

The German Dilemma.

A bachelor's thesis about strategic culture and Germany's involvement in the CSDP.

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Abstract

Trough literature study and interviews, this paper describes Germanys strategic culture and analyze if Germanys involvement in the CSDP is one example of a two-level game where political elites by using the Europeanization process try to affect Germany's strategic behavior. This paper presents a number of aspects of Germany's strategic culture and identifies '*Restraint in military matters*' and '*Aversion to unilateralism*' as the main features of Germanys strategic culture. The research show that there is a belief among the interviewees that Germany's strategic culture affects Germany's behavior and that the primary motive for Germany's involvement in the CSDP is likely to be promote national interest, which is described as more effective defense spending and increasing international influence. However there is also signs, in both the literature and trough the interviews, that some policymakers try to use the Europeanization process in order to influence Germany's security policy.

Introduction

"Interest politics alone . . . cannot account for Germany's pacifistic military security policy, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation of Bonn's approach to national sovereignty or its aversion to unilateralism. One must look beyond material and political interests to the politics of national identity in post war Germany..."¹

Germany is one of Europe's dominant powers, and with that position states in the western world, especially in NATO/EU, are calling for a more active German role in the world. Germany today has a central role in the EU, which has become obvious during the euro-crisis, but so far it has been a reluctant power when it comes to the use of armed forces to meet its allied expectations. This can be seen in Germany's refusal to participate in Operation Unified Protector and the limited contribution in Mali.

Since Germany shows a reluctance to use 'hard power', several scholars have described Germany as a 'lame power' or a 'civilian power'. This should not be understood as Germany lacking the military capacity to act with their armed forces but that Germany has national constraints that prevent the country from acting. The result is that German decision makers find themselves in a

¹ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) Germany and the Use of Force p.25

dilemma. On one side, the international community expects Germany to live up to its prominent European position and take responsibility when conflicts such as those that occurred in Libya arise. On the other hand, there are very strong national constraints on German decision-makers to remain reluctant to use robust means. This has resulted in a situation where Germany has been accused for abandoning Western consensus, having a irresponsible and inconsistent behavior,² and that Germany's "pacifist reflex" has undermined the project for common European defense.³

In order to understand Germany's behavior in security and defense issues, this paper aims at describing Germany's strategic culture and analyzes if it acts as a national constraint for policymakers. Furthermore this paper analyzes a specific case, Germany's involvement in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to see if it is one example of when political elites play a two-level game and use the Europeanization process to overcome national constraints.

Purpose

That a country's strategic culture may affect its behavior is well documented. One way for the political elite in Germany to handle these national constraints is by playing a two-level game and by using the Europeanization process overcome these. Explanations like this are presented by scholars like Harnisch & Wolf in *National Security Cultures : Patterns of Global Governance*,⁴ and Haaland Matlary in *European Security dynamics*.⁵ According to Haaland Matlary "we can expect governments to seek 'hedging strategies' through more EU burden-sharing and possibly integration. As stated above, weak governments are most likely to be willing to engage in 'self-binding' in the form of integration."^{6 7} She continues by arguing that Germany is using international obligations and expectations as a main argument for national policy change.⁸

² Berenskoetter, Felix, Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany's Abstention on Lybia

³ The Economist (Jul 14th 2011) Showing the strain

⁴ Harnisch, Sebastian & Raimund Wolf (2010), 'Germany: The Continuity of Change', in Kirchner, Emil & James Sperling, eds., *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* p.59

⁵ Matlary Haaland, Janne (2009) *European Union Security Dynamics In The New National Interest*

⁶ Ibid p.165

⁷ Germany is considered a "weak" government by Haaland Matlary since the "democratic control of deployment decisions is very strong."

⁸ Matlary Haaland, Janne (2009) *European Union Security Dynamics In The New National Interest* p.164

The possibility for Germany to have a more active defense and security policy through the process of Europeanization is also presented in a AICGS Research Report where the authors point out that *”if Europeanization legitimizes the use of force and makes the deployment of German soldiers abroad more acceptable to the German public, that would be a definite plus.”*⁹

If these arguments are true then the case of German involvement in the development of the CSDP is most likely one example of when politicians try to play a two level game. Germany is making a significant and widely acknowledged contribution to the CSDP and is involved in several agreements through the CSDP concerning the use of armed forces.

The purpose of this paper is to describe Germany’s strategic culture and analyze if Germanys involvement in the CSDP is one example of when political elites play a two-level game by using Europeanization to try to affect Germany’s strategic behavior.

Research questions

1. What does Germany’s strategic culture consist of?
2. Does Germany’s strategic culture affects its strategic behavior?
3. Which are Germany’s motives for involvement in CSDP?

Method

Structure of the paper

The research in this paper is divided in two parts.

Initially the focus of the paper is to present research in the field of strategic culture and describe how it could affect a country’s behavior. This research will be complemented with research concerning Germany’s strategic culture and interviews to get a more comprehensive understanding of German strategic culture and its national effects.

Then the research is narrowed down and one specific case is analyzed, the German involvement in the CSDP, with the purpose to investigate if it is one example of a two-level game where the

⁹ Lankowski, Carl & Serfaty, Simon (1999) Europeanizing security? NATO and an Integrating Europe p.7

national constraints that Germany's strategic culture offers forces the political elite in Germany to involve the nation in multilateral agreements to justify policy change at the national level.

Research method

To capture a country's strategic culture and analyze if it is affecting a state's strategic behavior is a comprehensive task and requires more time than available in a bachelor paper to complete, however since a large amount of research on Germany's strategic culture already exists, this part can be answered by presenting some of the earlier research that has been done on this subject. The result will then be complemented by interviews from German decision makers or persons with a good insight into Germany's policy who could provide new insights to what Germany's strategic culture is and how they view Germany's strategic behavior. Since the amount of literature concerning Germany's strategic culture and behavior is far-reaching, a selection of articles has been made which is in part presented in this paper. The selection of articles is partly based on suggested articles from the interviewed scholars but has also to large extent been based on the Google Scholar ranking of the articles, which ranks each document where it was published, who wrote it and in how often and recently it has been cited in other literature.¹⁰

To investigate if Germany's involvement in the CSDP is one example of when political elites play a two-level game by using Europeanization try to affect Germany's strategic behavior an analysis of possible motives must be completed. The purpose of the analysis is to establish what the actors try to achieve through a decision.¹¹ To answer this question there has to be an analysis of the mental process rather than observations of the actor and the closest to the truth we can come is through the motives provided by the decision makers. To get a grip of the mental process before a decision, in-depth interviews have proven a good way to collect material.¹² Therefore, semi-structured, in-depth interviews are used as a method in this paper.

One question researchers in the field of strategic culture are faced with is whether to consider purely the views of elites in either the security and/or military spheres or if broader public opinion

¹⁰ Google Scholar, About

¹¹ Esaiasson, Peter (2007) Metodpraktikan p.327

¹² Ibid p.339

should also be brought under analysis.¹³ Like most research in the field of strategic culture, the focus in this paper is on elites in the security, defense and political field but public opinions are in some cases presented to provide a greater understanding. The focus on ‘elites’ or ‘strategic cultural agents’, as they are sometimes called, is based on the assumption that they reflect a broader societal atmosphere. Since these ‘strategic cultural agents’ are at the forefront of decision making, they can act as gatekeepers, but also agenda-setters due to their in-depth knowledge of these issues. In their role as agenda-setters/gate-keepers they can also push the national discourse in a specific direction.¹⁴

With that said, the persons that are being interviewed should in a best case scenario be those who were personally involved in the agenda setting and prioritizing concerning the CSDP. Since this process has been ongoing for several decades and the people involved in the decision making are few in number and difficult to reach for interview, one alternative is to interview those with insight into the decision making process. When selecting interviewees it is important to account for which tendency they might have, as some persons in specific positions might have an interest to present motives that might be true but are not the decisive motive for involvement in the CSDP.

To handle this situation the interviewees are selected through three different criteria.

The first and the most important is that the persons have knowledge of Germany’s defense politics and the CSDP.

The second is that interviews should be conducted with persons in different fields which in this paper is the political, military and the research field.

The third is that interviewees in the political field are of different tendencies, i.e. they should represent different standpoints when it comes to ideology and views about the use of armed forces.

When doing the interviews it is important to be aware that the interviewees are biased, i.e. they have an interest in presenting their priorities and choices in a positive way. With that in mind, dismissing their explanations for Germany’s involvement in the CSDP without good reasons is difficult. Because of the importance of the interviewed actors justification for Germany’s involvement in the CSDP, it is vital to point out that justifications are not the same as motives.

¹³ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) Germany and the Use of Force p.21-22

¹⁴ Ibid p.21-22

However, if two or more sources with different tendencies present the same justifications, it will be a good foundation as a motive. Therefore, the tendency criterion is a vital factor when selecting people to interview.

Since the German involvement in the CSDP could have several motives, they have to be weighted against each other. A justification that being presented a number of times by the interviewees is more likely to have played a greater importance than others that are less often mentioned. But also the order in which the justifications are presented plays a role. Justifications that are mentioned first are more likely to have had greater importance than others. With that said, all the conclusions in this paper are based on reasoning which is presented later on in this paper.

In order to organize the motive analysis, predetermined motives are provided by Robert D. Putnam and Tanja A. Börzel. Their theories are well accepted in the analysis of international negotiations and help to frame the possible motives an actor could have in such situations. To get an explanatory view on how the motives of the actor could change national policy, Milena Büch's framework is used.

Conduct of interviews

The interviews have been conducted in a semi-structured way. In some cases the interviewees have allowed a recording of the conversation; in this case quotes can be presented. In the cases where the interviews are not recorded, notes have been taken during the conversation and the results are presented as a general understanding of what they have said.

The persons interviewed in this paper are:

Dr Claudia Major, Deputy Head of Research Division at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Executive Director at Institut für Theologie und Frieden

Colonel Ulf Gunnehed, Swedish Defense Attaché in Berlin

Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Member of the Board of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg

Burkhardt Müller-Sönksen, representative of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)

Member of the German Parliament 2005-2013 Member of the German Defense Committee 2009-2013.

Jörn Thiessen, representative of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Member of the German Parliament and member of the Defense Committee 2005-2009.

Jan van Aken, representative of Die Linke. Member of Parliament since 2009. Member of the Foreign Committee and the Spokesperson in Foreign Affairs for Die Linke.

Theory

Strategic culture

Within the discipline of international relations and its sub discipline strategic studies, there exist a lot of theories with the aim of understanding why states act the way they do. Theories like neorealism view states as rational actors acting in an anarchic system and with this assumption they try to explain the generation of military power in countries, without regard to their internal societies.¹⁵ Theorists in the field of strategic culture have a different approach for explaining states' strategic behavior. They do not reject the concept of rational actors that theories like realism or liberalism are based on, but insist that rationality must be understood within a cultural context.¹⁶ The concept of strategic culture places its focus on the milieu within which strategy is debated and claims that this milieu will have an effect on the strategy and strategic behavior of states.¹⁷ The main effect of a strategic culture is that it draws the discussion among the political elites toward certain actions and policies over others and excludes some options since they cannot be imagined.¹⁸ Understanding a nation's strategic culture, and thus how actors are constituted, enables scholars to make some predictions of strategic behavior since one actor is likely to act in accordance with its culture.

Even if thoughts about strategic culture can be traced back to Sun-Tzu,¹⁹ the concept of strategic culture was not introduced until the 1970 in a RAND Cooperation report for de US Air Force by Jack Snyder. Snyder applied his strategic cultural framework to interpret the development of Soviet and American nuclear doctrines as products of not just technological constraints, but also as a result of different organizational, historical, and political contexts with the purpose to better understand the institutional, intellectual and strategic cultural determinants that could affect the Soviet decision

¹⁵ Ibid p.6

¹⁶ Johnston, Alistair Ian (1995)(1995) Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History p.9

¹⁷ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) Germany and the Use of Force p.9

¹⁸ Johnston, Alistair Ian (1995) (1995) Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History p.11

¹⁹ A view that is based on his famous quote *"Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."*

making process in a crisis.²⁰ Snyder's conclusion was that "*as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of 'cultural' rather than mere policy*".²¹ In 1979 Ken Booth gave further attention to this issue when he sought to alert strategists to the 'fog of culture' and its distorting effects on the making and study of strategy.²²

Since then, particularly since the introduction of constructivist theory in international relations, the concept of strategic culture has got a lot of attention. A general agreement on the content of the subject and roughly on how it functions exists, most scholars in the field of strategic cultures do not view it as deterministic so it cannot be used to determinate behavior. However, it can be used to narrow the range of actions that are likely to be adopted in a given circumstance.²³ But there are exceptions; scholars like Alistair Johnston view strategic culture as a way to make specific predictions about strategic choice.²⁴

In *Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism*, John S. Duffield explains the relationship between culture and behavior. According to him there are four main ways that culture affects a nation's behavior:

First, culture could help to define the basic goals of a nation since culture shapes nation's identity, which in turn generates a nation's interest.

Second, culture shapes the perceptions of the external environment. It creates a framework in which some issues get attention while others are foreseen, it also affects how these issues are viewed.

Some issues will be viewed as challenges to the nation's interest, while others will not.

Third, culture shapes the behaviors available for advancing and defending the group's interests, some courses of action will be more likely to take place, while others are not even conceived of.

Culture will define the instruments and tactics that are judged acceptable and legitimate and thus place limits on the policies that can be proposed and adopted.

²⁰ Snyder, L Jack (1977) *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*

²¹ Ibid

²² Longhurst, Kerry (2004) *Germany and the Use of Force* p.9

²³ Ibid p.772

²⁴ Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995) *Thinking about Strategic Culture* p.43-46

Finally, culture can to a large degree influence the evaluation of the seemingly available options and thus affect the choices between them.²⁵

Even though a large number of scholars would agree with the basic thoughts about how strategic culture works, there is no agreement on how to define strategic culture. This paper uses Longhurt's definition of strategic culture since she is a well quoted scholar in the field of strategic culture and she has published several articles about strategic culture in a German context. According to her:

"A strategic culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences."

Europeanization

To understand the EU impact on the national level Europeanization has to be understood. The concept of Europeanization has been described by several scholars in different disciplines. The concept of Europeanization could be understood as a term that refers to the impact of the EU on the national level. Tanja A. Brözel describes Europeanization as a concept with a bottom-up and a top-down dimension. In the bottom-up process governments tend to strive to minimize their cost of implementation the European legislation by uploading their domestic politics to the European level. The greater the fit between the domestic and European policies, the lower the cost of implementation. The top-down process describes how these new European policies affect the national level.²⁶

In 'Europeanization of Nordic Security', Pernille Rieker describes how the European Union has changed the security identities of the Nordic countries through Europeanization. She describes Europeanization as a social process. The necessity for this process to start is a misfit between norms

²⁵ Duffield, John S. (2010) Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism p. 771-772

²⁶ Tanja A. Börzel, Pace Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence Sitting: Member states responses to Europeanization (2002) p.193-195

in the European arena and norms in the national arena. The Europeanization process starts when national actors adapt their behavior, for instrumental reasons, in accordance with the European norm. Through this process Europeanization creates institutional and policy changes at the national level.²⁷ With that said, it's important to point out that Europeanization in itself is not an explanatory concept but rather an attention-directing device and a starting point for further research.

In this paper I will use Börzel's definition of Europeanization in which "*Europeanization is a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making*".²⁸

Two level-game

If strategic culture is considered to be a national constraint for decision makers in Germany, the decision makers have to handle it in some way, and one option is by using the Europeanization process. The effect of this process could be achieved by playing a two-level game. The theory of two-level game was created by Robert D. Putnam and describes how decision makers are facing different opponents on the national and the international arena.²⁹ In the national arena different interest groups try to influence the government and make them promote their interest in international negotiations. In the international arena actors are trying to promote their national interest when meeting diplomats and other governments. When international agreements are created the chief negotiator/government is the only link between the international and national arena. This leads to a favorable situation where the government can choose three different strategies in the international arena.³⁰

1. The government could work to strengthen their own role on the national arena by pushing for deals that are popular domestically.
2. The government could work to change the power dynamics in the national arena by pushing for reforms that are politically impossible in the national arena and then claim that these are forced on the country.

²⁷ Rieker, Pernille (2004) *Europeanization of Nordic Security: The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States* p.371-374

²⁸ Börzel, T. (1999), "Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain" p.574

²⁹ Robert D. Putnam (2006) *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games* p.434

³⁰ *Ibid* s 433-435

3. The government could push for reform that they think is in the genuine interest of the people without any excuses or ulterior motives.³¹

Milena Büchs develops the two-level game theory further by introducing the concept of "invited dutifulness". This concept tries to capture the situation where governments agree to international agreements (in Büchs article Open Method of Coordination)³² because they see them as a useful justification for policy change at the national level.³³ This is a suitable situation for the government since it can justify national policy by blaming the EU despite the fact that the member states themselves are key actors in defining the objectives.³⁴

In this paper strategy one is called '**strengthen own role**', strategy two '**invited dutifulness**' and three '**promote national interest**'.

Creating change at the national level

In '*The Open Method of Coordination as a "two-level game"*' Büchs develops a framework in which she describes how the governance method of OMC could change national politics and behavior. According to her there are three main ways non-legally binding agreements could affect national policies.

1. *Peer pressure and shaming* - These approaches assume that national governments are rational actors who try to avoid being 'shamed' or 'blamed' by the EU, other member states or domestic opposition parties for not fulfilling OMC objectives. There are, however, two preconditions if peer pressure and shaming are to work. Firstly, all or most other member states must take the OMC procedure seriously; otherwise, those complying with the OMC could experience a competitive disadvantage. Secondly, the citizens must be aware of the OMC and concerned about the evaluation results issued by the EU. This can only occur if national policy-makers place the

³¹ Ibid p. 457

³² OMC is a governance method which is "softer" than the 'classical', 'regulatory' or 'redistributive' mode of EU governance. Its objectives are not legally binding and there are no formal sanctions available if member states fail to adopt or achieve OMC objectives.

³³ Milena, Büchs (2008) The open Method of Coordination as a "two-level game" p.1

³⁴ Ibid p.10-11

OMC highly on the agenda, discuss it widely and integrate a great number of actors in OMC processes. The media must also report about the OMC extensively.³⁵

2. *Discourse* - International agreements could change how states view their responsibilities and interest, and thus affect behavior. According to this perspective the OMC creates EU-wide discourses, promoting particular values and ideas about policies. Since governments and non-governmental actors at the EU and national levels are integrated into these OMC networks, which meet regularly, the participants are 'socialized' by this discourse. This, in turn, affects national policy-making as governments and non-governmental actors behave according to a 'logic of appropriateness'.³⁶

3. *Policy learning*- This assumes that policy makers' perceptions, assumptions and attitudes change voluntarily because they 'rationally' evaluate information and evidence. The OMC provides an opportunity for regular meetings and information exchange between member state governments and the European Commission. Regular reports and evaluations contain a pool of 'best practices' from which national actors can learn. OMC objectives and targets provide a general framework for interpreting the causes of social problems and developing approaches to tackle them. According to the policy learning perspective, the OMC provides incentives and valuable information that can lead to voluntary policy learning by the member states.³⁷

³⁵ Milena, Büchs (2008) The open Method of Coordination as a "two-level game" p.6- 7

³⁶ Ibid p.6-7

³⁷ Ibid p.6-10

Framework for analyzing motives and effect

To answer the question "What are Germany's motives for involvement in CSDP?" a comprehensive framework for analyzing the political elite's motives has been created from the above mentioned theories. As presented earlier, governments can choose three different strategies in international negotiations and their behavior as a rational actor should be based on the desired outcomes.

Strengthening own role

To answer if government's motives have been to **strengthen its own role** one may look at domestic polls on how important German voters view security and defense issues. These numbers could be helpful in answering if the government tried to strengthen its own role. If defense and security issues are of great importance to the German voters, a government that aims to become popular is more likely to put these issues on the agenda and strive for reform. These numbers are by themselves not enough to explain the "strengthen own factor" and the results from the interviews are a good compliment when supporting or disclaiming this motive.


Promote national interest

In answering if the government's motives have been to promote Germany's interest through involvement in the CSDP, the interviews play an important part. If the interviewed persons mention this as a motive, an explanation for what these interests are is needed, since an actor could be viewed as pursuing the national interest, even if their motives are invited dutifulness or strengthening own role.

Invited dutifulness

To answer if the government's motives have been to, through CSDP, justify policy change at the national level, the answers received in the interviews are significant. If the interviews reveal that an important motive for involvement in the CSDP was justification for policy change in Germany, then it will be a sign of invited dutifulness as a motive. If invited dutifulness is mentioned as a motive it would be in line with the arguments Halaand Matlary and Harnisch & Wolf are suggesting. Putman's theory offers some explanation of the motives behind the chosen strategy, but it lacks an in depth explanation of how these objectives are to be achieved. By placing the interviewed person's answers in the framework provided by Büchs we can get a more detailed explanation.

Even if the CSDP is not one example of OMC, I would argue that Büchs' framework for analyzing how international agreements could affect the national policy is relevant in the field of defense and security. One of the reasons for this is that the national governments in the EU still have the freedom to create their own security and defense policy, which are expressed in the Lisbon Treaty *"The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member State..."*³⁸ Since strategic behavior, like deploying troops abroad in an intervention still in the foreseen future is a decision taken by the national governments and not by the European parliament, the framework created by Büchs will be useful in analyzing how the increasing cooperation in the defense and security area could affect Germany's strategic behavior. It also offers a more in-depth explanation for the motives by the government. From the above mentioned theories this graphical chart has been created to show the different motives and how they are connected.



³⁸ The Lisbon Treaty, Article 42

From ESDP to CSDP

The ideas about a common defense policy for Europe can be traced back to when France, UK and the Benelux nations signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, which included a mutual defense clause. This treaty shaped the foundations for what was to become The Western European Union (WEU). The WEU, of which Germany became a member of during the 1950s,³⁹ was together with NATO the principal forum for dialog and consultation on defense and security issues during a large part of the 20th century.⁴⁰ One important element in of the WEU was The Petersberg's task which was formulated and agreed in 1992 by member states of the WEU.⁴¹ Petersburg's task defined the spectrum of military actions/functions that the European Union could undertake in its crisis management operations and clarified that military units could be used in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks by combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.⁴² In 1999 the Petersberg tasks were incorporated in the European framework through the Amsterdam Treaty,⁴³ and the same year at the Cologne European Council, the Western European Union functions transferred to the European Union and so created the Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁴⁴

The ESDP continued to develop with new treaties like the Helsinki Headline Goal which included that the EU should possess an autonomous military capacity to respond to crises.⁴⁵ The aim was to be capable of deploying up to 60,000 troops within 60 days on missions of at least one year.⁴⁶ Another important milestone was in 2003, when the first common security strategy for Europe was presented, which analyzed EU's security environment and identified key security challenges for the EU.⁴⁷ The same year, the first ESDP mission started; the EU Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

³⁹ Western European Union, Origins of WEU: from the Brussels Treaty to the Paris Agreements

⁴⁰ EEAS, About CSDP

⁴¹ Federal Foreign Office (2009) The European Security and Defence Policy p.16

⁴² EEAS, About CSDP

⁴³ Federal Foreign Office (2009) The European Security and Defence Policy p.16

⁴⁴ ESDP Newsletter (October 2009) p.6

⁴⁵ EEAS,About CSDP - Military Headline Goals

⁴⁶ ESDP Newsletter (October 2009) p.9

⁴⁷ EEAS, About CSDP

(EUPM).⁴⁸ Since then there have been a number of international missions conducted through the ESDP, the majority of civilian character.⁴⁹ In 2004 the European defense agency (EDA) was created with the aim to assist the member state with improving European defense capabilities.⁵⁰ After the Treaty of Lisbon came in to force in 2009 the name Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) replaced ESDP.⁵¹

CSDP

CSDP is an step forward in security integration in the EU. The CSDP operationalizes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through an intergovernmental structure and cooperation. ⁵²

The Lisbon treaty clarifies that the aim for the CSDP is still to gradually create a common European defense. Its aim is to promote a more coordinated and coherent EU external activity, as well as to overcome the current obstacles related to the formation of new military capabilities, and to develop a more effective mechanism towards the compatibility of hard power and soft power instruments.⁵³ The purpose of CSDP is to be a supplement to NATO, not supplant it.⁵⁴

But the fact is that the CSDP still remains a fundamentally intergovernmental issue where the Council of the EU mainly acts unanimously, while operational means and the finance for missions that are carried out under the framework of the CSDP is provided by Member States. After the Lisbon Treaty the tasks that could be carried out under the framework of the CSDP are:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management.
- joint disarmament operations;
- military advice and assistance tasks;

⁴⁸ ESDP Newsletter (October 2009) p.9

⁴⁹ EEAS, Completed missions and operations

⁵⁰ EEAS, About CSDP

⁵¹ Summaries of EU legislation, Common Security and Defence Policy

⁵² Ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of Latvia, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy

⁵³ Summaries of EU legislation, Common Security and Defence Policy

⁵⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006)The European Security and Defence Policy p.30

- tasks in post-conflict stabilization.”⁵⁵

The Treaty also includes a mutual defense clause that clarifies that a Member State under armed attack can rely on the assistance of other Member States. The Lisbon Treaty created permanent structured cooperation which refers to a more comprehensive cooperation between Member States, committing them to developing their defense capacities more intensively and to supplying combat units for planned missions.⁵⁶

European Defense Agency

Through the European Defense Agency, which also is a part of the CSDP, the member states' participation is regularly assessed.⁵⁷

European defense agency shall also:

- ”set **common objectives** for Member States in terms of military capacity;
- introduce and manage **programmes** in order to achieve the set objectives;
- harmonize Member States' **operational needs** and improve the methods for procuring military equipment;
- manage defence technology **research activities**;
- contribute to strengthening the **industrial** and **technological base** of the defence sector and improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.”⁵⁸

Germany and CSDP

That Germany has been a driving force in the development of CSDP is well documented. German participation and specially the German-French cooperation has always been considered essential to the European integration process. This is also true for the development of the ESDP.⁵⁹ Germany together with France was a proponent for the development of a European security and defense policy and there was a joint letter from the French President François Mitterrand and Germany's

⁵⁵ Summaries of EU legislation, Common Security and Defence Polic

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Brummer Klaus (ed.) (2006) The Big 3 and ESDP
France, Germany and the United Kingdom p.25

Chancellor Helmut Kohl that put the issue on the agenda in 1990.⁶⁰ The EU Battlegroup Concept was initiated first in a UK-France summit in 2003 but the suggestion was officially submitted by UK, France and Germany in 2004 after Dr Peter Struck, German Minister of Defense had expressed interest in the idea at a security conference in Munich.⁶¹ As expressed by Brummer in *The Big 3 and ESDP France, Germany and the United Kingdom*, the CSDP rapidly gained relevance as an option for Germany's engagement in global security affairs.⁶² In official German documents there are expressed that *"Germany is making a significant and widely acknowledged contribution to the ESDP"*, the document continues to declare that *"Germany has – from the very start – also lent its support to a pari passu development of civilian and military capabilities and is now involved in the civilian ESDP missions with police, customs personnel and experts. As a result of the reform of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces), Germany will be able in future to satisfy the requirements of military crisis management as part of the EU – and of NATO – to an even greater extent than before."*⁶³ and that *"German security policy is being formulated and implemented within the framework of the EU."*⁶⁴ Germany also supported the creation of a European Security Strategy at an early stage.⁶⁵ Additionally, according to the same document, one important concern for Germany in the creation of the document was the great emphasis on preventative instruments and that military force only shall be used as a last resort and in accordance with the UN Charter. It also clarifies that *"EU has become a 'civilian power with teeth' – willing to act if rules are broken."*⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Dirk, Peters (2007) *Constrained Balancing: The UK, Germany, and ESDP* p. 1

⁶¹ Chappell, Laura, *Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU battlegroup concept: Implications for CSDP* p.9-10

⁶² Brummer Klaus (ed.) (2006) *The Big 3 and ESDP France, Germany and the United Kingdom* p.23

⁶³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006) *The European Security and Defence Policy* p.5

⁶⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006) *The European Security and Defence Policy* p.6

⁶⁵ *Ibid* p.7

⁶⁶ *Ibid* p.8-9

Germany's strategic culture and behavior

Result from the literature study

After the end of the Cold War interest was placed on Germany and the role it might play in the new world order. Scholars with different views discussed if Germany once again would return to the role as one of Europe's great powers. Several constructivist scholars opposed arguments by leading neorealists about the possibility that Germany would seek to get nuclear weapons and try to once again play the role as a great power due to the nation's strategic culture.⁶⁷ Thanks to this debate and the aftermath, it remains a lot of research about Germany's strategic culture.

The foundation of Germany's strategic culture can be found in West Germany's post-war period. The first lesson drawn from the Nazi period and World War II was a widespread pacifism and the rejection of anything military to handle political conflicts.⁶⁸ Longhurst calls this time in Germany "*Stunde Null*" which "*implies the total physical, moral and psychological devastation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of the Second World War.*"⁶⁹ Stunde Null forced Germans to rethink perceptions about identity, power, and the nation since previous perceptions had been proven to be disastrous for Germany and the international community as a whole.⁷⁰ According to Longhurst's Germany's strategic culture are consistent of four core elements:

- *Stunde Null* which is the "*defining point which negates much of previous German history, especially recent history which is regarded as the 'domain of shame and guilt'.*"⁷¹
- "*The use of force* is no longer regarded as a justifiable tool of foreign and security policy, especially in the pursuit of national interests and twinned to this is the value assigned to the pursuit of stability and consensus-building".⁷²

⁶⁷ Schmitt, Oliver (2012) Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action p.65

⁶⁸ Ibid p.4

⁶⁹ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) Germany and the Use of Force p.26

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid p.45-46

⁷² Ibid

- The *redundancy of militarism* is evident in West German strategic culture: the military was no longer seen, by others or by itself, as the embodiment of national consciousness, identity and pride; moreover the vocation of the soldier was defamed and state and society was emasculated of all aspects of military culture.⁷³

- A rejection of nationalism and statism⁷⁴

According to Longhurst's these core elements steer policy preference by excluding and including policy options. These process is being done by emergence of security policy standpoints which then acts as transmitters between the foundational elements and regulatory practices. According to Longhurst the security policy standpoints of Germany are:⁷⁵

- "an aversion to singularity, unilateralism and leadership in security matters; a predilection to multilateral solutions and to conceive and promote interests through these;
- a predisposition to promote stability in the security sphere;
- a preference for non-confrontational defence and deterrence, and an opposition to war-fighting strategies, while emphasising the broader political role of armed forces;
- a general restraint on the use armed force, coupled with strong antimilitary sentiments;
- an aspiration both to pursue a responsible, calculable and accountable security policy, and wherever possible to 'make amends' for previous wrongdoings;
- a commitment to the full integration of the armed forces within civilian politics and society, exerting strong political control over the armed forces and embedding them within multilateral structures;
- a determination to pursue compromise and build consensus on both domestic and international security policy decision-making levels. ⁷⁶

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid p.45-46

⁷⁵ Ibid p.135-138

⁷⁶ Ibid p.138

Through her research she has concluded that Germany's strategic culture has not changed in a fundamental sense since its inception in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁷⁷

Another scholar, Dr H.W. Maull, claims that the German rethinking after the Second World War led to the conclusion that West Germany was to become a "civilian power" which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and national integration with the western powers. Germany was to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms and also by its constitution. Pacifism, democracy and basic human rights thus emerged as powerful core political values in West Germany's foreign policy concept.⁷⁸

Maull has a less comprehensive description of Germany's strategic culture. According to him there are four important norms that still today influence Germany's foreign policy and military action.

1. *'Never again': Self-imposed Constraints*. Germany rejects any initiation of military force for aggressive purposes. Pacifism is a core political value.⁷⁹
2. *'Never alone'*: Military integration is vital, Germany wants to remain firmly integrated within NATO or the WEU.⁸⁰
3. *'Politics, not Force'*: Using military forces as political tools is unacceptable. The pacifist impulse mentioned above also implied a strong preference for political solutions, and a profound skepticism vis-a-vis the use of force under all guises.⁸¹
4. *'Norms Define Interests'*: In political terms, Germany's national interests are routinely defined in terms of norms and values.⁸²

Other scholars (Sebastian Harnisch & Raimund Wolf) have suggested that German political elites have been pursuing a foreign policy based on two fundamental principles; *'never again alone'*, and

⁷⁷ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) *Germany and the Use of Force* p.138-140

⁷⁸Maull, Hanns W (1999) *Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?* p.1

⁷⁹ Ibid p.10

⁸⁰ Ibid p.11-12

⁸¹ Ibid p.7-12

⁸² Ibid p.8

'never again war'.⁸³ According to this policy Germany is actively integrated with other liberal democracies and shows skepticism about the use of force. This foundation was also stabilized and reinforced by institutional settings in the form of the Federal Constitutional Court and the constitution which has a great influence on security issues.⁸⁴ According to Harnisch & Wolf these fundamental principles still play a significant role in Germany's strategic behavior.⁸⁵

The effect of Germany's strategic culture

According to Longhurst, the features of Germany's strategic culture are persistent over time and policy makers in Germany appear to be acutely aware of their strategic culture, and regard themselves as subject to some form of cultural 'boundedness' which determines their choices and predisposes them to certain options. Evidence of this can be found in the language of the defense white papers, speeches and debates, which are imbued with convictions of the 'weight of the pasts', 'the lessons of German history', 'the defense culture of our country', and so on.⁸⁶ These claims are supported by scholars like Olivier Schmitt and Hanns W Maull to just mention some. In '*German Decision for Military Action*' Schmitt argues that Germany's strategic culture has an effect on the behavior of Germany when investigating Germany's different approaches to participation in international interventions.⁸⁷

Schmitt has shown that the rhetorics used to justify the EUFOR RD mission was consistent with a specific facet of the state's strategic culture, but Germany's political elite was also aware that they were violating other aspects of Germany's strategic culture. When it came to the Chad intervention 2008, Germany returned to other aspects of their strategic culture and abstained from participating. The signs on Germany's strategy culture can also be seen in the abstention policy regarding the

⁸³ Harnisch, Sebastian & Wolf, Raimund (2010), 'Germany: The Continuity of Change', in Kirchner, Emil & James Sperling, eds., *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* p.46

⁸⁴ Ibid p.46-47

⁸⁵ Ibid p.40-48

⁸⁶ Longhurst, Kerry (2004) *Germany and the Use of Force* p.2

⁸⁷ Harnisch, Sebastian & Wolf, Raimund (2010), 'Germany: The Continuity of Change', in Kirchner, Emil & James Sperling, eds., *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* p.40-50

intervention in Libya.⁸⁸ What is interesting in this regard was that in Transatlantic Trend 2012, 53% of Germans viewed the intervention in Libya as the right thing to do.⁸⁹

In '*Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?*', one of Maull's conclusions is that Germany is committed to its traditional foreign policy as a civilian power.⁹⁰ These attitudes can also be seen in the attitudes of the German public. Support for military missions abroad is traditionally low and tends to decrease in cases of high media coverage.⁹¹ People's major security concerns relate to economic and social issues, not to external challenges and threats. In addition, Germans remain very skeptical about the adequacy of military answers to global challenges and threats⁹² This can also be seen in the nationalities level of responsibility in CSDP missions, Germany has been a small contribution when it comes to military operations but are the largest contributor when it comes to civilian operations.⁹³

According to Haaland Matlary, German military presence abroad must be multilateral in order to gain support and be seen a legitimate.⁹⁴ That multilateral agreements have a large support in Germany can be seen in the strong public support for NATO. In the Transatlantic Trend report, when asking for agreement with the statement, "*NATO is an alliance of democratic countries that should act together*", 71% of Germans approved, the highest number recorded in the survey.

⁸⁸ Schmitt, Oliver (2012) Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action p.77

⁸⁹ Transatlantic Trends, Key findings 2012 p.35

⁹⁰ Maull, Hanns W (1999) Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power p.9-10

⁹¹ Bulhman, Thomas (2010) Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in Deutschland (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2010

⁹² Brummer Klaus (ed.) (2006) The Big 3 and ESDP France, Germany and the United Kingdom p.35

⁹³ International Security information service europe (March 2014) CSDP Note Nationalities of civilian and military Heads of missions and operations See attachment 1.

⁹⁴ Matlary Haaland, Janne (2009) European Union Security Dynamics In The New National Interest p.78

Result from interviews

Dr Claudia Major

Dr Major description of Germany's strategic culture put a large focus on Germany's need to act in a multilateral setting. A military intervention has to have a mandate from an international organization to enable Germany to act, not just because of the limitations to act according to the constitution, but also to be seen as legitimate and gain national support. For a more comprehensive description of Germany's strategic culture she refers to Carrie Longhurst work in *Germany and the Use of Force*, with which she concurs.

She agrees that Germany's strategic culture affects its strategic behavior in some cases, but this has to be reviewed from case-to-case but it is not possible to understand Germany's behavior by understanding the strategic culture.

Col. Gunnehed

Col. Gunnehed argues that Germany's strategic culture is strongly influenced by the Second World War and the division of the country after 1945, which involved limited sovereignty for Germany. Germany today has a lack of strategy when it comes to international issues. Germany is reluctant to use force except for self-defense. There is a strong belief that international operations/interventions should be carried out in a multilateral setting.

He also argues that Germany's strategic culture affect its security politics, one example of this is the interest of Germany to have good relations with Israel, but that the national opinions have great significance in the way Germany acts. A UN-mandate is extremely important for Germany when it comes to military action. Germany also feels a need to show commitment and contribute to EU and NATO. He also mention that it's hard to predict Germany's actions; how Germany might act has to be reviewed from case-to-case. He also believes that Germany, and in particular Angela Merkel, acts according to a moral compass. It is more about doing the right thing than gaining national benefits. He thinks that the major motive for Germany not being involved in operation Unified Protector was that Germany perceived the mandate and legitimacy as unclear, although one major reason could also be that the operation took place close to a national election in which the political parties didn't want to antagonize the pacifistic movement in Germany.

Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven

According to Prof. Dr. Justenhoven, the present German strategic culture was shaped after the Second World War. The situation after the war was that the idea that the use of armed forces for political interest and purposes was outdated, which was established and implemented in the German society. During the Cold War consensus developed that West Germany's liberal democratic order needed to be protected and that it was legitimate to use armed forces for that purpose, although there was still strong support for the idea that Germany should not push for military means for political purposes.

Since the end of the Cold War, new questions have arisen in the arena and a small group of influential people wants to change Germany's foreign and defense policy to a more "normal" one, which is more similar to other dominant powers. The result has been that since 1999 to present day there has been a change in how Germany's political elites view questions about strategy, although these views are not shared by large part of the population. This "security elite" tries to push Germany to take a larger international responsibility. However, Prof. Dr. Justenhoven adds that there is also a question of generation; the younger generation is much less reluctant to use military force compared to older generations.

According to Prof. Dr. Justenhoven, *"foreign policy is always constructed by interior policy"* and Germany's strategic culture have some effect on the country's behavior. Germany can never act like France when it comes to foreign intervention like in the case of Mali. Even if the public accepted a military intervention, Germany could not have an aggressive policy as France since the parliament has a lot of influence on military issues. According to Prof. Dr. Justenhoven, *"We [Germans] don't want to use military means, at least we try to avoid it as much as possible"*, one possibility for Germany to contribute in international operations while lacking the support of the public is by offering auxiliary support in the form of doctors, policemen, teachers etc.

If we see European politics as a line, France and Germany could be viewed as each other's outposts. In France it is quite easy for the president to use the armed forces while in Germany the parliament has a large influence and the members there reflect the attitudes of the public. There is in fact an absence of discussion on these issues. Prof. Dr. Justenhoven claims that *"If you nail it down, German society is not willing to frankly discuss whether and how much the world needs military intervention"*, *talks about NATO action makes people reluctant to discuss. Germany has not come*

to terms with its own foreign policy, we don't know our selves what our role in the world is". The behavior of Germany is affected by the end of the Cold War. *"In the 80's nobody wanted Germany to play a role in the international arena"*. This has changed and Germany has to try to find its own way. One role that Germany has played is a *"balancing role"* between other dominant EU powers, like France and UK which often take different positions on a number of issues.

According to him Germany's strategic interest could be summarized in a stable political order in Europe and stability along European borders. Germany has two great geopolitical concerns, and they are Russia and northern Africa.

Dr Jörn Thiessen

Dr. Thiessen does not believe that Germany's strategy during the Cold War was based on common values, rather that they were based on a common anxiety because of the Soviet threat.

He agrees that there is an aversion towards the use of force in Germany. But he does not see Wolf's "never again alone" a "moral" part of Germany's strategic culture, instead the question of not acting alone is about possibilities and financing. However, to act together with others is an important part of German policies and the country is used to giving away sovereignty.

According to Dr Thiessen, during the Cold War, Germany was not in need of a military strategy, the country was involved in the common NATO concept which offered a strategy and there was no internal or external pressure for a "strategic state". During the unification Germany focused inwards on internal issues and worked towards integration in the western system, but today Germany has been targeted with many international questions without having the ability to answer.

Dr. Thiessen argues that when the Balkan conflicts arose, and following the intervention in Afghanistan, the political environment in Germany changed. In political circles there was a growing strategic discussion and some politicians were pushing for a Germany with its own voice, not just in Europe but worldwide. Germany today plays an important role governing the euro crisis but lacks an important international role when it comes to military and security questions.

One important strategic decision for Germany is the close military cooperation with Netherlands. Additionally, there is a growing political will to create a common European army. This tendency

can be found both in SPD and CDU but these groups are still very small and he does not believe this will happen any time soon.

According to Dr. Thiessen, recent governments have had a policy that Germany should remain calm in a crisis. The country has been reluctant to get involved and, if it is involved, it does not want a leading role. He believes that this has changed somewhat in recent months but that it is still not a big strategic discussion in Germany. One reason for this could be that there is only a small "strategic group" in comparison to UK, France or the US.

He believes that the political elite has come to the conclusion that the country's economy is a strategic asset and that it is in Germany's strategic interest to promote free trade, secure energy, fight illegal migration and construct a common security. Germany has a strong strategic interest in securing its economic power, but this will be mainly done by the use of political means such as reforms for free trade, growth, and the flow of goods, but Germany will sometimes use the armed forces to promote their interest, for example during the Yugoslavia crisis, where one important argument for German involvement was to limit the immigration flow to Germany.

Jan van Aken

Mr van Aken had not thought before the interview that Germany had a specific strategic culture. He believes that the decisions made in foreign and military policy are on a tactical, not a strategic level. He believes that the decisions made since 2009 (the year he entered the Bundestag) have been Ad Hoc.

Van Aken argues that there are two important lines that Germany's policymakers follow. The first is that Germany wants to be the number one player in the EU, or at least share this role with France. Germany does not want France to become the dominant player in EU, and if France moves on one issue then Germany has to do that as well.

The second line is to strengthen NATO and EU. One example of this is that efforts are being made to create an independent EU military capability.

He also says that Germany has had a strong bias to international agreements, but that he can identify a changing environment when it comes to the use of force. In the 1980s there was no major

discussion in Germany about hard power, but today during discussions in the foreign committee the question about involving military means is more frequent. There still is an overall reluctance to discuss the use of violence, but the discussion is present. He believes that the Yugoslavia war was a game-changer in Germany's security policies.

Van Aken claims that a lot of Germany's tactical behavior (since he does not want to use the term strategic) is based on France's behavior. This does not necessarily mean the same behavior to a situation as France, but Germany reacts when France does. He does not see Germany as a country wanting to get involved in military matters abroad, and if Germany is involved the contribution is at a minimum level. Even if Germany's strategy sometimes is unclear, he believes that one exists. *"I hear a lot that Germany has no strategy, but if Germany would follow others, we would not be a powerhouse and I think there is a system behind it"*, and *"Germany has a large influence in EU, we shape the policy"*.

He believes that Germany has a good reputation around the world because they have not been a military power. For Germany to not join an initiative of the US, UK or France is, *"big, big, big"*. He was therefore surprised that Germany did not join the Libya intervention. According to him, foreign policy decisions and security matters are based on economic aspects, and Germany's strategic interests are to strengthen the EU and promote integration. Before a foreign policy decision is made the question is always asked: *"Is it good for EU or not?"*, Germany also wants to preserve its economic power, so free trade is one important strategic issue for Germany.

Burkhardt Müller-Sönksen

According to Müller-Sönksen, a lot of Germany's policies are affected by German history.

This has created a situation where Germany is reluctant to take the 'driving seat' and there is a large emphasis for 'soft power' and a reluctance to use 'hard power'. In German culture there is also firm respect for international law. If a military intervention occurs in violation of international law, it is not likely for Germany to participate. The constitution is designed so that the use of the armed forces is restrictive. According to Müller-Sönksen the main reason that Germany did not participate in Operation Unified Protector was that it occurred without a clear mandate.

According to Müller-Sönksen Germany's behavior is affected by the large peace-movement, which is reluctant to use violence. When it comes to 'hard power' Germany still plays a small international

role but when it comes to economic power Germany has a strong international role. But he believes that Germany is moving to a more 'normal' approach when it comes to the use of military power, but the use of military power will still be the last choice for policymakers in Germany.

However, as mentioned earlier, the constitution only offers the possibility to use military force when it comes to defensive operations, but the definition of defense has been stretched in the German discourse. After 9/11 the former defense minister said, "*German security depends on security of the Hindu Kush mountains*", which basically means that this could be viewed as a defensive operation; a view that was heavily debated.

Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart

Dr. Ehrhart believes that German history has affected Germany's strategic culture and its behavior. The two world wars combined with the threat of a war with Germany as the battle ground during the Cold War has created an atmosphere where war is considered to be a bad thing that should be avoided. The result is a culture and a foreign- and security policy that favors multilateral and bilateral cooperation and puts a great emphasis on features like diplomatic and economic means to forward Germany's agenda. Dr. Ehrhart does not think that this is because Germans are pacifist, but there is a strong public objection against increased defense spending since the public view that this money could be used to favor Germany through other investments.

Germany as a nation is unwilling to take a leading position and have in a lot of issues rather taken a more "mediating" role. As Dr. Ehrhart puts it "*Germany is too small to rule Europe but too big to be another Switzerland in Europe.*" Dr. Ehrhart believes there are a number of reasons why Germany did not get involved in Operation Unified Protector. The main reason was that the end state of the mission was unclear, there was a lack of strategy and a unclear goal for the mission.

Germany's motives for involvement in CSDP

Result from literature study

As pointed out in the introduction, scholars suggest that one motive for Germany's involvement in CSDP is to decrease the national constraints for Germany's security and defense policy and by that make it easier to deploy troops abroad. According to Haaland Matlary German political elites need a firm international support and backing in order to ensure legitimacy for using troops abroad. The strong pacifistic elements in the national politics of Germany can only be handled by arguing that Germany must honor its international obligations and commitments. As a result *"German interests are centered on acquiring legitimacy, sharing risk, and sharing blame."*⁹⁵

Haaland Matlary describes Germany's government as weak when it comes to security issues, and by weak she means that the parliament has a greater influence in Germany compared to countries like France and UK, this is the case not only when it comes to decisions to deploy troops abroad but also in how the operation is carried out.⁹⁶ Following this argument Haaland Matlary claims that weak governments are more likely to seek "hedging strategies" through more EU burden-sharing and possible integration and are likely to engage in "self-binding" integration.⁹⁷

What Haaland Matlary's claims are in line with Harnisch & Wolf who argues that Europeanization has become the preferred strategy to overcome domestication in Germany's security policy.⁹⁸ According to Harnisch & Wolf *"They [German policy makers] also managed to shape the public discourse in Germany and to establish new facts by slowly raising the scope of German military deployments, repeatedly moving beyond the established domestic consensus."*⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Matlary Haaland, Janne (2009) European Union Security Dynamics In The New National Interest p.74

⁹⁶ Ibid p.148-151

⁹⁷ Ibid p.165

⁹⁸ Harnisch, Sebastian & Raimund Wolf (2010), 'Germany: The Continuity of Change', in Kirchner, Emil & James Sperling, eds., National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance p.30

⁹⁹ Ibid p.25

Public opinion and threat perception

In a opinion poll from 2010, 45% of the German public agreed with the statement that Germany should have a more active policy to crises and conflicts while 46% preferred that Germany instead focused on its internal problems.¹⁰⁰ German's major security concerns are based on economic and environmental issues; 32% of German's perceived economic security a bigger threat to their personal safety than war and conflicts, which only 12% perceived as a threat.¹⁰¹ These tendencies can also be seen in opinion polls for the parliament election in 2013 which show that security and defense policy is not an important issue for the German voters.¹⁰²

Result from interviews

Dr Claudia Major

When it comes to the motives for Germany's involvement in the ESDP/CSDP she refers to her PhD paper in which she analyzes the influence Germany, France and United Kingdom have had on the ESDP. She points out that Germany, together with France and the UK, have been the driving force for the development of the ESDP. These countries also made high material contributions according to their commitment to the Helsinki Headline Goals.¹⁰³

According to her the interest of Germany in the development of the ESDP was driven by a *"genuine commitment to deepen the integration progress"*,¹⁰⁴ this corresponds with Germany's long-standing goal to create a political union, which means to Europeanize more policy areas. The development of ESDP also had a broad support in the Bundestag except for the extreme left.¹⁰⁵

In the development of the ESDP, Germany had a preference for multilateral rather than unilateral action and a civilian approach. Germany promoted a "toolbox" that included both civilian and

¹⁰⁰ Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (2011) Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland p. 89

¹⁰¹ Ibid p.92

¹⁰² Infratest dimap (2013) Wahlentscheidende Themen bei der Bundestagswahl 2013

¹⁰³ Major, Claudia (2009) Europe is what member states make of it" - An assessment of the influence of nation states on the European Security and Defence Policy p.6

¹⁰⁴ Ibid p.82

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

military capabilities.¹⁰⁶ Germany also wanted to combine the transatlantic link and the EU,¹⁰⁷ this stand has to be viewed in the light of the French critical stance towards the US and NATO and their willingness to develop the EU into a global actor.¹⁰⁸

She mentioned in the interview that one additional reason could be that Germany does not have a clear strategy and by creating an EU strategy through the ESDP/CSDP, Germany could easily adopt it as a national strategy as well.

Col Gunnehed

Col. Gunnehed argues that Germany has been a leading partner in the creation of the CSDP. The involvement in the CSDP, “*follows a natural path in German thinking*”, but one reason could also be that through the EU, Germany could get legitimacy for action. He does not think that Germany wants an expeditionary force like France or the UK, but they want to be (and are) a leading contributor in civil-military development.

Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven

From 1999 to the present day there has been a change in how Germany’s political elites view questions about strategy, but their views are not shared by large parts of the population. This ‘security elites’ try to push Germany to take a larger international responsibility and there is a large support for pushing more issues of defense and security into the European arena. He believes that the idea is that if we have a more common defense and security policy and Germany’s neighbors think like Germans in a specific issue, then Germany’s politicians can be “*swimming in the consensus of other states*” and the issues are seen as less bad since everybody else shares the same viewpoint.

He thinks that there is some support for Haaland Matlary’s claim that political elites try to use Europeanization to overcome national constraints in the security and defense area, especially amongst conservatives. However, the reality is more complex and there are a number of other ideas among politicians who may think otherwise.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ibid p.82

¹⁰⁸ Ibid p.101-113

Another reason behind pushing more issues into the European arena is that Germany, as well as other European states, has lost influence in the world. European states alone today have limited capabilities to push for their interests, but by creating policies together with others, Germany's global influence will increase.

Dr. Jörn Thiessen

He believes that there is a strategy to transfer questions about the use of armed forces to the EU and this will include some level of decreased sovereignty for Germany. But the reason behind this is driven by economic factors. It would be economically beneficial for Germany to increase the defense cooperation, and the European countries need to cooperate to afford eventual interventions. He says that Germany will never act alone militarily and that Germans always are interested in the full spectrum of means when facing a strategic dilemma, which includes all from diplomatic, economic and military tools.

There is political pressure for more German involvement internationally and there is an international attitude that says "*Do because you can*". But he does not think that this is the reason why Germany has been eager to support CSDP, it is rather an effect of economic pressure. He believes that decision to use the armed forces will always stay in the Bundestag, as long as no European army exists. So a more frequent use of Germany's armed forces just because of the CSDP is not likely. Perhaps one unarmed peace core with German support could be used in a less strict setting.

He does not think that cooperation in the EU and the number of contributing nations necessarily will affect the national opinion whether an intervention being legitimate or not. But it is clear that the chance that a vast majority of Germans view an international intervention as legitimate is more likely if it is in a multilateral setting, but there is no guarantee that this would be the case.

He does not think that the process of EU integration will change the attitude of the public concerning the use of armed forces as-well, and he views military interventions like the one in Afghanistan unlikely in the future unless something extraordinary happens.

Jan van Aken

Van Aken believes that external pressure is important for German action when it comes to interventions, but he also believes that internal pressure has to be taken into consideration. He believes that the process of raising military questions in the EU arena is a tactical decision which is made in order to save money. But the government could also want to move these issues up to the EU to avoid some constraints in the Bundestag.

Burkhardt Müller-Sönksen

He believes that the present government wants to play a more active role in the EU, even when it comes to military issues, but he doesn't think that Germany wants a leading role in the CSDP.

He also believes that at the moment it is quite unclear what Germany wants with the CSDP. It's clear that there are financial reasons behind it, like the pooling and sharing idea. But there is no larger understanding of what Germany actually wants to achieve in the long run. Overall there is one idea that a stronger EU will be beneficial for Germany since a single European voice is a powerful tool.

He also believes that the CSDP and the Europeanization process will shift the responsibility question; the EU will be seen as more responsible for external action. This could also lead to a situation where the use of armed forces is more easily done by the government.

Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart

Dr Ehrhart believes that Germany's involvement in the CSDP has many different reasons. One is that Germany has been a great supporter of the pooling and sharing idea, but he also believes that there are those who favor more international involvement through the CSDP in order to legitimize German action. One reason why Germany favors multilateral and bilateral cooperation is because it creates additional material capabilities, but also because it increases the legitimacy for action. It is hard to sell the idea that Germany should get more involved in security and defense issues to the public since the mainstream of the population do not want more military action, but if Germany acts together with others in a framework it increases the chances to gain support.

Analysis

Germany's strategic culture and behavior

The literature study of Germany's strategic culture shows that there is a large consensus that *rejection of force* and *aversion to unilateralism/promoting multilateral agreements* are important features in Germany's strategic culture. These features can be found in both Maull, Wolf and Longhurst's descriptions. Maull's feature that *'Norms define interest'* cannot be found in either Longhurst or Wolf's descriptions of Germany's strategic culture. The same is true for Longhurst's *'Stunde Null'*, *'Redundancy of militarism'* and *'exhaustion of statism and nationalism'* and the security policy standpoints *'Promotion of stability'*, *'Dedication to the pursuit of responsible, predictable security policy'* and *'Full integration of the Bundeswehr into society'*.

All the interviewees mention that the starting point of Germany's strategic culture was the end of the Second World War; the strategic culture was then more firmly shaped during the Cold War. This position is shared by the result from the literature study as well but there is no emphasis put on the feature *'guilt and shame'* which is one important part of Longhurst's *'Stunde Null'*.

All the interviewees have mentioned three features as Germany's strategic culture. The first is that Germany put great importance in to *multilateral agreements and is reluctant to act alone*. For Germany it is important to act with others, solo action is not likely.

The second feature that is considered a part of Germany's strategic culture is the *reluctance to use force*. Most of the interviewees mention that the use of military power is a last resort but even then it's not a simple solution. As Dr. Justenhoven said *"If you nail it down, German society is not willing to frankly discuss whether and how much the world needs military intervention"*.

The third is the *reluctance to take a leading position*. In contrast to economic policy, when it comes to military matters Germany is not willing to take a leading role, the contribution from Germany in a military operation is more likely "soft power", like medicines, policemen etc. If it comes to military contribution it will probably be at a small scale.

The literature study has offered a much more comprehensive description of what Germany's strategic culture is, this can be explained by the fact that the whole focus of the articles has been to conceptualize German strategic culture while a lot of the persons that have been interviewed are

affected by Germany's strategic culture and are likely to describe the features that they have noticed, in other words features of the culture that are more prominent than others.

There are two of Longhurst's core elements, '*redundancy of militarism*' and '*exhaustion of statism and nationalism*' that are not mentioned at all in the interviews. But there are also no statements from the interviewees that argue against Longhurst, which could mean that they still exist but that they have lost some of their importance in Germany's strategic culture.

There are also two of Longhurst's security policy standpoints that are not mentioned in the interviews, namely '*Dedication to the pursuit of responsible and predictable security policy*' and '*Full integration of the Bundeswehr into society*'. In the interviews there are actually several persons who claim that Germany's security policy and behavior is hard to predict. Van Aken describes a lot of decisions as ad hoc and he was surprised that Germany did not participate in Operation Unified Protector. The Swedish defense attaché says that Germany's action is hard to predict and has to be viewed from case-to case, which corresponds with Dr. Major's claim that Germany lacks its own strategy and that it is hard to predict its behavior.

That Germany is by some considered an unpredictable power can be understood by its role in the world. As many of the interviewees mentioned, Germany still is trying to find its role in the world, which may lead to unpredictable behavior since the role is unclear. One alternative answer is given by Prof. Dr. Justenhoven, who claims that Germany has a balancing role which will mean that Germany's position is taken with regard to what other powers' positions are.

An additional explanation is offered by the claim that Germany is moving from the "soft power" approach to international questions to a more "normal" approach. The use of military means is still a last resort but it exists more frequently today in the debate than before.

Longhurst's feature '*Promotion of stability*' is not described by the interviewees as an important feature of Germany's strategic culture but are mentioned as an important strategic interest of Germany which gives support to Longhurst's claim that this is a part of Germany's strategic culture, since strategic culture affects which issues get attention while others are foreseen; stability seems to be one of these issues.

None of the interviews mentioned '*Full integration of the Bundeswehr into society*' as a feature and since the Bundeswehr since 2011 is a full professional defense force and conscription is

abolished it is hard to find evidence that this feature still is an important part of Germany's strategic culture.

A determination to pursue compromise and build consensus on both domestic and international security policy decision-making levels is not mentioned as an important part of Germany's strategic culture, but several of the interviewees argued that cooperation together with other is an important feature.

The interviews do not give strong support to Maull's claim that "*Norms Define Interests*," which means that Germany's national interests are routinely defined in terms of norms and values. There is only one of the interviewees (Col. Gunnehed) who claims that Germany is mainly driven by moral standards. When asked what Germany's strategic interests are, the interviewees suggest that they are largely connected to economic questions.

Harnisch & Wolf's description of Germany's fundamental principles, '*Never again alone*' and '*Never again war*' are confirmed by the interviews. Since their claim is less comprehensive than Longhurst and Maull's, there are no real objections against these two principles.

Germany's strategic behavior

The literature study shows that several scholars claim that Germany is affected by its strategic culture. Germany is committed to being a "civilian power" which includes the rejection of force and that any eventual military operations have to be done in a multilateral setting. This is described in the literature and can be seen in the nationalities which are responsible for CSDP missions, Germany has a small contribution when it comes to military operations but are the largest contributor when it comes to civilian operations.¹⁰⁹

When asking the interviewees, most of them agree that Germany's strategic culture affects its behavior but no one claims that it determines the country's behavior. All agree that other factors have to be analyzed to completely understand Germany's position and behavior. When describing important features of Germany's policies there are several mentioned features that are to be considered central in Germany's strategic culture, like the importance of *multilateral agreements/aversion to unilateralism* and *restraint in military matters*.

Some of the interviewees like van Aken do not want to say that Germany's strategic culture affects its behavior because he views that decisions are more based on a tactical level and are not affected by any strategy. However in his answer it is clearly mentioned that there is a reluctance to use violence. Müller-Sönksen also does not say directly that Germany's strategic behavior is affected by its culture but he also mentions that there is a reluctance to use violence and that legitimization from a higher authority is necessary when it comes to its use.

¹⁰⁹ International Security information service europe (March 2014) CSDP Note Nationalities of civilian and military Heads of missions and operations
See attachment 1.

Motives for involvement in CSDP

The literature study suggests that one major motive for Germany's involvement in the CSDP is to decrease limitations to deploy troops abroad. The EU arena is thought to be used to increase legitimization for military action. This would be a typical example of **invited dutifulness**. Since the EU is thought to be used for legitimization this could be viewed as a way to change discourse and therefore change behavior.

This view is not shared by the interviewees. Dr Major believes that a genuine commitment to deepening the integration process is a driving force for Germany's involvement in the CSDP. But she also believes that one reason could be to create a strategy at the European level that then can be downloaded to a German strategy.

A genuine commitment to deepening the integration process is to be categorized as **Promote national interest** according to the previous presented framework. It is likely that the commitment for European integration is driven by a commitment to what is good for Europe and Germany. She also provides a second motive which is a possibility to download a European strategy to Germany. This is one example of **invited dutifulness**.

Col. Gunnehed says that the involvement in CSDP is a natural way of German thinking but that it could affect the legitimacy question when it comes to the use of power as well. The motive that is a natural way of German thinking is also one example of **promoting national interest**; it is unlikely that the natural way of thinking aims at changing national power dynamics.

Dr. Prof. Juestenhoven says that one motive could be to use Europeanization to overcome national constraints in the security and defense area. A "security elite" try to push Germany to take a larger international responsibility, and in this group there is large support for pushing more issues of defense and security to the European level. By that Germany can be "*swimming in the consensus of other states*". But that this is a well established strategy is unclear, he believes that there are some people in both CDU and SPD who have this view, but a more important motive is to gain influence worldwide, Germany on its own lacks influence worldwide, but when cooperating together with others in the EU, Germany can get international influence.

The initial motives provided by Dr. Prof. Juestenhoven are a clear example of **invited dutifulness** when a "security elite" try to push Germany to take more international responsibility. This also

corresponds with Dr Earhart's claim that one reason is to gain legitimacy for action. A additional and more important motive according to Dr.Prof Juestenhoven is to increase cooperation in the EU and by that Germany can gain influence. This is one example of **promote national interest**.

Thiessen, van Aken and Müller-Sönksen all mention economic reasons as the main motive for involvement in the CSDP. Van Aken believes that one motive is to move issues up to the EU arena to avoid some constraints in the Bundestag, but does not think it is the main motive. Müller-Sönksen believes that it is unclear what Germany actually wants from the CSDP except for saving money. All three provide motives that are examples of **promoting national interest**. Van Aken also gives one example of invited dutifulness as a motive but argues that this is not the main motive.

Since the opinions and threat polls show that Germans do not view issues that are linked to CSDP as important, it is unlikely that the motive '**strengthen own role**' has played a significant role in Germany's involvement in the CSDP. This claims is supported by the fact that neither the interviewees nor the literature have mentioned this motive at all.

Result and discussion

What does Germany's strategic culture consist of?

The result of this paper does not offer a new understanding of what Germany's strategic culture is but it has offered a greater understanding about what Germany's strategic culture is considered to be. It has also offered some new insight to what the more prominent features of Germany's strategic culture are considered to be, along a "security policy elite" through the interviews. These are:

Aversion to unilateralism. Germany is reluctant to act alone when it comes to issues regarding security and defense policies. This is not just a question about economy and capabilities, a intervention has to have a mandate by an authority and be carried out with others in order to be viewed as legitimate. This is not just a constitutional demand but also a belief that is deeply rooted in Germany's strategic culture. This feature is clearly seen in the interviews but can also be found in Harnisch & Wolf's, Maull's and Longhurst's descriptions of Germany's strategic culture.

Restraint in military matters. Pacifism that are considered to be a prominent feature of Germany's culture right after the second world war are no longer present, but still for Germany the use of military means to achieve political goals are always a last resort. As Dr.Prof. Justenhoven said "*We [Germany] don't want to use military means, at least we try to avoid it as much as possible*". The use of the armed forces is not any longer a taboo, but German's are reluctant to use "hard power". This part of Germany's strategic culture is described by all the interviewees and in Longhurst's, Harnisch & Wolf's and Maull's descriptions of the central features of Germany's strategic culture.

Aversion to taking a leading position is considered to be a prominent feature by most of the interviewees. This feature is only true when it comes to "hard power", then Germany is unlikely to take a leading position. This can be explained by the national objections to acting with "hard power" and that the country still has not found its "place" in the world. This claim does not have support in either Harnisch & Wolf's or Maull's descriptions of central features but can be found in Longhurst's security policy standpoints.

The result from the interviews should not be interpreted as meaning that the features mentioned in Longhurst and Maull's descriptions are non-existent, or that Harnisch & Wolf's description is the correct one, to be able to claim that there is a need to interview more policymakers and to

investigate central documents about Germany's strategy, like the defense departments White Papers. But this research shows that the features '*Aversion to unilateralism*' and '*Restraint in military matters*' are considered to be prominent features of Germany's strategic culture, both through the interviews and the literature. The feature *aversion to taking a leading position* is considered to be an important feature by the "strategic elite" interviewed in this paper but is not well supported in the literature.

Does Germany's strategic culture affect its strategic behavior?

There is a strong belief among the interviewees and in the literature that Germany's strategic culture affects its strategic behavior. One example of this provided by several of the interviewees is the German refusal to join Operation Unified Protector since it lacked a clear mandate for a higher authority. Germany's willingness to take a leading role in civilian operations while rejecting a leading role in military operations could also support the claim that strategic culture affects Germany's behavior.

This does not mean that Germany's strategic culture determines its behavior. There is an effect, but how large that effect is has to be judged from case to case. The many different aspects of Germany's strategic culture, their effect on security and defense policy and how international pressure on Germany has to be handled has led to diversity in politics which could be viewed as inconsistent or unpredictable.

One reason for confusion about Germany's behavior is that central elements of Germany's strategic culture contradict each other. '*Aversion to unilateralism*' and '*Restraint in military matters*' could contradict each other if the EU or NATO decides to conduct an intervention. If Germany joins a military operation in an international framework then the behavior goes against '*Restraint in military matters*' or if Germany goes its own way and denies participation in an international operation then it contradicts '*Aversion to unilateralism*' and could be seen as a new *Sonderweg*.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ *Sonderweg* are used to describe German foreign policy and ideology during the early parts of the 20th century which basically means that Germany took a "special path" in comparison with other western states.

Which are Germany's motives for involvement in CSDP?

The results from the interviews give some support to the claims in the literature that Germany's motives for involvement in the CSDP is one example of when political elites use the Europeanization process to implement national change. However, all the interviewees argue that the primary motive behind Germany's involvement in the CSDP is to promote national interest, but there is some difference in what this interest actually is; among representatives from the political field the reason is mainly to save money. Another interest that has been presented is to gain international influence through the EU. There is also a suggestion that the interest is driven by a genuine commitment to European integration.

Several of the interviewees say that there could also be persons in the government/Bundestag who favor involvement in the CSDP in order to implement domestic change, in other words have invited dutifulness as a primary motive. Examples of this provided in the interviewees could be to download strategies from EU or gain legitimacy from EU in order to gain national support for certain actions, in other words change the national discourse thanks to the EU legitimacy.

Despite the motives mentioned, there is even stronger support for the idea that the "*promote national interest*" is the primal motive for German involvement in the CSDP. All the interviewees with different tendencies have mentioned this as the primary motive, the difference has been in what Germany's interests actually are. This does not mean that there can't be other motives as well, it is even likely that a project of this size aims at promoting national interest in more than one way. The result also does not reject the suggestion that invited dutifulness could be behind German involvement, but there is no support for this as the key factor.

Conclusions

The theory of strategic culture provides numerous elements which can be used to understand and explain Germany's security and defense policies. This paper has presented a number of aspects of Germany's strategic culture and through interviews with influential persons in Germany's security and defense politics identified what is perceived by them as central elements in Germany's strategic culture. '*Restraint in military matters*' and '*Aversion to unilateralism*' are perceived to be the fundamental elements of Germany's strategic culture in both the literature study and through the interviews. The results from the interviews show that the feature '*Aversion to take a leading position*' is considered to be a prominent feature of Germany's strategic culture by the interviewees but is not presented as a prominent feature in the literature study. Two fundamental elements, '*Aversion to unilateralism*' and '*Restraint in military matters*', are however in fundamental conflict with each other with the result that Germany faces a dilemma inherent in its strategic culture.

This paper has also shown that there is a belief among the interviewees that Germany's strategic culture does not decide Germany's strategic behavior but that it affects its behavior. This claim is supported in the literature and by looking at the leading nations in civilian and military operations in a CSDP context.

This paper has also shown that it is likely that the primary motive for Germany's involvement in the CSDP is to promote national interest, which is described as more effective defense spending and increasing international influence. There is, both in the literature and among the interviewees, a belief that some policymakers try to use the Europeanization process in order to influence Germany's security policy since the EU will provide legitimization and by that affect the national discourse.

Final comments and further research

Trough this paper the interviewees, which could be considered as a part of the "strategical elite" in Germany, has been able to present their view of Germanys strategic culture and behavior. There is among them a overall consensus about the most fundamental elements of Germanys strategic culture and a belief that it affects Germanys behavior. This results support the constructivist standpoint in the field of international relations that international structures alone can not be sufficient to understand behavior and thereby rejects neorealism and neoliberal explanations.

When reading this paper it is important to have in mind that the motives provided by the interviewees concerning Germany's involvement in the CSDP are provided many years after that the process started which could have the effect that motives that where important at the time are disregarded or forgotten today. As mentioned in this paper Germany together with France was proponents for the development of a European security and defense policy, however this does not not clarify if Germany was a pace-setting nation when it comes to the development of CSDP or if the country just reacting to what de facto could be a french initiative.

Unfortunately this paper lacks interview from representatives from the conservative Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and the green Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. These parties are or have been influencial in current or former goverments and are likley to have expreience Germany strategic culture from a different standpoint than the other interviewees. However it is unlikeley that interviews with representatives from CDU and Die Grünen would affect the conclusions concerning what Germanys strategic culture actually consist of, since the conclusions in this area have a strong support trough both the interviews and in litterature, but it could have affected the outcome when it comes to how much the strategic culture affects Germanys behavior and the reasons behind engagement in the CSDP. Espacially representatives from the CDU would be fruitful to interview in order to understand the affect Germanys strategic culture has on the decision not to participate in Operation Unified Protector and by that se if Germanys stratregic culture affected the decision.

Further research is needed to understand to which extent to the CSDP has influenced Germany's security policy in terms of procedures and substance, in other words what has Germany "downloaded" from the European arena, in order to understand if policymakers are trying the change Germany's security and defense policy through the Europeanization process.

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
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
Obtained 2014-05-30

Attachment 1 - Heads of civilian and military CSDP missions

Heads of Civilian Missions (ongoing and completed)



Heads of Military Missions and Operations (ongoing and completed)



Attachment 2 - Interview Questions¹¹¹

How would you describe Germany's strategic culture?

Do you believe that Germany's strategic culture affects Germany's behavior and decision making?

What do you believe Germany's strategic interest are?

What do you think was the reason behind Germany's decision not to participate in Operation Unified Protector?

Why do you think Germany is involved in the development of the CSDP?

¹¹¹ These questions shall be viewed as a outline of the interview, depending on how the interview developed others questions where asked as well.