### Master Thesis in Political Science with a Focus on Crisis Management and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author: Annelie Gregor</th>
<th>Date: 2012-06-04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advisor: Professor Fredrik Bynander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examinator: Professor Jan Hallenberg</td>
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</table>

#### Limited Military Pressure – An Analytical Framework to Assess No-Fly Zones as a Single Instrument in Coercive Diplomacy

**Abstract:**

Coercive diplomacy attempts to use military force in a limited fashion as a diplomatic and political tool in order to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping. The use of limited military force in coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy, but rather a refined political and psychological instrument used for resolving a crisis. One relatively new instrument in the toolbox of limited force when engaging in coercive diplomacy, fashioned to deter adversaries, is the use of no-fly zones. The term no-fly zone describes the physical area of a nation that is patrolled using the airpower of another sovereign state or coalition. However, despite its relatively frequent use in its short history, it has largely been ignored in theoretical studies of coercive diplomacy.

As scholars, such as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, have presented a critical view on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, this paper grounds the argument that there is still value in this approach. Thus, the research question is posed as follows: *Given that the conditions of coercive diplomacy mainly focus on an array of coercive instruments at a political level, are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of the military instrument of no-fly zones?*

Hence, this paper illustrates the theoretical reach of the theories of coercive diplomacy by highlighting the fungibility of the coercive diplomacy’s theoretical ‘success conditions’ when assessing a single military instrument. By studying the political success and failure in four separate cases, this paper proposes an analytical framework, which is by and large, derived from Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Alexander George’s theoretical basis. However, as the theoretical basis does not fully cover all of the political dimensions of no-fly zones, an additional variable is proposed.

The resulting analytical framework suggests that this is a viable approach, but only by combining Jakobsen’s revised conditions with the original work of Alexander George, in addition to the proposed variable. Thus, this result contributes to the large body of scholarly work on coercive diplomacy theory and the debate whether one can assess a specific coercive instrument with the political ‘success conditions’ of coercive diplomacy, or not.

**Key Words:** Coercive Diplomacy, No-Fly Zone (NFZ), Ideal Policy, Limited Use of Force, Thomas Schelling, Alexander George, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Iraq, Bosnia, Libya
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# Definitions

**AWACS**

Airborne Warning And Control System: An aircraft, with an immediately-available airborne command and control, air and maritime surveillance and battle management capability.

**Brute Force**

Following Schelling’s definition; limited coercive measures are exceeded and ‘brute force’ is used as a means for “taking or getting what you want.”

**CAS**

Close Air Support

**Coercion**

Following Byman and Waxman definition as “getting an adversary to act in a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity for organized violence but chose not to use it.”

**Coercive Diplomacy**

A crisis management strategy that is employed when persuasion and diplomacy fails. It is employed in order to avoid or limit the use of force. Coercive diplomacy uses threats and limited use of force to influence adversaries to stop or undo actions already undertaken. It is an influence strategy that is intended to obtain compliance from the adversary without defeating it first.

**Compellence**

Encompasses both proactive and reactive uses of threats and limited force in order to initiate target action.

**DMO**

Discrete Military Operations

**Deterrence**

Using the threat of military action to compel an adversary to do something.

**Limited Force**

Following Alexander George’s definition as “demonstrative” or “symbolic” use of force, meaning “just enough” force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary.

**NATO**

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NFZ**

No-Fly Zone

**ROE**

Rules of Engagement

**Sortie**

A “sortie” starts when an aircraft takes off and ends when it returns.

**UN**

United Nations

**UNSC**

United Nations Security Council

**UNPROFOR**

United Nations Protection Force
1. Introduction: Coercive Diplomacy and the Political Uses of Limited Force

Clausewitz’s proposition that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” captures the Prussian general’s philosophy of the political uses of force. This oft-quoted dictum has led political scientists and military strategists to develop different schools of thought as to how the use of military force can best achieve political objectives. One such approach is with the use of coercive diplomacy, a theory developed by Alexander George. Coercive diplomacy attempts to use military force in a limited fashion as a diplomatic and political tool in order to “persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping.” The purpose of using limited force, when engaging in coercive diplomacy, is to achieve the final objective with less cost and bloodshed, less political backlash and less risk of escalation. This is in stark contrast to what would be the use of “brute force” through conventional warfare. Hence, the use of limited military force in coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy, but rather a refined political, psychological and diplomatic instrument used for resolving a crisis.

One relatively new instrument in the toolbox of limited force when engaging in coercive diplomacy, fashioned specifically to deter adversaries, is the use of no-fly zones (NFZ). The term no-fly zone describes the physical area of a nation that is patrolled using the airpower of another sovereign state or coalition. The legitimacy of such patrols over a sovereign territory derives from the fact that no-fly zones are typically implemented within the context of international peacekeeping operations. Introduced after the Persian War in 1991, NFZs have become more fungible as a result of modern technologies, but are chiefly utilized as a means to deny the enemy the use of airspace and to monitor enemy ground positions within the zone.

Despite its relatively frequent use in its short history, it has largely been ignored in coercion studies. The international community, including the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), now commonly view NFZ as limited use of force and as a viable means to enforce political objectives. When governments are unwilling to expose troops on the ground, NFZs have become an option to avoid ground intervention. Most recently, in the debate leading up to the military intervention in the Libyan civil war, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) broadcasted an array of arguments as to why the establishment of a NFZ would serve as the best means to effectively coerce the Quadhafi regime and protect civilians on the ground. Despite the perceived effectiveness of NFZs when engaging in coercive diplomacy, it is unclear as to what extent NFZs have been successful at achieving the political objectives. Karl Mueller advocates that, when studying specific instruments of coercive diplomacy, one must ask if the tools are “useful, worthless, or counterproductive.” While research has been conducted on the military successes and failures of

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2 Ibid., p. 19.
3 Ibid., p. 12.
NFZs and whether they have met their military objectives, there is an academic gap in assessing if the political objectives of NFZs have been accomplished in humanitarian peace operations.

1.1 Purpose of Paper and Problem Statement

While scholars such as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman have presented a critical view on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, I argue that there is value in this approach. Byman and Waxman have discussed in, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, that it is not useful or helpful to evaluate a single coercive instrument in isolation of the coercive diplomacy framework. They have argued that scholars such as Robert Pape’s assessment of air campaigns and David Baldwin’s analysis of economic sanctions, provides a distorted and limited understanding of the instruments as they must be studied as a part of a complete strategy in coercive diplomacy.\(^8\)

The chief purpose of this paper is thus to illustrate the theoretical reach of coercive diplomacy and highlight the analytical strengths and limits of the theory when assessing the single military instrument of NFZs in coercive diplomacy. To this end, I will apply the theoretical ‘success conditions’ based on the theories of coercive diplomacy. While there is an established guidance over the conditions that are favorable for a politically successful implementation, I anticipate that further conditions are necessary to consider when evaluating the conditions of success for NFZs.

1.2 Research Question

Thus, my research question is posed as follows:

*Given that the conditions of coercive diplomacy mainly focus on an array of coercive instruments at a political level, are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of the military instrument of no-fly zones?*

1.3 Scope of Paper

The scope of this paper includes an assessment of the state of the coercive diplomacy framework in today’s geopolitical context. By comparing Alexander George and William Simons’ original framework and Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s updated version of coercive diplomacy, I will highlight the two frameworks strengths and limits, propose a guideline on definitional issues, as well as, how to use the analytical variables when evaluating the coercive instrument of NFZs. The analytical tool, drawn from the theoretical basis of Jakobsen and George’s, will be applied and highlighted in four cases where NFZs have been established, namely in: Northern Iraq, Southern Iraq, Bosnia and Libya. While studying the military objectives is of critical importance, the scope of this paper will be limited to the political objectives of NFZs within peace support operations.

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1.4 Previous Research

A note on previous research on the theory of coercive diplomacy and on NFZs follows in the two sections below.

1.4.1 On Coercive Diplomacy

Much has been written on coercion since the work of Thomas Schelling’s *Arms and Influence*, was published in 1966 and of Alexander George’s *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* in 1971. Most notable work has been done by Richard K. Betts in his *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, (1987) Robert J. Art’s, *To What Ends Military Power?* (1980), and later his work together with Patrick Cronin on *Coercive Diplomacy – What Do We Know?* (2003). Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, (2001), attempts to explore the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy.  


Lastly, notable research on coercive diplomacy from the Swedish National Defence College has been contributed by Lieutenant Commander Patrik Schwartz in *US Grand Strategy after the 11th of September*, which assessed the U.S.’s rhetorical threats with Jakobsen’s ideal policy of coercive diplomacy.

1.4.2 On No-Fly Zones

Studies on coercion through air power in humanitarian peace operations have been, and continue to be, a popular phenomenon among scholars. Analyses of the effectiveness of NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been done by various military academies. Robert A. Pape’s, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion*, (1996), and Karl Mueller’s *Strategies and Coercion: Denial, Punishment and the Future of Air Power*, (1998), has been two prominent works in the field of air campaigns in coercive diplomacy, whom both have briefly discussed NFZs separately from air campaigns.

Typically, studies on NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia have addressed issues of the legality of the zones or if the military objectives have been met. For example, Alexander Bernard’s, *Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-fly Zones*, (2004), assesses the military objectives, specifically focusing on the capabilities of NFZs and the types of enforcement. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman’s *Air Power as Coercive Instrument and The Dynamics of Coercion, American Foreign Policy and the Limits of American Might*, (2002), highlights the effectiveness of NFZs in only a few paragraphs. Sara Graham Brown highlighted some of the political objectives of the NFZs in Iraq.
in her work, *Sanctioning Saddam, The Politics of Intervention in Iraq*, (1999). The most recent work has been done by Micah Zenko, at the Council on Foreign Relations, who developed a policy evaluative take on discrete military operations (DMOs) in his, *Between Threats and War*, (2010), where he highlights in one of the case studies whether the U.S. met the military and political objectives of Iraq’s Northern as well as the Southern NFZ or not.

1.5 Disposition

The remainder of this paper is divided into three parts followed by a conclusion. Section two, methodology, explains the methods used and the research design. Section three, theory, presents the theoretical basis and provides an overview of the seminal work of Thomas Schelling’s, *Arms and Influence*, and George and Simons’ *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, and Jakobsen’s updated version, labeled *ideal policy*, of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, a brief note on the definitional weaknesses of “limited force” and the uncertain meaning of success will be discussed. Part four, presents the empirical information of no-fly zones in each case. With the theoretical section in mind and the empirical information at hand, part five will begin with an explanation of the selection of the analytical conditions for success. These conditions will in turn be applied to each case study and follow with a conclusion on the analysis. Lastly, a brief summary is provided with a conclusion on research challenges and with suggestions for future research.

2. Methodology: A Qualitative Approach with Case Comparison

According to George and Bennett, qualitative approaches, especially the study of one or a few cases, allows for the development of differentiated and more closely focused concepts. The authors argue that case studies offer the exploration of causality by carefully studying the unfolding and the dynamics of particular cases. It allows scholars to examine which mechanisms and variables caused a particular political outcome to occur. It also enables the combination of process tracing and typological theorizing, which the authors argue, have considerable advantages when studying complex phenomena. George and Bennett are keen to assert that the contributions of qualitative case studies can foster a generation of new thinking. However, the authors warn students of reconstructing the process behind policymaking decisions and that one “should forgo the temptation to rely on a single, seemingly authoritative study of the case at hand by a historian.”

2.1 Research Design: The Deductive-Inductive Approach

Applying the variables proposed by Jakobsen’s ideal framework and George’s original variables of coercive diplomacy across the four cases selected, allows me to test if the theoretical conditions required to meet specific political objectives are addressed or not. A benefit of analyzing several cases of one specific component of coercive diplomacy is the comparative element of being able to draw

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15 Ibid., p. 95.
16 Ibid., p. 96.
broader conclusions and develop the framework’s variables for further assessment. As the aim is to apply such method, a brief note is required regarding the deductive and inductive approach of this study.

Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. Beginning with a theory, posing a research question, and observing and confirming a phenomenon, it is sometimes referred to as a “top-down” approach. Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, works the other way and is sometimes referred to as a “bottom-up” approach. In moving from specific observations, to broader generalizations and theories, inductive reasoning can detect patterns and regularities and help draw general conclusions or theories that can then be applied to later, similar scenarios.

This paper utilizes a deductive approach when examining NFZs through the theory of coercive diplomacy, as I am primarily concerned with testing or confirming a hypothesis rather than the creation of one. The theory of coercive diplomacy provides the variables that can help assess the political successes and failures of NFZs. However, as this approach becomes narrower in nature, I suspect that the theoretical variables will fall short. After close examination of each case, I will propose if there are other variables to consider when assessing NFZs as a component of coercive diplomacy. As the goal of the study is to assess where the theory’s variables succeed and fail, and as I observe patterns in each case, it will force me to refine the original research question through the more exploratory, inductive approach.

2.2 Variables for Analysis

For this paper, I follow Esiasson’s et al. argument that thinking in terms of dependent or independent variables when assessing cases does not necessarily mean that solely numbers and quantitative approaches should be conducted. As a research question is posed and the material is gathered and assessed, one can quickly realize that the answer to the question posed will have more than one or two answers. Thus, I will have a dependent variable, which consist of assessing the political conditions for success within coercive diplomacy’s and an independent variable, which consists of assessing is addressed, not addressed or inadequately addressed. A more thorough explanation of each variable will be presented in the theoretical chapter.

2.3 Selection of Cases

One prominent limitation of case studies is the tradeoff between detailed studies of a few cases and achieving broad generalization through a large number of cases. While case studies allows to highlight new issues related to the theory being studied, it also allows for either exposing limits or agreeing with interpretations on the components of the theory. Thus, case studies might contribute to theory building and, according to George and Bennett, they provide “historical explanations of particular cases, that is,

17 Bennett, Andrew, Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages, Chapter 2 in, Models, Numbers, and Cases, Methods for Studying International Relations, Sprinz F. Detlef (Editor), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2004, p. 44.
explanation of a sequence of events that produce a particular historical outcome in which key steps in
the sequence are explained with reference to theories or causal mechanisms.\textsuperscript{21}

Of interest in this paper, is to examine the political success conditions of NFZs in peacekeeping
operations. In the short history of NFZs, there have only been four cases of this kind:

(1) In Iraq, Operation Northern Watch, later known as, Operation Provide Comfort,
established primarily by the U.S., with support from the U.K., France and Turkey, in order to
provide air cover for the large humanitarian aid response in the Kurdish north.

(2) Operation Southern Watch in southern Iraq, which was maintained by the U.S., U.K, and
France in order to protect the Shiite opposition.

(3) In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Deny Flight, a NATO and UN enforced NFZ
operation, which later expanded to provide close air support for humanitarian peace workers
on the ground.

(4) In Libya, Operation Odyssey Dawn, which was primarily executed by NATO and the U.S.,
was established as a means to protect civilians on the ground and to coerce the Quaddafi regime
to step down from power.

The implementations of these four NFZs have had the similar objectives: namely to coerce the
adversary, to stop an autocracy from occurring and to create a secure environment for civilians on the
ground. Furthermore, these four cases have all had a dimension of an international coalition or support
from an international organization. The reason why Kosovo has not been selected as a case is because
neither NATO, nor the UN, nor the U.S., despite the conventional wisdom, ever established an official
no-fly zone over Kosovo in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{22}

2.4 Reliability, Validity and Ethics

Uwe Flick noted that the goal of a qualitative research is not to test what is already known (e.g.
theories already formulated in advance), but to discover and to develop new theories and expand
empirically grounded theories. The validity of pursuing such research requires a central criterion of
whether the findings are grounded in empirical data, whether the methods are appropriately selected
and applied, and whether the findings are of a relevant nature.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the question of validity can be
summarized as a question of whether the researcher sees what they think they see. This implies that the
assumptions of the researcher exist within the social constructions, such as perceptions, interpretations
and presentations of those whom they studied.\textsuperscript{24}

Qualitative research makes the external reliability lower as there is a generalization of the result based
on the researcher’s interpretations. Subjective assessment becomes the basis for the conclusions, which
in turn, is colored by the researcher’s assumptions. George and Bennett agree with King, Khoene and

\textsuperscript{23} Flick, Uwe, \textit{An Introduction to Qualitative Research}, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2009, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 387.
Verba’s regarding validity and reliability that, “the most important rule for data collection is to report how the data were created and how we came to process them.” Thus, the critical task becomes not taking the empirical information out of context, which will lead the researcher to draw incorrect conclusions. The responsibility as a researcher is to create a transparent and traceable argument using the criterion of George and Bennett’s reliability notion when pursuing qualitative research. Furthermore, it is important that all proposals can be proved and confirmed as to what is termed conformability. As for the information presented in this paper, it is important to note that all empirical information is transparent and drawn from reliable sources. Furthermore, all of my own proposals can be traced to accurate information and I clearly distinguish empirical information with my own interpretations and proposals. Thus, Bryman’s point of proving and confirming conclusions as to what is termed conformability is strictly followed.

According to Sharan Merriam, in qualitative case study approach, questions concerning ethics become vital in two scenarios during the research process: when gathering the material and when the final analysis is presented. Again, for an academic paper of this kind, it is crucial to keep a stringent, transparent referencing system to the material, which will avoid Merriam’s ethical issues and problems that may arise. As empirical information are derived from open sources with stringent references, a transparent line between the empirical material and my own interpretations is traceable when analyzing the empirical information.

2.5 Material, Sources and Criticism on Source Selection

According to Thorsten Thuren, there are four components to consider when critically examining sources and selecting material: authenticity, time correlation, its independency and its lack of inclination. While the theoretical framework is adopted directly from the author’s original work, there is no need to challenge the authenticity of the theoretical interpretation in this paper. The empirical material have been gathered from public available, and arguably credible sources, such as the UNSC Resolutions, RUSI, RAND, U.S. Air Force, NYTimes, and Washington Post, one can also easily trace the sources. Furthermore, empirical information has been gathered from the work of scholars such as Alexander Bernard, Robert Pape, Matthew Waxman, Daniel Byman, and Micah Zenko.

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3. Theory

“Diplomacy is the art of saying ‘nice doggie’ until you can find a rock.” – William Rogers

...
approach to coercive studies, Alexander George found Schelling’s arguments incomplete and argued that it was too difficult to operationalize such abstract theories through rationalist thinking and simple logical deduction.36

3.2 Alexander George’s Limits on Coercive Diplomacy

“Coercive diplomacy is best viewed as a flexible strategy in which what the stick cannot, or is not likely to achieve by itself, and can possibly be obtained by adding an appropriate carrot.”

– Alexander L. George37

While Schelling laid the foundation of the theory of coercive diplomacy, George found that Schelling’s mathematical formula, calculating the increment of pain needed to break the will of the target to resist, was of limited use. Motivated by the failure to develop a “policy-relevant” theory of coercive diplomacy, Alexander George and William Simons, opted for an inductive approach to the study of coercive diplomacy seeking to identify the conditions influencing coercive success by means of qualitative case study analysis.38 According to George and Simons’ they agree with Schelling that the strategy of coercive diplomacy is used as a means to alter an adversary’s behavior by threatening pain and using limited force in limited amounts, in order to achieve various political objectives.39 However, George and Simons’ refined Schelling’s “carrot and stick” philosophy by identifying relevant “conditions” that favor success or failures when engaging in coercive diplomacy. Before explaining the “success conditions”, a closer examination of George and Simons’ strategy of coercive diplomacy is needed.

3.2.1 Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy

George and Simons’ define four variants of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. These include the try-and-see, the classic ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, and the gradual turning of the screw variant. The try-and-see variant involves making demands without a set time limit or sense of urgency. The coercer takes one small coercive threat and waits to see if it is enough to persuade the adversary before going further. The classic ultimatum has three parts: the demand on the opponent, a time limit, or sense of urgency, for compliance and the threat of punishment for noncompliance. The tacit ultimatum is similar to the classic ultimatum, except that the threat of force and punishment is implied. The gradual turning of the screw involves making threats of escalation of coercive measures from the beginning, and later incrementally increases the use of force. George and Simons argue that the strategy can shift from one variant to another during coercive diplomacy. When determining which variant to use, policy-makers must decide:

1. What to demand of the opponent.
2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demands.
3. Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance.
4. Whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also offer positive incentives.

39 Ibid., p. 18.
George and Simons also noted that it is important to employ a flexible strategy of coercive diplomacy with these different approaches.

### 3.2.2 Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy

The authors presented conditions that indicate whether coercive diplomacy might be a viable option. The eight variables that favor coercive diplomacy are:

1. **Strength of motivation**: leaders must be sufficiently motivated by what is at stake in a crisis to act at all and to accept the perceived costs and risk of the action.  
2. **Asymmetry of motivation**: this condition is listed separately in order to highlight the fact that motivation is two-sided. The likelihood of success is greater if one side is more strongly motivated by what is at stake then its opponent, and particularly, if its opponent is aware of this.
3. **Clarity of objective**: clarity as to the objectives is of particular importance for policymakers as they must decide how much and what kind of force to use. Without a clear objective, it will be hard to determine what purpose the use of limited force will have.
4. **Sense of urgency to achieve the objectives**: the presence of this condition is important for motivating leaders to adopt the stronger strategy, the ultimatum approach, rather than the weaker try-and-see strategy. Furthermore, the opponent’s perception of this sense of urgency is often a critical factor in motivating him to recognize the credibility of coercive threats.
5. **Adequate domestic and international support**: a certain level of domestic and international support is necessary for the military-diplomatic measures necessary. An inadequate public support may constrain the choice of policymakers as to the military instruments used to achieve the objectives.
6. **Usable military options**: while special kinds of military capabilities are often needed for coercive diplomacy, it is important to have some sense of flexibility with this option. As requirements for usable military options often are stringent and difficult to satisfy in reality, decision makers must always have a clear sense of what the political objective is and if the military option will achieve those objectives.
7. **Opponents fear of unacceptability of threatened escalation**: coercive diplomacy is enhanced if the initial small steps taken against the opponent begin to arouse his fear of unacceptable levels of warfare.
8. **Clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of the crisis**: while the clarity regarding the objectives may not be sufficient enough, it may be necessary to formulate specific demands with precise terms of settlements of the crisis.

According to George and Simons’, getting these elements right is in part a substantive matter of strategy, as coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. The actual use of force, except for minor demonstrations of resolve, means that coercion has failed as the coercer is moving to brute force to take what it wants.

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41 Ibid., p. 219.
42 Ibid., p. 220.
43 Ibid., p. 221.
44 Ibid., p. 223.
3.3 Peter Viggo Jakobsen Revised Framework

Claiming that George and Simons’ complex model is no longer relevant to the post-cold war environment, Jakobsen points to a simpler framework with four conditions necessary for coercive diplomacy to succeed. He examines each of George and Simons’ eight success conditions and reformulates each variable to an updated *Ideal Policy* framework of coercive diplomacy. While he dismisses some of George’s variables, he renames others, arguing that it gives more specificity and clarity in what is desired. The four “success conditions” in Jakobsen’s framework consists of:

1. A threat of force backed by the necessary capability.
2. A deadline for compliance.
3. An assurance against future demands.
4. An offer of carrots for compliance.

According to Jakobsen, it is crucial that the threat appears credible in order to convince the adversary of his determination to execute the threat unless the opponent complies. A deadline is crucial to signal resolve and minimize the scope for delaying tactics. The assurances and carrots serve to build trust and to reduce compliance costs.

Jakobsen further contribution to the theory is that one must spend considerable more attention to the role of coalitions, fragmented opponents and situations where the opponent is already using force. In addition to the updated version, with the refined success conditions, Jakobsen’s primary contribution to the theory is the assessment and further emphasis on the role of coalitions. While he does not include such a condition in his *ideal policy* framework, Jakobsen reiterates George and Simons’ point that the role of the UN, as an actor in coercive diplomatic strategies, have increased and become much more complex in the post-cold war world. He concludes that coercive diplomacy has become exceedingly difficult, particularly as the various coalition members will often assess the threat posed by an opponent differently and thus making it problematical to adopt a strategy required for success.

However, Jakobsen notes that implementation of the *ideal policy* does not guarantee success. Failure of coercive diplomacy may still occur due to misperception, miscalculation or a preference for military defeat rather than compliance. Jakobsen’s main point is that coercive diplomacy is guaranteed to fail if the *ideal policy* is not implemented.

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3.4 Definitional Weaknesses of Coercive Diplomacy

3.4.1. The Notions of “Limited Force”

The concept of limited force is critical to the study of coercion as coercive diplomacy essentially fails when the threshold between limited use of force and full-scale, or in Schelling’s words, “brute force”, is conducted. Physical and brute force, in Carl Von Clausewitz words is “...thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the aim of warfare.”\(^{52}\) Coercive diplomacy in contrast, employs limited force, which in George’s definition concerns “just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary.”\(^{53}\) George further explains that the strategy’s focus is on making the adversary comply through diplomatic means, or use of limited force, as opposed the full-scale use of force as in Clausewitz terms.

Jakobsen critically highlights that “regrettably, he [Alexander George] offers no guidance as to how much force constitutes ‘just enough’ in a given situation, and thus offers no standard for assessing whether the force employed is demonstrative or full-scale, the latter being equal to the failure of coercive diplomacy.” Moreover, Jakobsen explains that the confusion of the disagreement over how “limited” the notion of “limited force” really is and which military instruments that can be considered part of “limited force”, needs to be clarified.\(^{54}\) Jakobsen thus proposes a definition of limited force, which has two components, which he claims are directly observable and easy to measure:

1. A communication of limited intent to the adversary, and,
2. military operations that do not achieve decisive outcomes. Some will object that ignoring the amount of force employed will create paradoxical results.\(^{55}\)

Following Jakobsen’s argument, Lieutenant Colonel Alan J. Stephenson, have argued in his research report, Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy, that in the past decade, technological innovation, has demonstrated that limited war can be orchestrated much more precisely and in a more limited manner in order to achieve a desired political end-state.\(^{56}\) While the coding of limited force is difficult, coercive diplomacy scholars have nevertheless labeled certain military actions as limited force. For example, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin noted that NATO’s 1995 air campaign in Bosnia is labeled as limited force. Byman and Waxman have also argued that the Operation Allied Force over Kosovo was an application of coercive diplomacy and use of limited force. However they also note in Dynamics of Coercion that “distinguishing brute force from coercion is similar to the debate over what constitutes pornography or art: coercion is often in the eye of the beholder.”\(^{57}\)

Following George’s definition, that the ‘limited’ aspect of limited force is based on the constraints and Jakobsen’s definition that military operations that do not achieve decisive outcomes are limited, we

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 75.
can begin to pinpoint which military instruments and strategies that indeed are limited. As scholars of coercive diplomacy, such as Byman and Waxman, have considered air campaigns with bombings as limited force, I argue that when assessing NFZs in isolation from air campaigns, they are indeed limited and often used as a symbolic threat. Furthermore, NFZs do not achieve decisive outcomes as they are based on constraints, with defensive measure rather than offensive coercive measures.

3.4.2 The Uncertain Meaning of Success

Discussing measures of success and failure in coercive diplomacy highlights some of the methodological problems in coercive diplomacy. According to George and Simons’, coercive diplomacy is termed as success if the adversary gives in to the demands, without uses of extensive force, or as in Schelling’s words, brute force. Meaning that rhetorical threats and “limited use of force” have been credible and successful. Coercive diplomacy has essentially failed, if coercive measures, outside of the “limited use of force”, and when a full-scaled war breaks out. Furthermore, if the coercer fails with the strategy and does not prevail credible, that would also be termed as a failure of coercive diplomacy. Reiterating George and Simons’ argument that threat implementation is crucial and has to be successful, especially if the implementation of the threat is linked to the communicated objectives and demands (such as regime change). Lastly, success and failure in coercive diplomacy is also dependent upon the number and type of objectives and demands that the coercer has. It is thus crucial that the coercing state have a clear objective with demands at all times.

4. Case Studies

Before an examining of the conditions for success through the coercive diplomacy theory, a brief background and overview of each NFZ case will be presented.

4.1 Iraq’s Northern Zone

Once the majority of the ground troops withdrew at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Hussein turned his troops to the north and began massacring Iraqi Kurds, whom with U.S. encouragement, had risen up against him. To counter this, and to send a message that the world would not stand idly by the daily death rates, which had reached 1000 Kurdish refugees, the UN Security Council (UNSC) with the Resolution 688, on April 5th, 1991, demanded that Hussein immediately end its repression of the Kurds. Even though the UN Resolution 688 neither specified any use of force, nor an implementation of an NFZ, the U.S. and its British and French allies interpreted the resolution as a legitimate mean to use limited force and to establish a NFZ. The U.S., Britain and France asserted that a NFZ above the 36th parallel was necessary in order to protect the Kurds and that they did in fact ‘act under’ the UN Resolution 688. While the resolution was subsequently used to justify the NFZ, UN Secretary

General Perez de Cuellar and later Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali were careful to distance the UN from the coalition countries enforcing the NFZ.

The northern NFZ established in 1991 was initially part of Operation Provide Comfort, but later followed by Operation Northern Watch in 1998 until 2003. The established political objective of the zones was to provide relief to a persecuted Kurdish minority and to coerce Hussein. The ambitious political objectives and the measures to establish an NFZ gave the impression for the Western public that there was a high degree of commitment of protecting the Kurds. 62 However, there was never a commitment to keep Iraqi ground troops out of the larger areas of the NFZ. Sara Graham Brown noted that in her work, Sanctioning Saddam, the Politics of Intervention in Iraq, that in 1996, James Barker, the former secretary of State stated that, “We went for the no-fly zone and Resolution 688, which said he [Saddam Hussein] had to respect human rights of his own citizens. But there was never an effort to put specific prohibition against Iraqi forces moving north of the 36th parallel.”63 Furthermore, the NFZ did not offer protection from neighboring states, such as Iran and Turkey’s air forces, which regularly entered the NFZ and even attacked Kurdish nationalist movements.

The original draft of the UN Resolution 688 and the implementation of the NFZ was inspired by an ideology of humanitarian intervention and protection, which had a particularly strong base in France at that time.64 During Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch, Turkey provided the Incirlik airbase, which allowed the coalition forces to fly daily surveillance missions above the 36th parallel. While the support from Turkey became an institutionalized arrangement over the years, permission for this mission had to be renewed by the Turkish government every six months.65 The British government also took a sympathetic line with the Kurds, although they were particularly sensitive to Turkish concerns and argued that the coalition forces should not pursue an offensive campaign. In December of 1996, France announced its withdrawal of supporting the NFZ, as a response to the escalating air attacks by the U.S. in the south. The French argued that coercive diplomacy had failed as the strategy had crossed the threshold of “limited force” to measures of brute force. Furthermore, when the U.S. evacuated U.S. and international aid organizations from the region, the French argued that the ‘humanitarian component’ of the operation, which they supported, no longer existed.66

4.2 Iraq’s Southern Zone

In 1992, Iraq and the U.S. led coalition began to disagree over the enforcement of the UNSC resolutions 687 and 688, which demanded Hussein from attacking the Shia’s in the south and from rendering all WMD stockpiles and research. As Hussein continued to slaughter Iraqi Shia’s and reverted to disruptive behavior against UN’s weapons inspectors, the U.S. led coalition implemented a no-fly zone on August 26th in 1992.67 While voices in Washington and UN officials had opted for ground monitoring, the Bush Administration with Brent Snowcraft in the lead, argued that opting for a

63 Ibid., p. 112.
65 Ibid., p. 108.
66 Ibid., p. 109.
NFZ would punish Hussein and most effectively coerce his behavior. The formulation used in announcing the NFZ made no mention of defending or protecting the Shia’s, but rather the stated that the purpose of establishing the zone would be means to ensure the safety of the coalition aircraft monitoring compliance with the UNSC Resolution 688. However, Hussein’s continued defiance of the resolutions, the UN’s weapons inspectors and its continued attacks on Shiites, compelled the U.S.-led coalition to engage in more coercive strikes against Iraqi targets. However, Turkey refused to allow the coalition to use the Incirlik base for such an offensive mission rejected this option. Instead, on August 26th in 1992, President Bush and other coalition officials imposed a second NFZ, dubbed Operation Southern Watch. The operation became a means to fly surveillance missions and to monitor the situation.

Similar to the case of Northern Iraq, Southern Iraq’s principal political mission of the NFZ was to protect the Shiites in the south by preventing Iraq aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd. Other objectives of the southern NFZ was to contain Hussein from invading Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and to use it as an instrument of tactical intelligence gathering.

Many Iraqi violations occurred during the “surveillance mission” of Operation Southern Watch. One of the more notable violations was Hussein’s MiG Foxbat whom had locked his air-to-air radar on a U.S. F-16 patrolling the zone below the 32nd parallel. Other incentives offered by Hussein, such as the issue of a bounty of $14,000 to anyone able to take down a U.S. aircraft, encouraged Iraqi air force to disobey the NFZ. The U.S. and the UN warned Hussein to remove missiles that threatened pilots flying Southern Watch missions, but Hussein ignored the ultimatum, condemning the NFZ enforced by the U.S. as illegal. The U.S. expanded the NFZ to the 36th parallel in 1996, but Iraq nonetheless maintained a substantial presence of ground troops and forces in the region.

In 1998, when the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) suspended its supervising activities, the Clinton administration adopted an "aggressive enforcement", under Operation Desert Fox. The no-fly zone became a part of the so-called "enhanced containment" of Iraq. This NFZ stood in stark contrast to the less credible “surveillance mission” under Operation Southern Watch. Soon after the implementation of Operation Desert Fox, in December, 1998, President Clinton sanctioned further changes in the ROE for U.S. aircraft operating in the NFZs, which allowed U.S. pilots to strike at any part of the Iraqi air defense system, not just those that directly target their aircraft. While France initially supported the NFZ, it withdrew its support and involvement in the northern as discussed earlier as well as in the southern no-fly zone. France whom at that point, disassociating itself from enforcing the NFZ, as the objective now had changed to more coercive measures of air strikes.

69 Ibid., p. 109.
70 Ibid., p. 120.
French officials guarded that the risk of spiraling in to a full-fledged air war could have serious humanitarian consequences. France urged instead that more limited coercive measures should be taken outlining in January of 1999 a proposal to the Security Council. The proposal broadly consisted of "preventative" measures rather than offensive strategies and "retrospective" control.

Despite this “turning of the screw”, as Alexander George would have labeled it, under Operation Desert Fox, Iraqi forces continued to violate the zone and continued to use both ground and air forces to attack the Shia’s. Between December, of 1998, and May, of 2000, coalition aircraft were directly threatened by Iraqi air defense forces on over 320 occasions and aircraft responded in self-defense on 74 occasions. The imposition of the NFZ was evidently not confined to the issue of protecting the civilians, but rather a political gesture and a signal to the Iraqi’s that the international community would respond.

4.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina

In the breakout of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan war in October of 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 781. Under the resolution a NFZ was authorized, under the name of Operation Sky Monitor, which applied to all military flights in Bosnian airspace. However, NATO forces where only allowed to monitor violations of the NFZ, without mandate to take military action against violators. By April of 1993, NATO forces had documented more than 500 violations in the zone and the UN had realized that Operation Sky Monitor was completely toothless. The ineffectual NFZ ultimately produced Resolution 816, which authorized more active measures by NATO forces under Operation Deny Flight, which lasted from April 12th, 1993, until December 20th, 1995.

Operation Deny Flight was initially implemented to enforce a NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The official mission statement was to conduct aerial monitoring and to enforce compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 816, which banned flights on fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, as the operation evolved, the objective of the NFZ became twofold. The UN also authorized NATO to fly additional missions providing close air support (CAS) to UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) on the ground and to protect UN designated safe areas. The stated political objective with Operation Deliberate Force, as described by Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton’s special envoy to the region, was to save as many lives as possible. Michal O. Beale, Major at the U.S. Air Force, noted that the implied political objective of the NFZ was to demonstrate the UN and NATO determination to stabilize the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. Meaning, the option of controlling the airspace would be the cleanest way to get NATO involved without exposing its troops to a hostile ground environment.

The twofold political objectives of the NFZ, conducting aerial monitoring with CAS and enforcing compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 816, became complex and unclear. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, whom argued that the NFZs purpose, instead became a tool to show the world that “we are ‘doing something’...” Just as the Ambassador had warned, the NFZ became a public relations success in the short-term, but a fiasco in the long-term as civilians were still not

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protected from the Serbian forces.\textsuperscript{79} In order to achieve both political objectives, the UN and NATO had to balance the non-provocative peacekeeping objective of the NFZ, while serving as support in monitoring the zones around several large cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The scholar, Richard Perry, noted that, "The inability to separate the two objectives contributed to a general feeling by the world press and political leadership in Washington that both the UN and NATO were ill-equipped and unprepared to handle such a complex crisis."\textsuperscript{80}

After Operation Deny Flight was put in place, Bosnia-Serbs initially reduced their violations, but did not end helicopter and fixed-wing flights within the prohibited zone. As NATO forces had no clear mandate to enforce the resolution with adequate rules of engagement (ROE), Bosnian, Serb and Croatian forces continued to repeatedly violate the ban. Despite an increased level of enforcement of coercive measures under the resolution, between April, of 1993, and January of 1994, there were over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone.\textsuperscript{81}

Furthermore, despite the reinforced role of the NFZ with objectives to reinforce the zone to include CAS for UN Protection Forces, in August 1995, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs had continued to consistently violate the NFZ. The UN had documented over 5,000 airspace violations, primarily by helicopters. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had killed or wounded over one hundred UNPROFOR soldiers and aid workers, and the Serbs had overrun three of the six designated safe areas. Serbs had also used UNPROFOR soldiers as human shields to guard against NATO air strikes.\textsuperscript{82}

Operation Deny Flight’s ROE required that the engaged fighter needed to physically observe the helicopter committing a hostile act in order to shoot it down.\textsuperscript{83} Flying in to the NFZ and violating the safe zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina was not enough justification to engage.\textsuperscript{84} The violators quickly learned NATO’s ROE, and as Michael Beale have highlighted, the Serbs “would play cat and mouse games with NATO. When intercepted, the violator would heed the warning to land but would wait until the interceptor left to continue on his flight.”\textsuperscript{85} The number of unauthorized helicopter flights climbed throughout Operation Deny Flight and by July 1995, the number of apparent violations since monitoring began in November, of 1992, had climbed to 5,711.

The major problem, however, with Operation Deny Flight, was supporting the ground component, as ground forces did not have enough authority to engage the enemy. Despite the coercive threat of an NFZ with reinforced ROE, such as CAS, clearly showed that it was not threatening enough to coerce Milosevic, particularly as the Srebrenica Massacre in July of 1995 took place within the NFZ. This

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{82} Byman, Daniel, and Waxman, Matthew \textit{Air Power as a Coercive Instrument}, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 12.
\bibitem{83} Ibid., p. 38.
\end{thebibliography}
arguably led to the realization that NFZs alone are anything but effective at saving lives, without a significantly strong ground component.\textsuperscript{86}

The multinational effort of Operation Deny Flight is often credited as a strength of the NFZ. However, one main setback with the multinational coalition was the “dual-key: coordination structure.”\textsuperscript{87} This complex command structure has been classified as “dual-key” because NATO strikes on violators required approval from both NATO and the UN at command level. Richard Holbrooke dubbed this approach “dual-veto” and noting that the delays in long process of asking for authorization often resulted in inaction. While the support from NATO, EU and the UN was there, the shortcoming was the cohesion of the coalition’s rules of engagement. The inadequate authority resulted in air forces not being able to assist in key situations.

The U.S. and its allies made burdensome command arrangements to ensure force was threatened and applied only up to a level that the coalition members as a whole could support. Divergent demands of major coalition members resulted in a compromise agreement, which placed severe restrictions on NATO’s use of force. The compromise resulted in that NATO could not strike preemptively at airfields or engage violating aircrafts into Serbian Airspace. The US was the most enthusiastic about using offensive air operations against the aggressor Serbs, NATO less enthusiastic, and the UN least enthusiastic of all.\textsuperscript{88}

### 4.4 Libya

On March 17\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) backed the resolution authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya and using all “all necessary measures”, with the ultimate goal to protect civilians. The Security Council authorized the use of limited force in order to protect civilians targeted by Qadhafi, his allied forces and mercenaries.\textsuperscript{89} On March 19\textsuperscript{th} Operation Odyssey Dawn began with deployment of U.S., British and French military assets under command of US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Resolution 1973 (2011) was adopted by a vote of 10 in favor to none against, with 5 abstentions, namely, Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia. The Council authorized member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, namely requesting them to immediately inform the Secretary-General of such measures.

Introducing the resolution, the Foreign Minister of France, Alain Juppé said at the UNSC that the urgent need to protect civilians could only be done through the resolution of implementing a NFZ,

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\textsuperscript{89} United Nations, ‘Security Council Approves, No-Fly Zone over Libya, authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions’, \textit{United Nations Security Council}, 6498\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, 2011. 
authorizing the Arab League and those Member States wishing to do so, to take all measures to protect areas that were being threatened by the Qadhafi regime. Juppé stressed that the objective was solely to protect civilians from further massacre.\footnote{United Nations, ‘Security Council Approves, No-Fly Zone over Libya, authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions’, \textit{United Nations Security Council}, 6498\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, 2011. \textless \url{http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm} \textgreater accessed 18 May, 2012.}

Historically, every NFZ operations with a humanitarian dimension have all ended only when ground forces have been introduced to conduct decisive, coercive measures against the adversary. Perhaps with this in mind, delegations of India, Germany and Brazil, stressed the need for peaceful resolution of the conflict and warned against unintended consequences of a NFZ, such as a full-scaled intervention. Brazil expressed that, with regards to the NFZ and the use of force, it would not lead to the realization of the UNSC objective of an immediate end of violence and the protection of civilians. Brazil, also concerned that the measures approved might lead to the unintended effect of exacerbating the tensions on the ground and might thus cause more harm than good to the very same civilians the coalition sought to protect.\footnote{Ibid.}

As for NATO’s role, only 14 of the 28 member countries supported the NFZ and actions to protect Libyan civilians from Quadhafi’s forces. Only six of them carried out air strikes and Germany positioned itself outside the Western consensus. Furthermore, Robert Gates, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, discussed several consequences of the UN and U.S.’s support of the NFZ, also criticizing "loose talk about some of these military options."\footnote{Sanger, David, ‘Gates Warns of Risks of a No-Flight Zone’, \textit{New York Times}, 2 March 2011. \textless \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/africa/03military.html?pagewanted=all} \textgreater accessed 18 May, 2012.} He argued that a no-fly zone would first require taking out Libyan air defenses, which would be an act of war. He also argued that it would be expensive to maintain, that it would drain resources from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that it would put the U.S. at war in a third Muslim country.\footnote{Ibid.}

As the NFZ extended throughout the country, not just over areas in which the fighting took place or where civilians were at risk, as was the case for the zones over Iraq, the extent to which the role the NFZ had expanded. While the NFZ served as a mean to “protect the civilians”, scholars such as Michael Schmitt have argued that “the broad geographical scope of the zone reveals the extent to which Resolution 1973 is targeted at crippling the Libyan government’s ability to operate militarily, rather than merely preventing aerial attacks on civilians.”\footnote{Schmitt, N. Michael, ‘Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-Fly Zone Rules of Engagement’, \textit{Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review}, 1998. \textless \url{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603799} \textgreater accessed 28 April, 2012.}

Despite skepticism by heads of state and military advisors, such as the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that a NFZ would entail a longer commitment, NATO took sole command of the NFZ under Operation Unified Protector on March 31\textsuperscript{st} and just five months later, after Quadhafi was captured and consequently killed, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced the end of a ‘successful’ mission while visiting Tripoli on October 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2011.

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\[91\] Ibid.


\[93\] Ibid.

5. Analysis and Discussions

5.1 Finding the Variables

At this juncture, it is crucial to establish variables for analytical assessment of the political successes and failures of NFZs, based on the theories of coercive diplomacy. There is no doubt, though, that understanding conditions of success and failure is a major theoretical and practical challenge. First, assessing the broad strategy of coercive diplomacy is tricky as the requirements for success are paradoxical: to succeed the coercer must both frighten with a credible threat and reassure the adversary at the same time, while restraining from the use of brute force. Second, George and Simons’ widely used definition of limited force concerns, “just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary.” As Jakobsen have argued, the problem is that it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what “just enough” or how much an “appropriate kind” really is.

While keeping this in mind, there is also a clear challenge when evaluating a single instrument in the diplomatic toolbox, as the contextual variables of the grand strategy of coercive diplomacy measures should also be taken into consideration. However, I argue that the political theoretical “success conditions” of the coercive diplomacy literature is fungible to use when assessing the outcomes of a military instrument, such as a NFZ, for two reasons. First, as NFZs have become a popular instrument in the toolbox of the coercive diplomatic approach as means to use limited force, a deeper understanding if NFZs are politically successful (and what they can and cannot achieve) in coercive diplomacy is crucial. Secondly, just as George and Simons’ was motivated by the failure of previous scholars, such as Schelling, to develop a policy-relevant theory of coercive diplomacy, I propose that a policy relevant framework of evaluating specific military instruments used when engaging in coercive diplomacy, such as NFZs, should be considered. As the coercive diplomacy literature has contributed to an abundance of theoretical “success variables”, which have been applied on many political instruments, such as economic sanctions and rhetorical threats, I argue that it is helpful to apply these variables on a military instrument and establish if we can assess what contributed to the successes and failures of NFZs.

Thus, throughout the assessment of each case study I will, in a deductive approach, follow Jakobsen’s four theoretical variables, which will be referred to for analytical and explanatory purposes, when assessing NFZs. Again, the variables are derived from the original set of contextual variables favoring success in coercive diplomacy as envisaged by Jakobsen’s updated version of George’s coercive diplomacy framework.

(1) a credible threat of force backed by the necessary capability*
(2) a deadline for compliance
(3) an assurance against future demands
(4) an offer of carrots for compliance

*When evaluating (1) a credible threat of force backed by the necessary capability, I will include an evaluation of the rules of engagement (ROE) and if they served as a necessary capability to adequately support the threat.

While Jakobsen’s revised, post-cold war framework, dubbed ideal policy, will be used as a basis, one can quickly evaluate each case and realize that Jakobsen’s compromised framework, with only four “success conditions”, do not help to assess the cases adequately enough and its political implications. For example, Jakobsen’s framework does not include the role that the clarity of the objective has, what the role of regional actors play, and whether there was a clear exit strategy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the obscure role of several objectives hindered the effectiveness of the NFZ, as well as its dual-key command structure. In both of the Iraq cases, the support of regional actors played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the uses, and thus its credibility. As Jakobsen’s framework does not provide full coverage of these other political dimensions, I suggest that three of George’s variables will be needed in order to better assess the political success conditions of NFZs. Variables, or success conditions, derived from George’s coercive diplomacy framework concerns the clarity of the objective, adequate domestic and international support, and clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis.

(1) clarity of the objective 
(2) strength of motivation 
(3) asymmetry of motivation 
(4) sense of urgency as perceived by the opponent 
(5) adequate domestic and international support 
(6) opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation 
(7) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis

At this point, it is helpful to explain the exclusion of George and Simons’ remaining four conditions. George argued that not all seven of the conditions appear to be equally important for the success of coercive diplomacy efforts. The three that seem to have significance for influencing the outcome have to do with the opponent’s perception, concerning; the asymmetry of motivation, the time urgency and the opponents fear of escalation. All of these conditions are perceptions held by leaders of the state that is being subjected to coercive diplomacy. As George notes, an analysis rests on the psychological variables on adversary’s heads of state, which requires extensive elaboration. The fact also introduces considerable uncertainty into efforts of understanding the perceptions of the opponent. Furthermore, the scope of Jakobsen’s variables takes Georges remaining conditions somewhat into account and is essentially just reformulated based on George’s original conditions. For example, Jakobsen’s first point of a credible threat of swift military defeat, implies two subset’s of George’s components: mainly, the strength of the motivation, meaning that the threat is credible enough if states are motivated enough to pursue the threat and the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation; meaning that the opponent sees the threat as credible and thus fears the escalation of those threats. Furthermore, George’s variable of sense of urgency as perceived by the opponent, is also included in Jakobsen’s updated success condition concerning the deadline for compliance.

98 George L. Alexander, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1991, p. 76-80
The principal advantage of combining Jakobsen’s and George and Simons’ variables, lies in the ability to more clearly pinpoint the political sources of success and failures more accurately concerning NFZs. Generals such as Clausewitz have encouraged policymakers to recognize that there is a political purpose to every aspect of military force, regardless of its objectives, intensity or duration. Following Clausewitz’s thinking that, when assessing military activities it is necessary to assess the politically contextual variables, which George originally contributed with.

Thus, the framework of assessing NFZs, with its conditional “success components”, which will be evaluated if they are present or not, are:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>A clear objective (George)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>A credible threat was conveyed (Jakobsen)</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>A deadline for compliance was created (Jakobsen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>An assurance against future demands (Jakobsen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>An offer of incentives for compliance was made (Jakobsen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Adequate support from regional/international powers (George)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement (George)</td>
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While assessing the empirical material of the NFZ, I encountered that an additional condition concerning whether there is a political identity which supports the use of force, is present or not. For example, as in the case of Iraq’s Southern Watch, the French’s attitude and commitment to the NFZ changed when the U.S. proposed additional use of force, as its normative principles towards actions other than limited force did not support such an option. Or as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the normative principles between UN and NATO led to two different types of attitudes of how much force to use, as the UN wanted to keep the NFZ as a strict humanitarian intervention, whereas the U.S. and NATO encouraged more coercive measures to achieve the objectives. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend the success conditions and limits of NFZs, one must understand the political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force. As Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein have argued in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, that the view of more coercive types of force are manifold and cannot be explained by material or rationalist factors alone. Rather ideational and cultural factors are necessary to account for when evaluating states perceptions on the use of limited force. Thus, following the argument of Katzenstein’s point on culture, norms and identity in world politics, I will expand the coercive diplomacy’s framework with an additional variable formulated as:

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<td>8.</td>
<td>A political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force (Katzenstein)</td>
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In order to assess the cases, each “success condition” of Jakobsen and George and Simons’ framework, in addition to the expanded variable, will be posed as a statement. The analytical tool will thus capture whether the conditions where “addressed”, “inadequately addressed” or “not addressed”.

Thus, the analytical tool for assessing if the “conditions for success” where addressed or not is posed and rephrased to a statement as follows:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>A clear objective was established (George)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>A credible threat, with adequate ROE, was conveyed (Jakobsen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>A deadline for compliance was created (Jakobsen)</td>
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</table>
4. An assurance against future demands  
5. The NFZ was coupled with positive incentives  
6. Adequate support from regional/international powers was present  
7. A political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force was present  
8. The purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was clear at all times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions for Success</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An assurance against future demands</td>
<td>Jakobsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NFZ was coupled with positive incentives</td>
<td>Jakobsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate support from regional/international powers was present</td>
<td>George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force was present</td>
<td>Proposed variable, derived from Katzenstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was clear at all times</td>
<td>George</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Illustrating the NFZ Cases with the “Conditions for Success”

What follows is a discussion and analysis of each case with the selected conditions for success as mentioned above.

5.2.1 Analysis of Northern Iraq

The objectives of the U.S. humanitarian assistance plan, Operation Provide Comfort I and the enforcement of the NFZ, was to provide relief to the refugees, and to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort. The Bush administration and policymakers claimed that the NFZ would serve as an integral instrument in the containment policy. Furthermore, while the NFZ successfully coerced Hussein from using extensive airpower, it did not stop him from terrorizing the Kurds with ground troops.

Initially, the NFZ, was not enough of a credible threat, with adequate ROE, as Hussein demonstrated his defiance in the regional Kurdish elections of May in 1992, where he sent in masses of ground forces to threaten the civilian population. Hussein’s escalation of his defiance in December of 1992, when an Iraqi fighter entered the NFZ in which a U.S. combat aircraft had to shoot it down and as a result also led to stricter emphasis of the coalition’s threats and ROE with regards to violators of the NFZ. U.S. air crews and command elements on the AWACS were given much more authority to respond to Iraqi violations or to threats from ground-based defenses. General Shalikashvili, the CTF commander, argued that the stricter rules of engagement permitted more flexibility in its responses to violations and thus made the NFZ a more credible threat.

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman noted that the coercive threats of the NFZ, contributed to the successful credibility of U.S. containment of Iraq, as Iraq’s regional influence remained limited. The authors argued that because of a robust U.S. regional presence, with a strictly enforced NFZ with adequate ROE and a willingness to use limited coercive force when necessary, convinced Saddam that regional aggression would not produce results. The NFZ and the presence of international humanitarian staff may have deterred the Iraqi regime from trying to retake the northern region. However, as a protection mechanism it had considerable limitations as Hussein continued to harm civilians.

As for the deadline for compliance, the U.S., Britain and France whom had asserted that a NFZ was taken under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 688, followed the UN’s demands to comply, but never demanded a deadline for compliance nor did they provide an assurance against future

100 United Nations, Security Council Approves, No-Fly Zone over Libya, authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions, United Nations Security Council, 6498th Meeting.

101 Ibid.
demands. As for the coercive threats with positive incentives, the U.S. failed to offer Iraq a credible promise to lift the NFZ in return for full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. Instead, the U.S. scaled up its efforts to overthrow the Iraqi leader.\(^\text{102}\)

The international and regional support was limited. While the combined effect of Hussein’s refusal to comply with Resolution 687, persuaded international and regional actors, in addition to the U.S., to turn the screw and take limited coercive action in order to compel Hussein. However, Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Turkey, rejected the coercive air strikes proposed by President Bush. As an alternative to coercive behavior, the coalition forces imposed the NFZ, which became heavily dependent on the NATO infrastructure available in Turkey. While Ankara’s support initially was tolerant, the Turkish parliament became unenthusiastic about allowing the use of Incirlik air base for U.S.’s offensive air operations within the NFZ. Thus, the political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a state’s action of limited force, was limited as they became concerned about the political risks of putting Incirlik at the disposal of U.S. forces (i.e., beyond Northern Watch and NATO tasks) and only became tolerable in relation to operations aimed at producing the political goal of security and regime in Baghdad.\(^\text{103}\)

The purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was arguably not clear at all times. Considering the time span of the NFZ, from 1991 until the U.S. invasion in 2003, there was arguably an unpredictability of the NFZ and its exit strategies. Unless it is beneficial to contain the adversary for an undetermined amount of time, policymakers must be aware of the dangers of a perpetual patrol of the zone as they risk complicating the achievement of the long-term strategic political goals.\(^\text{104}\)

### Table 1: Summary of the No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq

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<td>1. A clear objective was established</td>
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<td>2. A credible threat, with adequate ROE, was conveyed</td>
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The NFZ in Northern Iraq, in this case, were a mixed success in achieving one of the political objectives of protecting the Kurds in the north. The NFZ symbolized a measure of political recognition of the Kurds, as a sign of commitment to protect them and it contained the airspace. However, it did not effectively coerce Hussein as he continued with his terror attacks on the Kurds. Despite the liberal set of ROE, under the enforcement with the U.S.’s whose political identity allows more coercive measures, the U.S. was constrained by Turkey’s reluctance to engage in more offensive measures. One argument that points to a partial success is that the U.S. reserved the measures of the NFZ to limited force, as coercive diplomacy prescribes. However, as the NFZ only contained the airspace and left Hussein unharmed and in power, it did not tackle the origin of the problem. Ultimately then, the NFZ hampered the accomplishment of the U.S. original policy goals.

5.2.2 Analysis of Southern Iraq

During the Bush Administration, the NFZ served three major objectives. The first objective was to protect the Shia populated areas and to prevent Iraq aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd in to the zone. The second political objective of the NFZ served as a form of tactical intelligence gathering. These two broad objectives later changed from humanitarianism and intelligence gathering to containment and regime change during the Clinton Administration in 1998 in which openly promoted regime change.

As for the containment policy, the Clinton administration considered that a limited coercive tool, such as an NFZ, served as critical instrument to reach the political objectives. “The no-fly zones have been and will remain an important part of our containment policy." President Clinton further explained that,

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106 Ibid., p. 34.
"...because we effectively control the skies over much of Iraq, Saddam has been unable to use air power to repress his own people or to lash out again at his neighbors."^108

Both the Bush and Clinton administration objective with the NFZ was to protect civilian populations and that they were part of an international policy of "containing Iraq" that protected its neighbors from attack. However, the three political objectives of humanitarianism, containment and regime change have a mixed success in making a demand with a clear political objective. Enforcing a unilateral NFZ that would serve for a mixed range of objectives can arguably be labeled as an unclear objective, particularly as the rhetoric of the objective and real intentions displays a considerable gap. As many wondered what the purpose of a NFZ would be, considering that Hussein focus on ground forces, a senior Bush official addressed the concern stating that one of the effects of enforcing an NFZ, is to deny him the attribute of sovereignty, which psychologically would put pressure on the dictator.\(^{109}\)

As George and Simons have highlighted, the complexity and flexibility of coercive diplomacy varies in each situation. In some instances it is advantageous to not make ones demands specific and precise, as it allows for policymakers to be flexible with its political objectives.\(^{110}\) Even though the stated objectives were flexible it never actually contributed anything to the safety of the civilian population. In fact, the role assigned to the mission was to observe violations, not to stop them.

A credible threat, with adequate ROE, was not conveyed, despite the U.S. reference to the UNSC Resolution 688, and its protection using “all necessary means” as a justification of the NFZ, as the role of the NFZ was simply to “observe” violations, not to stop them. At first, Iraq complied with the no-fly restriction, but Hussein began challenging Southern Watch operations already in November, of 1992, such as Hussein’s MiG Foxbat whom had locked his air-to-air radar on a U.S. F-16 patrolling the zone, and the issue of a bounties to anyone being able to take down a U.S. aircraft.

In 1998, the UN inspectors suspended its supervising activities and the Clinton administration adopted an aggressive enforcement with more credible threats of the NFZ as part of its so-called "enhanced containment" of Iraq. Soon after Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, President Clinton sanctioned changes in the ROE for U.S. aircraft operating in the NFZs, which allowed US pilots to strike at any part of the Iraqi air defense system, not just those that directly target their aircraft.\(^{111}\) Despite the “turning of the screw”, as George and Simons’ would have labeled the situation, Iraq forces continued to violate the zone. Between December of 1998, and May of 2000, Iraqi air defense forces directly threatened coalition aircraft on over 320 occasions and aircraft responded in self-defense on 74 occasions.\(^{112}\)

An assurance against future demands was never fully addressed. While the U.S. and the UN warned Hussein to remove missiles that threatened pilots flying Southern Watch missions, they never provided an assurance that if the Iraqis’ honored the NFZ, sanctions would be removed. Hussein ignored the


\(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 36.


threats, condemning the NFZ enforced by the U.S. as illegal.\textsuperscript{113} As a result, the U.S. expanded the NFZ to the 36\textsuperscript{th} parallel in 1996, but Iraq nonetheless maintained a substantial presence of ground troops and forces in the region.\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{A deadline for compliance was created}, indirectly through the U.N Security Council’s Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq “…remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.”\textsuperscript{115} While the resolution never specifically endorsed a NFZ, the U.S. and its ally, the U.K., claimed that the basis lies within the UN resolution and considered that the precise legal basis was “…the justification for the No-Fly Zones remains that of overwhelming humanitarian necessity in that, without our deployment, a severe humanitarian crisis would in all probability recur.” Arguably, by adapting the resolution’s core ingredient, the sense of immediacy was created in the establishment of the zone and created a perception that that the condition was critical.

However, under the Clinton administration's policy of "containment" of Iraq, both no-fly zones became part of the vague objective to "keep up the pressure on Saddam." This political pressure was used to create a perception that compliance was critical. While a credible sense of urgency for compliance was created, it boomeranged, just as Alexander George have warned. George and Simons had noted that creating a sense of urgency often encourages a desperate opponent to initiate war in preference to accepting onerous demands. While Saddam’s regime refrained from using airpower against the Shia’s and coalition forces residing within the NFZ, it did not deter him from deploying ground forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, \textit{the NFZ was not coupled with positive incentives}, which arguably might not have been a decisive factor. Particularly as Hussein dispatched 70,000 troops and 1,000 tanks toward the Kuwait border, in October of 1994, which left the Clinton administration with no choice but to send in 36,000 troops to counter Hussein’s defiance. The U.S., who led the NFZ, did not have \textit{adequate support from regional and international powers}. Most regional partners cared little about the fate of Iraq’s Shiite populations. Some even preferred that Hussein consolidate his hold on power rather than risk fracturing the country.\textsuperscript{116} Initially, the U.S. had strong support from France and the U.K., whom had argued that its legality stemmed from the UN Security Resolution 688. The French had even stressed the “humanitarian objectives with the NFZ. As a result of the shooting down several Iraqi aircrafts in response to Iraqi violations, as well as air strikes made on the anti-aircraft missiles which Hussein had placed within the zones, during the early days of the Clinton Administration, France and Britain’s support of enforcing the zone weakened. While the U.S. favored a more robust coercive air strategy, Britain and France resisted, arguing for limited coercion. Turkey, which provided key airbases, supporting the NFZ enforcement, also worried that an extended conflict could escalate to its own crisis involving separatists Kurds, if the U.S. pursued the more coercive measures. Other Arab states also feared increasing coercive backlashes, with the intensified U.S. efforts in the zone and urged Washington to call off further air strikes.

While the UN never endorsed the southern NFZ, the U.S. and the U.K. argued that the NFZ stemmed from the UN Resolutions, and based its argument on humanitarian necessity and the need to uphold Resolution 688. The fervent argumentation of the legality of the zone shows that the need to gain international support and legitimacy was crucial for the coalition partners. However, the erosion of coalition support exposed the difficulty of enforcing a cohesive international coalition supporting a NFZ with strict rules of engagement. Alexander George argued that international support (or lack thereof) is important in some cases and in others, not so much. While the U.S. could easily adopt strict coercive measures, they also contemplated the dilemma of maintaining coalition support.

*A political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force* was present, in the case of the U.S., but not so much within the British or French government. In the British parliament, decision makers recognized that the precise legal basis for the NFZs were controversial but noted that “we have no doubt that U.K. participation in the NFZ operations over Iraq is justified on moral and humanitarian grounds.” The British Ministry of Defense justified it as “... the justification for the No Fly Zones remains that of overwhelming humanitarian necessity in that, without our deployment, a severe humanitarian crisis would in all probability recur.”  

While France initially supported the NFZ, it withdrew its support and involvement in the southern no-fly zone in December of 1998. The U.S. and the U.K. had authorized Operation Desert Fox, a four-day air campaign against targets all over Iraq, as an initial wave of strike aircraft against the Iraqi forces. France, whom at that point disassociating themselves from enforcing the NFZ, argued that the ‘humanitarian component’ of the operation no longer existed. French officials guarded that the risk of spiraling in to a full-fledged air war could would have serious humanitarian consequences. France urged instead that more limited coercive measures should be taken outlining in January of 1999 a proposal to the Security Council. The proposal broadly consisted of "preventative" measures rather than offensive strategies and "retrospective" control.

Lastly, as in the case of the Northern Zone, the purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was not clear at all times, arguably as the objectives changed from containment to regime change and it was not until the 2003 invasion in which the NFZ was suspended.

**Table 2: Summary of the No-Fly Zone in Southern Iraq**

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<tr>
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<td>3. A deadline for compliance was created</td>
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<td>x</td>
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</table>


4. An assurance against future demands & x
5. The NFZ was coupled with positive incentives & x
6. Adequate support from regional /international powers was present & x
7. A political identity, with normative principles, that guides and accepts a states action of limited force was present (Mixed: U.S. yes U.K. no France no) & x
8. The purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was clear at all times & x (Initially, yes, after 1998, no.)

Looking at the success conditions, and with the case at hand, one can argue that the political goals of the NFZ were a failure. The first two years of the NFZ had some effects of coercing Hussein, as the NFZ had relatively routine patrolling with no major violation. However, as the motivation to comply degraded, Hussein began to increasingly violate the zones, also claiming its illegality. The U.S. sought to continue, and at times increase pressure on the dictator, particularly after he threw out UN weapons inspectors in 1998. When Bill Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox, a four-day air campaign of brute force in the southern zone, there was arguably a failure of the coercive diplomacy components of the NFZ. As a result France eventually ended its military efforts, as its political identity would not support such brute force measures, it also made the credibility of the NFZ much weaker.\(^{119}\) Furthermore, while NFZs have the objective of coercing states and used as a limited tool in humanitarian operations, such as the one in Northern Iraq, it did not prove useful in containing Hussein or providing security for the Kurds.

5.2.3 Analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The mission objective of the NFZ under Operation Deny Flight was to conduct aerial monitoring and to enforce compliance with the UN Resolution 816, which banned flights on fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, as the operation evolved, the objective of the NFZ evolved, as NATO would fly additional missions providing close air support (CAS) to UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) on the ground.\(^{120}\) The implied political objective with the NFZ, as described of by Richard Holbrooke,

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President Clinton’s special envoy to the region, was to save as many lives as possible. The objectives of the NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina served multiple purposes, thus making it unclear what the real purpose was. While the UN wanted to maintain a degree of impartiality and restrained the use of force to threaten violators, it faced tremendous political scrutiny from the U.S., and Europe, as NATO forces became unable to pursue the objectives. The UN’s restraints to engage coercively with violators stemmed from the impartiality of the UN were to shoot down an aircraft, it would taint their reputation. Clearly UN’s political identity, with normative principles, did not allow for such actions as limited force on violators. The need to protect the image or the political identity, thus turned the NFZ in to a simple observe and “do-nothing” approach.

A credible threat, with adequate ROE, was clearly not conveyed. While the UN Resolution 781, passed on March 21st, 1993, established “a ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, NATO forces had no clear mandate to enforce the credibility of the threat of the resolution with adequate ROE. Operation Deny Flight’s ROE required that the engaged fighter needed to physically observe the helicopter committing a hostile act in order to shoot it down. Flying in to the NFZ and violating the safe zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina was not enough justification to engage. The violators quickly learned NATO’s ROE, the Serbs “would play cat and mouse” games with NATO. Despite an increased level of the role of the NFZ with CAS to UNPROFOR and other coercive measures under the resolution on violators, between April of 1993 and January of 1994, there were over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone. By August 1995, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs had consistently violated the NFZ. The UN had documented over 5,000 airspace violations, primarily by Serbian helicopters. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had killed or wounded over 100 UNPROFOR soldiers and aid workers, and the Serbs had overrun three of the six designated safe areas.

In order for NFZs to be effective at achieving the political objectives and seem as a credible threat, they need sufficient mandate from policymakers of using force in order to uphold the zone and thus, seem credible to coerce an adversary’s behavior. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, two major problems with establishing adequate ROE surfaced. First, the ROE differed between UN and NATO forces, and second, both coalitions ROE ran counter to states national policy preferences. The process of establishing ROE for NFZs requires sensitivity to the distinction between purpose and means. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NFZ was nothing more than the means to states national, and international organizations purpose to provide humanitarian relief and to keep feuding parties apart. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this fine, yet critical distinction of establishing a credible threat with a clear objective became lost in the rush to design a NFZ with ROE that would be supported by both UN and NATO

and coalition members. The measure for failure was not the extent to which violations occurred, but rather the ROE of the operations execution with its underlying political purpose. Even the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at that time, Madeleine Albright, admitted: "We voted to enforce no-fly zones, but the Serbs violated them hundreds of times without paying a significant price." In practice, while NATO declared an NFZ, it lacked the political will to actually enforce it.

The UN Resolution sent a clear signal that a **deadline for compliance was created**, and that Milosevic adhere to the resolution immediately.\(^{128}\) Neither Operation Sky Monitor, nor Operation Deny Flight was coupled with positive incentives, or **an assurance against future demands**. As Jakobsen have noted, effective coercion occurs when it is coupled with positive incentives and assurance against future demands. Once this is understood, one can use the insights provided by prospect theory, psychological theories, and area specialists to put together a package of positive incentives and assurances that may increase the likelihood that a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached.\(^{129}\) Whereas Deny Flight was generally ineffective in its mission, Deliberate Force was, in the words of US Secretary of DEFense William Perry, "the absolutely crucial step in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton, leading to the peace agreement." It was arguably, not until after the Dayton talks, which NATO and UN provided the assurances.

Adequate support from regional /international powers was present, as it was a multinational effort. However, despite the presence of this condition, one main setback with the multinational coalition was the dual-key coordination structure.\(^{130}\) This complex command structure was classified as dual-key because NATO strikes on violators required approval from both NATO and the UN at command level. The shortcoming with the cohesion of the coalition’s rules of engagement of the NFZ, resulted in a weaker credibility if the threat as the inadequate authority resulted in air forces not being able to assist in key situations. These burdensome command arrangements to ensure force was threatened and applied, was only up to a level that the coalition members as a whole could support.

These divergent demands of major coalition members, based off the **political identity, which that guides and accepts a states action of limited force**, resulted in a compromise agreement, which placed severe restrictions on NATO’s use of force. The compromise resulted in that NATO could not strike preemptively at airfields or engage violating aircrafts into Serbian Airspace.

While the US was the most enthusiastic about using offensive air operations, NATO was less enthusiastic, and the UN least enthusiastic of all. The different cultures and the normative beliefs on the use of limited force among states and organizations was a notable factor in the Bosnian NFZ. Not only did the different level of member’s commitment, willingness to engage against violators and divergent interest limit the role of the NFZ, but NATO was also guided by the many different normative principles on the use of force against violators, which severely restricted their ability to enforce the NFZ. These different normative principles on engaging with enemy aircraft, reduced NATO’s flexibility and it damaged the credibility of the threat of enforcing the NFZ. As Byman and

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Waxman have noted, the constraints policymakers set on its own military operations can be more binding than those imposed by adversaries.  

Lastly, the purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was not clear at all times. Operation Sky Monitor and Operation Deny Flight escalated from primarily a deterrent operation towards a more coercive use of airpower. It later escalated into Operation Deliberate Force, a two-week bombing campaign designed to lift the siege of Sarajevo. As a coercive threat, Operation Deny Flight initially worked well under these circumstances, but as the strategies changed, the deterrence threshold rose. Furthermore, the UN and NATO’s unclear purpose of the NFZ and the inconsistencies in responding to violations underscored the lack of an internationally unified and resolute political stance, with a clear purpose and exit strategy, thus doing little to discourage or deter the Serbs.

Table 3: Summary of the No-Fly Zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Assessment</th>
<th>Addressed</th>
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In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, only one conditional factor was present and despite the threats of an NFZ with reinforced ROE, such as CAS, was clearly not credible enough to coerce Milosevic.  

particularly as the Srebrenica Massacre in July of 1995 took place within the NFZ. This arguably led to the realization that NFZ’s alone are anything but effective in achieving the political objectives, without a significantly strong coalition with adequate ROE and finally, a strong ground component.  

5.2.4 Analysis of Libya

*A clear objective was established* on March 17th, 2011, when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) backed the resolution authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya and using all “all necessary measures”, with the ultimate goal to protect civilians. The Council’s objectives were clear: to protect Libyan civilians with all necessary means. Introducing the resolution, the Foreign Minister of France, Alain Juppé said at the UNSC that the urgent need to protect the civilians could only be done through the resolution of implementing a NFZ, authorizing the Arab League and those Member States wishing to do so, to take all measures to protect areas that were being threatened by the Quadhafi regime.

*A credible threat, with adequate ROE, was conveyed,* as the UNSC had authorized the use of force, including enforcement of a no-fly zone, in order to protect civilians targeted by Quadhafi, his allied forces and mercenaries. Just the mere threat of establishing the NFZ initially served as a credible threat. Immediately after the UNSC Resolution, which authorized the NFZ, the Libyan foreign minister announced an offer to negotiate a ceasefire with the rebels. As George and Simon have argued, the process authorizing enforcement must be responsive and efficient with adequate ROE that allows for swift action. A NFZ without a robust mandate and timely force is open to challenge. Without the right mandate and ROE a NFZ lacks teeth and policy value, as it turned out to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of Libya, however, the Quadhafi regime did not breach the NFZ, as adequate ROE against violators was established, and arguably, deemed as a credible threat. After much deliberation at the UNSC regarding the ROE of the NFZ, a mandate with adequate ROE for aircraft policing of enforcing the zone was implemented.

*An assurance against future demands* was implied that the NATO forces, would in fact, cease the NFZ and economic sanctions only with the condition that Quadhafi immediately comply with a ceasefire. The adequate support for the NFZ from regional and international powers was present with support from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Even though some of the major states were skeptical to the NFZ, mainly Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia, and India, whom had warned against unintended consequences of armed intervention, it did not weaken the credibility and implementation of the NFZ.

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134 ‘UN authorizes no-fly zone over Libya’, *Al-Jazeera*, March, 18th, 2011.  
The political identity, with normative principles, that allowed action of limited force was mixed. Despite the limited political will in the U.S. regarding the mission in general and the NFZ in Libya, the U.S. sent a clear message to Quadhafi regarding the willingness to extend the limited use of force, as Obama said:

"Let me be clear, these terms are not negotiable. These terms are not subject to negotiation. If Quadhafi does not comply with the resolution, the international community will impose consequences. The resolution will be enforced through military action."

Brazil, on the other hand, was concerned that the measures of the NFZ might have the unintended effect of exacerbating the current tensions on the ground, leading to more use of force and in the end "causing more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting". Furthermore, in Sweden, one could argue that the extent that the Swedish parliament’s half-measure engagement, of only allowing surveillance measures for humanitarian purposes within the zone, was because of the political identity, and historically normative principles of not engaging in more coercive measures.

The purpose of the NFZ and exit strategies was clear at all times, the coalition forces were vocal about the two objectives with the NFZ, mainly protecting civilians and precipitating regime change, but being against any form of ground troops. The exit strategy among the coalition forces was carefully calibrated, once these two objectives where achieved. As Micah Zenko have noted, when addressing the objective of protection, there was little evidence that Libya had used air power against civilians, but rather attacked the civilians from the ground. Thus, the purpose of NFZ would have little or no impact in protecting the vulnerable. Zenko also noted that, just as what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pilots enforcing the NFZ would be in the position of remaining isolated, watching the killings from above.

Table 4: Summary of the No-Fly Zone in Libya

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<td>3. A deadline for</td>
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In the case of the Libya NFZ, most of the success conditions were present and arguably, out of the four NFZ cases, it proved to be the most successful implementation, mainly as the threat of force was credible enough to coerce Quadhafi’s forces from entering the zone and it did not escalate to more coercive measures. It did serve as a coercive threat against using airpower, however it did not coerce the Quadhafi forces from attacking civilians on the ground.

5.3 Conclusion of Analysis

Based on this analysis and reflecting on the problem statement; *are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of NFZs?*, I argue that it is reasonable to induce the conditions of success from the coercive diplomacy literature when evaluating the political outcome of a single military instrument, such as a NFZ. Nevertheless, as the success conditions based of the coercive diplomacy literature did not provide sufficient depth, an additional variable, was proposed as a condition necessary for success. I argue that the additional condition, derived from Katzenstein’s notion of considering states political identity and norms, which thus either supports the option of limited force or not, is a necessary condition to include. Meaning, the difference of the perception on the uses of military force, and when imposing a NFZ, is a decisive factor for its success. In Libya for example, it was not a greater deal for the U.S. to deploy its military and engage in more coercive measures against violators, as their past history of NFZs in Iraq and cultural identity with normative principles, perhaps allows for such measures; whereas in Germany, such measures would not be supported, arguably because of the respective states political identity and perception on the use of force. The way states project ones national desires and capabilities are crucial to keep in mind when enforcing an NFZ. As we saw in Iraq, France withdrew its support as the U.S. offensive measures within the NFZs were not seen as a “humanitarian component” in which French policymakers had draped the NFZ in. Likewise, Sweden, during the Libya intervention, supported the humanitarian notion of the NFZ and provided surveillance capabilities, but would not support the option of more
coercive or brute measures. By adding this variable we can also addresses states perspectives, definitions and thresholds states have on the use of limited. Thus, the importance of this variable is that the interstate relations in the affairs of international security are seemingly most driven by domestic politics and are also to some degree socially constructed.  

Furthermore, two broader concluding points concerns the credibility of the threat and the notion of international support. Firstly, the credibility of the threat as George and Simons have argued, essentially depends on capability and will. The coener must at a minimum have the military capability to execute its threat, which was present in all of the NFZ. The credibility though, varied in Southern Iraq, Northern Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, partly because adequate ROE were not present. Thus, issuing threats of force within the NFZ on violators cannot be deemed credible if policy makers do not allow for adequate ROE that allows for appropriate actions against violators. ROE are particularly important to assess as they represent the intersection of political decision-making, rule of international law, and operational concerns.  

It is also crucial to address and keeping in Jakobsen’s emphasis on the contextual consideration concerning international coalitions. While the UN is just a degree of consensus that can be achieved among its most powerful members at any one time, it often has many restrictions to the ROE and thus may lose its credibility, as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, the U.S.’s dilemma of pursuing the NFZ in Northern Iraq, without international support, portrays the difficulties with unilateral uncertainties. Acting in a concerted action with the international community to enforce the NFZs was important, but not equally as critical as it was in Libya. This supports Jakobsen’s point of the growing importance of coalition cohesion and the contextual factors in the post-cold war environment.  

6. Discussion and Implications of Main Findings  

6.1 Summary  

This paper has evaluated the political conditions of success of no-fly zones through the framework of coercive diplomacy. The methodological approach to deductively apply the theoretical success conditions of Jakobsen’s update coercive diplomacy theory, on four cases where NFZs have been implemented in humanitarian peace operations, consisted of:  

(1) a credible threat of force backed by the necessary capability  
(2) a deadline for compliance  
(3) an assurance against future demands  
(4) an offer of carrots for compliance  

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However, as Jakobsen’s revised framework was seemingly not comprehensive enough when evaluating the political successes and failures of the military instrument of NFZs, I proposed that three of George’s original success conditions are necessary when evaluating each case in order to get a more holistic perspective. The conditions included in the framework of the analysis are the:

- **(5) clarity of the objective**
- **(6) adequate domestic and international support**
- **(7) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis**

Furthermore, while assessing each case, an additional condition, in which the theories of coercive diplomacy did not fully cover; I proposed an expansion of the theory by adding a variable concerning the political identity and normative principles that guides a state’s action.

Thus, the research question posed of whether the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy is sufficient to explain the political success of NFZs or not, is an initial assessment that the application of the conditions are possible and the political objectives of NFZs can be assessed, if we combine Jakobsen’s revised framework with the original work of Alexander George, in addition to the variable proposed.

### 6.2 Reflections on Research Challenges and its Implication

“We should prepare for the many problems that lie ahead, on a road we have traveled before.”

– Daniel Byman

Recognizing that research within in the field of coercive diplomacy requires a modest approach, this paper has sought to articulate the fungibility of the uses of the theoretical success conditions as a means to illustrate that it is possible to apply the theoretical success conditions on a single military instrument, if we expand the framework.

However, a reflection on a broader research challenge and limitation must be addressed concerning the theoretical approach of this paper. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman have warned students of coercive diplomacy not to focus on one instrument of coercive diplomacy in isolation, but rather, considering the effects of several instruments in combination. They argue that scholars such as Robert Pape and his critical assessment on the use of airpower in Iraq and Kosovo have contributed to an erroneous assessment in the value of particular instruments of coercive diplomacy. While Byman and Waxman present a valid point on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, I have proposed that there is still value in this approach. The results in this paper suggest that military instruments employed in coercive diplomacy can be evaluated in isolation if appropriate variables for assessment are established and if a baseline for evaluating success is drawn. While military components of coercive diplomacy must be understood in context, not in isolation, a detailed assessment of a specific military capability through the coercive diplomacy framework can provide useful insights to its effectiveness and which political conditions that contributes to its success or failure. Furthermore, as NFZs have become an increasingly attractive option for Western leaders in

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147 Ibid., p. 4.
peace operations as a political symbol with a means to “do something”, a more detailed overview with appropriate analytical framework that can assess the conditions for success or failure is helpful.

Hence, from an academic perspective, this paper fits in with a large body of scholarly work on coercive diplomacy and the debate whether one can assess a specific coercive instrument with the variables of coercive diplomacy, or not. From a policy relevance perspective, as NFZs continue to be an attractive tool and frequently discussed amongst policymakers, a deeper understanding for when they work and why is of value to the debate of the NFZ usage in peace operations. Examining specifically one component of coercive diplomacy stems from a general observation that even though NFZs have had a mixed record of being unsuccessful at achieving their political objectives, policymakers continue to enthusiastically propose and support the option. As this is the case, understanding how, why and under what circumstances NFZs turn out to be successful is important to investigate.148

6.3 Suggestions for Future Research

There is arguably a weakness in having variables of equal importance, when perhaps one variable is seemingly more crucial than others. The three conditions, which according to Alexander George’s argument in Forceful Persuasion, Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, have particular significance for influencing the outcome, are conditions which have to do with the perceptions held by leaders of the state that is being subjected to coercive diplomacy. The three conditions include:

(1) the asymmetry of motivation,
(2) the time urgency, and,
(3) the opponents fear of escalation.149

As George have discussed, an analysis rests on the psychological variables of the adversary’s heads of state, which requires extensive psychological elaboration. By doing an “operational code” analysis on the heads of state in each case, can we distill more in depth how they perceived the threat of a no-fly zone and find additional explanations for behaviors of compliance or defiance?

7. References

**Literature and Articles**


**Official Documents and Reports**


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