104 \textit{Sverige och tsunamin, granskning och förslag}. The main criticism regarding the structural deficits on crisis management on a national level was the lack of formalized coordination and information sharing between agencies. These were the reoccurring themes on what caused the “too little, too late” response to the situation. Further areas of critique were the absence of a crisis management function close to the Prime ministers’ office, or an appointed agency acting as a hub. The possibility of an enhanced crisis leading office was mentioned, but also cautioned against, since the main deficits and shortcomings were in the area of coordination and cooperation and might not be remedied by a new agency, but better coordination between the existing ones. The inherit tension between efficiency (forceful actions and a flexible relation to regulations and procedures)\textsuperscript{22} and a more prudent approach subjected to procedural rigors where apparent during the first hours of the tsunami. The problem seemed to be on fathoming the extent of the disaster before understanding that it was not a normal or prejudicing case but a more extraordinary occurrence (SOU 2005: 104, p. 73). The dilemma of efficiency and prudence seemed to also be case of political cost of ineffectiveness (public outrage) and political cost of an all too relaxed approach to constitutional restraints and procedural praxis (getting slammed by the opposition and perhaps facing hearings) might be a part in the delayed reaction from the Prime Ministers’ Office (SOU 2005: 104, p. 73). A function at the Prime Minister’s Office was inaugurated in November 2005, with Kenneth Axelsson as their director. The main task would be monitoring events and analyze potential relevance to Swedish interests, no operative or active duties were to be ascribed the new unit (DN: 2005-11-28). Just weeks after the announcement of the instalment of this unit, the Crisis Commission’s report was published, making its critique on the lack of such a function less damaging (NE, Järtelius, 2005). The initial public reaction to the handling of the tsunami was a decreased trust in the Prime Minister Göran Persson and the Foreign Minister Laila Freivails, however the trust in the crisis management system did not seem that much dented. The main structural problem was not the lack of centralized policy field governance, but rather the opposite: “It is claimed in interviews that political action was delayed, and that central control prevented authorities from acting independently. In response to the question about future emergency management, the majority feel that it is hardly possible to be prepared for similar events outside of Sweden, but that it should be possible to handle similar situations inside the country’s boundaries” (KBM 2005:4, p. 131).

\textsuperscript{21} Katastrofkommissionen, led by Johan Hirschfelt

\textsuperscript{22} ”Detta spänningsfält går som en röd tråd genom denna studie. Och det är ett delikat dilemma för statsmakten. Att agera snabbt och kraftfullt med ett flexibelt förhållningssätt till lagar och förordningar är förvisso populärt, men sänder missvisande signaler om statens kapacitet och förpliktelser vid mindre allvarliga händelser” (SOU 2005:104, p. 73).
Another important conclusion that was drawn from the same report was that much of the failings on the government’s behalf were on the image of the crisis rather than the actual crisis (KBM 2005:4, p. 118f.). That implies that much of the political damage done was on the image of the government, especially the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. To what extent that will affect the political subfield of crisis management policy and the behaviour of the advocacy coalitions will be addressed further on.

The issue of a leading agency was raised again as the crisis management came under media attention, the Petterson report was once again news material and quite a few former stakeholders re-entered the debate. There where demands for a much more operative crisis agency, with its own civil task force (Dahlén23, SvD, 2005) the appointment of a crisis Commander in Chief (Conny Nordin24, interviewed in Norrköpings Tidningar, January 8, 2005), and the speculation as to whether a national crisis agency as recommended by Petterson would have changed the course of events (SR, December 2, 200525).

Staffan Karlsson of KBM/SEMA advocated the creation of a lead agency to be in charge in times of crisis based on the Pettersson model but perhaps even more modelled after the military that have vast mandates during wartime. This model was criticized by Berit Jóhannesson (v) of the SDC for being at odds with the constitution, which states that no agency should have the authority to interfere with another agency (Flamman, January 13, 2005)26. SEMA/KBM also proposed that a crisis paragraph should be introduced in the constitution, giving the SEMA a clearer mandate, amongst other things, and that a system of alert levels should be devised (KBM, 2005, p. 287ff.).

In summary the 2004 tsunami sparked an intensified debate, much of which ended up outside the policy subfield, i.e. appointing guilt. What is interesting is that most of the debate seems to address the very same themes as earlier: the benefits and drawbacks of a “beefed up” crisis agency. The activity of 2005 continued into 2006; however the elections in September 2006 called for the attention of the decision makers. As we learnt from PE, decision makers (and media) have a limited attention span, thus forcing some issues up or down the agenda (True et al. 2007, p. 157f). In January 2006 the Swedish Defence Commission published a report (Ds 2006:1), which contained their suggestions for improvements and adjustments of the Swedish crisis management structure. These suggestions were then to a great extent presented in the Government’s Proposition of March 2006. The lead agency should be inaugurated; further investigation in the matter should be dealt with promptly. The estimation was a fully operative agency by 2007, or at the latest a year after. This agency should be able to assume leading and coordinating position in times of crisis or severe stress (prop. 2005/06:133, p. 55). A crisis analysis unit should be positioned at the Prime Minister’s Office27 (p. 58f.) The change of direction since the 2002 structure, when the creation of such an agency was scrapped was

23 Rune Dahlén was the acting Director General of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency 1986 – 2000.
24 Professor Conny Nordin was member of the committee that investigated the Estonia aftermath 1997-1999.
25 Comments by Ake Pettersson
26 The article also questions the effectiveness of creating such an agency.
27 Actually it had been, at least in name, since November 2005.
explicitly addressed. The key was not a change of opinion, but rather a change in the external context. It was thus more of an adaption to a changing reality than a change of heart (prop. 2005/06:133, p. 96). It was also presented as a logical step in an ongoing process of which the 2002 structure was the first step. This adaptability signals a *confession* \(^{28}\) as to the level of commitment on the belief-scale. Since they\(^{29}\) express a willingness of change and presenting the change as gradual and undramatic, it would be safe to assume that the issue of leading agency was viewed (or presented) as a *secondary belief* or technicality. Instead of signalling drastic and forceful measures they signal incrementalism and cautiousness.

The parliamentary debate on the proposition took place in May 2006, Ola Sundell (M), who was a member of the SDC at the time, criticized the idea of a “Super Agency” and the lack of crisis management competence at the Prime Minister’s office\(^ {30}\). Tone Tingsgård (S) who also was a member of the same commission, declared that the proposition was a natural progression from the 2002 structure and that the new agency would not be at odds with the constitution. The level of concord in the parliament was further lauded. The importance of the concurrence on matters of principles such as the general path of the development of the crisis management structure had been imperative for a politically driven progress in the policy field. The view presented was that the political level was proactive as opposed to reactive, however, it was not stated how that was expressed in the changes in policy because contextual changes of the policy field. The friction between the political elite and the public agencies and institutions was expressed by Nordgren-Christensen (mp) of the SDC, who saw resistance from “bureau-Sweden\(^ {31}\)” as expected when changing the mandates and resources in the structure (*GP*, January 15, 2006).

Lars Ångström (Mp) saw matters a part of a wider context of changes in the entire defence policy system. According to that take, the creation and institutionalisation of a civil crisis preparedness would stand as a pinnacle of a transformed and non-military defence structure focused on civil concerns and international cooperation.

Defence Minister Björklund got the last word and claimed that a leading agency solution would end any insecurity amongst the agencies and organisations on who’s in charge at times of crisis. \(^ {32}\)

The Persson government ordered an investigation (*Fö* 2006:02) on how a new crisis management structure under a lead agency should be brought about\(^ {33}\). Anders Svärd (c) of the Swedish Defence

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\(^{28}\) As defined in chapter 3:1

\(^{29}\) Prime Minister Persson and Defense Minister Björklund

\(^{30}\) Riksdagens protokoll 2005/06:130 Monday May 29, 2006

\(^{31}\) ”Jag tror säkert vi får höra av en hel del motstånd från Myndighetssverige”, säger Annika Nordgren-Christensen (mp) GP. January 15, 2006

\(^{32}\) Riksdagens protokoll 2005/06:130 Monday May 29, 2006

\(^{33}\) Dir. 2006:81 Utformningen av ett system med en krisledande myndighet
Commission got the job as chief investigator. The presentation of the report was scheduled to after the 2006 elections.

Parallel to this, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the National Board of Psychological Defence were ordered an audit to establish the possibility of some sort of a merger of the agencies, maybe even becoming the lead agency (Dir. 2006:81). Mats Sjöstrand was appointed Chief Investigator of the merged agency (Fö 2006:03).

5:4 2007-2009 Reform and Implementation

After the 2006 elections, in which SAP lost office to the Alliance for Sweden consisting of the four parties on the right bloc, a period of changes and adaptations of promises into policies started. And quite naturally so, since voters would expect changes when deciding on supporting the opposition. Nevertheless, the crisis policy subsystem had been presented as one of concord and a broad understanding across the party lines. The Swedish Defence Commission had been the main token of such a concurrence. This might seem to imply that no bigger changes would be expected. However, there was quite a change, when the lead agency investigation, by Svärd (c) was discontinued prior to any presentation. Wessberg (m), the secretary of Defence Minister Odenberg (m), stated in a seminar in January, that the two main reasons for the discontinuation was that it was not in accordance with the constitution with an agency leading other agencies, and secondly that it would undermine the responsibility of the agencies. These were supposedly the main reasons for scrapping the “super agency” as it was referred to as (DN, January 14, 2007). Juholt (s) saw things differently and claimed that strong interests from different unnamed agencies had been against the lead agency idea from the get go and now had increased their influence on the new government. It would presumably be the case of turf mentality, where public agencies act in a protective manner towards their resources and mandates (SvD, January 11, 2007).

There were also some changes in the Swedish Defence Commission; Juholt (s) lost his chairmanship to Lennmarker (m); Jóhannesson (v), Rhodin (fp), Tingsgård (s) and Sundemo (m) left on December 13, 2006, new members from January 2007 where: Danielsson (c), Widman (fp) and Wahlén (v) (Fö 1992:B). The Commission’s first report Säkerhet i Samverkan (Ds 2007: 46) restated the claim of the 2006 report, that the crisis preparedness was insufficient. A lead agency of professional public officials – not politicians - should have the operative responsibility in times of crises. A unit at the

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34 (which then would switch places, making the party in office the new opposition)
35 No official reason was ever given for this according to Mats Berglind (s) (Debatt och beslut Torsdag Mars 2, 2007 “Kristantering och skydd mot olyckor” anf. 90)
36 Folk&Försvar
37 He remained as a member however. It is noteworthy that Lennmarker also chaired the Defence Committee.
Prime Minister’s Office would not suffice, even though it was regarded as step in the right direction (Ds 2007: 46, p. 45-47). There was almost complete concurrence among the members according Juholt in a press statement; the only minor division in opinion was in matters of international cooperation (GP. December 4, 2007).

The investigation on the merger of three agencies into one crisis agency resulted in a report (SOU 2007:31) that suggested a non-leading agency with supporting and cooperative role in order to aid other agencies and organisation in their crisis management. Evaluation and education (in form of checklists, “fire drill” type of manoeuvres and so forth) were the main tasks. It had been specified that any lead agency suggestions should be avoided (Dir 2007: 21).

In October 2007, Christina Salomonson (previously of Swedish Rescue Services Agency38 and the Coast Guard) presented the report on the establishment of a Crisis Management Centre within the Government Office (Salomonson, 2007, p. 5). The notion of a leading agency or “super agency” was alien to Swedish public policy tradition and would not be a viable option according to Salomonson (Signalen nr 1, 2008). The report was especially instructed not to clash with the constitution in regards to the sovereignty of the agencies and institutions (Salomonson, 2007, p. 59-61), however there was an opening that the civil crisis management might be considered to be included in the extended mandate of wartime that is already in the constitution (Salomonson, 2007, p. 61).

The Swedish Defence Commission presented a new report in December 2007; once again the establishment of a lead agency was proposed (Ds 2007: 46, p. 45f.), the Crisis Management Centre at the Prime Minister’s Office was not quite enough, an appointed agency to assume leading position and even direct other agencies was once more advocated. The Commission was unanimous on the issue. This means that some of its member took an opposing stance to their party colleagues in the government (Ekot, Sveriges Radio, December 4, 2007). The then former Defence Minister Odenberg responded that he was surprised that they persisted with a proposal that was rejected earlier the same year with the discontinuation of the Svärd investigation. Anders Karlsson (s) of the Defence Committee said in a statement that the commission supported the SAP line of crisis structure (Karlsson, Press statement, December 4, 2007), however, that would be the post-tsunami SAP-line since they were inclined against a leading agency prior to that (see 2001-2004, this essay). Only two months before the presentation of the report Juholt (s) had threatened to leave the Commission in protest to the lack of clarity on the government’s behalf on whether they intended to actually base any policy making on the recommendations of the commission. The newly appointed Defence Minister Tolgfors raised the issue that this might be more of a political manoeuvre from the opposition, than a sincere worry on the status of the Swedish Defence Commission (DN, September 14, 2007). Tolgfors then got critique for the very opposite reason, when former Defence Minister Odenberg claimed that

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38 Who were against the lead agency idea in Petterson’s report (see 2001-2004, this essay).
the Swedish Defence Commission got too much attention, when they were given the mandate of preparing the coming proposition (autumn 2008). He further proposed that the commission were given the task to find analyses that fit with budgetary cuts on the defence policy field at large, to humour the “political establishment” (GP, December 4, 2007). The notion that the commission would be some sort of a vehicle for transforming the defence policy field towards a more civil structure had been voiced earlier by Åkerström (mp) (Riksdagens protokoll, May 29, 2006). Only that Åkerström saw this as a positive progress.

The main disagreement on the lead agency topic was not a matter of different policy visions on behalf of the political parties as much as a dispute amongst stakeholders. The division was clearest within the Government as shown above. 2008 saw the results of two major investigation, first the inauguration of the new Crisis Management Function at the Prime Minister’s Office, the other was the report on the new Contingency Agency that was the replace the three previously described agencies. The first had already been reported on in 2007 and since it was not an agency but a reformation within its own office, the government were free to introduce the new unit without previous parliamentary approval. On March 31 (Regeringen, March 31, 2008), the unit was up and running. The new contingency agency was proposed on March 13, 2008. The central feature was its adherence to the three principles of the 2001 structure and the importance of not creating an agency with leading role, since it might delay the instigation of countermeasures upon a crisis, when agencies are waiting for the approval of another agency before acting (Prop. 2007/08:92 p. 16). The National Audit Office had performed evaluations of the crisis management structure since the 2004 Tsunami catastrophe. The results of these were presented in the report *Regeringen och krisen* (RiR 2008:9) many of the deficiencies that had previously marred the structure had been remedied by the inauguration of the new function at the Prime Minister’s Office and the creation of the contingency agency, however a more forceful leading role was found wanting. What was proposed was a crisis paragraph in the constitution that would admit emergency laws to be applicable thus making it possible to assume a leading role. It would give the Government much more legal leeway to act promptly and resolutely in case of an emergency (RiR 2008:9 p. 84). It would also mean that there would be a special decision process that would be applicable when the government declares state of alert (RiR 2008:9 p. 83-84). Isander who was one of the authors of the report suggested that the changes in the crisis structure so far may very well be a reaction to the critique of the Tsunami events and more driven by a will to appease the public opinion than to address the roots of the deficiencies in the crisis structure (Isander, at FHS, May 26, 2008). These roots would be a reactive crisis system and the lack of an agency with enhanced crisis mandate. There were however some concerns regarding the issue that an agency with mandate to control other agency including for instance the police or even military might not be advisable (Thomas Bull39 in

39 ”En sista sak – som inte är av juridisk karaktär – är att en sådan myndighet som här skissas skulle bli en ”supermyndigheten” med mycket omfattande befogenheter på nära nog samtliga samhällsområden om ett
RiR 2008:9p. 116). In charge of the National Audit Office was Flyborg (fp) whom we already are familiar with since the parliamentary debate on the Pettersson report (2001-2004 section, this essay). Already then she stated that structural factors such as the Swedish public management tradition of independent agencies and prohibition of ministerial intervention in agency matters hindered the creation of more powerful crisis reaction structure. Juholt concurred and claimed that “turf-thinking” and “stovepipe mentality” on behalf of the agencies and public organizations was the single factor that is at the heart of everything that is wrong with the crisis management structure (Focus, December 19, 2008). Flyborg (fp) also expressed her support of the establishment of emergency laws, to further improve the response time of crisis management (SvD, October 30, 2008). The emergency law notion also gained popularity outside the policy subfield with supporters amongst daily newspapers (Expressen, June 13, 2008).

On December 31 2007 the three agencies that would merge into Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency the following day, were finally put to rest thus marking the last step in the reformation of the crisis management structure that was initiated in 2001.

5:5 2009 to Present

Defence Minister Tolgfors started off the new year of 2009 with a rather neat summary of the crisis management structure and the mandate of MSB:

“[The] Emergency preparedness and emergency/crisis management is based on the ‘responsibility principle’. This means that the party responsible for a certain activity under normal conditions should also have the corresponding responsibility during emergency situations. This is a very important principle since it gives stability to the system. The one who knows the systems best should be the one to run them during crises/emergencies. A weakness in the past has been the lack of cooperation between the actors involved. The Government is therefore making it clear that the responsibility principle also includes the responsibility to cooperate with other affected actors. In other words, the MSB will not take over the responsibility of other actors in the case of an emergency or disaster, but rather make sure that coordination functions as it must” (Speech at the National Defence Collage, January 28, 2009).

However the criticism for the lack of emergency laws and a lead agency prevailed (Färm & Eriksson, DN, July 13, 2013) and demands for a crisis commander was also raised again (Westrup, Tjugofyra7 krisläge skulle uppstå. Det kan finnas politiska och andra skäl för att inte tillskapa en sådan organisation om man inte är övertygad om att ett verkligt behov därav finns”. Thomas Bull, RiR 2008:9 p. 116. Bull was expert advisor and p. 116 is his appendix to the report. 40 Riksdagen.se 41 This name was first made public at the May 29 conference at FHS “Att lära från kriser och stora olyckor”
June 14, 2013). This was later addressed by Defence Minister Enström (m), who stated that the lead agency issue keeps popping up in the crisis management debate. Nevertheless the principle of responsibility is more important and warrants every agency’s own initiative in times of crisis rather than them waiting for the lead agency to signal for crisis protocol to apply (Enström, DN Debatt, July 27, 2013). The importance of the responsibility principle was further stressed in the article by reference to the SDC, who “unanimously supports the principle” (Enström, DN Debatt, July 27, 2013).

There had been some friction in the SDC’s relationship with the government, but also between SDC and the Defence Committee. Juholt (s) complained that SDC did not have a single session between summer 2008 and 2009, he saw this as an arrogant attitude towards the Swedish tradition on cooperation and concurrence in defence matters, he also claimed that the SDC was instrumental in keeping defence policy independent of strong special interests (SvD, June 12, 2009). Who the special interests might be was not divulged, but as we have seen from previous statements it could very well imply the “bureau-Sweden” that has been referred to. The merit of the SDC was latter questioned, when Rolf Nilsson (m) of the Defence Committee demanded the SDC to be dissolved and acquitted, mainly on the grounds of it not being representative of their respective parties but more of an in-group that agrees amongst themselves, without necessarily been given that mandate by their respective parties (DN Debatt, August 5, 2010). This further supports the hypothesis that the advocacy coalitions in the crisis policy subfield cannot be divided along party lines. There is a difference in the description of the division within the subfield. The supporters of the lead agency idea are more prone to stress the differences of opinion and the potency of the desired policy endgame—a lead agency with legal room of manoeuvre to match—while the supporters of enhanced coordination and limited departure from public policy customs seems to stress the overall concord and the difference as one of a technicality. This has been a constant pattern since the 2001 debate on Pettersson’s report. Another trait is the view that the crisis policy subfield is one of constant reformation and adaptivity towards the larger political environment. (DN Debatt, Enström, 27 July, 2013).
6:1 Final Analysis and Conclusion

We have now studied the process of the development of the Swedish crisis structure on a national level. We have done so by presenting it as a comprehensive story line, divided in four main parts (thus facilitating an overview of the main phases as well as actors). The actors have been presented with regards to their function vis-à-vis the coalition on the issue of a lead agency and the mandate of the crisis agency. We shall now once more look at these actors, but with a clearer theoretical approach in assessing their function in regards to the ACF theory. We will start by looking at what the theory tells us about the empirics and then problematize this by assessing where the empirics deviate from the theoretical assumptions.

As stated in Chapter 2, the ACF basic assumption is that actions are stemming from beliefs and values. A stakeholder is involved in the political process to pursue her conviction. We have already stated that this assumption is rather hard to prove, however, the belief system can be applied as an analytical tool, or lens, through which the behaviour of the stakeholders can be categorised and subjected to scientific research. By applying the ACF belief system we also get a sense of the level of resolution the various stakeholders have shown towards the issue.

As stated in the 2009 and beyond part, the majority coalition (supporters of more incremental changes and adherent to a stricter approach towards the responsibility principle) time and again makes a point of stressing the differences as minor or merely on a technicality. Whereas the challenging coalition, have a more drastic description on the differences and the dangers of not implementing a more forceful crisis management structure. It makes sense that the challengers have a greater need to rally support, the majority coalition have –by definition- the advantage of resources and power. The “devil shift” that makes the opposing sides perceive each other as more cunning and dangerous than they probably are, was more applicable to the minority coalition. That may explain their persistence. The commitment to the cause was also the greatest amongst two of the challenging actors; The Swedish Defence Commission and the National Audit Office. The fact that they kept championing the lead agency structure long after the discontinuation of the Svärd investigation in 2007 (January, 11), further supports the evidence for a policy core belief or core policy preference. Their reports and public statements serve as confessions; the timing would then serve as the smoking gun; as the continuous actions with the intent of changing the direction of the policy subfield were carried out long after the structure was up and running. Debating on an issue and reporting an alternative view may very well be

42 Otherwise it wouldn’t be a majority coalition, had it no position or resources.
43 See Chapt. 2, this essay
44 See chapt. 3, this essay
45 See chapt. 3 this essay
considered a technicality issue, or _secondary belief_, resolute objection and recurring demands for drastic new directions however, is the mark of a deeper conviction.

_Why_ then, did this committed and persistent opposing coalition not succeed in changing the agenda and institute a new lead agency?

By applying the tools provided by the ACF, we get a deeper understanding and a comprehensive way of mapping out the events. If the majority coalition is the path of 2001 with the three principles guided reform work. That would imply that the rejected ideas, which were championed by a minority in the parliament and entities such as the Swedish Defence Commission, that is stakeholders within the policy subfield that failed to get their ideas implemented would constitute the minority coalition. We have seen in the Theory chapter (2:1) that changes are the exception rather than the rule of ACF and that change means that the majority coalition loses their advantage to the minority who can exploit the situation in order to forward their beliefs as policies. Changes may occur of four reasons; Policy Induced Learning, External Perturbations or Shocks, Internal Shocks and Negotiated Agreement. These categories cannot, however explain the lack of change. They do nonetheless state what prerequisites are needed for a change option and can therefore be used to examine why the change in the subfield came to nothing in the scrapping of the Svärd report. To clarify – there were severe repercussion of the Tsunami handling (SOU 2005:104, for instance) it could even be a contributing factor in SAP losing office (SAP, 2006 election evaluation report p.10, p.101), but those effects were outside the policy subfield. The main change was actually on behalf of SAP who _seemingly_ changed their stance from the majority coalition (no lead office) to the minority (lead office, with or without enhanced constitutional mandate). It will be regarded as _seemingly_, since ordering an investigation is not equal to pursuing a policy path. The ACF explanations to such action would as seen above be caused by one of four different factors. We can rule out negotiated agreement, the opposing coalition did not negotiate – they debated. And most notably, negotiated agreement is used in absence of shock or learning opportunity. Policy learning is a tempting candidate as it was claimed (prop. 2005/06:133) that the new direction regarding the lead agency was a natural progression in the ongoing reform work on the crisis management structure and a mere adaption to external factors. This adaptability however signals a somewhat lesser degree of commitment to the issue of a lead agency. The short time span between the Tsunami and the proposition of a lead agency suggests that the slow process of policy learning is less likely. We are then left with the shock options. Obviously the Tsunami, and the storm Gudrun that occurred on Jan 8, 2005, when the crisis management structure was still reeling from the tsunami, qualify as shocks. Internal perturbation weakens the conviction of the majority, thus may have played a major role. We have not addressed the Gudrun issue, but on January 8th, 2005 a heavy storm broke in on Sweden doing massive damages (Deverell, 2010, p. 216) and further exposed

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46 Not meant in a derogatory sense, on the contrary, pragmatism can be a political virtue.
weaknesses in the preparedness for a more foreseeable domestic catastrophe. The KBM investigation (2005:4) stated that the PR damage of the Tsunami was additionally weighted by the shortcomings of the Government in the handling of Gudrun.

The notion that a shock would diminish the confidence of the majority coalition would seem applicable. Nohrstedt refers to this as “inherit logic of crisis” that they highlight the deficiencies of the dominant coalition’s policies and chosen path (Nohrstedt, 2008, p. 262). The statement that internal shocks galvanizes the support and enhances the resolution within the coalitions, describes the increased activity and commitment of the minority coalition. However we should not regard SAP as a coalition member. We have seen that throughout the course of events, almost every party has had representatives for both coalitions within their ranks. The division have not been according to partisan affiliation, but more so by other memberships, such as the inter-partisan SDC. The coalitions have thereby been on another level, within the parties and in society in general. The Government, have acted as recipients rather than active participants. Thus it was more of a case of SAP government lending its ear to the minority coalition upon the system shock of the Tsunami (and Gudrun). Once there was a change in office, the majority resumed its position. Hence the outcome of the elections 2006, proved disastrous for the minority coalition who had slimmer chances of gaining influence a second time. Once the reforms of 2007-2008 were in place, the chances of exploiting the tsunami crisis were lost. The change in office took away the necessary condition of crisis induced change: the willingness of decision makers to reconsider their support of the majority coalition. The Alliance had no recent policy failure, hence nothing to reconsider.

If we do a counterfactual reasoning, some further evidence can be discerned. The method implies that if one decisive factor is removed, what would be the likely outcome? The idea is to test the causal value of that factor (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 121). So if we remove the Tsunami from the equation –what then?

From what was stated in 2004, the scheduled proposition on crisis management structure was not going to include a lead agency suggestion. This is mainly based on the recurring statements on the importance of the responsibility principle and the previous rejection of such an idea. That assumption is further grounded on the ACF stipulation that path adherence is more probable than changes in course. However the merger of the “crisis related agencies” into one would probably be a reality anyway – all stakeholders were rather unanimously in favour of such a move. The same can be said for a function at the Prime Minister’s Office, but not necessarily identical to the current. Even smaller

47 See Internal shocks or perturbations chapt. 2:1
48 SOU 2004:134, for instance
changes such as more frequent simulations and drills as well as closer cooperation do not constitute change since there was never anyone opposing such reforms.

The conclusion is thus that the Tsunami impact on the crisis policy subfield was low in terms of policy output on a national level. However the impact on Swedish politics and actually society in large was immense. The Tsunami has shaped the discourse in the sense that almost every report on crisis management hence refers to it. It is in that sense a vivid image for decision makers within crisis management.

6:2 Theoretical Implications and Further Research

The Nohrstedt take on ACF to describe the nuclear policy subsystem (Nohrstedt, 2008) found that the political parties acted more towards strategic ends than on plain beliefs, for instance of SAP’s move to make some changes in the energy policy in order to keep more radical elements out of the subsystem, in this case the “green” contingent (Nohrstedt, 2008, p. 272). As we have seen in this study, political parties do not really act in accordance with the ACF theory. Simply put; the diversity of views within the parties, make the cohesion too weak thus creating a very own subsystem within the parties. It would seem as the issues that are not as easily defined on an ideological scale, such as crisis management (as opposed to for instance welfare, privatizations etc.), have less of a clear cut partisan line, making the ACF hard to apply on that level. Applying the theory on coalitions based on endgame, such as this essay, did however work out, thus expanding the areas of usefulness of the framework. The functionalistic approach resolved issues of how to define abstract concepts like values.

To further develop this research field it would be fruitful to adapt a Bureau-political approach, to really get to grips with the fleeting references to “refusal fronts” and “turf mentalities”. However, the scientific evidence of such claims may be hard to substantiate.

The impact of the Tsunami on the policy field has been evident when working on this essay in the sense that it is the event that every report, statement or investigation relate to, it would therefore be very interesting with further studies on the Tsunami disaster as an analogy, shaping the perceptions of crisis management.

A final thought for further investigation, would be to follow up on the link between enhanced crisis management structure and demilitarized defence policy discourse. We have for instance Lars Ångströms speech in parliament (2005, May 29) on the creation of a civil preparedness structure versus Odenbergs strong opinion against such an agency (Sirenen, 2006, nr 8) and subsequent resignation from his post as defence minister in protests to budgetary cuts (SR, 2007, Sept. 5).
It would also be very interesting to compare this case to an adjacent case like for instance the debate on counter terrorism measures versus civil rights and rule of law. There are partially overlapping stakeholders which would help substantiate, or negate, some of the claims of this essay.
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