

This article was downloaded by: [Anna Lindh-biblioteket], [Kjell Engelbrekt]
On: 23 November 2012, At: 07:49
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Asia-Pacific Review

Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/capr20>

The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach toward Asia: Military Diplomacy

Kjell Engelbrekt

To cite this article: Kjell Engelbrekt (2012): The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach
toward Asia: Military Diplomacy, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 19:2, 62-84

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2012.739498>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach toward Asia: Military Diplomacy

KJELL ENGELBREKT

The Lisbon Treaty enacted in 2009 allows the European Union (EU) to adopt a foreign, security, and defense policy with a higher profile. In particular, the High Representative and the European External Action Service are now in a position to conduct a continuous conversation with China, India, Japan, and ASEAN beyond trade-oriented dialogues. But a genuine strategic approach toward Asia requires military expertise so as to adequately assess how to best contribute to stability in this part of the world. Military diplomacy involving individual member states already takes place, yet virtually no information is shared at the EU level. The adoption of a full-fledged strategic approach toward Asia would not only be politically astute and make excellent economic sense; it can also consolidate EU institutions in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy.

The European Union (EU) in many respects enjoys an excellent reputation in Asia. European quality products are much appreciated at the same time as the welfare state arrangements for broad segments of the population—largely intact in the majority of EU member states—are perceived as worth striving for. To the extent that they are ambivalent about the sometimes tangible influence that characterizes the military and financial presence of the United States in the region, most Asian governments are quite comfortable with the Union's reliance on soft power instruments in its external relations.

The Lisbon Treaty enacted on December 1, 2009 has improved the prospects for spreading awareness of EU programs and policies while simultaneously creating preconditions for a strategic approach toward Asia. If the present debt crisis can be resolved and member states that maintain a broad spectrum of relations

with Asian states allow the evolution of common policymaking instruments to proceed, EU institutions are poised to expand their activities and deal with this increasingly pivotal region in a more cost-effective and coherent way. In fact, the promise of a strategic approach toward Asia partly lies in “connecting the dots” between existing EU programs and initiatives so as to provide relevant actors with a clear sense of direction.

The expanded mandate of the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) create EU leverage both in Brussels and through the EU delegations already operating in Asian capitals. The EEAS and the EU delegations are adding capabilities that enable them to formulate a detailed, continuous dialogue with Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo beyond trade-oriented dialogues. So far, however, the potential role of military expertise has not been adequately taken into account. Whereas the United Kingdom, France, and Germany entertain various military-to-military contacts in the region, a more ambitious, EU-wide scheme would bring in the expertise and information-gathering capability of the other 24 member states in order to underpin the Union's nascent strategic approach toward Asia.

The overall goal of this article is to analyze the preconditions for the EU to enhance its standing and influence toward a region which due to its rapid economic growth and consolidation of political institutions is having a growing impact on the rest of the world. The narrower goal is to examine a potential element of a strategic approach that could render complete a solid foundation of EU policymaking toward Asia—and in particular toward China, India, and Japan as the “gigantic three”—namely military diplomacy.

The basis for the analysis are the dialogues that the EU Council of Ministers and the European Commission long have conducted with each of the three preeminent Asian powers, plus some recent studies of how Asian countries view the EU and the latter's potential to develop a real and more visible presence in the most populous part of the world. The analysis also draws on research regarding the capacities that the Union is developing as a result of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, properties which at the same time need to be seen against the limitations associated with decision making in a multilaterally organized (yet partially supranational) institution.

EU relations with China, India, Japan, ASEAN

The EU's relations to *China* have steadily expanded in importance and scope since the first ambitious trade and cooperation agreement was concluded in 1985, with impressive growth in recent years in spite of widespread global recession. Between 2009 and 2010, Chinese exports to the EU increased by 31% whereas the increase in imports from the Union rose by 38%, as trade in both directions

mainly consisted of industrial products.¹ The EU is presently China's main trading partner and that country's primary export destination, while China represents the second-biggest trading partner and export destination for the Union (after the United States). Each year 56 sector-oriented dialogues are held between the EU and China and in 2010 the parties agreed to deepen the dialogue on foreign and security policy, the climate issue, and the economic crisis. The explicit goals of the Union's China policy are to help integrate that country into the world economy, reinforce its rule of law and human rights, upgrade the political dialogue, as well as to raise the EU's profile in Chinese society.²

It is sometimes argued that the EU and China are too different for Brussels to exert substantive and lasting influence through interaction in the sphere of trade and business. On that premise one would predict that Beijing will not allow the Union to pose conditions for developing the relationship further. Yet access to European markets continues to be of enormous importance for the Chinese economy and a coherent foreign, security and defense policy on the part of the EU could induce Beijing to pay more attention to Europe outside the trade relationship. Whether the circumstance that the military only plays a marginal role in EU-China ties is an asset or a liability is difficult to conclusively ascertain.³

The EU also constitutes the largest trading partner of *India*, having more than doubled the value of trade over the past decade (to 61 billion euro in 2008). But in this case trade dependence is vastly more one-sided since Indian imports make up some 2% of EU trade whereas the EU represents about a fourth of aggregate Indian trade. To the Union, India is the eighth most important trading partner, although the trend is clearly geared toward further growth. The legal basis is a cooperation agreement from 1994 which both parties want to supplement with a "Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement" that could move the relationship to a new level. The 2008 EU-India summit produced a document that identified four priority areas for such expansion: peace and security, sustainable development, research and development, and intensification of people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

Climate and energy issues are a common concern to India and Europe. They partly apply to development and aid questions, such as assisting New Delhi in its effort to connect the last 300 million Indians to the electricity grid. But increasingly,

Table 1. 2010 EU trade with Asian partners

	China	Japan	India	ASEAN
EU 27, imports	18.8%	4.3%	2.2%	5.8%
EU 27, exports	17.9%	3.2%	2.6%	4.5%

Source: EUROSTAT, Comext, Stat. regime 4.

the energy issue is reframed as a concern about long-term sustainability, even though the Union and India do not share a similar outlook on the historical responsibility for today's levels of industrialization and pollution. In traditional Indian security and defense policy, no EU institution or individual member state features at the same level as Russia and the United States, countries with which New Delhi maintains good contacts on a pragmatic basis. On the other hand, the common legacy of India and the United Kingdom, while fraught with complexity, carries the seeds of closer ties.

Even as its share of total EU trade has fallen by 30% over the past 10 years, *Japan* is still the EU's sixth largest trading partner. For decades the EU and Japan acted as stakeholders of the global financial system, with the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and the G-7 (later G8) as key arenas. EU-Japan summits are an annual event since 1991. Compared to the Union's relations to China and India, ties to Japan are more fine-tuned and mutually enmeshed. Recurrent negotiations on deregulation of legal and administrative barriers to transnational trade and business illustrate the interdependence. The free movement of capital, goods, services, and individuals is extensively practiced, often mirroring intra-EU relations. Trade imbalances occasionally arise, but are addressed in the "Regulatory Reform Dialogue" set up in the 1990s.

In the area of security and defense, EU-Japanese cooperation is rarely given attention by outside observers. Japan has nevertheless repeatedly been attracted by security policy initiatives anchored in the Union's economic weight and the "civilian power" concept.⁴ Concrete collaboration between the Union and Japan in the 1990s contributed to the elimination of mines from Cambodia, the setting up rudimentary civil administrations in East Timor and Palestine, and the realization of several minor projects in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In the field of counter-terrorism, the EU and Japan typically agree that military means should be subordinated to other measures.

But as China's relative importance grows along with its defense build-up—whereas Japan's vulnerabilities are accentuated by its economic stagnation and the 2011 "triple disaster" (tsunami, earthquake and nuclear-induced)—Tokyo may feel that it needs to remove some self-imposed limitations in the area of traditional military capabilities.⁵ While the relaxing of constitutional constraints is unlikely, Japanese and US forces could take steps to integrate infrastructure, training practices, and defense acquisition planning.⁶ At the same time, the growth of EU-Chinese military-industrial exchange forces Japanese decision makers to pay more attention to relations with Brussels and other European capitals.

Finally, there is the *Association of South East Asian Nations* (ASEAN), formed in 1967 and today including Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Brunei. ASEAN clearly falls behind the three "Asian giants" in terms of influence as a corporate

actor despite the fact its share of EU trade exceeds that of Japan or India. That is, although individual member states receive attention due to their population size (Indonesia) or economic prowess (Singapore), the lack of internal cohesion and high regard for the principle of non-interference continue to prevent the organization from asserting itself on the political scene.⁷

To the extent that the general provisions ruling the Union's external actions legally obligate Brussels to defend "principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement" (Article 21, 1st paragraph) as well as to encourage "multilateral solutions to common problems" (Article 21, 2nd paragraph), ASEAN arguably ought to be given pride of place in a strategic approach toward Asia. Stopping short of such a lofty ambition, the EU would do well not to neglect the basic security interests of a community of small- and medium-sized countries, let alone that individual ASEAN members might be pulled deep into the power sphere of one of the "gigantic three."⁸

The Lisbon Treaty and the strategic perspective

The Lisbon Treaty improves legal and organizational prerequisites for consolidating and developing relations between the EU and the most resourceful Asian countries. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in reality still needs unity among the 27 members states, the Union is now an independent legal entity, and the High Representative "shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy" (Article 18, 1st paragraph). Decision making procedures that facilitate rapid financing of measures have been introduced and the EEAS is currently creating broad capacities in order to utilize the right to initiative of the latter with well-prepared policy proposals. These bodies will supplement instruments and resources already established in the realm of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), above all the Committee for Foreign and Security Policy, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff.

If the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS make up the necessary "hardware" that is required for the Union to raise its profile outside the European continent, a broader doctrine or approach in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy constitute the "software." The first contribution in this respect was the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003, seven years later supplemented with an Internal Security Strategy. The ESS reaffirmed security collaboration between the Union and the United States (after the conflict over Iraq in the UN Security Council) but inadvertently also helped bring about formal discussions on such matters with the most important Asian countries. The breakthrough with New Delhi came about at the EU-India summit in The Hague in 2004, formalized as a common action plan in security matters in 2005. The same year a strategic dialogue on the situation in East Asia was launched with Japan, and in 2006

an EU-Japan dialogue devoted to Central Asia was created. As mentioned above, high-level meetings within the EU-China strategic dialogue were initiated in late 2010.

The danger is, however, that there will not be further progress in these dialogues if the EU remains unable to articulate distinctive strategic priorities outside the European continent. Generally speaking, the intentions and actions of the EU are more difficult to assess and predict than those of most nation-states, partly due to discrepancies between declaratory policy and implementation and partly because of the distance between EU officials and leaders of nation-states, whose consent and support is required for implementation. Moreover, the Union's policymaking process rarely allows for old-fashioned leader-to-leader deliberations in order to fine-tune intergovernmental agreements. For such and other reasons, several of the world's great powers—including Russia, Brazil, and the large Asian countries—in most contexts give priority to bilateral relations and handle key issues outside the EU and other multilateral arenas.

The Union thus confronts a formidable challenge when it comes to shaping a strategic approach that is novel yet compatible with existing activities between EU countries and the three most resourceful Asian states, while not neglecting ASEAN in the process. Such a strategic approach will need to be developed on the basis of a good understanding of the real problems that leading Asian capitals are facing in the coming years. But it also needs to consider the preconditions for successful implementation by the Union, as a collective as well as through the contributions of individual states, before precise objectives are outlined. In the latter context the internal dialogue about strategic goals will need to be regarded as a work-in-progress in the same way as that of building broader and deeper relations between the EU and the Asian “gigantic tree” plus ASEAN.

A continuous foreign and security policy dialogue

If the original motive behind attempts to forge a more coherent, assertive, and comprehensible EU foreign and security policy via treaty amendments was to improve transatlantic relations, the growing importance of Asian and other great powers in world politics further strengthens the case for making Europe speak with one voice. The EEAS website boldly states that “[w]e are deepening our strategic partnerships with China, India, Japan.”⁹ But whereas Washington has considerable experience in interpreting diplomatic signals coming out of Brussels and other European capitals, Asian governments have had less interaction with the EU and often struggle to assess its policies and predict their implications. As a consequence, Asian governments tend to pay less attention to European political processes than the latter deserve, given the Union's considerable weight in

international trade and diplomacy, and often fall back on bilateral ties with individual EU states.¹⁰

Even as EU integration in this field deepens further, it will supposedly never play a role similar to that of the United States in Asia.¹¹ On the basis of its long-standing strategic engagement, the United States remains present in all parts of Asia, having gradually extended its diplomatic reach from the Pacific Ocean rim toward South Asia over the course of several decades. In 1945 Washington was almost exclusively oriented toward Japan, the Philippines, and Formosa (today's Taiwan). Following the diplomatic offensive toward the People's Republic of China in the 1970s, US interests gravitated toward Southeast Asia. In the beginning of the twenty-first century the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the rise of China as a global player prompted Washington to open a new page with one of its most vocal critics in international diplomacy, India.¹² And, as of 2011, Washington is shifting back toward East Asia.¹³

Since US strategic engagement in Asia is controversial to governments that fear it may constrain its own activities in this dynamic region, a rise in EU visibility could conceivably induce public opinion there to link the two. Japan is clearly least apprehensive of US involvement among the Asian "gigantic three," as it perceives itself aligned with Western interests in most areas of policy, and will not oppose an enhanced EU diplomatic presence in Asia. India, by contrast, is less keen on Europeans reinserting themselves in their Asian neighborhood, in part due to that country's colonial past and its leadership of the largely anti-Western nonalignment movement. Finally, there is China, whose economy has become closely enmeshed with Europe but whose political system remains at odds with democratic transparency and Western political rights. So while encouraging the growth of business and trade between China and Europe, Beijing is wary of initiatives that can be perceived as EU meddling in its domestic politics or supporting American designs.

For such reasons, a useful and realistic policy objective on the part of the EU would be to insert itself as a significant interlocutor on Asian foreign and security policy matters in general, building on the annual dialogues and on convergence of positions regarding the handling of various global issues. This is an agenda that the EEAS under High Representative Ashton is becoming equipped to accomplish, as it accumulates competence and develops an institutional memory from which long-term policy perspectives can be derived. As long as the Union directs only smaller military missions, the lack of an adequately-staffed operational headquarters is not acute.¹⁴

What so far is only rudimentarily developed is the "software" of EU diplomacy in terms of a coherent doctrine or set of priorities. The 2003 ESS outlined a generic list of such priorities, although one that many say already needs revising. But even if it were to be revised, considerable distance would remain

between a document devoted to a handful of common denominators and agreed among 27 member states on the one hand, and the sector-oriented dialogues that the EU Council of Ministers and the Commission over many years have conducted with China, India, and Japan, on the other. Each of the latter is tailor-made to suit the expectations of the two sides. In other words, the Union still lacks an overarching approach to the Asian region as a whole, one in which relations to the “gigantic three” would feature and correlate to a set of policy objectives.

In the dialogues with each of the Asian “gigantic three” it is so far the trade relationship that pervades the deliberations. Far from being a weakness of the existing relations, this reflects the strength of what has been accomplished in areas where the Union has had something substantive to offer. True to its traditional preoccupation with stability of rules and regulations for trade and economic interaction, the EU has encouraged dialogues in fields that have demonstrated promise for enhanced and deepened exchange. Although difficult to evaluate in terms of their precise consequences, one can assume that those dialogues in fact have helped integrate all Asian “gigantic three” into global economic institutions (with Japan also co-shaping them) such as the World Trade Organization.

In inserting itself as a significant interlocutor on Asian foreign and security policy matters, the EU can expand on these accomplishments and established practices. The High Representative and the EEAS took an important step in this direction by creating a high-level strategic dialogue with China, which so far has produced two meetings in September 2010 and May 2011 between Ashton herself and State Councillor Dai Bingguo. EU officials have publicly acknowledged that the strategic dialogue with Beijing should be viewed as an extension of the dialogues carried out in other fields, noting that only with the United States does the Union conduct a broader range of regular consultations (64 as opposed to 56 sector dialogues).

For the high-level strategic dialogue to constitute an element of a strategic approach to Asia and all three giants, though, three additional things need to happen. First, a comparable top-level conversation needs to be in place with India and Japan. Japan is of course integrated into the Western economic institutions to much higher a degree than the other two countries, and therefore already applies “soft security” strategies developed alongside those of the Union.¹⁵ But outside of economic governance, development aid, crisis management and counter-terrorism measures, the Union’s security policy cooperation with Japan actually remains limited.¹⁶ Between the EU and India, furthermore, there has in the past never been a strategic dialogue worth the name. The eleventh EU-India summit, held in Brussels in December 2010, has now produced a first agreement to remedy this situation.¹⁷

Second, the strategic dialogue needs to be rendered politically effective so that it actually impacts the top decision making circles on either side. At this point in time Brussels should be reasonably satisfied by the fact that Beijing has assigned the Sino-EU strategic dialogue to its top foreign policy official, Dai Bingguo, whose experience and leverage is not to be underestimated.¹⁸ But Dai Bingguo is not a ranking Communist Party leader with direct influence over decision making and the political symbolism that goes with the latter. With all due respect for Lady Ashton and her new team, the appointment of a more senior European politician (a former prime or foreign minister of a leading European country, for instance) on the post of High Representative may be needed before China, India and Japan reciprocate by producing an interlocutor at the highest political level.

Third, tangible follow-up and implementation measures are central to progress via the dialogue format. Strategic dialogue may sound like an innocuous and vague term, but Chinese, Indian, and Japanese leaders will want to see some sort of results from these high-level deliberations if they are to take them seriously. A firm commitment on the part of the 27 member states to move forward on a strategic approach will be an indispensable prerequisite for implementation to occur. By extension, a higher level of commitment by EU governments should be reflected in fewer national government initiatives that stray from Union priorities and more projects that undergird those same priorities. In the past both small and large EU countries have had a tendency to cultivate bilateral ties with the Asian “gigantic three,” with little consideration of implications at the aggregate level of Union policymaking.¹⁹

If the dialogue format seems too modest, an alternative and much more ambitious policy objective on the part of the EU would be to engage one or several of the three giants on matters that generate friction among them, acting as an honest broker or facilitator of direct talks on matters of security. To those who view the Union as an emerging “pole” in international relations and also hope that it will remain true to a “civilian” or “normative” ethos, this would be a natural development. But even fervent advocates of EU integration in foreign, security and defense policy tend to have modest expectations about what the High Representative and the EEAS can accomplish in this regard. Policies toward Asia cannot be artificially conjectured on short notice but must evolve alongside specific statements and decisions on precise measures. Put differently, there is both a demand and a supply deficit when it comes to the Union acting as an honest broker between the Asian “gigantic three.”

In fact, even if demand and supply were to come together and the diplomatic services of the Union would be required at this level, there would still be a long way to go for member states to start pulling in one direction. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU “big three”) have a long history of institutionally-

entrenched bilateral connections to China, and the virtual explosion of mutual business interests have reinvigorated such ties. Beijing itself has recently nurtured what has been referred to as “bond diplomacy” with the financially vulnerable southern European countries, as a result of which some of those governments have tended to neglect human rights and rule of law in their bilateral contacts with that emerging Asian powerhouse.²⁰

In the meantime, the EU can encourage multilateral and bilateral diplomacy aimed at conflict prevention and reduction of regional tensions. The Shangri-La forum in Singapore, organized annually since 2001 by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies with a strong European presence, is a case in point. Drawing defense ministers and top military commanders from 28 member states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shangri-La forum is an “unofficial defense summit” that contributes to fostering practical security cooperation as well as a sense of community in the Asian region.²¹ Shangri-La is especially successful in having established a much-needed meeting point for the three giants and the relatively smaller ASEAN states.

The dialogue with China should be given extra care both because of its potential impact and because there are several sources of miscommunication and misunderstanding in terms of differing sensitivities.²² All the relevant actors seem to want to avoid the emotional highs and lows of the past four to five years, with the EU as well as the US.²³ A major advantage in the EU's relations to Japan is that they are more mature, so that discussions typically can move faster into a mode in which substantive matters are handled. Symptomatically, there is no official EU document regulating the strategic relation to Japan. As Mykal demonstrates, the result of half a century of low-key collaboration is a rather finely woven security cooperation fabric, arguably with a stabilizing effect on the operation of global institutions in general.²⁴

To the extent that the Union develops specific initiatives outside China, India, and Japan though engages in projects that have a distinctive regional dimension, it can avoid causing irritation while working to render its activities relevant for all, “giants” included. One of the reasons why the future of Asian multilateralism matters is that the UN-oriented system for dispute settlement and preservation of peace, with the Security Council at its core, remains skewed in favor of China as the sole permanent, veto-wielding member state from the region.

Another reason for helping to consolidate multilateral arrangements including ASEAN in Asia is that the relative importance of the “gigantic three” vis-à-vis the latter otherwise may grow at the latter's expense. In order to accommodate Japan, India, and, above all, China, ASEAN has also created consultation mechanisms that include the giants and facilitate direct business relations between them and the smaller countries. ASEAN has since 1997 held annual consultations in the extended ASEAN + 3 format, with China, Japan, and South Korea attending

(and later established the ASEAN + 1 mechanism, with China alone on the other side of the table).²⁵ Especially the accords signed after China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 have opened up smaller societies to the economic might of the former.

At the same time, the "gigantic three" remain much less integrated into security institutions than are large countries—such as Russia—in the Western hemisphere. By not being subjected to a military transparency regime like that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the rule of law and human rights regime of the Council of Europe, Asian great powers face few constraints on their power projection activities in their neighborhood. One option may therefore be to try and draw attention to the combined influence of multilateral institutions developed in Europe, jointly strengthening the framework for conflict prevention, crisis management and dispute settlement there, as a useful analogy.

Active military diplomacy and disaster response cooperation

Traditional military diplomacy is bilateral and aimed at securing the support of allies while indirectly deterring potential enemies from political and military confrontation. The new military diplomacy, which emerged in the relaxed atmosphere of the 1990s with the purpose of reducing tensions or preparing candidate countries for NATO membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) scheme, added a multilateral dimension. Besides the ambitious military diplomacy programs launched by the United States in that period, a number of European countries fully engaged in related activities with former communist countries, thereby breaking new ground in military-to-military relations.²⁶

When it comes to nationally organized outreach activities, the United Kingdom is recognized as an innovator. As part of the 1998 British Strategic Defense Review, military diplomacy (labelled "defence diplomacy") was elevated to a core mission of the armed forces. In a MOD policy paper devoted to military diplomacy seven types of activities—jointly geared toward a "disarmament of the mind"—were enumerated, including defense ministry training courses and education programs, the dispatch of fixed term advisors or educators serving to overseas governments, visits by military units, inward and outward visits by civilian or military personnel at all levels, the organization of staff talks or seminars, long term personnel exchange programs and, finally, exercises.²⁷

By conceptually aligning military diplomacy with the broader objectives guiding professionally organized armed forces, the British experience of enhancing mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts could serve as a model for other EU countries engaged in similar outreach activities. The

British practice of military diplomacy serves to relax the previously sharp distinction between the activities of the armed forces and those of traditional diplomats. But it also lessens the delineation between symbolic and intelligence-related purposes of military diplomacy, as the sending and receiving countries are keenly aware that both are significant in exchange programs where consequential security and military matters are on the table.

In today's Asia, meanwhile, a more traditional kind of military diplomacy is being pursued. When it comes to exchange of experiences, the level of professionalism among military officers in the defense forces of the Asian "gigantic three" is not to be underestimated. China, India, and Japan have areas in which their respective defense forces belong to some of the most competent and best-trained in the world. As their respective military histories are rich and varied, nor is there a lack of professional self-confidence. That being said, in all three countries military education and training is lagging behind international standards in at least some respects, with insufficiently rapid integration of state-of-the-art scholarship, a tendency to sustain traditional educational practices, and a reluctance to engage with civilian decision makers. As a consequence, several areas can be identified where interaction with European military professionals would be beneficial.

China, having entertained vast visit and exchange programs with third world countries in the 1970s and 80s, has both expanded its activities and shifted focus toward Asia and the West. In the late 1990s US-China military diplomacy involved high-level delegations, exchange visits between defense universities, and maritime cooperation.²⁸ By the middle of the previous decade hundreds of the elite officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and associated military colleges and academies were given the opportunity to study abroad for a semester or two. The United States, Australia, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom were some of the preferred destinations.²⁹ The same shift has taken place when it comes to visits by high-level military delegations. Observers in the West note that the PLA has expanded its visibility in public life at home as well as abroad, apparently gaining influence at the expense of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁰

In 2009 the number of countries in which China keeps military attachés was 109 and Beijing presently entertains military relations in some form with over 150 countries throughout the world.³¹ Still, the most recent diplomatic offensive by the PLA was directed toward China's neighbors. In the spring of 2011 military delegations to Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Nepal, and Myanmar apparently sought to reaffirm China's longstanding policy of calming the anxieties of those who fear its economic, political, and military rise (what Beijing calls the "China Threat Theory"). Striking in these visits was their high-level composition, with participants from bodies like the PLA General Departments, the Central

Military Commission, the General Staff, or the Politburo of the Communist Party. Through the strong military component of these delegations, some observers believe that the PLA is seeking to become the most influential player within the context of Chinese foreign and security policy overall.³²

Certainly, limited exchange programs cannot compete with the much broader and deeper relations developed with Russia over the past two decades. From 1990 onwards Moscow and Beijing have been able to couple extensive military diplomacy with considerable reduction of force levels and a string of bilateral accords that have improved relations. Since 2001 a number of additional border disputes have been resolved and major arms sales completed.³³ In 2010 the thirteenth round of strategic consultations between the Russian and Chinese general staffs were held.³⁴

By contrast, European countries hardly figure at all in the official account of the PLA's outreach activities, and the 2010 biannual white paper only mentions France, Germany, and the United Kingdom by name. Following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Beijing temporarily interrupted military relations with the United Kingdom.³⁵ As relations with European NATO countries were rebuilt, France was at the forefront with a strategic dialogue mechanism established earlier, in 1997.³⁶ In 2009 Germany began catching up in terms of the frequency of strategic consultations at the top military level.³⁷

The situation with *India* is similar in that Europe has not been an important player in the sphere of military diplomacy. Similar to China, India used to forge ties with defense forces in Asia and in Africa in the 1970s and 80s. Some of these relationships are proving significant to a new set of economic and foreign policy aims, such as securing access to energy resources in the future and promoting international trade and diplomatic goodwill. But as the Indian economy is growing and its armed forces are expanding its activities and modernizing its equipment and doctrines, New Delhi is increasingly looking to the West for professional exchange and visitor programs.

If the United Kingdom has not managed to engage China to the same extent as Germany and France in recent years, the reverse is true for India. The British government that came into power in 2010 entered into what has been called an "enhanced partnership" with its Indian counterpart, after an agreement between Prime Ministers David Cameron and Manmohan Singh in July of that year. In part the enhanced partnership is an example of London's new emphasis on military diplomacy as a separate mission of the armed forces, as reflected in the high frequency of top-level visits by British officers from all military branches and repeated trips by the defense secretary.³⁸

A key motive for India to be interested in expanding military diplomacy with European countries is that it feels it lags behind China in this area. Domestic

commentators say that India may need to create its own institutional structures in order to involve neighbors in activities such as conferences, exercises, maritime surveillance, and disaster relief training, and thereby offset some of the leverage that Beijing has accumulated in recent years.³⁹ But part of India's self-criticism concerns the tendency of the top military management to centralize control over military diplomacy and be insufficiently transparent about its objectives. In that respect India could hope to learn from the practices of Europeans, who are appreciated partners in military diplomacy not least because of their emphasis on transparency and democratic accountability.⁴⁰

For its part *Japan* has been described as an "underachiever" in military diplomacy, with a "transient feel" to its activities.⁴¹ While the country over many years has been eminently active in promoting transnational ties in the area of security and defense policy, the mismatch of concepts and institutions compared to most other countries is said to limit its effectiveness. Most basically, the Japanese defense forces lack a clear legal standing given the constraints on the usage of military means that the constitution imposes. Notably, 65 years after the Second World War the navy remains organized as the "Japanese Coast Guard" and the army and air force as the "Japanese Self-Defense Forces." Moreover, the relevant doctrines are said to lack a lucid conception of military diplomacy that could guide the development of relations to the armed forces of other countries.⁴²

For obvious reasons, Japan awards top priority to its alliance with the United States. Within that bilateral framework, a lot of what other countries would call military diplomacy takes place. When it comes to the two other Asian giants, Tokyo has not been particularly successful in establishing close relations. Military and foreign policy relations with India were weakened by the latter's withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1995 and the 1998 nuclear tests, acts that Tokyo found objectionable. With regard to China, the first ever meeting between defense ministers took place in 1998, paving the way for a well-executed chemical weapons disposal program in which wartime Japanese arms were removed from Chinese soil. Unfortunately, political acrimony over symbolical issues such as school textbooks and Japanese politicians paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine (which the Chinese say ignores the fact that war criminals are buried there) have blocked further progress.⁴³

The significance of Japan's alliance with the United States could very well grow as the country faces vast challenges to rebuild its economy after years of stagnation, a severe financial crisis, and the "triple disaster" of March 2011. But Europe and the EU have always held attraction for Tokyo in another dimension. The fact that European-style military diplomacy tends not to be military-centric and is associated with broader foreign policy goals, such as arms control and foreign aid, are features that resonate with Japanese sensibilities.⁴⁴

Regarding the wider pattern of military relations in the region, neither the increasing defense expenditures (matching economic growth) among the rising Asian economies minus Japan or the repercussions of that development on “non-giant” neighbors, is particularly noteworthy. China has bolstered its annual defense spending by an estimated 11.8% during 2000-2009, slightly higher than the 9.6% economic growth displayed over the same period.⁴⁵ India’s defense budget, meanwhile, went from \$6.7 to \$16.3 billion between 2000-2001 and 2010-2011, with expenditures reaching \$13.1 billion.⁴⁶ To be sure, few of the smaller countries can keep up with the qualitative upgrade of the latter “giants,” Singapore being the most notable exception.⁴⁷

So the main concerns of many governments in Asia stem from the growing ambitions of the rising two giants, and primarily China, in asserting themselves in the region and beyond. Whereas no specific aspirations have been raised concerning the classical flashpoints—especially Taiwan and Tibet—in recent years, the South China Sea and associated competing territorial claims constitute the most acute points of controversy. As was widely reported, in early 2010 Chinese officials began referring to the South China Sea as a “core national interest,” followed by a new policy of patrolling Chinese maritime interests as far as 392 km from its coastline and placing a flag on the underwater seabed outside the Philippines.⁴⁸

The potential role for EU military diplomacy in this context is modest but not negligible, as military-to-military relations can be made to fit the desires and needs of either party. Military diplomacy is relatively inexpensive and risk-free as far as diplomatic repercussions go, since politicians are not expected to answer for communication between military personnel in the same way as that of professional diplomats. The question is what kind of programs and initiatives that would be feasible for Europeans and beneficial for Asian security and stability.

Some programs could be quite broad, ambitious and run over several months or years, while others might involve narrow and practical tasks. Given that several Asian countries have served in the Gulf of Aden in the ATALANTA mission, an offer by EU countries to provide long-term sea lane patrolling in Asian waters where piracy occurs is likely to be welcome.⁴⁹ The training of peacekeepers may be another appreciated type of collaboration. Not disregarding that Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India today dispatch larger numbers of peacekeeping troops than any other country, there are aspects of such operational assignments where EU member states have especially qualified experience and insight. Institutional cooperation between military academies or defense colleges is also unlikely to be controversial.

A further possibility would be non-combat tasks performed by military units, such as complex search and rescue and disaster relief operations, in a designated area. This fits the fifth of EU’s own five priorities for internal security.⁵⁰ Indeed,

several parts of Asia are particularly vulnerable or frequently affected by natural disasters, above all earthquakes and flooding, and would benefit from highly qualified emergency relief teams that could provide training and at the same time constitute a small standby unit. Incidentally, the EU and China signed an agreement on Disaster Risk Management in November 2010 that is devoted to crisis prevention and response.

Finally, one should mention the possibility of dispatching military attachés to all existing EU delegations in Asia. This would establish a symbolically significant military diplomatic presence in Asia, and provide EU institutions with qualified and up-to-date information on security and defense issues. In line with the reasoning above, though, the attachés should report to (and possibly be recruited by) the EU Military Committee in the first instance. Apart from ensuring that military expertise informs the Union's information gathering and initial evaluation, the responsibility for assessing the aggregate picture at the strategic level would in this way be entrusted to military professionals.

The EU's coordination problem

Beyond external trade and the internal market, individual EU countries still demonstrate substantial differences on specific policies with relevance for a strategic approach toward Asia. There is, for instance, no common commercial policy on the part of the EU, something that has impeded the process of forging an ambitious joint framework vis-à-vis China.⁵¹ There are also divergent approaches when it comes to how to outline a nuclear energy policy post-Fukushima, to take another topical example, and differences in how ministries of foreign affairs and defense go about conducting (conventional and military) diplomacy. Naturally, no member state has had reason to contemplate the significance of official visits to Asia by military officers to the Union's wider foreign and security policy.

In view of such limitations the objectives that form part of a strategic approach toward Asia need to be few, realistic, cost-effective, and their implementation easy to monitor. For simplicity, it would appear useful to assign various aspects of a strategic approach to a lead institution (or a category of such institutions). Since Asia has become increasingly associated with dynamic economic growth and optimism for the future, it is a prestigious portfolio for any government, agency, or organizational unit. With the European Council preserving its prerogatives in drawing up the key parameters, certain EU institutions are especially well-suited to assume direct responsibility for translating a strategic approach toward Asia into guidelines for policy development and implementation.

The lead institution for establishing a continuous foreign and security dialogue should undoubtedly be the EEAS under the High Representative. This is precisely the type of mandate that most EU governments believed that they provided

to that body when they agreed to the relevant formulations in the Lisbon Treaty. Whereas the Union's approach to the United States or Russia may be difficult to render precise given the close security entanglement of some of the member states with those countries, the relations to China, India, Japan, the ASEAN, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are above all associated with business and trade. The strategic dimension of those relationships should be easier to work out within an EU framework which at the outset is based on common economic interests.

The EEAS is in a good position to elaborate ways to realize this objective. The strategic dialogue with China is already underway, and the analogous deliberations with India can be upgraded to a comparable level. Regarding Japan it is vital to draw on 20 years of close collaboration in the broader sphere of security policy, arms control, non-proliferation, civilian nuclear technology, and such like, and extend that cooperation to more traditional security and defense matters. Without intruding on the US-Japanese military alliance, there are areas where Tokyo's and Brussels' views of the world coincide quite closely.

When it comes to institution building through active military diplomacy and disaster response projects, the lead institutions should be the member states and their armed forces, with the EU Military Committee—assisted by the EU Military Staff—serving as coordination hub. As long as the Union lacks an operational headquarters with staff comparable in size and resources with that of major member states, it would be inappropriate to assign a bigger task to a European institution.⁵² It is quite clear that a considerable amount of military diplomacy is already taking place but that much work is duplicated and that activities rarely amount to a cohesive approach.

A simple remedy to the present “waste” of knowledge and opportunities in eliciting benefits from military diplomacy would be to introduce a formal duty to report such contacts to the EU Military Committee. Based on the United Kingdom's concept of military diplomacy as a transparent practice intrinsically linked to foreign and security policy, information about related activities could be provided via the defense ministries of all 27 countries to the Council. In turn, this documentation could form the basis of an annual report by the EU Military Committee.

In developing military diplomacy instruments toward Asia, the EU could benefit from drawing on the toolbox that was developed during the eastward enlargement process, and which involved a great variety of activities whose implementation was delegated to the member state level. That being said, there will for the foreseeable future need to be a division of roles among states with different capacities and legacies within the sphere of military diplomacy. The majority of EU member states do not entertain relations with the armed forces of China, India, or Japan at the level of which this is done by Italy, Germany but, above

all, by France and the United Kingdom. Acknowledging this fact, it is necessary to continue to promote well-established ties between the member states with large and influential armed forces and the Asian “giants,” as long as this does not to the detriment of the Union. Meanwhile, smaller countries with a good reputation might at times be in a position to act “under the radar” of China, India, and Japan.

In general, Asia’s “gigantic three” will desire to work closely with military officers whom they perceive as “peers,” limiting the prospects for any EU country besides the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. But if the big three EU countries lead the Union’s military diplomacy toward the Asian “giants,” small and medium-sized member states might be better suited—as just alluded to—to develop projects oriented toward ASEAN, SAARC, and individual countries within those groups. The latter projects could either be geared toward consolidating the multilateral bodies and their legal arrangements, building on the institutional legacy of European integration, or address challenges that individual or groups of countries experience in the sphere of security, in a sense linking an “Asian demand” in terms of a problem with a “European supply” of a solution.

Conclusions

The EU has proved in the past that it can successfully devise strategic objectives and wider approaches toward geographic regions. The most obvious example is the eastward enlargement policy that was carried out during some 15 years, starting with the Copenhagen criteria adopted in 1992 and ending with the accession of 10 Central and East European countries to the Union in 2005-2007. Other examples are the Barcelona process and the European Neighborhood Policy designed to enhance trade and cultural exchange with North Africa and Eastern Europe, respectively. Each of these instances of a strategic approach wedded to a geographic region has brought about considerable changes in the relationship itself as well as on the ground in the targeted region.

Asia is admittedly too large and too resourceful for the latter to be a reasonable prospect for a strategic approach adopted by the EU, especially when the time frame is short. Therefore the evaluation of the eventual success of a strategic approach cannot be assessed within the time scale of most other policies. This article has tried to sketch out a strategic approach toward Asia and identify two central components within such an ambitious project. The justification for putting a strategic approach in place cannot exclusively be based on the likely end result, but should include considerations about its implications for the EU and its member states, as well as the costs of not adopting it. Four different conclusions have been reached that, when put together, can be said to provide that justification.

First of all, the adoption of a strategic approach toward Asia may in fact enhance stability in that part of the world. Even though the Union needs to be humble and patient about what it can accomplish in the world's most populous and economically dynamic region, the establishment of a continuous dialogue with the "gigantic three" Asian powers has the potential of inserting Brussels as a stable interlocutor that over the medium- to long-term might exert influence over how countries like China, India, and Japan choose to pursue global and regional objectives. The EU is unlikely to be called upon as a power broker between the three, but it can apply its considerable diplomatic muscle toward creating a political environment in which major and lesser actors can co-exist and resolve their differences.

A corollary to that conclusion—borne out by the analysis above—is that the EU, while paying much attention to cultivating relations with the Asian giants, must not neglect the rest of the region. This applies to sizeable states like Indonesia, Pakistan, South Korea, and the Philippines, or economically resourceful entities such as Singapore and Taiwan. But it also applies to Asia's multilateral organizations and, above all, to ASEAN. The institutions and international accords associated with ASEAN constitute some of the most consequential security arrangements in the entire region, providing an economic context and a political affiliation that mitigates the leverage of the largest neighbors. Moreover, ASEAN countries in some respects perceive the EU and European integration as their counterpart (even "role model"). It would be politically unwise to disregard the particular goodwill that ASEAN member states often have reaffirmed, and the two sides may very well want to exchange practical lessons about how to organize regional economic integration.

Second, the establishment of a strategic approach toward Asia would therefore be politically astute. Few of the Union's own member states have anything to lose from the adoption of a strategic approach toward Asia. There will be (and already is) resistance against "EU-ization" within the ministries and agencies charged with formulating and carrying out the Asia policy of countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This is understandable. There are long histories of bilateral relations between each of these countries and the Asian giants, endowed with valuable legacies and a justifiable sense of prestige. As a result, governments with such experience should not be discouraged in seeking to maintain and further expand on existing ties.

Third, the creation of a strategic approach toward Asia makes good economic sense. EU member states have already begun to slash the expenditures of foreign ministries, in anticipation of closer coordination on foreign policy at the United Nations and other international organizations, as well as toward non-European regions of the world. The EU delegations are being restructured so that they serve less as public relations bodies and more as multifunctional institutions in

which a traditional diplomatic service forms the core. Yet it is only when the EEAS can provide that organization with a clear sense of direction that member states will be able to reduce the size of their foreign ministries. The same goes for ministries of defense, which by integrating their Asia-related activities into the information-gathering and evaluation structures of the Union would be in a position to operate more cost-effectively.

Fourth, the adoption of a strategic approach toward Asia will help consolidate EU institutions operating in the realms of foreign, security and defense policy. According to many commentators the EU is currently expected to make adjustments in order to fit into the "larger-size suit" that the Lisbon Treaty created. The EU has to make itself useful in more areas of policy than in the past, and it needs to speak with one voice and do so convincingly. Recognizing that many find the Union's reliance on soft power instruments particularly appealing, it will be a challenge to extend Europe's successful brand of military diplomacy without jeopardizing the "civilian" emphasis of external relations. Involving the EEAS and the EU Military Committee in executing the strategy, by virtue of their institutional mandates and areas of expertise, enhances the likelihood that implementation will succeed and that the Union will not "overextend" itself politically.

Notes

- 1 See *European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade Web site*, April 2, 2012. Available at: www.ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/china/
- 2 *European External Action Service Web site*, "EU around the Globe: China," April, 2, 2012. Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/china/index_en.htm
- 3 Gustaaf Geeraerts, "China, the EU and the New Multipolarity," *European Review* Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011), pp. 157-167.
- 4 Louis-Francois Duchêne, "Europe's Role in the World," in R. Mayne, ed., *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana, 1972), pp. 32-47.
- 5 Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection," *Asia-Pacific Review* Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 84-99.
- 6 Patrick M. Cronin, Paul S. Giarra, Zachary M. Hosford and Daniel Katz, "The China Challenge: Military, Economic and Energy Choices Facing the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *Center for a New American Security* (April 2012), pp. 11-12.
- 7 Anja Jetschke, "Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through Network Governance," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), pp. 407-426.

- 8 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 130-141.
- 9 *European External Action Service Web site*, "EU around the Globe: Asia," September 20, 2011. Available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/asia/index_en.htm
- 10 William A. Callahan, "Future Imperfect: The European Union's Encounter with China (and the United States)," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 30, No. 4 (2007), pp. 777-804.
- 11 Yong Deng, (2007) "Remoulding Great Power Politics: China's Strategic Partnerships with Russia, the European Union, and India," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 30, No. 4 (2007), pp. 836-903, 897-898.
- 12 Subhash Agrawal, "India and the United States: A New Partnership," *International Spectator* Vol. 46, No. 2 (2011), pp. 57-73.
- 13 Tan Sen Chye, "Changing Global Landscape and Enhanced US Engagement with Asia—Challenges and Emerging Trends," *Asia-Pacific Review* Vol. 19, No. 1 (2012), pp. 108-129.
- 14 Jolyon Howorth, "Europe at a Historical Crossroads: Grand Strategy or Resignation?" Institute for European Integration Research, Working Paper No. 02/2011. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, pp. 24-25.
- 15 Olena Mykal, *The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Invisible but Comprehensive* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2011), p. 18.
- 16 Mykal, *The EU-Japan Security Dialogue*, pp. 131-142, 157-200.
- 17 But given that Washington has pulled New Delhi into its orbit in recent years, the overtures from Brussels may be coming at a time when Indian desires to engage Europe are receding.
- 18 Jacobson, Linda and Dean Knox, "New Foreign Policy Actors in China," *SIPRI Policy Paper* 26 (September 2010) (Stockholm: SIPRI), pp. 5-6.
- 19 Iana Dreyer and Fredrik Erixon, "An EU-China Trade Dialogue: A New Policy Framework to Contain Deteriorating Trade Relations," *European Centre for International Political Economy* No. 3 (2008), pp. 3-4; European Council on Foreign Relations, *Power Audit of EU-China Relations* (Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).
- 20 *The Scramble for Europe*, Policy Brief 37 (Brussels: European Council of Foreign Relations, July 2011).
- 21 *International Institute of Strategic Studies Web site*, "IISS Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue," April 2, 2012. Available at: <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/>
- 22 Shen Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power," *Journal of Contemporary China* Vol. 19, No. 4 (2010), pp. 255-272, 266.
- 23 Tomas Renard, "The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships," *Egmont Paper* 45 (2011), Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations. Available at: http://www.thomasrenard.eu/uploads/6/3/5/8/6358199/ep45-treachery_of_strategies_official.pdf, 20; Yan Xuetong, "The Instability of China-US Relations," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* Vol. 3, No. 3 (2010), pp. 1-30.

- 24 Mykal, *The EU-Japan Security Dialogue*.
- 25 Long-standing hopes that the ASEAN organization would develop a cohesive legal framework and surrender sovereignty to an executive body, along the lines of European integration, remain unfulfilled. See Jürgen Haacke, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Proactive Security," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), pp. 427-449.
- 26 Timothy C. Shea, (2005) "Transforming Military Diplomacy," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* Vol. 38 (Summer 2005): 49-52; Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), pp. 6-9.
- 27 British Ministry of Defense, "UK Defence Minister Returns to Delhi," An MOD Press Release, July 8, 2011. Available at: <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/PressCentre/PressReleases/0912011UkDefenceMinisterReturnsToDelhi.htm>, 2-4.
- 28 Kirsten Gunness, "China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change," paper prepared for the National Defense University Symposium on China's Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006. Available at: <http://www.ndu.edu/iNSS/symposia/Pacific2006/Gunnesspaper.pdf>; Cottey and Forster, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy*, pp. 25-26.
- 29 Yasuhiro Matsuda, "An Essay on China's Military Diplomacy: Examination of Intentions in Foreign Strategy," NIDS Security Reports, No. 7 (December 2006), pp. 10-12.
- 30 Jacobson and Knox, "New Foreign Policy Actors in China," p. 14.
- 31 C. Raja Mohan, "Military Diplomacy," *The Indian Express*, August 18, 2010. Available at: www.indianexpress.com/news/military-diplomacy/661831/
- 32 Russel Hsiao, "PLA Steps Up Military Diplomacy in Asia," *China Brief* Vol. 11, No. 8. (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2011).
- 33 Yasuhiro, "An Essay on China's Military Diplomacy," pp. 21-23.
- 34 *China's National Defense* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010). Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm. (Page numbers are from the pdf version available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/China_English2010.pdf).
- 35 British Ministry of Defense, "Defence Diplomacy," *Ministry of Defence Policy Paper* No. 1 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2001), p. 12.
- 36 *China's National Defense* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). Available at: www.english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html, p. 68.
- 37 *China's National Defense*, p. 31.
- 38 The currently strong focus on India may in part also be a reflection of London's ambition to sell the Typhoon Eurofighter to that country, which is looking for a medium multi-role combat aircraft; see British Ministry of Defense, "Defence Diplomacy."

- 39 K. A. Muthanna, "Military Diplomacy," *Journal of Defence Studies* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2011), p. 15. Available at: www.idsa.in/system/files/jds/_5_1_kamuthanna.pdf, 10-11.
- 40 Muthanna "Military Diplomacy", p. 8.
- 41 Garren Mulloy, "Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in Asia," *Asia Journal of Global Studies* Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007), pp. 2-14, 8-11.
- 42 Mulloy, "Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in Asia," p. 4.
- 43 Mulloy, "Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in Asia," pp. 10-11.
- 44 Mulloy, "Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in Asia," p. 4.
- 45 United States Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010. Annual Report to Congress" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010). Available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf, 40.
- 46 Harinder Singh, (2011) "Assessing India's Emerging Land and Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns," *Asian Security* Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 147-168, 149 and 164.
- 47 Trefor Moss, "Buying an Advantage," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 18, 2010.
- 48 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, "Can China Defend a 'Core Interest' in the South China Sea?" *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 34, No. 2 (2010), pp. 45-59.
- 49 Catherine Zara Raymond, "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?" *Naval War College Review* Vol. 62, No. 3 (2009), pp. 31-42.
- 50 Renard, "The Treachery of Strategies," p. 9.
- 51 Dreyer and Erixon, "An EU-China Trade Dialogue," p. 11.
- 52 Bruno Waterfield, "Britain Blocks EU Plans for 'Operational Headquarters,'" *The Telegraph*, July 18, 2011. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html>

About the author

Kjell Engelbrekt is Associate Professor at the Swedish National Defense College and member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. After receiving his Ph.D. in political science from Stockholm University Engelbrekt was a visiting scholar to the European University Institute (Florence), the Institute of Social Science at Humboldt University (Berlin) and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University (New York). Engelbrekt co-edited and co-authored *The European Union and Strategy: An Emerging Actor* (2008) and *Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches* (2010), both on Routledge, and he has published articles in *International Politics*, *Ethnopolitics*, *Problems of Post-Communism*, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *Perspectives on European Politics & Society*, *European Law Journal* and *The European Legacy*.