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Writer		Program
Li SKARING		OP 09-12
Tutor		Number Of Pages: 60
JP HANON		Security classification: Unclassified
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Doctrinal descriptions of Stabilization

Same challenge- different articulations in Swedish and French doctrines

Abstract

The Swedish armed forces' doctrinal documents are currently under review, where the Doctrine for Land Forces will together with the doctrines for Navy and Air force be reissued into one common operative doctrine 2013. This essay can be seen as a possible interjection in order to facilitate the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine, by analyzing doctrinal articulated descriptions and know-hows from the French Army in the context of stability operations. Since, what fundamentally differentiates stabilization from the pacification operations of the past is the end state where the local authorities and population retake the ownership of their country.

The research question is: *How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents view on stabilization be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?*

The result of the essay shows that the studied doctrines can be characterized in the overall level of a general consensus regarding the main principles of stabilization and stability operations: the initial control of environment, the support and assistance to the population and other actors, the reviving of the social and juridical structures, and the continuation towards peace where the forces can withdraw.

The French doctrines contain a significant higher level of details regarding the tactical methods and principles, such as the Oil spots, Quadrillage, Force and Influence ratio, and the measures for how the actual re-construction and re-building should take place. This compared to the Swedish doctrinal document that mainly involves the initial stages of intervention and laying the foundations for further development. The gap between these phases and the desired end-state of peace is vaguely described, which can be characterized as a major difference.

Keywords: *Doctrines, Stabilization, Stability operations, Counterinsurgency, Interoperability.*

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Table of content

1.	Introduction.....	6
1.1	BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE	7
1.2	AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	8
1.3	DISPOSITION	8
1.4	RESEARCH MATERIAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW	9
1.5	DEMARCATIONS.....	11
1.6	TERMINOLOGY	12
1.7	PREVIOUS RESEARCH	14
2	Method	15
2.1	SYSTEMATIZING	15
2.2	THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....	15
2.3	SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION.....	16
2.4	DEFINITION OF ASPECTS.....	17
2.5	VALIDATION AND RELIABILITY	18
2.6	SUMMARY	19
3	Analysis	20
3.1	THE ASPECT GOALS AND AIMS	20
3.2	THE ASPECT OF THE OPPONENT	24
3.3	THE ASPECT OF METHODS AND MEASURES.....	29
4	Result	42
5	Summary and discussion.....	46
5.1	SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	49
5.2	REFLECTION	50
6	References.....	52
	Appendix I.....	55
	Appendix II	59
	Appendix III.....	60

1. Introduction

“it remains for you to forget what you have learned, and for me to do the opposite of what I have taught you.”¹

This is a conclusion made by the future Marshal of France; General Ferdinand Foch, to his staff after realizing that the doctrine used in the Great War was exactly the wrong doctrine for the French Army to employ in 1914, which nearly resulted in the death of France. Foch also called for synergy between education and doctrine, in order to learn from what had already been taught, tested, applied and criticized.²

A military doctrine constitutes a nation’s official position and clarifies the interpretations made by its armed forces. The precise definition and content of a doctrine therefore differ between nations.

The Swedish definition of a doctrine states how the Swedish Armed Forces aim to build and use the military force, whereas the French states that a doctrine gathers all the rules governing the use of forces on a theatre of operation. The overall aim is however to present the basic principles that guide the armed forces when pursuing an objective.³

“By nature it is difficult to anticipate what our adversaries will do and even sometimes what our own politicians are likely to do, but a common doctrine makes it at least easier to guess what our own troops will do.”⁴

The common ground for the today’s warfare is the irregular battlefield and stability operations conducted around the world. In order to fight the new challenges of these battles, nations as well as international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE etc.) have to work together and use the rich doctrine heritage and very worthy know-hows of the expertise already existing. One should however avoid to transpose an idealized past onto a burning present. Meaning, that a doctrine is a living document as well as its content; it’s however not laws and should be used with judgment.⁵

¹ Charles W Sanders, Jr, *No other law: the French doctrine of the offensive*, the RAND corporation, Santa Monica, 1987, p 31

² Ibid, p 4

Major General Gérard Bezacier, ‘Synergy between doctrine, training and military education’, *Doctrine General Military review*, Gérard Bezacier, CDEF, Armees, 2004, p 3

³ Försvarsmakten, *Militärstrategisk doktrin med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*, Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2011, p 8

⁴ Harald, Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine?’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway, 2011, p 14

⁵ Major General Gérard Bezacier, ‘Synergy between doctrine, training and military education’, *Doctrine General Military review*, Gérard Bezacier, CDEF, Armees, 2004, p 3

1.1 BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

The Swedish armed forces' doctrinal documents are currently under review and the new Military strategic doctrine (*Militärstrategisk Doktrin* - MSD) was released in 2011. The Doctrine for Land Forces (*Doktrin för Markoperationer*- DmarkO) will together with the doctrines for navy and air force be reissued into one common operative doctrine, in order to present a relevant doctrine that interacts with the MSD.

This essay can be seen as a possible interjection in order to facilitate the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine, by analyzing doctrinal articulated descriptions and know-hows from the French Army in the context of stability operations.

Another aim with this research is to increase the author's knowledge and understanding concerning the challenges that the Armed forces face today. This essay is focused on the land forces and their role in stability operations, where the area of this "new warfare" and its significance are likely to be a future part of the author's career as an infantry officer.

The MSD mentions doctrines by NATO, Great Britain, USA, Russia and the UN. France is a member of NATO and also has a long history of colonization and decades of irregular warfare, where French military strategists and their thoughts, lessons learned and principles lie some of the foundation to today's international doctrines. Whereas, what fundamentally differentiates stabilization from the pacification operations of the past, is the end state where the local authorities and population retake the ownership of their country.⁶

⁶ Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations' (CICDE), *JC(FR)* – 3.4.9 STAB, CICDE, 2011, p 15

MSD 12, 2011, p 125

1830> French use political and economic means to achieve some sort of success in Algeria under Bugeaud.

1850 – 1860 attempts to use political and economic means to win population or subvert rebellion by Faibhead in "West and Central Africa", talks about protectorates instead of colonies and cooperating with local rulers. Gallieni wrote about development in counterinsurgency in 1902, during correspondence with Lyautey, who wrote the article "On the army's colonial rule" in 1900 (Becket p.40) Combination of military pressure and political means used in Morocco between 1924 – 1926, victory achieved through joint action with Spanish (Becket p.41) French counterinsurgency developed in colonial wars since somewhere around 19th century. The French colonies were lost through three larger conflicts, the Second World War, the war in Indochina and the war in Algeria. Indochina was lost to the Japanese during the Second World War, attempts to reinstate French rule was resisted by the Viet Minh (<http://www.ne.se/frankrike/historia/fj%C3%A4rde-republiken-1946-58>). After the peace in Geneva 1954 France gave up all claims to their colonies in Indo-China, today consisting of the countries Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In Africa, France sacrificed the control over Morocco and Tunisia to gain advantages in Algeria, which was later lost due to international pressure. Morocco and Tunisia received independence in 1958, as a stage in this (same link). E.g. modern conflicts; Somalia (1991-1992), Kosovo (1999- present) The Ivory Coast (2003-present), Afghanistan (2001- present).

E.g. Gallieni, Lyautey, Trinquer, Galula.

⁶ FM 3-24, FM 3-24.2, AJP-01D, JDP 01

1.2 AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In order to facilitate the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine, guidelines from the Swedish officers working with the new doctrine was given, which resulted in one overall question with three aspects.⁷

The research question is:

- *How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents view on stabilization be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?*

The three aspects are:

- Goals and Aims;
- The Opponent;
- Methods and Measures.

A further description and motivation to the chosen aspects will be explained in chapter two (Theoretical background).

1.3 DISPOSITION

The first chapter of this essay is an introduction, where the background and description of the aim of the research and clarifying definitions.

The second chapter describes the methods of this research, where the theoretical framework is described along with the aspects developed from it, the systematizing and choice of scientific approach are also stated.

The third chapter contains the analysis of used empirics, which is presented parallel with each aspect and ends with a comparing analysis.

The fourth chapter presents the result of the research and answers the research question.

The fifth chapter discusses the result and chosen method of this research in a wider context and makes suggestions for further research.

⁷ Övlt Johan Brovertz HKV

1.4 RESEARCH MATERIAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The following part of the essay will present a short introduction to French and Swedish doctrinal documents, with the purpose to put them in their context.⁸

1.4.1 French doctrines

The French definition of doctrine: "A Land forces doctrine gathers all the rules governing the use of forces on a theatre of operation", i.e. "aiming at a common way to see things"⁹

The French Ministry of defense has presented a renewed tactical approach for actual conflicts, defined in four documents (FT-01 to FT-05) that represent the keystone of the French Army doctrine corpus. These four documents derive from the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF), and are army doctrines for the operative and tactical levels.¹⁰



Picture I: The French doctrinal documents; *Winning the Battle Building Peace* (FT-01), *General Tactics* (FT-02), *The Fundamentals of Combined Arms Operations* (FT-04), *The Tactical commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations* (FT-05).

- *Winning the battle, building peace* (FT-01) concerns the role of land forces in today's warfare.¹¹
- *General tactics* (FT-02) lays down the general framework for their use; it describes how to conduct operations and which tactics are to be used.¹²
- *The Fundamentals of Combined Arms Operations* (FT-04) describes the basic and operational means of the land forces according to the different environments in today's international operations.¹³

⁸ A thorough explanation and structure of the whole French Doctrine system is available in Appendix I and III.

⁹ General Ferdinand Foch http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine_us.htm 2012-06-04 14:15

¹⁰ Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *General Tactics*, CDEF, Paris, 2010, p 3

¹¹ *General Tactics*, CDEF, 2010, p 3

¹² Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *Winning the battle Building peace*, CDEF, Paris, 2010, p 5

¹³ Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *Les fondamentaux de la manœuvre interarmes*, CDEF, Paris, 2011, p 3

- *The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations* (FT-05) intends to provide the foundation for officers, particularly the youngest of them, when exercising command and control in operations.¹⁴

The FT-04 and FT-05 intends to specify the French approach to operational command in the light of the field manuals and handbooks that the French key allies have recently published on the same topic.¹⁵

In the context of this essay, the FT-01 deals with the stabilization approach, whereas FT-02 deals with counterinsurgency and the more tactical stability methods. The two doctrinal documents correspond to the operative and tactical level for corps and brigade.¹⁶

1.4.2 Swedish doctrines

The Swedish definition of a doctrine: It is based on knowledge, experience and a documented will, of how the Swedish Armed Forces aim to build and use the military force. It is normative but has to be implemented with reason and concern according to the situation.¹⁷

The Swedish documents are developed in order to fit the Swedish armed force's conduct of operations, its abilities and ambitions, and should be implemented as much as possible by Swedish forces no matter what level of conflict or multinational mission.¹⁸

The Swedish Armed Forces have one main doctrine, *Militärstrategisk Doktrin*, which consists of several parts that are aligned to tactical regulations. As mentioned before, there is a gap in the Swedish doctrinal system due to that the operative directions are currently under review and will be defined during 2013 in an operative doctrine. It is further stated in the *Reglemente för Markoperationer* that an additional chapter regarding land force's operations in stabilization is under development¹⁹

The Swedish Armed Forces has chosen not to develop its own national doctrines in the areas of military interoperability, since they are stated in the MSD to already exist internationally, regarding; PKO, SO, CRO, PSO, COIN.²⁰

¹⁴ Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations*, CDEF, Paris, 2011, p 3

¹⁵ Ibid, p 3

¹⁶ *General tactics*, CDEF, 2010, p 70

¹⁷ *MSD 12*, 2011, p 8


¹⁸ Ibid, p 10

¹⁹ Försvarsmakten, *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2010, p 3 & 11

²⁰ PKO - Peacekeeping Operations, SO - Stability Operations, CRO – Crisis Respond Operations, PSO – Peace Support Operations, COIN – Counterinsurgency.

“The Swedish Armed Forces does however need the knowledge and the ability to – together with other nations- fight irregular opponents and hybrid threats parallel with the ability to regular warfare.”²¹

The Swedish doctrinal document *Reglemente för Markoperationer* (RMO) describes the tactical foundations for the land forces at brigade and higher.²²



Picture II: The Swedish doctrinal documents; MSD (Operative Doctrine 2013) and RMO.

1.5 DEMARCATIONS

This essay intends to analyze the doctrinal documents in the context of stabilization for the land forces, and does not deal with descriptions of the reasons to the conflicts. The focus have been on the land forces' acting units, where connections to their support, intelligence, staff and other arenas or combat forces have been made when they have been expressed in the doctrines, in order to enable an overall understanding and also to define a clearer result in the end. No criticism is issued towards the interpretations that the doctrines make of stability operations. This fact is accepted and the content is used in the analysis.

The official positions to the concepts have been analyzed strictly as constructions and textual articulations, and not how these are perceived and are being accepted by the nations' armed forces. Since the background to this essay is a possible facilitation of the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine, the focus has been the land forces and its operative and tactical levels. For this matter the French doctrinal documents have been delimited to the FT-01 and FT-02, and the Swedish to the RMO. Other Swedish documents could have been used in this essay, whereas the RMO is considered most relevant, since it is the overall tactical doctrinal document for the Swedish Land Forces.²³

²¹ (MSD 12), 2011, p 105

²² Where *Reglemente* can be translated to *Regulation*, it is however stated in the RMO, page 158, that in the commanding system, the *Reglemente* is equivalent to doctrines. *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 9

²³ The MSR11-series (Markstridsreglemente – Regulations for the Land Forces) are, also, under review, and contains regulations of e.g. Counter-IED and tactics for the Land Forces.

1.6 TERMINOLOGY

The following part will describe the terminology used in the essay, for relevant abbreviations see Appendix II.

Stabilization: "to make or hold stable, firm, or steadfast [...] to maintain at a given or un-fluctuating level or quantity: *The government will try to stabilize the cost of living.*" In this essay the concept, while highlighting the multidimensional nature of stabilization, only covers operations in which armed forces are engaged. However, when there is no military threat or for political reasons, stabilization interventions are performed using only civilian means (e.g. Georgia in 2008).²⁴

Pacification: "Re-establishing peace in a country: the act or process of pacifying." "The act of forcibly suppressing or eliminating a population considered to be hostile (colonial wars)".²⁵

Irregular warfare: "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."²⁶

COIN: "the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances."²⁷ The doctrine of the French Army today refers to "*contre-rébellion*" (CREB) rather than "counterinsurgency", whereas armed violence expressed under the form of terrorism and /or guerilla, in this meaning, COIN and CREB are synonymous.²⁸

Insurgency: "the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion." The difference between insurgent and guerilla is that the guerilla does not necessarily aim to overtake the rule of the country in question,

²⁴ *JC(FR) – 3.4.9 STAB*, 2011, p 15

<http://m.dictionary.com/d/?q=stabilize&o=O&l=dir> 2012-05-15 10:20

²⁵ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pacification> 2012-06-04 14:10

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JP 1-02 as amended through 17 October 2008; a definition of *Irregular warfare*

²⁷ NATO, 'AJP-3.4.4', *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*, NATO, UK, 2010, p 20-21

²⁸ Military History Research Office of the Research and Lessons Learnt Department (CDEF), *Winning Hearts and Minds, Historical Origins of the Concept and its Current Implementation in Afghanistan*, CDEF, Paris, 2010, p 51
In France, CREB was developed over time with successive contributions, relaying on the legacy of Gallieni and Lyautey and the "oil spots", as well as the general principles concerning actions among the population as established by Trinquier and Galula. There has also been some proliferation with the new COIN doctrines jointly developed in the US and UK.

but insurgents often utilize guerilla tactics. The French term "*rebellion*" is rather equivalent of "insurgency".²⁹

Quadrillage: also called "gridding tactics" principles, a system of dividing an area into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible suppressing rebel operations in their assigned sector. Used in order to control the population where the aim is to restrict the contact between the population and the insurgency. First used by General Raoul Salan, commanding the French army in Algeria 1957.³⁰

Oil spoils: *Tache d'huile*, this method of "*gradual penetration*" starts from one secure sector from which all insurgents have been driven out, and extend "pacification" outwards in concentric circles. It is followed by social and economically development in order to eliminate resistance and the cooperation of former insurgents. The method was adopted and emulated by Lyautey from Gallieni, where Lyautey's theory relied upon acting simultaneously in various places, in order to expand and join like oil stains.³¹

Propaganda: The use of information, true or false, to influence the feelings of a population, one's own or the opponent. Propaganda is a term with a negative value, and as such counterinsurgents often describe it as information- or psy-ops campaigns.³²

Characterization: "portrayal; description" In the context of this essay the term is defined to describe, in order to understand, the differences and similarities between the French and Swedish constructions of texts, regarding stabilization and stability operations in the doctrinal documents.³³

Methods and Measures: "a procedure, technique, or a way of doing something, especially accordance with a definite plan", "a unit or standard of measurement". In the context of this essay the methods are described as ways of achieving the stated goals, where the measures can be described as ways/conditions to enable the method. A further explanation will be given in chapter two (Definition of aspects).³⁴

²⁹ NATO, 'AJP-3.4.4', 2010, p 20

Hearts and Minds, 2010, p 51

³⁰ Ibid, p 14

³¹ Ibid, p 14

³² Becket Ian E. W, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, Routledge, Oxon, 2001, p vii

³³ <http://m.dictionary.com/definition/characterization?linkId=nzemv7> 2012-05-15 10:25

³⁴ <http://m.dictionary.com/definition/method/?linkId=ibc5yn> 2012-05-15 10:27

<http://m.dictionary.com/definition/measures/?linkId=ibc5yn> 2012-05-15 10:30

1.7 PREVIOUS RESEARCH

At the Swedish National Defense College (FHS) Major Anders Killmey's has conducted a research comparing COIN and stability operations in American doctrines, where he used traditional military aspects as the criteria. The three aspects used in this essay can be related to this research, whereas Killmey's research also involves the aspects of *means* (military resources). However, this aspect was delimited due to the fact that France and Sweden have completely different means in war. Killmey's research also distinguishes the strategic and tactical levels of these aspects. This has not been done in this research due to the fact the empiric used deals with the operative and tactical level, which are seldom distinguished in an irregular battlefield.³⁵

Captain (N) Michael Gustafson conducted an analysis linked to a dissertation study on the character of contemporary Swedish military thinking on tactics in Irregular warfare and its articulations in US, Canadian, French, and UK doctrines 2011, where he used the scientific approach of social constructionism. Gustafson's research has inspired this essay's approach to find the characteristics in the doctrine writings.

Thomas Vrenngård's essay 2010 involved the new Swedish field manuals in the context of protection of the local populations in, somewhat, stability operations. His conclusion is that the MSD does not describe stability operations in detail, concerning the fourth concept *supporting*. His recommendations are further that the Swedish Armed Forces rework the method of stability methods where focus should be made on describing the stability implementations.³⁶

Other Swedish research analyzing the French doctrinal documents in the context of stabilization does not exist according to the author's current knowledge.

³⁵ Anders Killmey, *Upprørsbekämpning eller stabiliseringsoperationer? En jämförelse med stöd av amerikanska doktriner*, Bachelor Thesis, FHS, Stockholm, 2009

In the irregular battlefield, tactical activity can have strategic and operational effect, partly due to the constant media pressure where the focus lay on the suffering of the populations in the middle of the battlefield.

³⁶ Thomas Vrenngård, *Relevance of Swedish Field Manuals for the Afghanistan Mission: A Comparison Regarding the Protection of the Local Populations*, SA 2010, Försvarshögskolan, p 39-40

2 Method

2.1 SYSTEMATIZING

To bring out the essence through a thorough reading of the text parts, and to understand the whole picture and the context in which it is included, the method of *qualitative text analysis* was used. Another method could have been the quantitative content analysis, where a large number of empirics are treated equally and are assigned the same importance. This method would however diminish the ability to capture the central parts of the texts.³⁷

In order to systematize the empirics, the doctrines content regarding stabilization have been the initial focus, where three aspects were chosen in order to delimit and sum up the texts.³⁸

2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The function of a theory is to specify the nature of the studied phenomena, how it should be understood, what the essential features are, how different factors are related and how they should be described and understood as constructions. Theories consists of theoretical concepts, structural patterns and/or rules, explanations and also models with applied rules. In the examination of theories, it is important to operationalize the concepts, to find indicators or measurable equivalents to the theoretical concepts.³⁹

This essay relates to the characteristics of war, where the theory to study this characteristics consists of doctrinal documents. The indicators used in order to operationalize the concepts of this theory, are traditional military aspects: *Goals and aims*, *The Opponent* and *Methods and Measures*.

Militärteorins grunder states that: "Military doctrines can be said to be institutionalized knowledge of how, for what and why military resources should be used [...] doctrines should be seen as an actor's decisions of how something should be conducted in a specific context."⁴⁰

This means that a doctrine can be seen as an actor's statements based on knowledge that describes the methods and measures (*how*), the goal and aim (*for what and why*) and the opponent (*specific context*).

This overall definition and content of doctrines shows the need for an understanding regarding the significance of goals and aims, methods and measures, and the perception of an opponent.

³⁷ Esaiasson, m.fl, *Metodpraktikan*, Norstedts juridik AB, Vällingby, 2007, p 237

³⁸ Ibid, p 238

³⁹ Göran Wallén, *Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmetodik*, Studentlitteratur, Sweden, 2005, p 52

⁴⁰ *Militärteorins grunder* - The Foundations of Military Theory

Jerker Widén & Jan Ångström, *Militärteorins grunder*, Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2005, p 7

Criticism can be directed towards the chosen aspects since they do not cover all aspects of the doctrinal documents. However, the chosen aspects can be regarded as important considering the context the analysis is taken place, where the aspects have contributed to the understanding of the doctrinal documents' essential components. This will be further developed in chapter five (Summary and discussion).

2.3 SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION

As stated before; doctrines can be seen as an actor's statements based on its knowledge, where the statements concerns war and warfare, which in itself contains many aspects and perspectives that cannot be restricted to measurable truths or be seen as laws. Doctrines contains guidelines and can be said to consist of a number of structures in terms of descriptions, which forms an external view directed to both personnel within the military system, politicians and citizens in the current country, partners and also to potential counterparties.

All explanations and understanding are related to statements and can be seen as constructions of words, given a certain meaning and value. These affect how we perceive the world and therefore what knowledge we consider to be important. Conversely, the events in our environment affect the current explanatory models and constructions. This research aims to show the result of these descriptions, and its interpretations, as constructions in the doctrinal documents. *Constructionism* is therefore chosen as a scientific basis. This means that the descriptions of the doctrines are sought in doctrines, where this research aims to identify the characteristics of the descriptions in certain aspects. As to say: how can French and Swedish contemporary doctrinal documents for its land forces be characterized regarding certain aspects; does consensus exist in some areas and separated/different statements/positions in other? ⁴¹

⁴¹ Bryman, Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder, Liber AB, 2005, p 34

Michael Gustafson's essay ('Taktik i COIN – På Västfronten Olika Nyheter', *Doktrinstudie FoT IW*, FHS Stockholm, 2011)

"Constructionism, constructivism, social constructivism: social-science orientation that claim that reality or aspects of reality are socially constructed, ie. they are products of human interaction and collective action. Constructionism is primarily a critical perspective that questions the social phenomena's naturalness or inevitability." <http://www.ne.se/konstruktionism> 2012-06-04 15:15

2.4 DEFINITION OF ASPECTS

In the previous part of the essay the foundation for the theory was presented. The criteria have been delimited to: *Goals and Aims*, *The Opponent* and *Methods and Measures*.

2.4.1 Goals and Aims

Military operations and its actions are conducted with the purpose to achieve a defined goal or aim. The goal has to be related and be logically connected on all levels in order to reach effect and facilitate the command and control.⁴²

The criteria goal and aim is interpreted as *what* do the doctrines express to be achieved and *why* should this be achieved.

2.4.2 The Opponent

War takes place between two sides, where each of which do not control events separately, but is partially dependent on the other side's behavior. The goals of military operations should relate to the opponent's center of gravity.⁴³

The two sides can be interpreted as several actors on each side, which are further dependent on/try to overcome the other side's behavior, or so to say warfare.

The aspect of the opponent is thereby interpreted as: how do the doctrines *characterize* the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's *ambitions*.

2.4.3 Methods and Measures

The methods are how the goals and aims in a military operation are described to be achieved with available means. This function of methods constitutes a general ground in the framework of doctrines. The described methods can be connected with the military use of power, which in general terms extends from persuading, to the last resort of force by violence.⁴⁴

The criteria methods and measures, is formed by *what* methods and measures are *principally* described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims.

⁴² Jerker Widén & Jan Ångström, 2005, p 86

⁴³ Ibid, p 28 & 131

⁴⁴ Ibid, p 11

Goals and purpose	Opponent	Methods and Measures
What do the doctrines express to be achieved and why should this be achieved?	How do the doctrines characterize the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's ambitions?	What methods and measures are principally described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims?

2.5 VALIDATION AND RELIABILITY

Validation means that the research is examining what is said to be examined, and reliability that the work is done in a reliable and accurate way. Validation is further defined by: 1) consistency between the theoretical definition and the operational indicators, 2) the absence of systematic errors and 3) that one measure what is claimed to be measured. The definitions 1 and 2 are in-cooperated in the term *conceptual validity*, whereas the definition 3 is called *results validity*. Well defined conceptual validity together with reliability equal a clear result validity.⁴⁵

The main empirics used in this research are the three doctrinal documents (FT-01, FT-02 and RMO). The documents represent the two countries' official guidelines of the land forces. This knowledge is based on the countries' traditions and contemporary military thoughts according to its abilities and strategic relations. The framework and range of these doctrines may therefore be limited.

In order to exclude systematical errors, a thorough and approved systematization of the French doctrinal organization was made. Thereby, the French doctrinal documents could be explained in its military structure and context.⁴⁶

Due to that doctrines represent the institutionalized knowledge of a specific country, interpreting this knowledge is challenging to comprehend without intimate, military cultural understanding. In order to maintain the consistency between the theoretical definition and the operational indicators, traditional military theory, as presented in Swedish War Studies education, have been used.⁴⁷

Meaning, that the operational indicators have been formed by traditional military theory, in order to analyze and make out the character of the descriptions in Swedish and French doctrinal documents in

⁴⁵ Göran Wallén, *Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmetodik*, Studentlitteratur, Sweden, 2005, p 65-66
Conceptual validity – begreppsvaliditet, *results validity* – resultatvaliditet, the authors own translations.
 Esaiasson, m.fl, *Metodpraktikan*, Norstedts juridik AB, Vällingby, 2007, p 63

⁴⁶ Esaiasson, m.fl, 2007, p 63

Interaction and contact with the CDEF, Colonel Remy Porté.

See Appendix I

⁴⁷ *Militärteorins grunder* is an autonomous text that can be used by all kinds of educations, military, civilian, ground schools. The book reflects the existing literature, more than the current situation, international and national. The chosen aspect used in the essay is further linked to military theoreticians as Clausewitz, Jomini and Foch. (Jerker Widén & Jan Ångström, *Militärteorins grunder*, Försvarsmakten, Stockholm, 2005, introduction)

the context of stabilization.

The traditional military aspects were further configured in order to support and not delimit the analysis of the empirics, where a scientific approach (constructionism) was used to determine the specific characteristics of the descriptions in the result.

The biggest challenges in the results validity have been that the empirics consist of doctrines, partly written in English and French. Statements can thereby be deduced different in different parts of the texts. To address the language, several different sources have been used and keywords have been analyzed in their context, in order to avoid misinterpretations. The French doctrines used are further translated by a panel of British and French officers, and academic military experts.⁴⁸

A complete validity and reliability can, considering the used method and empirics, always be questioned, since they are the author's subjectively choices. This will be further developed in chapter five (Summary and discussion).

2.6 SUMMARY

The theoretical framework for this essay is doctrines, where the empirics consist of Swedish and French doctrinal documents. In order to understand what is stated in the empirics, the method of qualitative analysis was used. Three aspects from traditional military theory were chosen in order to delimit and enable characterization of the descriptions in the doctrinal documents. The summary of each aspect from the empirics, have been used in a comparing analysis. This comparing analysis has had the approach to characterize what is stated in the doctrinal documents according to the aspects. The comparison will be presented in a result that aim to answer the research question: *"How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents view on stabilization be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?"*

⁴⁸ The French academic dictionary(accessed on: <http://www.academie-francaise.fr/dictionnaire/>), and verification of research by Colonel Remy Porté at CDEF, and teachers at Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan (Mj JM Holtzinger, Mr JP Hanon)
Winning the battle Building peace, 2007, p 3

3 Analysis

This chapter of the essay presents the analysis of the used empirics. The three used documents will be analyzed parallel in three steps with the identified aspects as support. Each step begins with a summary of what is stated in the empirics and ends with a comparing analysis. Through this the essay's overall question has been answered in the result.

3.1 THE ASPECT GOALS AND AIMS

What do the doctrines express to be achieved and why should this be achieved?

3.1.1 Goals and aims with Stabilization

FT-01

The doctrine calls the Stabilization phase "the New Decisive Phase ". This phase is described as it depends on preparation, involves numerous actors and starts with the concept of the operation, where the goal is a successful transition from one phase to another. This can be understood as the stabilization phase's goal is a continuous transition towards the next phase, which the doctrine calls normalization.⁴⁹

This decisive phase, that is stated to take place between "winning the battle" and "building peace", aim to re-establish a secure environment , public order, nation building and humanitarian relief by supporting the environment, enable humanitarian operations, facilitating diplomatic initiatives, the economy and the Rule of Law in countries in crisis. This presents four sub-goals that can be covered by: security, governmental services, infrastructure and humanitarian relief.⁵⁰

The doctrine further states that the aim with stability operations is to: "consolidate the transitional order previously imposed through the reduction and the containment of the violence, allowing all to set off on the path towards peace."⁵¹

Furthermore in this phase, the land forces operate in close coordination with other actors in asymmetrical violence. This, in order to stabilize the environment and to contribute to the return of stable political and social systems in countries in crisis, where they seek to both win the population over to its cause and defeat the enemy.⁵²

This statement explains the need for a continued transition from the intervention phase and that

⁴⁹ *Winning the battle Building peace* , 2007, p 47

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p 47

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p 12

⁵² *Ibid*, p 47 & 77

violence still occur but the aim is to isolate and control it, in order to control the environment and let the actors involved in the stabilization work in secure areas. It is also means that the land force's goal should not only be to protect the other actors and contribute to the nation building, but also to defeat an asymmetrical opponent and win the population over.

“the aim is to restore stability through a general control of the area and make confidence-building possible between the protagonists.”⁵³

This can be understood as, by upholding a general control of the area, the primary causes to the conflict and destabilization can be addressed, which will encourage reconciliation between local opponents.

The doctrine further states that the safe and secure environment enables the re-establishment of basic services, such as water, energy, transport, medical support etc. which will support the recognition of the legitimacy of the local authorities and the restoration of the rule of law. This statement can be interpreted as that the basic services provided for the population will improve the legitimacy of the nation's social and juridical structure. It is also stated that these improvements of everyday life will reduce people's despair and thereby delimit the opponent's recruitment.⁵⁴

FT-02

The doctrine states that stabilization is a decisive phase to achieve the strategic object. Initially there are the security actions that aim to control the environment. The purpose with these are to defeat the opponent, ensure security and freedom of movement, protect the people and properties, restore public order and enable influencing actions that does not strictly favor military methods. Then, there are the actions to support the population, where the purpose is to enable disarmament and rebuilding of armed structures and security institutions. Finally, there are the actions aimed at reviving political, administrative and economic life.⁵⁵

These actions lay the ground for the normalization phase, where the goal is to re-establish the rule of law in a country and transfer of responsibilities.

⁵³ *Winning the battle Building peace*, 2007, p 12

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p 47

⁵⁵ *General tactics*, 2010, p 18

RMO

"The military operations aims to stabilize the situation in order to let other actors, e.g. assistance or diplomacy, have an impact."⁵⁶

It is further stated that the stability methods' aim, in addition to assistance and diplomacy, are to create a "sufficiently" secure environment for the re-construction of state-building/infrastructure. This, since these measures are required to achieve a stable peace and development.⁵⁷

An operative control on the ground is stated to be vital in international missions order to get freedom of movement and thereby the ability to stabilize the environment.⁵⁸

It is stated, that in order to achieve the overall goals in international missions, a comprehensive approach is necessary. The comprehensive approach is further described to be built on that the military and civilian operations are coordinated towards a common goal, where the civilian operations are exemplified as diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures.⁵⁹

It is also stated that the actors' measures need to be coordinated or in coherence with the military, in order to achieve the comprehensive political goals. This statement can be understood as that the overall aim with stability operations is to enable the presence and actions of other actors, in order to achieve the end-state of peace and further development.⁶⁰

The focus is stated to lie on the people, not the battlefield, whereas it is therefore vital to gain the support from the populations in order to suppress the opponent.⁶¹

It is further stated that the desired end-state is when the local units have the ability to take over responsibility for the security, and thereby letting the international forces withdraw.⁶²

⁵⁶ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 122

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p 148

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p 63

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p 32 & 36

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p 122

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p 125

⁶² *Ibid*, p 152

3.1.2 Analysis Goals and Aims

	GOALS AND AIMS	
	WHAT	WHY
FT-01	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Re-establish a safe and secure environment, governmental services, infrastructure and humanitarian relief - Control the environment - Defeat the opponent - Win the population over. - Restore the normal conditions of viability of a state or a region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To establish the conditions for the achievements of the strategic objective and thereby a return to peace. - Eliminate previous causes of conflict - To enable confidence-building between protagonists - Disable the opponent's recruitment pool - For the return of stable political and social systems
FT-02	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control the environment - Support the population - Reviving political, administrative and economic life 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To suppress the opponent, ensure security and freedom of movement, protect the people and properties, restore public order and enable influencing actions - To enable disarmament and rebuilding of armed structures and security institutions - To enable the normalization phase
RMO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace and development - Enable the presence and actions of other actors - Gain the support from the local population - The local units have the ability to take over responsibility for the security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To achieve the comprehensive political goals - To prevent the opponent's activities - To let the international forces withdraw

The overall political goal and the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in order to let other actors work are similar. The FT-02 describes the final actions in stabilization, in the transition towards normalization, to be aiming at reviving political, administrative and economic life. The RMO refers to this as a comprehensive approach where military units work together with civilian actors, initially supporting and there after monitoring.

The FT-01 and FT-02 emphasize the need of environmental control in an early stage and throughout the stabilization. The aim is to intervene and thereafter secure the own area in order to stay and disturb the opponent. The control is dual, whereas it involves both the terrain, which should be dominated and where the force can stay untouched from the opponent, and the population, which should be influenced and understood in order to detect social unbalances/variations.

The focus on the population is similar, where in the RMO it is stated to be the main objective and not the battlefield. The document also describes the importance of operative control on the ground in an early stage, and that the environment needs to be controlled in order to gain the support of the population.

This support from the population is further stated to be vital in order to prevent the opponent's activities in all documents. The FT-02 describes the initial aim in security actions to be the control of the environment, where the purpose is to eliminate the opponent and thereby ensure the forces security

and freedom of movement. The FT-01 also describes that in order to stabilize the environment the opponent needs to be defeated. The defeat of the opponent is also mentioned in the RMO, however not stated as a goal in stabilization.

The FT-01 describes that it is first after that the environment is controlled that there are actions to support the population and reconstruction. The re-establishment of basic services is mentioned to be a quite vital measure, since it will gain the legitimacy for the local authorities, the restoration of Rule of Law and eventually delimit the opponent's recruitment. The RMO also describes that re-establishing measures are required in order to achieve peace and development. These achievements are a common factor in the documents, whereas they all have clear statements that the overall aim is to achieve the political goal, where peace and development is described. The FT-02 does however state that the military aim itself is not the development of a nation but the elimination of the opponent that tries to disturb it. When this is achieved, the local authorities and humanitarian assistance can work in safety, whereas the forces can go home.

The FT-01 also mentions that in order to reach stability and allow confidence building possible, the primary cause to the conflict and destabilization must be addressed. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

3.2 THE ASPECT OF THE OPPONENT

How do the doctrines characterize the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's ambitions?

3.2.1 The Opponent in Stabilization

FT-01

"The military superiority of Western armies is most likely to provoke increasingly asymmetrical responses."⁶³

The doctrine distinguishes two types of asymmetry:

- "a conflict in which a subversive system leads a global asymmetrical struggle against the interests of a state or an alliance and in which the armed forces are only part of the instruments available in response to the threat;
- a conflict in which an armed force is confronted with an asymmetrical form of combat directly linked to its involvement constituting the violent response of its opponent in the field. As the main targets of these actions located in the theatre of operations, the armed forces are the key actors in that fight."⁶⁴

⁶³ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 16

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p 16

The doctrine makes a difference between the global asymmetrical struggle, where the land forces only constitutes one of the actors, and an asymmetrical form of combat, where the land forces are the key actor. In this extract, two types of asymmetrical opponents can be recognized: a global opponent whose ambitions are subversive, and a fighting opponent on the field with violent response ambitions.

The doctrine states that: in the context of Rules of Engagement and Laws of war, the asymmetrical opponent places himself beyond common rationality and attempts to bypass it, where he is likely to switch to a different type of combat that negate the technological supremacy that he faces. This means that the opponent does not follow the laws and rules that the land forces have to follow, where he will most probably avoid the strength of the land forces and try to exploit their weaknesses. This describes the general cases with guerillas, where the opponent uses terrorism as the main means.⁶⁵

The doctrine states that the urban guerillas constitute the easiest and most effective response in the struggle of weak versus the strong. The opponent's objective in an asymmetry is often to defeat the deployed forces by influencing the political will of the force's nation, rather than being able to defeat the force itself.⁶⁶

It is stated that, the opponent does this by blending into the environment, refusing to hold ground or to acts as an objective. He thereby delimits the land forces force's increasing capability for acquisition and targeting, where the force's ability to make full use of their most effective equipment is constrained. It is also described that, the opponent may establish a local supremacy and forcing the land forces expensive and difficult adjustments, as demonstrated by the increasingly widespread use of remote-controlled explosive devices.⁶⁷

"Fighting through media is characteristic of the asymmetrical struggle"⁶⁸, where the element of the opposing activity relies on the use of information tools and the manipulation of public opinion. In the context of media surveillance, the doctrine states that the opponents will try to discredit the forces or force them into making errors by provoking a disproportionate response which then can be exploited.⁶⁹

The doctrine states that interactional strife based on ethnic, political or religious grounds is translated by assassinations, bombings, attacks against the civilian population, massacres and kidnappings which may take place across the whole theatre of operations."⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 44

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p 59

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p 52

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p 70

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 2007 p 59 & 70-71

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p 60

The aim of these actions may be to undermine the credibility of the forces or the legitimacy of its presence, as well as to influence the exit strategy, undermine positive development or force certain elements to flee the area.

The doctrine further characterizes the opponent as rejecting, or lacking of knowledge, the laws of armed conflict, where the violence often is exacerbated by fanaticism, the denial of Western values and that he often operates outside any form of national framework. The opponents may focus on political aspects, ethnic opponents, crowd manipulation, or violence intended to cause problems for the force. The opponent's organization is described as usually horizontal with great flexibility, which is both political and military in nature without any formal hierarchy.⁷¹

FT-02

In the context of security operations it is stated that: "It is particularly suited for the **asymmetric** threat which mainly targets the population or institutional symbols. This type of opponent, whose methods rely upon **bypassing** the action or regular forces, makes it difficult to identify potential targets."⁷²

Here, an asymmetric threat that targets the population and uses irregular methods such as subversion and guerilla tactics can be recognized.

"The main cause for uncertainty is the difficulty in determining the political and military goals of the opponent. The latter is not homogeneous any more but compromised of a multitude of actors with different interests."⁷³

Here there doctrine mentions the psychological aspect of the opponent, where the opponent's political and military goals often are hard to distinguish and affected by several actors with different goals and aims.

The doctrine characterizes the opponent by stating that he uses of terror as regular method of operations where he tries to assert his superiority with nationalism combined with religion. His motivators are based on corruption and promises of looting and plunder, where the effect on narcotics, especially those handed out to child-soldiers, and the rejection of the western democratic model makes up the psychological frame of mind and the ways of thinking for the opponent.

⁷¹ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 59-60 & 67

⁷² *General tactics*, 2010, p 84

⁷³ *Ibid*, p 10

RMO

In stability operations, the opponent is often characterized as irregular and is driven by a political, nationalistic and/or religious ideological beliefs, where he wants to change the present social system with violence. These operations can therefore often be characterized as counterinsurgencies. This extract can be understood as if the opponent often is characterized as irregular with subversive ambitions and violent features.⁷⁴

It is further stated that irregular units are “such units that are not an organizational or juridical part of the government or head-of-state.”⁷⁵

Examples of these kinds of units are stated to be guerilla units, militias, criminal organizations, partisans, terrorists or private military companies, which are often organized in unstructured networks. In this context, the opponent can be characterized as an unorganized fraction outside the present social structure with subversive, rebellious or criminal character.⁷⁶

“The opponent is governed by its purposes and drives, which will in combination of how he understands the situation he is in, lay the foundation of how he acts [...] drives and purposes can for example consist of struggle for survival, struggle for independence, struggle for increased power or simply a struggle to achieve economic gain.”⁷⁷

This can be understood as if the opponent is multifaceted, since his ambition and drive can differ radically depending on the situation he is in. In the context of appearance, the opponent is stated to act with great variety considering his discipline and ability to use technology. “The fact that the opponent possesses technically advanced equipment does not mean that he will be able to use the full spectrum of the systems.”⁷⁸

This implies that the opponent may possess technology, however, the level of use and knowledge may vary. It is stated that an irregular opponent is likely to use a complex terrain, such as jungle, mountainous or urban areas in order to complicate the forces measures of detection and elimination. It is further mentioned that the opponent may use the civilian population as complementary protection in built up areas.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 122

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p 46

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p 46

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p 46

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p 46

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p 39

3.2.2 Analysis the Opponent

	OPPONENT	
	CHARACTERIZATION	AMBITIONS
FT-01	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not respect the Law of War - Blends into the environment - Refuses to hold ground - Acts as an objective - Widespread use of remote-controlled explosive devices - Terrorism - Urban Guerilla - Attacks against the civilian population - Fanaticism - Denial of Western values - Operates outside a national framework - Horizontal organizations with great flexibility, both political and military in nature - Equipment is often unidentifiable - Fights through media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tries to achieve local supremacy - Force the land forces to expensive and difficult adjustments - Influence the force's political/strategic level - Discredit the forces - Force the land forces to make errors - Provoking a disproportionate response - Exploit the land forces - Spread propaganda - Use unpredictable violence - Obstruct the missions of the land force - Undermine the legitimacy of the land force's presence - Influence the exit strategy - Undermine positive development - Force certain elements to flee - Manipulate the public opinion
FT-02	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unclear military and political goals - Terror as regular method of operations - Uses religion, nationalism, narcotics and the rejection of western values as his motivators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legitimize his cause - Make the Forces and/or the government the common enemy
RMO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Irregular - Subversive, criminal, rebellious - Organized in unstructured networks - Political, nationalistic and/or religious ideological believes - Multifaceted - Use complex terrain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To change the present social system with violence - To survive - Independence - Increased power - To achieve economic gain

All documents state that stabilization is most likely to take place in an asymmetrical battlefield where the mission is of counterinsurgency character against an irregular opponent with guerilla methods.

The FT-01 states that the opponent's military and political goals often are unclear and affected by several outside actors, whereas the RMO states the similar. This is further mentioned in all documents as that the opponent has more flexibility than the international forces, since he works outside the Law of War and is therefore considered irrational.

The FT-01 states that the opponent is likely to fight through media in order to exploit the land forces and spread propaganda. The urban terrain is emphasized in this matter, where these areas contains the majority of the population, the opponent and therefore also the media. The RMO states the similar, but does not express the opponent's use of propaganda.

The FT-02 mentions subversion, religion, nationalism, narcotics and the rejection of western values as the opponent's motivators. Narcotics, in the context of child-soldiers, are stated to have a high impact

on the land forces warfare. Similarities can be found in the RMO, whereas narcotics and the rejection of western values are not clearly mentioned. This could however be interpreted as such in the content of nationalistic and criminal networks.

The opponent's use of technology attempts to vary, is stated in the RMO. Here the FT-01 describes the battlefield to have become much more complex and various due to the fact that the opponent might use the same equipment and means as the forces. In the context of a global war, where there are differences between the opponent that tries to affect the political will of the armed forces, and those that use pure violence, the documents are similar.

The RMO states that the opponent is likely to use complex terrain in order to escape the full force of the land forces. In the FT-01, it is stated that the opponent will try to blend into the environment, refuse to hold ground and/or to act as an objective. This kind of guerilla tactics is similarly mentioned in the documents.

3.3 THE ASPECT OF METHODS AND MEASURES

What methods and measures are principally described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims?

3.3.1 Methods and measures in Stabilization

FT-01

The military commitment is comprehensively described according to a continuum of operations: intervention, stabilization and normalization. The doctrines state that stabilization is the decisive phase to achieve the strategic objective. The phase entails various types of actions in keeping with the land force's three-fold operational posture, which means that the land forces are able to simultaneously execute actions of force, security and assistance. In stability operations this operational posture involves:

- Security actions, which aim to control the environment;
- Actions to support the population;
- Actions aimed at reviving political, administrative and economic life.⁸⁰

The doctrine describes how to conduct operations and achieve peace with four stages: **Acting**, **Controlling**, **Adapting** and **Mentoring**. These stages deal with the different phases in operations, where operational and tactical methods are described. The four stages involve several conditions of how to conduct and succeed in stability operations.

The first stage of **Acting** involves combined arms operations, a joint framework and multinationality.

⁸⁰ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 10-14

The doctrine states that combined arms operations and the joint framework have become vital and inseparable from land operations, due to the importance of operations in urban areas, the variety of situations and conditions for the use of force, and the synergy effect needed in order to fight the irregular opponent. Whereas, the increasing European integration will have to increase the framework for the definition of the interoperability and the training of the forces, in order to keep the multinational operations legitimate and effective.⁸¹

The second stage of **Controlling** involves the managing of the use of force and the controlling of technology, time and violence. Here, the doctrine states that the security and improvement of living conditions lay the foundation for the forces support from the population. Whereas, the failure of this can further on question the legitimacy of the mission. The Rules of engagement, the conduct and the management of which is a key challenge, where the rules need to be simple and applicable to all. The advantage of technology is stated to allow the land forces to gain and maintain ascendancy over and opponent, whereas information technology enables the increase of force protection. The doctrine also states that the technology does not diminish the importance of sufficient numbers of troops, since these are very much needed for operations in urban areas and in close contact with the population. The force protection is stated to be vital, but should not lead to isolation from the environment, since an understanding of this contributes to the overall security. The development of crowd control techniques and of reduced lethality weapons and ammunitions, are stated to reinforce the operational capability of troops operating among civilian populations.⁸²

The third stage called **Adaption** involves the setting of conditions for peace and facing increasing asymmetry. The doctrine states that this stage will focus on human presence, relationships and general security in order to build peace. Whereas, the land forces thereby have to adapt to all of the actors they are working with: populations, political authorities, organizations, belligerents and the enemy. The combination of intelligence, technology and systemic analysis claims to be vital element in all operations, where the land forces have to be aware of the opponent's means and measures for propaganda, as well as being able to conduct offensive and defensive information operations themselves.⁸³

The fourth stage, **Mentoring** involves the disarmament of the combatants, training of the local forces and to support nation building. Here the doctrine states that during the DDR process the land forces need to develop an organization adapted to the task and establish a dialogue with other actors

⁸¹ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 42

⁸² *Ibid*, p 43-44

⁸³ *Ibid*, p 64-68

involved. The forces are also mentioned to be vital in the training and mentoring of local security forces. This training or refreshing of local defense and security forces, is further stated to be vital for the re-establishment of the rule-of-law in a country, which is reliant of forces entrusted with enforcing law, order and security. It is described that since the relief of the force can only be carried out by local forces, the task of bringing them up to the standards required is a vital aspect for the stabilization force. The doctrines states that together with the support of the local populations and other services and agencies, the land forces will operate to re-establish vital functions or in response to distress or emergencies.⁸⁴

CONDUCTING THE OPERATION	
STAGE	CONDITIONS
Acting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Combined arms operations - Joint Framework - Multinationality
Controlling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Managing the use of force - Controlling technology - Controlling time - Controlling violence
Adaption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Setting the conditions for peace - Facing up to increasing asymmetry
Mentoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disarming the combatants - Training local forces - Support nation building

FT-02

The doctrine describes the tactical methods and principles of land operations. In order to conduct the four operation stages stated in FT-01, the tactical principles of **quadrillage** and **oil spots** are used together with the tactical methods of **security and assistance operations**. These tactical procedures are broken down to generic courses (for Corps. Command level 1-3) and missions (Brigade level).

The doctrine states that after the intervention phase the area must be controlled in order to be stabilized. The territorial organization is mentioned as important for the ability to conduct political actions that complement the military actions. The gradual occupation by spreading oil spots is stated to reduce the opponent's domination in the surface area while protecting the deployed forces. It is stated that the extension of protection relies upon quadrillage operations that will enable occupation of the territory that is adapted to both the local political organization and the stabilization object.

Three rules are further mentioned to assure success of stabilization; 1) In order to respect the Economy of Means principle, units are assigned to different *territorial compartments*, which are stated to

⁸⁴ *Winning the Battle Building Peace*, 2007, p 69-71

generate an organization of sectors where the commanders receive full military and political responsibility, 2) The sectors are mentioned to ensure close *contact with the population*, even the most remote, where a continual search for information is mentioned, 3) The method is stated to favor a *growing participation* of the local population in the stabilization process. It is further stated that the commander's area is additionally subdivided in order to define the areas given special legal, political or operational statuses; where the *confinement tracts* of land make it possible to separate the belligerents or to isolate the insurgency from its external support, *exclusive zones* interdicts the presence of certain weapons or impedes the enemy's operational movement, and a *demilitarized zone* will ban any military activity or presence.⁸⁵

Further on, it is stated that the tactical level of maneuver fulfills the larger effect through methods that attempt to locate and delimit the opponent. This is stated to reduce the opponent's domination and protect the deployed forces and its allies, where the operational quadrillage of the territory into sectors allows for reconciliation between military effectiveness and political action.

CONTROLLING THE ENVIRONMENT	
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES	CONDITIONS
<p>Oil spots</p> <p>Quadrillage operations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Territorial organization - Enable political actions - Reduce opponents domination - Protect deployed forces - Territorial compartments - Close contact with the population - Continual search for information - Catalyze the growing participation of the local population <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confinement tracts - Exclusive zones - Demilitarized zone - Monitor, protect and control space - Reconciliation between military effectiveness and political action.

The **Security operations** aim to create a stable and safe environment, essentially to the benefit of civilian actors and the population. Initially there is a stage called preparation/gaining the advantage, where it is stated that, in order to dominate the environment and master the ground space, the capabilities of influence, control and intervention need to be obtained. Force ratio and influence ratio are two principles mentioned. It is stated that during security operations, the need to dominate the environment requires a more constraining force ratio, whereas the influence ratio must be assessed in a comprehensive manner. The ratio is described to be set on the basis of friendly troops dedicated to

⁸⁵ The French Army recognizes three war fighting principles: *Freedom of action principle*: "The ability of a commander to use his means at any time and act despite the presence of the enemy and the various constraints imposed by both the environment and circumstances, in order to achieve the assigned goal." *Unity of effort Principle*: "Convergence in space and time of actions and effects of the different operational functions." *Economy of Means Principle*: "Proper distribution and use of assets in order to obtain the best ratio of capabilities vs. effects in order to achieve the assigned goal." *General tactics*, 2010, p 33 & 66-68

the operations, on the desired effect, to the number of insurgents to be fought and the number of inhabitants to be controlled.⁸⁶

Measures in order to achieve control are exemplified as: intelligence collection, surveillance, support the freedom of circulation, protection of axes or sensitive points, curfews and isolation or confining the enemy.⁸⁷

It is stated that: "Lessons learned from history and recent operations recommend an influence ratio of **1 to 50 inhabitants** in order to effectively dominate the environment during a security operation."⁸⁸

This can be interpreted as the environmental control depends on the population, as well as the opponent and his abilities to effect, and not the size of the terrain controlled, where one soldier per 50 inhabitants is needed for this control. The next stage is called effort, where it is stated that the force must exert a deterrent pressure in order to restore the compromised situation. This pressure is based upon rapid and precise reaction capabilities, which will enable the detection, neutralization or elimination of armed groups/hostile strongholds. It is further mentioned that via the operational quadrillage, surveillance and intervention in all areas: ground, sea and air, the enemy will be confined.⁸⁹

Consolidation is stated as a stage, which consists of taking local advantage of the opponent's weakening military capability and the moral advantage gained in order to win the population over. The turnaround of local warlords or armed gangs is mentioned as a method aimed at cutting off the insurgents' supplies and intelligence sources.⁹⁰

It is stated that: "Against an armed insurgency, the response may take on a coercive nature that requires a superior, local force ratio of **3 to 1**. Furthermore, the influence ratio required to launch this type of action is **20 friendly troops to 1** insurgent."⁹¹

Here the difference between force ratio and influence ratio is mentioned, where the influence ratio is stated to require an essential amount more troops. It is further stated that the evacuation of a threatened population or crowd control requires identical tactical action, which, have to be adapted to specific context. The methods used in order to gain this kind of control is mentioned to be improved by protection, identification, information, controlling the level of violence, and seizing key points.⁹²

⁸⁶ *General tactics*, 2010, p 84

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p 86

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p 87

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p 87

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p 88

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p 89

⁹² *Ibid*, p 91

The second tactical method described in the doctrine is the **Assistance operations**. These operations are stated to consist of giving aid to the populations suffering from a conflict, natural or technological disaster, ensuring their safety as well as the area where they are consolidated, and to take part in the reconstruction of the state and its infrastructure as well as assisting local authorities.⁹³

It is mentioned that assistance is a way to win over the neutrality of the assisted populations as well as the public opinion, and hopefully their cooperation. The generic courses of action are stated to be the support of state's reconstruction, including participation in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of veterans, and to provide aid to the population and humanitarian assistance.⁹⁴

These generic courses of action are further divided into three general principles: provide relief, the facilitation of the work to cover vital needs to the destitute population; the external information is mentioned to be a vital instrument when the military action is applied to the population; reorganization of city life where missions to do this are exemplified as the decontamination and explosive ordnance disposal/mine clearance operations, communications security, transportation and distribution of humanitarian aid, disarmament, training and support of security forces and organization of elections.⁹⁵

The overall goals are stated as: to restore freedom of movement, reviving the economic life and to restore political life and public services.⁹⁶

METHODS	STAGES INVOLVING GENERIC COURSES OF ACTION/ MISSIONS
Security operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparation/ Gaining the advantage - Effort - Consolidation - Crowd control or Evacuation of threatened population
Assistance operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support the nation's reconstruction - Aid to the population - Humanitarian assistance

RMO

The RMO describes operative concepts and methods, where stabilization is one of three approaches (together with offensive and defensive approaches). In order to achieve the operative goals there are combat and stability methods, whereas in the stabilization there can be both combat and stability

⁹³ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 92

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p 93

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p 95

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p 95

methods.⁹⁷

The document describes that the forces often operates in a multinational theatre (UN, EU or other nations) in a multifunctional context (development of the police forces and political system and assistance to individuals and organizations).⁹⁸

It is also stated that this theatre calls for: interoperability regarding the co-operating forces' technology and procedures, a common ground of tactics, operative concept and training, where the understanding of other nation's military culture and traditions is vital.⁹⁹

This can be understood as the armed force's environment is likely to be both multinational and multifunctional, which calls for the measures of a high level of interoperability as well as a common combat ground and overall understanding of other actors. In the document it is stated that stabilization is characterized by gaining the support of the population, which is one of the goals in stability operations. A measure to gain this support is the forces need to identify the part of the population that are against the opponent and thereafter support this part by every means. After achieving this, the neutral part of the population (often the majority) can be affected. The part of the population that remains hostile will thereby be isolated and easier to oppose.¹⁰⁰

It is also mentioned that resources should be implemented where success most likely can be achieved, whereas the support of the population thereby be won in one defined area, which will gradually expand.¹⁰¹

These measures imply that in order to gain the support of the population the environment needs to be controlled. This is achieved by influencing the part of the population that is against the opponent and focusing/prioritizing on areas where success is most likely obtained. The measures mentioned to achieve the wanted effect in such a theatre are exemplified as: a developed leadership, language skills and respect for other countries culture and behavior.¹⁰²

Six methods for stability operations are described in the document: **Power projection, Support, Monitoring, Police enforcement, Education, Protection.**¹⁰³

⁹⁷ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 119

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p 148

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p 38

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p 125

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p 125

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p 38

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p 148-153

Power projection is described as a method where military forces can contribute to creating stability and safety in a conflict zone, thereby dampen the possible resurgence of conflicts and also contribute to strengthen of allies. It I also stated that power projection can be used for deterrent purposes, in order to let civilian organizations operate with an acceptable risk.¹⁰⁴

The method includes versatile units, which are organized by the principle of combined arms, and the availability of quick reaction forces/units (QRU) at all levels. These measures are stated to gain operational control on the ground.¹⁰⁵

“To succeed with power projection it is important to find the right balance between the presences of competent military units with the ability to combat as well as a good appearance in order to be considered as fair and legitimate by the population. It is also important to be able to work together with local police and other military units.”¹⁰⁶

This extract can be interpreted as power projection is likely to be contrived by boots on the ground, with a legitimate approach, that co-operates with both the population and the local security forces.

The documents states that during International missions, the Armed Forces can be used as **Support**, a complement or as an option to civilian actors if: there are not enough civilian actors available, the security situation does not allow civilian actors to operate or if the civilian actors have to be complemented with military abilities in order to achieve effect.¹⁰⁷

This extract can be interpreted as if the military units should not be considered the first hand choice regarding support operations, furthermore as an additional asset with the ability to force. The measures are further exemplified as: mine clearance, building roads- and bridges, supplying resources, fire extinguishment, humanitarian support, interference of ethnical cleansing.¹⁰⁸

The method of **Monitoring** is stated to involve focus on certain geographic areas or specific military operations, e.g. monitoring of a separation zone or surveillance of an area through Framework Operations, and also the monitoring of the re-/construction of civil institutions, juridical systems, police force, etc. The monitoring is stated to often involve regular contact with the actors, local politicians and officials, the resolution of minor conflicts, and regular reporting. “The task must be carried out with

(The author’s translations of Maktprojicering - Power projection, Stöd - Support, Övervakning- monitoring, Polisiära metoder – Police enforcement, Utbildning - Training, Skydd – Protection)

¹⁰⁴ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 149

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p 149

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p 150

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p 150-151

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p 150-151

credibility and sufficient protection for the Armed Forces, which means that there are often strong impacts of power projection in this type of mission.”¹⁰⁹

This can be interpreted as the method of monitoring is multifaceted, since it involves measures of surveillance, reinstatement of the Rule of Law, possible interference and liaison.

The method of **Police enforcement** mentions the armed forces contribution to the eventual reform of the existing police structure or the rebuilding of a new one. It is further states that during this eventual reconstruction, military units may have to perform tasks of police character to help the local police force to maintain law and order. The measures exemplified are patrolling together with local police or independently, checking and scanning for illegal weapons in vehicles and buildings, arrest operations, escorting civilian transports and crowd control. The method does not distinguish the reformation from the rebuilding, more than “This can be considered to be a complicated and time-consuming work.”¹¹⁰

The method of **Training** is partly described as the training of local military units that aim to increase their military capabilities. This is stated to lead to that the local security forces get the opportunity to assert their interests to the surrounding world in a credible manner, and the ability to take over responsibility for the security. This is further stated to increase the stability in the area and reduce the risk of conflict and, in time, reach the desired end-state of force withdrawal. This can be interpreted as the armed forces need to conduct training missions with the local security forces in order for them to eventually take over the responsibility and regain control. It is also stated that: “Training missions can in some cases be complemented with support in the form of military equipment.”¹¹¹

Protection in an international mission is briefly described as that the Armed Forces protect its own or someone else's operations or objects.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ “Framework operations generally provide an effective, coherent and consistent approach to conducting the tactical aspects of a counterinsurgency. They enable focused surge and strike operations to take place which deter, disrupt, dislocate or degrade insurgent groups using enough force but no more than absolutely necessary.” British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, *Counter insurgency*, British Army, 2009, p 57

Reglemente för Markoperationer, 2010, p 151

¹¹⁰ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, 2010, p 152

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p 152

¹¹² *Ibid*, p 153

METHOD	MEASURES
Power projection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deterrence - Combined arms - QRU - Boots on the ground <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legitimate approach - Co-operation with population & local security forces
Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mine clearance - Building roads- and bridges - Supplying resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fire extinguishment - Humanitarian support - Interference of ethnical cleansing
Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Framework operations - Surveillance - Reinstatement of Rule of Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possible interference - Liaison
Police enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to reformation of existing police structure or in the rebuilding of a new one - Checking and scanning for illegal weapons in vehicles and buildings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arrest operations - Escorting civilian transports - Crowd control - Patrolling
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct training missions with local security forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In some cases assist with military equipment
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protecting the forces' and others' operations and objects

The table shows the six described stability methods in the RMO. The measures are the author's summary of what is described in the document according to the methods. This, since these ways/conditions are not stated as actual measures/or other definitions of likewise in the RMO. However, as mentioned before in the Terminology (chapter one), the context of the described measures can be equated to the ways/conditions in the other doctrinal documents (FT-01 and FT-02) used in this essay.

3.3.2 Analysis methods and measures

METHODS AND MEASURES				
	STABILIZATION	OPERATIONAL STAGES	CONDITIONS	
FT-01	Security actions; Actions to support the population; Reviving actions; Interoperability;	Acting Controlling Adapting Mentoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Combined arms operations - Joint Framework - Multinationality - Managing the use of force - Controlling technology - Controlling time - Controlling violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Setting the conditions for peace - Facing up to increasing asymmetry - Disarming the combatants - Training local forces - Support nation building
	Offensive, defensive, stability operations;	TACTICAL METHODS	STAGES INVOLVING GENERIC COURSES OF ACTION/MISSIONS	TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
FT-02	ROE; Competence capacity.	Security operations Assistance operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparation/ Gaining the advantage - Effort - Consolidation - Crowd control or Evacuation of threatened population - Support the nation's reconstruction - Aid to the population - Humanitarian assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quadrillage Oil spots
		METHODS	MEASURES	
RMO	Interoperability; Offensive, defensive, stability operations; ROE; Competence capacity.	Power projection Support Monitoring Police enforcement Training Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence friendly population in order to expand influence - Focus economic means to likely successful areas - Deterrence - Combined arms - QRU - Boots on the ground - Legitimate approach - Co-operation with population & local security forces - Mine clearance - Building roads- and bridges - Supplying resources - Fire extinguishment - Humanitarian support - Interference of ethnical cleansing - Framework operations - Surveillance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reinstatement of Rule of Law - Possible interference - Liaison Contribute to reformation of existing police structure/ rebuilding of a new one - Police missions - Arrest operations - Escorting civilian transports - Crowd control - Patrolling - Training local security forces - In some cases assist with military equipment - Protecting the forces' and others' operations and objects

The table shows the different descriptions of methods and measures in the three documents, whereas they all use different definitions of the actual methods and measures. The methods are, as previously stated, ways of achieving the stated goals, where the measures can be described as ways/conditions to enable the method. As an example the French operational stage Acting (method) is conducted with combined arms operations, a joint framework and multinationality (measures), as well as the Swedish Power projection (method) is enabled by deterrence, combined arms and boots on the ground (measures). The author has chosen to keep the documents' definitions in order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion. For a graphic illustration of the French operative phase of stabilization see Appendix III.

The RMO states that a comprehensive approach in stabilization is vital to achieve the overall goal, where military and civilian operations are closely coordinated. The FT-02 states the similar, whereas the FT-01 states that the military commitment is comprehensively described according to a continuum of operations: intervention, stabilization and normalization.

In the context of the international theatre of stabilization, all documents mention that measures for success are interoperability in the multinational operations, and a mutual respect and understanding for other actor's culture and capacity. Measures that involve a common ground for equipment, technology, language skills and training are also mentioned in similar ways in all documents.

The emphasis on an understanding of the Rules of Engagements during the stabilization is a vital measure according to all documents, where the legitimacy is a returning keyword.

The FT-01 mentions the French land force's three-fold operational posture, which means that the land forces are able to simultaneously execute actions of force, security and assistance. The document further states that the stabilization phase involves three overall actions: Security actions, Actions to support the population, and Reviving actions. These are conducted with the support of four operational stages: Acting, Controlling, Adapting and Mentoring, which involves several conditions for conduct. In the FT-02 the mentioned actions are described as tactical methods of security and assistance operations, which are achieved by the generic courses of actions and different missions.

Stabilization includes six stability methods in the RMO, which are described as: Power projection, Support, Monitoring, Police enforcement, Training, Protection.

The RMO states that the operative concept of stabilization includes measures of gaining the support of the population and controlling the environment, which is achieved by initially influencing the part of the population that is against the opponent, where thereafter the part of the population that remains hostile will be isolated and easier to oppose. These measures can be linked to the operative control on the ground. Similar measures are concretized as quadrillage and oils spots in the FT-02, where force ratio and influence ratio are two additional principles described. It is further mentioned, in the FT-02, that during security operations, the need to dominate the environment requires a more constraining force ratio, whereas the influence ratio must be assessed in a comprehensive manner. Figures based on lessons learned from history and recent operations recommend an influence ratio of 1 to 50 inhabitants, and against an armed insurgency a local force ratio of 3 to 1, where the influence ratio required to launch this type of action is 20 friendly troops to 1 insurgent. No similar statement could be found in the RMO.

In the operational stage of control, the FT-01 mentions that the development of crowd control techniques and of reduced lethality weapons and ammunitions are likely to reinforce the operational capability of troops operating among civilian populations. It is further stated in the FT-02 that the evacuation of a threatened population or crowd control requires identical tactical action. The crowd control is mentioned similarly in the context of police enforcement in the RMO, but the evacuation of a threatened population or the examples of identification of the population could not be found.

The FT-01 states that the combination of intelligence, technology and systemic analysis are vital element in all operations, where the land forces have to be aware of the opponent's means and measures for propaganda, as well as being able to conduct offensive and defensive information operations themselves. The external information is further mentioned in the FT-02 to be a vital instrument when the military action is applied to the population. Similar measures as mentioned in the RMO as information operations. In this phase of the operation, the FT-02 mentioned that assistance is a way to win over the neutrality of the assisted populations as well as the public opinion, and hopefully their cooperation. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

The turnaround of local warlords or armed gangs, are further mentioned in the FT-01 as a method aimed at cutting off the insurgents' supplies and intelligence sources. A similar statement could not be found in the RMO.

To monitor the re-/construction of civil institutions, juridical systems and the police force, are stated in the RMO as measures to maintain and achieve stability. The FT-01 describes the similar measures in the mentoring stage, where the disarmament of the combatants, training of the local forces and the support of nation building are further mentioned. The FT-02 describes these measures in the context of assistance operations. The support is partly described in the RMO as; the military units should not be considered the first hand choice regarding support operations, furthermore as an additional asset with the ability to force. The RMO also states that the training of the local security forces, can in some cases be complemented with support in the form of military equipment.

In the context of training the local security forces the FT-01 states that the training or refreshing of local defense and security forces is vital for the re-establishment of the rule-of-law in a country, since without them the forces cannot be relived and expand/continue the stabilization.

4 Result

This part of the essay will answer the research question: *How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents' view on stability operations be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?*

ASPECT	QUESTION	ANSWER		
		FT-01	FT-02	RMO
Goals and aims	What do the doctrine express to be achieved and why should this be achieved?	Re-establish a safe and secure environment, governmental services, infrastructure and humanitarian relief in order to establish the conditions for the achievements of the strategic objective and thereby a return to peace.	Domination of the environment and the revival of the political, administrative and economic life to enable the normalization phase.	To let other actors operate in a stable environment, where the overall goal is to achieve the political end-state of peace and development.
The Opponent	How do the doctrine characterize the opponent and what is stated about the opponent's ambitions?	Irregular, fights through media with the ambitions to undermine the legitimacy of the land force's presence and Influence the exit strategy	Irregular, uses religion, nationalism, narcotics and the rejection of western values as his motivators in order to legitimize his cause and make the forces and/or the government the common enemy.	The opponent is irregular with ambitions to affect the present social system with violence.
Methods and Measures	What methods and measures are principally described to be used in order to achieve identified goals and aims?	The stabilization phase involves three overall actions (Security actions, Actions to support the population, and reviving actions) these are conducted with the support of four operational stages (Acting, Controlling, Adapting and Mentoring) which involves several conditions for conduct.	The principles of quadrillage and oil spots are used in order to control the environment, where the tactical methods of security and assistance operations are achieved by the generic courses of actions and different missions.	The operative control of the ground enables the six stability methods (Power projection, Support, Monitoring, Police enforcement, Training and Protection) to reach the operative concept of stabilization.

The studied doctrines can be characterized in the overall level of a general consensus regarding the main principles of stabilization and stability operations: the initial control of environment, the support and assistance to the population and other actors, the reviving of the social and juridical structures, and the continuation towards peace where the forces can withdraw.

The French doctrines contain a higher level of details regarding the tactical methods and principles; Oil spots, Quadrillage, Force and Influence ratio, and the measures for how the actual re-construction and re-building should take place, compared to the Swedish RMO that mainly involves the initial stages of intervention and laying the foundations for further development, where the gap between these phases and the desired end-state of peace is vaguely described.

Summary of the aspects; Goals and aims, The Opponent and Methods and Measures:

Goals and Aims

FT-01 and RMO: The desired end-state of force withdrawal is described similarly, as well as the descriptions of a stable, safe and secure environment in order to let other actors work and enable humanitarian relief. The FT-01 contains a higher level of details, where several sub-goals are described (the transition to normalization, re-establishment of basic-services, the enabling of confidence building, the defeat of the opponent e.g.).

FT-02 and RMO: The descriptions of achieving the political and strategic goal as well as the environmental control are similar (suppressing the opponent, freedom of movement, influencing the population). The FT-02 contains a higher level of details regarding how the goals are achieved (security actions, actions to support the population, actions to revive political, administrative and economic life) and have a more offensive approach (both the opponents and populations are seen as actors that needs to be controlled and influenced).

The French doctrines' descriptions of goals and aims in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details and an offensive approach towards the actors. The Swedish doctrinal document's descriptions are characterized by a strong strategic-political end-state, where the detail level on the operative and tactical level is low, and a segregation of humanitarian and military actors can be noticed.

The opponent

FT-01 and RMO: The descriptions of the opponent are similar (Irregular, guerilla methods, terrorism, ambitions to affect the forces' political will). The FT-01 emphasizes the opponent's use of propaganda and its possible effects, as well as describing the opponent's ambition to not only as subversive.

FT-02 and RMO: As in the FT-01, there are strong similarities of how the opponent is described in the

two documents (Multifaceted and irrational opponent with ambitions to legitimize his cause)

The French doctrines' descriptions of the opponent in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details where the effect of propaganda and the public opinion is emphasized. The Swedish doctrinal document's description of the opponent is characterized by high level of details where the irrationality and flexibility of the opponent is emphasized.

Methods and Measures

FT-01 and RMO: The descriptions of interoperability measures required in the joint and multinational theatre are similar as well as the comprehensive approach with combat and stability methods in order to gain stabilization. The FT-01 describes operational stages (Acting, controlling, adapting, mentoring) where several conditions for conduction of operations are described.

FT-02 and RMO: The descriptions of gradually expanding the influence and control of the environment, to thereafter use different stability methods in order to create a stable and secure environment are similar. The FT-02 describes tactical methods (Security and assistance operations) which are achieved by tactical principles (Quadrillage, Oilspots, Influence and Force ratio), whereas the RMO describes several stability methods (Power projection, support, monitoring, police enforcement, training and protection). The FT-02 described the tactical methods in detail (troops per inhabitant needed are exemplified in different conducts of operations) where an offensive approach (demilitarized zones, isolation/confining/controlling opponent) can be noticed.

The French doctrines' descriptions of methods and measures in stability operations are characterized by a high level of details regarding the conduct of operation where different stages, methods and tactical principles are described, where the isolation of the opponent is emphasized.

The Swedish doctrinal document's description of the methods and measures is characterized by vaguely described stability methods where the vitality of interoperability is emphasized.

Differences could be found in following matters; The French doctrine's clearly stated transition of phases: intervention, stabilization and normalization, the different tactical principles of environmental control: characterized as oil spots, quadrillage, influence and force ratio, the emphasize on the opponent's propaganda: the vital need of offensive information operations and spreading of one's own propaganda to maintain a stable public opinion, the more offensive approach towards the population and opponent; these are both seen as actors that need to be controlled and influenced. And furthestmost the content of the descriptions where stability operations are given a clearly larger space compared to the Swedish, whereas the FT-01 describes the stabilization phase and the FT-02 describes the stability methods in COIN.

Answer to the research question:

The research question *“How can contemporary Swedish and French Doctrinal documents’ view on stability operations be characterized by the means of traditional military theory aspects?”*, **can from the results described in the previous section , be answered as follows;**

The French and Swedish doctrines’ descriptions of stability operations can be characterized by a large degree of uniformity regarding articulations of goals in general.

Differences in descriptions can be characterized with a French high level of tactical details and an offensive approach towards the opponents, where the effect of propaganda is emphasized. Swedish doctrinal descriptions can however be characterized as vague descriptions of stability methods where segregation between humanitarian and military actors can be noticed, and interoperability in a multinational context is emphasized.

5 Summary and discussion

The purpose with this essay has been a possible facilitation of the work with the new Swedish operative doctrine by analyzing another nation's doctrinal descriptions and knowledge summarized in doctrines. A nation situated in the same present international operations with more experience from earlier colonization and pacification.

The main empirics used in this research are two French doctrines (FT-01, FT-02) and one Swedish doctrinal document (RMO). The documents statements are based on the countries' traditions and contemporary military thoughts according to its abilities and strategic relations. The framework and range of these doctrines may therefore be limited. The comparison and the result can be criticized to be unfair or irrelevant due to the delimitation of Swedish empirics used. A more relevant comparison might have been the Swedish operative doctrine, but since this does not exist yet, guidelines of the work in progress of it was given from the Swedish Military Headquarters (where Goals, Methods, Means were stated). A strict observation of the positions in a doctrine of a certain level must be linked to what might be said of some sister doctrine of higher or lower level. The extent of this research has delimited the use of empirics, however, it has not been written out but indirect understanding of such higher sister doctrines has influenced.¹¹³

In order to reach a high level of validity and reliability of the essay, theoretical definition and operational indicators from traditional military theory were used. Furthermore, a thorough and approved systematization of the French doctrinal organization was made in order to exclude systematical errors. Contacts with Swedish and French officers working with the different doctrines have been made, in order to get an overall understanding and guidelines of how to interpret the doctrinal documents. The validity of the research is therefore assessed as satisfactory in its context.

The theory and operational indicators, or aspects, are not specific for stabilization, whereas the *Goals and aims*, *The Opponent* and *Methods and Measures* can be seen as basic concepts in the military context. The aspects were used to support and not delimit the analysis of the empirics, where the theory of doctrines has been the essay's framework. The issue has not been about validity in the form of measurable truths, more about how well the results can be said to connect to the statements described in stabilization.

¹¹³ The Swedish *Militärstrategisk doktrin (MSD)* as well as the French *Le Livre, Blanche, JD-01 CDEAF(2011)*, *JC(FR)-3.4.9 STAB* have been read.

It is the opinion of the author that the French and Swedish forces would probably conduct stabilization similarly in an operation. The framework and foundations of the stabilization is highly corresponding: the comprehensive approach, the Rule of Law, ROE, legitimacy, control of the environment, supporting the population, assisting and enabling other actors and humanitarian relief.

The two nations would probably also reach a high level of cooperation and coherence in operations, due to the similar descriptions of an *understanding* for interoperability, similar technology, training and competence. These aspect have however just been analyzed with the nation's doctrinal documents, whereas the actual impact, implementation and the influence of different military culture has not been measured. However, since the French doctrines contain a higher level of details, it is likely that the French officers would have a clearer view of what they are supposed to do in stability operations.

The *understanding* itself can be said to contain several levels, whereas coherent descriptions in doctrinal documents are a progress towards interoperability. The actual understanding between different actors, in the conduct of the operation, can however be highly affected by the different military cultures.

One example can be the fact that the RMO express that the opponent should be isolated and then opposed in the context of environmental control, where the FT-01 and FT-02 states defeat. This can be interpreted as a more offensive approach from the French Armed Forces.

The strategic and political goal is coherent within the international mission, as well the descriptions of the opponent and similar approaches regarding methods and measures for stability. The French doctrines clearly states different phases that depend on a continuous transition between them, where the first phase, *initial intervention* on the crisis area of operations, the armed forces deploys and neutralizes the enemy forces. The second phase, *stabilization*, aims to stabilize the area in order to restore the social situation. The third phase, *normalization*, aims to restore the political balance. This could be related to the French experience of colonization and pacification from the past, where the success of the mission depends on early intervention where the forces to lie the foundation for domination of the environment, and thereby allow further transition and development.

The phases described in the French doctrines are further fully in line with the American and British doctrines of three-block war: coercion, stabilization and assistance, where the Swedish doctrines are adapted to the NATO's AJP-01 doctrine.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ *Hearts and Minds*, 2010, p 51
MSD12, 2011, p 11

The French doctrines clearly emphasize the effect of the opponent's propaganda, where the vital need of offensive information operations and spreading of one's own propaganda to maintain a stable public opinion is mentioned. This can be related to the effect that the FLN had in Algeria on the French population. The Swedish Armed Forces does not have the same experience, whereas the lack of more emphasis on this matter in the doctrinal document could be explained.¹¹⁵

The major differences that can be said to characterize the doctrinal documents are partly the level of details and statements of historical examples and lessons learned in the French doctrines. The practical knowledge can be noticed in the in the context of the different tactical principles of environmental control characterized in the French doctrines: oil spots, quadrillage, influence- and force ratio. Whereas, they mention actual relationship on number of troops needed per inhabitant and insurgents in different operations, which clearly shows the result of pragmatism in the doctrines. These descriptions are based on historical experiences from Madagascar (Gallieni), Marocco (Lyautey), Algeria (General Raoul Salan), Indochina (Trinquier, mostly Algeria as well) e.g.

These principles are partly described in the RMO, whereas the statements regarding COIN and stabilization can be assumed to be partly based on knowledge from the previously mentioned French tactics. The two countries have completely different pragmatic knowledge from historical conflicts, they have however been operating in the same areas of conflict during the late 20th and early 21th century (Kosovo, Congo, Tchad, Afghanistan e.g.).

The differences described can be said to be depending on the two nations' completely different extent of strategic, operative and tactical experiences of stability operations and COIN, and furthermore means for operations.

The examples mentioned could however be irrelevant to the Swedish Forces, since a doctrine is normative for the nation itself and its armed forces. However, it is stated that the Swedish Armed Forces does need the knowledge and the ability to, in cooperation with other nations, fight irregular opponents. If the variation of the descriptions of tactics in stabilization is as vague as indicated in the essay, it can speak for the need for more hands-on Swedish approaches for effective staff-work,

¹¹⁵ The use of propaganda inside Algeria, with focused efforts on indoctrination in schools and terror directed against schools that could not be controlled - *Becket Ian E. W, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Routledge, Oxon, 2001, p.400-404*, The attempts to internationalize the conflict, where FNL uses the media's attention after the Battle of Algiers, and make contacts in the U.S. and the UN. This is the way they eventually win - *Becket Ian E. W, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Routledge, Oxon, 2001, p.244-245*, The propaganda impact of population movements, where the result is unbalanced negatively linked to the actual achievements - *Sutton Keith, Army administration tensions over Algeria's Centres de regroupement, 1954-1962, p.253*

practice planning, joint production and above all effort. This argues in part against the position of the Defense Forces Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD), states that Sweden does not need to develop own national doctrines in the areas of military interoperability since they already exist internationally.

5.1 SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The French Armed Forces has a long experience of pacification and colonization, where the “war among the people” and “winning the hearts and minds” are “worn out phrases”, whereas what fundamentally differentiates stabilization from the French pacification operations of the past is the end state where the local authorities and population retake the ownership of their country. The Swedish armed forces have a well-developed warfare of combat in mined terrain from the cold-war, whereas the “new complex battlefield” of IEDs and guerillas can be related to the Swedish previous way of war, against a larger opponent in the east.¹¹⁶

These experiences can be said to strengthen the fact that nations as well as international organizations have to work together during stabilization, and use the “rich doctrine heritage and expertise” already existing, in order to reach the desired effect of synergy and the political- strategic end-state of peace and development.

One should not either forget that the doctrines used are official documents, whereas one can question who they are really written for. Can a guiding document for the armed forces really be used as a regulation when it has to be approved by as well the public opinion, the media and the politicians? Even the opponent can read and understand how the forces will act and are regulated.

At least, two conclusions can be made; a doctrine can be used as a deterring measure for the opponent, as well as, by the public theatre, as an approved document that regulates the Armed Forces.

The author suggests three areas for further research;

- Since the Swedish doctrinal development can be stated to be underdeveloped/or have great potential for further and more describing doctrinal documents for its forces, a continuation of research and analysis of other Armed Forces doctrines are recommended in order to support the Swedish working groups.
- Pragmatic research regarding the actual implementation of doctrines in, as well international missions as national unit's operational training. Are the present doctrines a part of their training? Are they implemented or seen as containing “to large words” for the units?

¹¹⁶ Military History Research Office of the Research and Lessons Learnt Department (CDEF), *Winning Hearts and Minds, Historical Origins of the Concept and its Current Implementation in Afghanistan*, CDEF, Paris, 2010

- Research regarding the consequences of multinational operations with its joint staffs and units, technology, equipment, training, language-skills and competence, can this be considered to be as a large friction as the opponent? And how is it dealt with?

It is further suggested that the Swedish National Defense College (FHS) and the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (HKV), recommends areas of research that is of interest/would facilitate the work of their publications to the students/cadets at the different War science departments.

5.2 REFLECTION

A doctrine makes it at easier to guess what our own troops will do, as stated in the introduction. Whereas, since the French doctrines contains a higher level of details and show clear signs of pragmatism, it is likely that the French officers have a clearer view of what they are supposed to do in stability operations. Vaguely described documents leave room for initiative and a decentralized commando, but also potential for confusion and misunderstandings in the conduct of operations.

As mentioned throughout this essay, the French Armed Forces have a background of colonization and participation of several COIN missions from past and present conflicts. The Swedish Armed Forces have been non-aligned, with a background of Peace Supporting operations with little experience of COIN.

The focus of this essay has not been the practical use of doctrines or how they are implemented in the armed forces. An interesting question/hypotheses in this essay would however be, Why there are such large differences in the doctrinal documents. The subject has been mentioned in the essay, the extent of the research has however delimited the focus/discussions on these matters.

In order to understand doctrines one has to understand the context they are in. All Armed Forces have different ways of presenting their doctrines, as well as means to develop them. It is therefore hard, not so say almost impossible, to make a straight comparison/implementation of them even in a completely theoretical approach. This does not however exclude the possibility to use others lessons learned and wisdoms in order to facilitate your own work and guiding regulations, whereas a doctrine can be as well a tool for education, change or command.

As mentioned before, the precise definition and content of a doctrine differ between nations. The Swedish definition of a doctrine states to describe how the Swedish Armed Forces aim to build and use the military force, whereas the French states that a doctrine aims at a common way to see things. The statements are similar, but do however leave a large forum for interpretations. The overall aim is however to present the basic principles that guide the armed forces when pursuing an objective, in this case stabilization.

The authors lessons-learned from writing this essay can be as just stated; it is hard to understand doctrines due to their complex relationship to its Armed Forces, it is further complex to understand them in the military culture they are in, since one have to understand their background as well as how they are "related" to its Armed Forces. A more practical research would have been interesting to conduct, since the question "Why" is constantly returning in this sort of strictly theoretical, military, research. However, it is first now after the research is finished that this question has become obvious and its necessity is understood.

The interest has, however, been awaken, further knowledge have been maintained, and a foundation of understanding for the complexity of War science have been achieved during this research, which can be seen as necessary elements for further research and development in a, young, officer's career.

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PICTURES

Picture I: Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *General Tactics*, CDEF, Paris, 2010, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *Les Fondamentaux de la Manœuvre Interarmes*, CDEF, Paris, 2011, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *The Tactical Commander's Guide to Command and Control in Operations*, CDEF, Paris, 2011, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *Winning the battle Building peace*, CDEF, Paris, 2007

Picture II: Försvarmakten, *Militärstrategisk doktrin med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*, Försvarmakten, Stockholm, 2011 & Försvarmakten, *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, Försvarmakten, Stockholm, 2005

Picture III: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/ministere/organisation/organisation-du-ministere-de-la-defense-et-des-anciens-combattants/organigramme/organigramme>

Picture IV: Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), *Winning the battle Building peace*, CDEF, Paris, 2007

Picture V: http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine_us.htm

Picture VI: http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/les_cahiers_recherche.htm

Picture VII: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations' (CICDE), *JC(FR) – 3.4.9 STAB*, CICDE, 2011, p 11

Appendix I

THE FRENCH DOCTRINAL ORGANISATION STRUCTURE



The defense minister is assisted by the chief of Staff of the armed forces (Chef d'État-Major des armées) for the general organization of armies and joint agencies under its authority, their preparation and implementation condition of employment as well as capability choices. The chief of Staff of the armed forces is further assisted by the Chief of staff of the Army (Chef d'État-Major de l'armée de terre). Doctrine Center for Forces Employment (CDEF) and the Centre for Joint concepts, doctrines and experiments (CICDE) are outside agencies directly subordinated to the Chief of staff of the Army.

Picture III: Simplified flowchart of the Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs¹¹⁷ (With the authors own addition with CDEF and CICDE)

CICDE

(Joint Forces Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation – Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations')

At national level, the CICDE; Is associated with preliminary studies necessary for the design of concepts and doctrines; Designs and updates joint forces concepts and doctrine literature, within an inter-ministerial and combined framework, based on prospective studies and experience feedback; Supervises concept experimentations and proposes the adjustments necessary for a constantly evolving environment. At international level, the CICDE represents France in international organizations responsible for designing concepts and conducting experimentations. The objectives assigned to the CICDE are subject to three-year planning and yearly programming accompanied by priorities and resources. These decisions are made under the authority of the Chief of Defense. Firmly focused on operational studies, the CICDE supervises a vast network of multi- disciplinary civilian and military experts, both French and foreign. It is in close contact with mirror organizations from each part of the military as well as higher military education.

¹¹⁷ <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/ministere/organisation/organisation-du-ministere-de-la-defense-et-des-anciens-combattants/organigramme/organigramme> accessed 2012-05-08 21.00

The French White Paper on National Defense and Security

The national security strategy is defined in the French White Paper on National Defense and Security, the White Paper. The concept on the employment of French Armed Forces derives from this national security strategy and contributes to the definition of the overall military strategy by defining the context in which the Armed Forces may intervene, as well as the conditions for the exercise of military action. The white paper imposed an overhaul of the Capstone concept on the employment of armed forces (Concept d'emploi des forces).¹¹⁸

The White Paper defines French strategy in a 15-year perspective, embracing both defense and national security. It includes foreign security and domestic security, military and civilian means, tools and approaches.¹¹⁹ The document involves the spectrum of force protection and land combat capabilities, nuclear attack submarines to cyber-war capabilities.

The Capstone Concept on the Employment of the Armed Forces

The Capstone concept (JC [FR]-01) defines the framework in which the armed forces are to operate, the general military strategy to be implemented and the conditions for the use of military force. It is the translation of the guidance contained in the White Paper, and serves as the foundation of the joint forces' conceptual and doctrinal writings.¹²⁰

Concept on the Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilization

This document (JC [FR] - 3.4.9) is intended for the strategic and operational levels and is applicable to the entire armed forces (including the National Gendarmerie¹²¹). It is pragmatic and provides the operational staff with useful guidance regarding the practice of stabilization in operational theatres abroad. The document aims to clarify the place and role of the armed forces with respect to the other actors involved, i.e. what they must, can, cannot and must not do in this specific engagement framework. The White Paper sets standards in the field of stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations' (CICDE), *JC-01 (Joint Concept)*, CICDE, 2010, p 5

¹¹⁹ Ministry of Defense and homeland security, *The French White Paper on defense and national security*, Ministry of Defense and homeland security, Paris, 2008, p 4

¹²⁰ Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations' (CICDE), *JC-01 (Joint Concept)*, CICDE, 2010, p 5

¹²¹ France's two state police forces are the military organized Gendarmerie Nationale, the French Armed Forces fourth armed service, and civilian State Police, Police Nationale.

¹²² *JC(FR) – 3.4.9 STAB*, 2011, p 9-10

CDEF


(Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces - Forces Employment Doctrine Center) exists "Par les forces, pour les forces" ("Through the Forces, For the Forces").

The main missions of the CDEF are distributed among the divisions, placed under the direct authority of the Director:

- The Doctrine Division (DDo) is in charge of all the force employment doctrine activities (design, writing, dissemination, teachings) within the Army.
- The Lessons Learned Division (DREX) co-ordinates the Lessons Learned function for the Army. It defines the lessons and steers their processing in three domains: doctrine, training and equipment.
- The Modelling Simulation and Operational Research Division (DSRO) acts as an advisor for combat simulation and decision-making expertise. It develops the simulation tools for the forces' CPs and carries out operational analysis studies.
- The Support and Documentation Division (DAD) runs and supports the CDEF. It finalizes the presentation of the documents and disseminates them.¹²³



Picture IV: The doctrinal manual is part of the ongoing series of 'Capstone Doctrine' documents of the Army's doctrinal corpus. It intendeds to specify the French approach to operational command in the light of the field manuals and handbooks that the key allies have recently published on the same topic.¹²⁴



Picture V: The quarterly Doctrine tactique magazine is primarily concerned with studies on the employment of forces. This magazine is produced in both French and US English versions. The purpose of the English version is to spread French Army doctrine and military thoughts among foreign militaries.¹²⁵




Picture VI: The Journal of scholarly research (DREX) is the result of studies by the research office, potentially in conjunction with specialist agencies in the field of defense.¹²⁶

¹²³ http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/cdef/overview_cdef.htm accessed 2012-05-08 23.00

¹²⁴ http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/doctrineFT/doc_fond_english.htm accessed 2012-05-08 23.15

¹²⁵ http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine_us.htm accessed 2012-05-08 23.00

¹²⁶ http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/les_cahiers_recherche.htm accessed 2012-05-08 23.15



Picture VII: The Joint Concept and Doctrine Hierarchy.

- The black circle shows the White Paper;
- The blue circle shows the Capstone concept on the Employment of Armed Forces (JC[FR]-01);
- The red circle shows the Contribution of the Armed Forces in Stability Operations (JC[FR]-3.4.9);
- The orange circle shows the Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces (JD[FR]-01).
- The green circle shows the Army doctrines (FT-01-FT-05)

(Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations' (CICDE), *JC(FR) – 3.4.9 STAB*, CICDE, 2011, p 11)


Appendix II

Abbreviations:

AJP	Allied Joint Publication/ <i>Publication interarmées</i>
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CCEAF	Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces
CEF	<i>Concept d'Emploi des Forces / Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces</i>
CICDE	<i>Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d'Expérimentations / Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation</i>
CM	Crisis Management
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
DmarkO	Doktrin för Markoperationer
DDR	Disarmament-Demobilisation-Reintegration
EU	European Union
FJP	French Joint Publication
JC(FR)	French Joint Concept
JD(FR)	French Joint Doctrine
IO	Information Operations
MIO	Military Influence Operations
MSD	Militärstrategisk Doktrin
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
RMO	Reglemente för Markoperationer
RoE	Rules of Engagement
UN	United Nations
SSR	Security Sector Reform

Appendix III

A graphic illustration of the French Methods and Measures in the Stabilization phase.



Stabilization is a decisive phase to achieve the strategic objective. It entails various types of actions in keeping with the land force's three-fold operational posture.

Conducting operations (FT-01)

The conditions to enable the operations

Tactical principles

FT-02 Tactical Methods

Generic courses of Action (Corps) and Missions (Brigade)