Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan   2011-05-25
Martin Björnfors
SA VT 11

Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan

Ecoles de
Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan

Bachelors Thesis, 15 cp

Writer		Program	
Martin Björnfors		OP 08-11	
Tutor		**Number Of Pages:** 50	
Didier Danet		**Security classification:** Unclassified	
Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan	*Report date -11*	*Swedish Defence College*	
Institution: CREC (Centre de Reserch Ecole Coëtquidan)		Bachelor's Thesis War science	

I

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Insurgent organisation structure

A neglected subject?

Abstract

On 1 November, 1954 an armed insurgency against French rule commenced with a large scale terrorist attack throughout various parts of Algeria. France responded by sending troops from the continent to Algeria and was soon involved in a full out counterinsurgency against the Front Liberé National (FLN), a revolutionary movement organised in a classical communist insurgent pattern. Many of the experiences the French gained conducting counterinsurgency in Algeria have been examined by writers of COIN literature. The conclusions have been incorporated into counterinsurgency doctrines of many countries, and the works of Galula, who experienced the war, is considered basic literature for many counterinsurgency courses. This has been inherited by modern COIN literature. The US FM 3.24 draws from the French experiences and theorists in its main body.

This essay examines whether modern counterinsurgency literature derived from French experiences and theories gained, fighting FLN fails to address the question on how the insurgent organisation is structured. It provides a few arguments why we should know this, such as knowing your enemy's structure will help you understand his vulnerabilities. To archive this and lay a foundation for the argumentation it first compares the Algerian FLN to modern day Taliban to establish if their organisational structures are different or similar.

Key words: Counterinsurgency, insurgent, organisation, structure, Algeria, Afghanistan, comparison, COIN theory

II

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1. Introduction

The FLN incited revolt and following insurgency against France between 1954 and 1962 resulted in Algerian independence. On a military and tactical level, the French military counterinsurgency was successful and the FLN was all but beaten when due to political decisions, the freedom of Algeria was granted.[1]

During the war was, among others, Roger Trinquer was serving as a senior ranking officer. His *"La Guerre moderne"*[2] based on his experiences in Vietnam and Algeria, was published 1961 and his thoughts influenced the ongoing French counterinsurgency in Algeria. In the Algerian counterinsurgency, these theories were put to the test and practically examined. The practical experience gained was soon concluded in theoretical works by other French officers who had participated in the Algerian war. Galula and Bigeard both served in Algeria during the war and wrote major works on COIN.[3]

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 victory was almost instant, but soon an insurgency broke out. Trying to grasp the worsening situation military theorists looked back to French counterinsurgency literature and composed a new manual, based on old knowledge.

"The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, of December 2006, relies heavily on Galulas ideas, especially regarding the focus on social and political reform."[4]

Now, on the same basis the COIN in Afghanistan is being conducted. However, the French had fought another type of insurgent. The Taliban organisational structure is nothing similar to that of what FLN was as we soon shall see. So even despite obvious differences literature written or based on the French experiences has been used in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan as

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[1] Nationalencyklopedin, *Algerietrevolten*, NE, 2011, accessed on 2011-03-31,

<http://www.ne.se/lang/algerietrevolten>

[2] Trinquir, R, *Modern warfare, a French view of counterinsurgency.* Pall mall press Ltd, London, 1964

[3] Griffin, C, *Major combat operations and counterinsurgency warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959-1960*, *Security Studies,* vol 19, no 3, 2010, Page 555-589. Page 560

[4] Griffin. Page 561

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COIN literature. But are theories gained from fighting one enemy really applicable to use fighting another? Would you like to eat soup with a knife or would you prefer a spoon? This essay will examine the FLN and the Taliban organisational structure. It will compare the structure of both the organisations and finally use the result from the comparison to see whether they are similar or not. If not, is this something taken into consideration in modern COIN-literature?

A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

There has been a debate whether modern counterinsurgency literature is based on a too selective part of history. This comes from the fact that the U.S counterinsurgency manual (FM) 3-24 some argue, is based on experiences from a narrow part of history and geography. This narrow part of history are mainly French experiences and writings from Algeria and Indochina and what has come to be called the French revolutionary war school.[5] The French experiences there lead up to what we call a population centred approach and is the theoretical ground on which, for example FM 3-24 is based upon. The critics argue that there are other theories and that the French will not always provide the best example.

In the light of what's been written, this essay can be said to contribute to, and also be seen as an interjection to the enemy or population centric COIN approach debate. The study aims to describe and compare the FLN and Taliban insurgent organisational structure. It will look into how the organisations were structured, the evolution of the structure and then to compare them both to see if there are any differences or similarities. In the perspective of these results I will look into FM 3-24 and literature of which it is compiled, to examine if it fully addresses how the insurgents are structured, as the insurgents today are not the same as the revolutionary insurgents of the 1950's. It will also try to provide a few arguments why addressing insurgent organisational structure is important.

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[5] Gentil, GP, 'The selective use of history in the development of American counterinsurgency doctrine', *Army history,* vol.20-09-3, no.72, 2009, accessed on 2011-04-27,

<http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH72%28W%29.pdf> Page 21

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B. AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The aim and research presented in this essay can be looked on as a three stage rocket. The first stage is used to establish if there is a difference in the organisational structures of different insurgents. The primary research question is:

- What differences and what similarities are there between the FLN and the Taliban organisational structures?

The second stage is to provide a few arguments to why knowing insurgent organisation structure is important to us and therefore legitimate this essay.

- Can I provide some arguments on why it is important to know the structure of your enemy?

The third stage is to examine the literature to see if it actually addresses insurgent organisation structure and if not, look in to why.

- Are insurgent organisational structures addressed in modern COIN according to FM 3-24 with references?

C. RESEARCH MATERIAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW

C.1 Taliban insurgent organisation

The research material I've primarily used in this research is secondary sources, in the way of written research and reports. Thus as in ongoing war and counter-insurgency it is hard to find some information on the organisation of the Taliban because it is classified. All information used about Taliban structural organisation is open source information.

C.2 FLN insurgent organisation

The research material of the structure of the FLN organisation is primarily based on secondary sources in the form of literature and research reports. I have used some documents from French sources on the Algerian war that was recently declassified. Apart from this, I have also talked to experts on the subject. These persons have exclusively been French.

C.3 Validation of the material

Many of the sources used have been written by American militaries and scientist. The work on FLN has been complied of mostly American and French sources which might add a built in partiality. But the essay is on an objective subject, the structure of the organisation and not on a controversial subject such as for example torture. Therefore have I considered errors only be made by mistake and not intentionally. The same goes for the chapter on the Taliban. Of course it would have been useful and added legitimacy to the work to have a first hand source from for example the FLN organisation but this has not been possible. An expanded section on the various databases and sources used can be found in Appendix A. There I've compiled some of the information from the homepages of the sources to see if they for example are peer viewed before published and if they apply any other principles to their work.

D. DELIMITATION

Firstly, this essay will try to establish if insurgent structure is important to know, if it differentiates and if it is addressed in COIN theory. Therefore this essay deals with the COIN subject. Within this broad subject I have chosen to look into insurgency itself and the insurgent organisation. The ones I chose were the FLN and the Taliban. I chose these two because experiences from the first are applied to the latter one. I further delimited the work by looking into the specific structure of each respective organisation. This means leaving out a deeper penetration of other structural inputs such as ideology and environment.


Fig. 1 Delimitation of work

I have chosen to work with the *US FM 31-4.2 Counterinsurgency handbook* to a great extent. This is mainly because it has become the symbol and debate of modern COIN. It is also course literature at the Swedish military academy. I chose to see whether it addresses the structure of the insurgent organisation as a way to analyse the enemy.

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E. LIMITATIONS

One limitation to the work has been because it is as an ongoing insurgency, much of the assessments and reports on the Taliban organisation are still classified. What can be examined are bits and pieces from open sources. These tend to be limited as well and the same facts and sources tend to be presented in various works on the Taliban. Secondly, the rather flat and covert structure of the Taliban makes it hard to describe their organisation schematically. Third, some of the more interesting sources on FLN have been written in French, which include reports issued during the insurgency. Due to limited linguistic skills it has been hard to translate and use these sources as extensively as I would have liked. It has also been hard to get a general organisation tree of the FLN and the one presented in the essay is made by the author himself.

F. TERMINOLOGY

F.1 Definitions

Insurgency

Insurgency is a contentious term. The conflict in Algeria can be called anything from civil war to revolution, depending on which definition you want to use. The Afghanistan Taliban is a bit easier to define as an insurgent even though the conflict could be described as a civil war equally well. As this essay deals with insurgent organisations, it is important to see that both organisations can fit into the definition of an insurgent. In my essay, I have used the term insurgency in a broad sense, rather including than excluding. As a reference I have used United States FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98) (Field manual; Tactics in Counterinsurgency) which defines insurgency as;

"[…] an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (…) the key distinction between an insurgency and other movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals. An insurgency is typically an internal struggle within a state, not between states. It is normally a protracted political and military struggle designed to weaken the existing government's power, control, and legitimacy, while increasing the insurgency's power, control, and legitimacy." [6]

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[6] Headquarters department of the army, *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in counterinsurgency*, Federation of American Scientists, 2009, accessed on <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24-2.pdf> Page 13

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Organisation

Organisation in this essay refers to a group of people who work together in a structured way for a shared purpose.[7]

Structure

Structure in general refers to the internal relationship and context between the different parts of a whole. In other words how an entirety is built up by its elements.[8] In this essay the organisational structure is the relationship between the elements, for example leadership and the guerrillas but also how the elements themselves are built up.

F.2 Abbreviations

ALN – Armé liberté national (National Liberation Army)

CCE - Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution (Committee of coordination and enforcement)

COIN – Counterinsurgency

CRNA - Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (National Council of the Algerian Revolution)

CRUA - Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action

FATA – Federally administered tribal areas

FLN – Front National Liberté (National Liberation Front)

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom

OS – Organisation Secréte

MTLD (Mouvement Pour le Triomphe de Libertio Democratique

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OTAN – Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord

TTP – Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

UGTA - Union Générale des Travailleurs Alégriens

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[7] Cambridge Dictionaries online, *Organisation,* 2011, Cambridge university press, accessed on 2011-04-27

<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/organisation_1#organisation_1__3>

[8] Nationalencyklopedin, *Struktur*, 2011, NE, retrieved on 2011-05-04

<http://www.ne.se/lang/struktur>

2. Method

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to provide the methodology to answer the primary and secondary research questions stated in this essay. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is the introduction which familiarizes the reader with the framework of chapter three. The second section is research design. In this section, the choice of method and a description of how the method was used to generate data and produce findings is presented. The third section is called procedure. This section describes the process used in the course of this study. The fourth and last section is the summary, which aims to sum up the content presented in the chapter.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN

B.1 Choice of method

I chose the method of a qualitative literature study to conduct a comparison, but also a hypothesis examination. The result from the comparison is used to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis is that modern COIN theory (represented by the manual FM 3-24) is influenced by theorists that have gained their experiences fighting a specific type of insurgent organisation and therefore fails to address the structure of modern insurgencies and the importance of knowing this. To establish if structure is addressed in FM 3-24 I had to do a qualitative search in this manual and references used in this.

B.2 Motive for choice of method

I chose the method of comparison because, to be able to verify or falsify the hypothesis I needed to have the structure of an insurgent used in classical COIN literature as well as a modern insurgent and establish if they are similar or not. You would not use the same tool or method to peel a potato as to peel an orange. It would in fact be possible, but there are in fact better ways. By describing the organisational structure of both the FLN and the Taliban we can in fact see if they are both 'potatoes' or 'an orange and a potato'. This is important to know when testing the hypothesis. If they turn out to be different this should be addressed in the literature as different structured organisations function and behave differently and have different vulnerabilities and strengths.

C. USE OF FM 3-24.2 TACTICS IS COUNTERINSURGENCY

In this essay the results from the organisation comparison era used to verify or falsify the hypothesis presented. As modern COIN literature I have chosen to work with the U.S FM 3-24 as it represents the combined knowledge of modern U.S COIN theory and practice. [9] It is distributed to the soldiers and marines and officers in the United States. The United States being involved in recently two major insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan recently and carrying the majority of responsibility in both theatres gives this choice legitimacy. It is also used as course literature at the Swedish national defence college. FM 3-24.2 chapter two deals with the foundations of insurgency and the insurgent organisation and it is here I will look for material to answer my research question.

D. PROCEDURE

The comparison is done by using open source literature, newspaper articles and speaking to Algeria war experts to gather facts and to compile two chapters. The first describes the FLN organisational structure and the second describes the Taliban organisational structure. This will wield whether a) They are similar or b) They are different. If they are different it means that they should have different weaknesses and therefore if not addressed in Fm 3-24, verify my hypothesis. Thereafter I scoped through the FM 3.24 and some references to see whether it addresses insurgent structure. This can result in a) It is addressed or b) its not addressed. If the result from the essay turns out to be b) they are different and b) it's not addressed I consider the hypothesis to be verified. Finally I will provide some arguments deriving from manoeuvre warfare thought on the importance of knowing the enemies organisation structure.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter outlined how this essay will answer the aim and research questions pointed out. This will be done by a qualitative literature analysis comparing the organisations and testing the results with a hypothesis. The Taliban and FLN organisations will be described in subsequent chapters and a discussion will follow. Based on the facts presented and the discussion conclusions will be drawn and presented in the final chapter.

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[9] B, Connable & MC, Libicki. *How insurgencies end,* RAND Corporation, 2010, accessed on 2010-05-26, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510427&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> Page 10.

3. FLN

A. INTRODUCTION

FLN was a revolutionary movement, active in the Algerian war, created in the 1950s, with the political aim of Algerian independence from France and active in the Algerian war. The organisation drew its main support from the large Muslim population of Algeria. Competing initially with other political factions with the same political aims, FLN endured and stood solely victorious at the end of the conflict.

10 million inhabitants lived in Algeria in 1959 consisting of 9 million Muslims and one million "Pied Noirs"[10]. The absolute majority of the Muslim population lived in rural areas with initially little French oversight. They were in general illiterate with only 6 percent of the male populace and 2 percent of the female being able to read, which made it hard for them to get public jobs. [11] Landowning in Algeria was not very proportionate to the composition of the population with 2 percent of the population owning 25 percent of the arable land. Meanwhile, lack of jobs affected at least one third of the Muslim population leading to mass migration to the cities where ghettos soon grew up.[12] Examining this further leads to political barriers erected early in the history of French Algeria. Originating from a compromise from the first years, which allowed native inhabitants to preserve their traditional legal system, natives fell under something called Muslim status. The people in this category lacked political representation. All inhabitants of Algeria were considered French but citizenship was granted automatically only to French Europeans making the Muslims a kind of second class citizens.[13]

This resulted in civil unrest and in 1954 the conflict came to a bloody start with FLN conducting simultaneous terrorist attacks throughout the whole of Algeria. France, on the other hand, had in 1957 just lost the Indochina war, had been forced to withdraw from Suez by the super powers and had no intention on leaving Algeria without a fight. Furthermore,

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[10] A Pied noir was a French citizen of various origin that lived in Algeria mainly descendants of European settlers and made up 13% of the populace in 1961.

[11] FM Gougeon, *The Challe plan: Vain yet indispensable victor,* Small wars and Insurgencies, vol. 16, no. 3, 2005, pp. 293 - 316, accessed 2011-04-15, Informaworld. Page 295-296

[12] Ibid. Page 296-97

[13] Ibid Page 297

Algeria was seen as an integrated part of France itself since 1848 and had been under civil administration for decades. The war was characterized by acts of violence from both sides, terrorism and from a military point of view, new methods of staining an insurgency. And even, despite the fact that the French military enjoyed highly successful counterinsurgency, ultimately, the insurgency led to the release of Algeria as a free nation in 1962.

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This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, introduction, introduces the reader to the conflict and outlines the subsequent sections. The second section is called origins and briefly summarizes the creation of the FLN. The third chapter is called structure and describes the FLN structure. It aspires to show an organisation tree of the organisation and then subsequently describes the elements of which the tree is composed. It also tries to describe the relationship between the elements and how they interacted. The fourth section is called inputs and schematically describes different inputs that shape the organisation such as ideology and strategy. The final section is a summary where the most important parts from the chapter are summarised.

B. ORIGINS

The insurgents in Algeria whom the French forces fought during the 50s and early 60s were a political movement and a party called the FLN (Front Liberté National). The armed wing of the FLN was the ALN (Armé Liberté National).[14] This was not the first political movement in Algeria to appear making the segregation and poor political representation for the native Muslim inhabitants a political question. The predecessor to FLN, an earlier revolutionary movement was called the OS (Organisation Special). This organisation was organised hierarchically with a national chief and under him regional commanders, something that lived on to the later FLN's structure.[15]

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[14] Y, Gortzak, *Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954 – 1962,* University of North Texas, 2007, accessed on 2011-04-23 <http://www.psci.unt.edu/enterline/UNT4.pdf> Page 3

[15] KC, Leahy, *The impact of technology on the command, control, and organisational structure of insurgent groups,* Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, accessed on 2011-05-04 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA437024> Page 29

After the OS was disbanded by the French authorities, soon a new organisation called the CRUA (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action) appeared. FLN was created in October 1954 and sprung out of CRUA when it officially changed its name and merged with other political elements. CRUA was created by among others; Ben Bella after the French police had broken up OS, and was based in Cairo where Ben Bella lived in exile.


Fig. 2 Origins of FLN

The Algerian insurgents had at least six months to build up their organisation in 1954 and 55 since the failure from the French side to recognize there was unrest in Algeria. It was first in August 1955 that France started calling in reservists and committing troops to Algeria.[16] This gave them a head start and when the reaction came from the French side, they were already an established organisation.

C. STRUCTURE

C.1 Political Structure

As an organisation, the FLN came to shift from a rather decentralized state to a more centralized one throughout the course of the insurgency. Initially, the local motivation from tribes and local chiefs was the main driving force.[17] The driving force of the FLN was to establish itself as an organisation, gain political recognition and ultimately seize the power in Algeria. Up until the outbreak of the revolution when the organisation still was called the CRUA, both military and political functions were unified within the structure. This was

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[16] Gortzak. Page 4

[17] Gougeon. Page 309

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changed when the newly formed FLN was split into two delegations, an external that was political and an internal military one.[18] Both the political and military wing operated from safe havens abroad such as Tunis and Cairo, as well as from inside Algeria initially.


Fig. 3 FLN structure until 1956 on a strategic level simplified

C.1.1 External delegation and foreign liaison

The external delegation was primarily responsible for establishing foreign support for the insurgency including funds, diplomatic and military aid.[19] The external delegations were situated in Tunisia and Cairo in Egypt where they were put under the wings of Egypt's President Nasser. Ben Bella along with Khider and Ait Ahmed formed the external delegation in Cairo with the aim of gaining international recognition for their struggle as well as foreign aid to the struggle.[20] While Egypt gave full support and became the foremost supporter to the

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[18] PA, Jureidini, *Case studies in insurgency and revolutionary warfare: Algeria 1954 – 1962,* The Defense Technical Information Center, 1963, accessed on 2011-05-16,

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0436814&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> Page 82.

[19] Jureidini. Page 83.

[20] Global security.com, *Algerian National Liberation (1954-1962),* John E Pike, accessed on 29-04-11

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm>

12

FLN, the other members of the Arab League also contributed with financial, political and diplomatic support. Yugoslavia sent military and medical supplies to the FLN from 1957 and onward. When Tunisia and Morocco were granted independence they became safe havens for FLN, who established bases on Tunisian and Moroccan soil.[21]

C.1.2 Internal delegation

The internal delegation was composed of political leaders from each district (Wilaya)[22] After the creation of the FLN, the internal delegation was responsible for directing the military elements of the insurgency and held power for local decisions. [23]

C.1.3 Propaganda

Intensive propaganda with messages to both the French and the Muslim population was broadcast from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Albania, Hungary and the Soviet Union.[24] Algerian underground also featured clandestine press.

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Several reasons, including a shortage of arms for the insurgency and lack of communication between the two delegations, led to a schism within the insurgent organisation. This led to the 1956 Soumman valley conference, where the leadership of the FLN came together. Another important question raised at the conference was the need of a more centralized organisation.[25] At the conference it was decided that the interior would be prioritized over the exterior in allocation of resources but that political issues were prioritised over military.[26] This was manifested in that both the delegations were replaced by the CNRA, the highest and policymaking organ of the FLN, and the CCE, the FLN war council.

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[21] Jureidini. Page 104-105

[22] Leahy. Page 29

[23] Jureidini. Page 83.

[24] D, Galula. *Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958,* 2nd edition, RAND corporation, Santa Monica, 2006. Page 16

[25] Kraft, *The Struggle,* pp. 80-81. As quoted in Jureidini. Page 83.

[26] Jureidini. Page 83-84.

Fig. 4 FLN structure late in the insurgency, simplified

C.1.4 CRNA

CRNA can be seen as a kind of parliament with thirty four elected delegated from the whole of Algeria.[27] The CRNA included both leaders from the former external and internal delegation and its function was: [28]

"The CNRA, the highest organ of the Revolution, guides the policy of the [FLN] and Is the sole body authorized in the last resort to make decisions relative to the country's future. For example, only the CNRA is capable of ordering a cease-fire." [29]

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[27] A, Horne, *A Savage war for peace.* New York Review Books, New York, 2006. Page 180

[28] Jureidini. Page 82.

[29] *El Muadjahid,* Special Issue, P. 3. as quoted in Jureidini. Page 84

C.1.5 CCE

CCE's task was to coordinate the insurgency from the directives given by the CNRA and was therefore subordinate.[30] CCE had the following function:

"The CCE is a real war Council, and is responsible for guiding and directing all branches of the Revolution: military, political or diplomatic. It controls all the organized bodies of the Revolution (political, military, diplomatic, social and administrative)."[31]

Fig. 5 Command and control for the Wilaya's expanded[32]

The schism between the CRNA located in Cairo and Tunis and the CCE located in Algeria widened as relations continued to deteriorate even after the Soumman conference. The root was mainly an argument on how possible negotiation would be conducted with the French,

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[30] Jureidini. Page 82.

[31] *El Muadjahid*, Special Issue, P. 3. as quoted in Jureidini. Page 84

[32] P, Tripier, *Autopsie de la guerre d'algerie,* France-Empire, 1972, ANNEXE 12

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because most of the military only wanted to negotiate if the French came to the negotiations with the question of <u>when</u> and not <u>if</u> Algeria would be freed.[33] A new conference was set up in August in Cairo to sort out the troubles between the CCE and the CRNA. It would try to eliminate the differences between the external and the internal delegation. The conference resulted in that CCE was expanded to 14 members and given broad executive powers, except for political issues concerning the country's future. The CRNA suffered a slight decline in power and was expanded to 54 voting members and it also needed 2/3 of the votes to overrule the CCE.[34]

C.1.6 Provincial government

In September 1958, CCE was replaced by a provincial government that assumed executive powers and CRNA gained legislative power. From 1958 the FLN structure remained unchanged throughout the insurgency.[35] The creation of the provincial government came to be because of a variety of different reasons. One was that France had declared it had the right to pursue rebels if caught red handed, even if they crossed the border to another country. This made the Tunisian President force the FLN to moderate their terms for an agreement with France. To be able to negotiate, they needed a Government and the FLN demanded Moroccan and Tunisian recognition if they created one. With recognition they would gain status as the sole representatives of the Algerian people. The provincial government took the form of a regular state government and was meant to give legitimacy to FLN as the representatives of the Algerian people. This meant that ministers were appointed even though they weren't ministers of anything more than on a piece of paper. To achieve this rather smooth line policy, key roles in the new government where given to militaries, who otherwise might have opposed negotiation. To reassure political dominance over the military, political commissars were appointed to all levels of command.[36]

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[33] Jureidini. Page 84

[34] Ibid. Page 82.

[35] Ibid. Page 82.

[36] Ibid. Page 85

C.2 Military wing

C.2.1 Regular forces

The military wing of the FLN was called ALN. ALN in itself was divided into an external and an internal force.[37] During the initial twenty first months of the insurgency, the regional commanders themselves were in charge of organizing the guerrilla units in their own region. No central orders were given and the commanders had to organize their units as they saw fit for their local circumstances. This means they themselves made the recruiting, appointed subordinates and conducted military operations. Directions from the top and cooperation between Wilaya's (districts) were nonexistent.[38] The operation groups would initially be formed in watertight groups of 5 men who knew each other well.[39]

The newly formed ALN eventually grew and a military commander was appointed for each Wilaya as well as the political one. What needs to be stressed is that the political officer was superior to the military one, participating in all decisions and consulted in all matters. The guerrillas in each district under the command of the district commander were initially organized primarily out of personal relationships and geography. Eventually the Wilaya's were split up into Montika's, which in turn split up into Nahia's. The Nahia's were then split into sections that were the basic territorial subdivision.[40]

By August 1956 had the guerrillas had laid the foundation and established themselves in the Wilaya's. At the Soumman conference of 1956, major reforms for the ALN were decided.
The insurgents tried to reform the loosely tied and organized guerrilla into a more conventional and centralized force. In this, they would implement standardized uniforms, equipment ranks and doctrine. By 1958, the reforms had been implemented on a company level. This had been achieved by the creation of training and recruitment camps in external

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[37] George A. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947 - 1962* as quoted in JM, Norton, *The French-Algerian war and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: A comparison,* Combined arms research library, 2007, accessed on 2011-05-10,
<http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=1310&CISOBOX=1&REC=2> Page 48

[38] Jureidini. Page 90

[39] Horne. Page 105

[40] Leahy. Page 29-30

safe havens, as well as other means of education for the units.[41] It is important to know that the external regular army never engaged in fighting inside Algeria except for attempts to break the Maurice line.[42]

The ALN never reached (with exceptions) battalion sized units, mainly because of lack of command and control and operational interest. ALN tended to use company sized units for operations and as an organisational unit. By mid 1958 there were an estimated 128 insurgent companies, each around a 100 men strong.[43] The battalion consisted of three companies and 20 officers, all in all 350 men. Companies consisted of three platoons and 5 officers, totaling 110 men and a platoon of three groups and 2 officers, totaling 35 men. Groups consisted of 11 men and half groups of 5 men and a NCO.[44]

This was changed in 1958 when the battalion became larger in size, increasing to 600 and the company to 150. This reform was intended to increase coordination in major engagements. This was little optimistic and the major engagements for which the larger companies and battalions were designed for, soon proved too costly for ALN. The larger units were soon organized into light infantry commando units. These were around a 100 men strong, self sufficient and highly mobile.[45]

C.2.2 Irregular forces

The irregulars or auxiliaries were not affected by the reorganisation of the regular forces. Their prime function continued to be that of assisting the regulars in certain limited operations, in gathering intelligence, and acting as advance guards.[46]

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[41] Gougeon. Page 6

[42] C, Melnik, *Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Algeria,* RAND Coporation, 1964.

<www.rand.org/pubs/documents/D10671-1.html> Page 125

[43] Gougeon. Page 298

[44] Jureidini. Page 90

[45] Ibid. Page 90

[46] Ibid Page 90.

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C.3 Underground

From 1954 until 1957, the FLN underground was organized in two fundamental types of cells, which were a military one and a political one. The underground operated in primarily Algiers and other large cities and in mainland France. These two cells combined were responsible to a leader who was both a political and military leader. In June 1957 the underground was reorganized. Local cells where grouped together into larger clusters, collective responsibility was introduced at the highest level and an intelligence-liaison cell was added. Algiers was divided into three regions and formed the Algiers autonomous zone.[47]

Fig. 6 Algiers underground structure, simplified[48]

The military, political and intelligence activities were ruled by three men, one for each branch, who were responsible to the Council of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, the underground's supreme authority. This council was composed of a political-military chief who reported to CCE and he had three deputies charged respectively with political, military, and liaison-intelligence responsibilities.[49]

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[47] For a full organisation scheme on the Algiers underground see Tripier. Annexe 10 and 11.

[48] Tripier. Annexe 10

[49] Sergeý Bromberger, Les Rebellcs Algdricns, Librairle Pion, 1958, Paris. Page 149-152. As quoted in Jureidini. Page 86

The underground military wing of the region was made up of three groups of eleven men each. The groups consisted of three cells of three men and a leader and his deputy. This made for 35 armed men per region. The military cells also included 50-150 persons who were charged with protecting FLN members. There was also a network for manufacturing and conducting bombings of 50-150 members. The political side of the region was made up of 50-70 persons. The political cell's assignments were to delegate tasks and organise secret transportation. There was also a unit whose purpose was to enforce the directives of the FLN, a propaganda unit and each regional level branch had a financial commission.[50]

C.4 Trade union

In 1956 was the trade union UGTA (Union Générale des Travailleurs Alégriens) was created by the FLN and soon admitted into the International Confederation of Trade Unions. The union grew rapidly and within a month it is estimated the members were in between 55 and 100,000. The organisation was headed by a general secretariat and an executive committee but the leadership coincided with FLN leadership on many positions. The union activities in Algeria were directed by the CCE and later on the provincial government. The trade union provided funds, recruits and intelligence for the FLN.[51]

C.5 Command and control

The Wilaya's were under the command of colonels who were also members of the CCE. The colonel had three majors who assisted him and the same goes for every level of command. These three assistants represented the political, military and liaison-intelligence. The political commissar always assumed the same rank as the other assistants regardless of his position. Zones were under the command of captains, regions by second lieutenants and sectors by adjutants. Promotions and demotions of officers were done by the CCE at the recommendation of the colonel in command.[52] CCE was created partly because when the insurgency grew the fairly autonomous Wilaya's needed to be coordinated and communications secured.[53]

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[50] Jureidin. Page 86-87.

[51] Ibid. Page 87

[52] Ibid. Page 91

[53] Leahy. Page 42-43

Communication in the FLN was conducted mainly through personal contact because the French had technical superiority and could monitor electronic communication. Therefore, meetings where important for directing the FLN and general directives were sent out each month to each Wilaya. Communications could also take the form of taxi drivers moving between towns, radio broadcasts and printed material.[54]

C.5 Territorial organisation

In 1954, the predecessor to FLN, CRUA organized the guerrillas in Algeria into six military districts.[55] Mainland France itself was divided into seven autonomous Wilaya's.[56] The autonomous regions meant that they would have to care for themselves with little or no outside support and only limited directions from the top. The regional commanders would conduct the insurgency as they saw fit for their local conditions. This was conducted out of military and practical necessity as France was inaccessible with conventional forces and therefore only could be affected by underground presence there.

At the 1956 Soumman valley conference, Algiers was added as an autonomous zone. More specifically, the guerrillas were formed as the ALN, and military command and control was established. In 1957 the western respectively eastern part of the country, bordering to Morocco, respectively Tunisia, were added as autonomous zones.[57] This was done out of military necessity as Algiers was heavily garrisoned but had a powerful underground. As major insurgent activities were ruled out, the most effective way of using the underground was giving them much self independence to conduct their own missions. Even if it was an autonomous zone it was still politically controlled by the CCE.[58]

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[54] Leahy. Page 42

[55] Global security.com, *Algerian National Liberation (1954-1962),* John. E Pike, accessed on 29-04-11

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm>

[56] Jureidini. Page 83.

[57] Ibid. Page 90

[58] Ibid. Page 83

D. SUMMARY

FLN was a revolutionary organisation that was strictly hierarchical in its structure. It started out fairly decentralised with autonomous regions of self-sustainment. The organisation evolved and always struggled towards being more centralised and uniform. This manifested itself in a reform of the military wing and creation of institutions for example. FLN premiered political supremacy in all decisions and had a clear purpose with this. It enjoyed foreign aid and safe havens from neighbouring states.

4. Taliban

A. INTRODUCTION

The term Taliban is widespread and has taken on a myriad of different meanings. Taliban is often used as an overall term for any Pashtun insurgent or any anti government militia in the Afghan vicinity by the media.[59] The Taliban that is examined in this essay are the Taliban that emerged in the post Soviet Afghanistan as a political movement. The same organisation that ruled Afghanistan 1996 to 2001 and still are led by Mullah Muhammad Omar and his supreme Shura. This does not include the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) or other independent organisations. The organisation is sometimes referred to as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which was the name of the Afghan state during Taliban control. This name is still preferred by the Talibans themselves.[60] The organisation has now grown out of its baby clothes and now recruits from a broad base of Afghan people and not only out of religious reasons anymore. Initially, a centralized organisation it has since the commencing of OEF become flatter with local militant working rather as franchises than as a closely tied organisation.

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This chapter will initially provide a short overview of the origins and emergence of the Taliban organisation. It will then look into the Taliban organisational structure. The elements of the existing structure are presented as a form of legend with a figure of the whole organisation outlined in the beginning of the structure part of this chapter. The relationships between the elements are presented in form of the command and control part. The chapter will also present some of the inputs that shape and have shaped the structure of the organisation. The results from this chapter will be used to compare the Taliban organisation to that of Algerian FLN in the following discussion.

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[59] A Stenersen, *The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – Organisation, leadership and worldview*, Human security gateway, 2010, retrieved 2011-05-05,
<http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FFI_TheTalibanInsurgencyInAfghanistan_OrganisationLeadershipWorldview.pdf> Page 11

[60] Ibid. Page 11

B. ORIGINS

The Taliban is an organisation with roots in the religious community and with origins from the post-soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Originally it sprung up from 'madrassas' in Pashtun refugee camps, where a selective interpretation of Islam called Wahhabism drew young men to its ranks. These men adopted a strictly conservative approach to politics and society and were called Talibs. The refugee camps themselves were the result of the post Soviet invasion inner turmoil in Afghanistan where different warlords fought each other for power.[61]

The war tired general population in Afghanistan welcomed the Taliban thinking they would bring an end to turmoil and fighting inside Afghanistan.[62] By 1994, the Taliban had conquered Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan and by the time of the 9/11 attack, they had control of at least 75 % of the country with the remaining percentage being under the control of an alliance of warlords.[63] This alliance later came to be famous as the Northern alliance which together with US Special Forces during OEF overthrew the Taliban government.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, an ultimatum was given to the Taliban regime. The ultimatum that included extraditing Osama bin Laden was not met and OEF began on the October 7th 2001, when around 1000 Special Forces operatives and aircraft were deployed to the assistance of the Northern Alliance. With the foreign aid the alliance enjoyed rapid success and soon recaptured Kabul. The end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is generally dated to December 9, 2001 when the Taliban was thrown out of Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled.[64]

Soon after the end of major operations in Afghanistan was declared, an insurgency started to grow. Widely spread illiteracy and unemployment are major issues of dissatisfaction that the Taliban can channel to their own benefit. Financially, the Taliban are making profits out of

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[61] SA Afsar, & CA Samples, *The evolution of the Taliban,* Naval postgraduate school, 2011, retrieved 2011-04-20, <www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Afsar_Samples_thesis.pdf> Page 20-21.

[62] A Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999), 22-35. As quoted in Afsar & Samples. Page 21

[63] K Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,* Federation of American scientist, 2011, retrieved 2011-05-03, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf> Page 8

[64] Katzman. Page 9

the large poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The political aim for the Taliban organisation is the expulsion of foreign troops, the overthrowing of the government and installation of an Islamic Caliphate in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Taliban operates within a fractioned insurgency where different groups with different agendas operate. Sometimes the overall policies of the groups align and sometimes they clash.

C. STRUCTURE

Fig. 7 Taliban organisational structure[65]

C.1 General

A common misunderstanding of the Taliban is that they consist of a bunch loosely tied groups working independently with no coordination. The Taliban is in fact a network of loosely tied groups that can work independently but are contained and directed strategically by a central leadership structure. [66] The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the aftermath of counter-insurgency in 2001 might suggest that the organisation would be hard to control centrally with the superior technology for surveillance possessed by the allied powers. This

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[65] Afsar & Samples. Page 48. The organisation tree has been composed by gathering information from various open sources.

[66] Ibid. Page 55.

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also seems to be the case in Afghanistan were local commanders have become more influential and dependent since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Prior to the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the organisation was operating in a very centralized fashion with Mullah Omar micromanaging the organisation. The organisation is now flatter rather than pyramid shaped.[67] Even so, the Taliban movement can still be considered a fairly hierarchical structure with centralized command and decision making although not in a traditional sense.[68]

C.2 Mullah Omar, top Taliban leadership and the Supreme Shura

The central and recognized leader of the Afghan Taliban is Mullah Omar. He is assisted by the Supreme *Shura*, the highest Taliban ruling council. This council is believed to consist of twelve members and three advisors. Many of the members are based in Quetta, Pakistan.[69] Due to the councilmember's being active in the field, one could also say the council is a gathering of not only field commanders but governors as well.[70] This council is supposed to provide the Taliban with visible institutionalized leadership for decision making.[71]

In 1994, Mullah Ohmar wore a sacred cloak believed by many to be the original cloak of the Prophet Mohammed standing on a mosque in Kandahar. This indeed gave him tremendous publicity among Pashtuns and gave him religious authority to finish the conquest of Afghanistan.[72] Accordingly, Ohmar draws authority from religious authority. This aligns well with general assumptions of the Taliban organisation.

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[67] SMA, Zaidi, 'The Taliban organisation in Pakistan', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, no. 5, 2009, pp 40-47. Military and government collection. Accessed on 2011-03-26, Page 40.

68 Afsar & Samples. Page 48

[69] Ibid. Page 51

[70] Ibid. Page 52

[71] A, Giustozzi, *Negotiating with the Taliban, Issues and Prospect,* The century foundation, 2010, accessed on 2011-04-19*,* <http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb716/Giustozzi.pdf> Page 8

[72] Johnson & Mason. Page 80

Apart from the supreme Shura, several provincial leadership councils are believed to exist. The Taliban struggle to create other formal institutions and they seem to succeed from time to time, when commissions that might work as such have been reported of in Taliban media. This is part of a Taliban problem, to be seen as an organisation rather than a social network. Up until now, networks still dominate the Taliban organisation but formal structures struggle to emerge.[2]

C.3 Proxy political wing

Interesting is the proxy political wing that is believed to exist within the Taliban organisation. This takes the form of politicians who have known or covert links to the Taliban and take seat in the Afghan government.[73] Recently, Taliban leaders have been invited to a national reconciliation council and have had talks with US representatives. But because of their complex structure, it is hard to say if they go there as representatives of different networks and tribes or of the whole Taliban organisation. There have been incidents where people claiming to be Taliban leaders or affiliated with them have turned out to be frauds.[74] Of great interest is also the fact that the Taliban seem to be so scarcely institutionalised. There is no political driving force in the traditional meaning and the political and military aims and bodies are united in one.

C.4 Regional commanders and operatives "The network"

The basic unit for the Taliban organisation is the local commander who commands a few fighters. These are usually recruited by him and follow him out of personal loyalty and leadership. These local commanders for their part are elements of a larger network and subject to a regional commander. This commander can for example be a regional level Taliban leader and the number of basic units connected to him varies depending on local conditions.[75] The network of the regional level commander is in turn linked to a larger network through its

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[73] Syed Saleem Shahzad, "A Political Curtain-Raiser for the Taliban," *Asia Times* (2007), <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IB03Df01.html> (accessed February 1, 2008). As quoted in Afsar and Samples. Page 49.

[74] DeYoung, K, U.S speeds up direct talks with Taliban, Washington Post, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-19, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-speeds-up-direct-talks-with-taliban/2011/05/16/AFh1AE5G_story.html?wprss=rss_homepage>

[75] Giustozzi. Page 5

leader. The larger network might be run by a province-level leader for example. This network itself might or might not center onto a top Taliban leader. If not it can be further networked until it reaches the top tiers.[76]

What differentiates this from a traditional military structure for example is that some networks might include only two tiers while other reach the top tiers through a complex set of links. This is due to the face that these networks are dependant on personal relationships. Sometimes, a top leader might have connections to a relatively small network because he is linked to it through the tribal structure of the Pashtun society. Top leaders can also try to gain connections with lower tiers to get direct information that doesn't get filtered while it is sent upwards in the organisation. At the top tier the networks are linked together by personal relationships and loyalty to Mullah Omar. [77]


Fig. 8 Basic network structure

The organisation on a tactical level can best be described as a franchise company which fits well into the tribal and local traditions of the Pashtun society. This comes from the fact that small bands or militias that originate from social and tribal traditions align themselves with the Taliban. These groups may have not the exactly the same objectives, but they, in some way align with the Talibans. However, they get the right to call themselves Taliban which gives them local authority in exchange for support and cooperation to the Taliban in their strategic aims.[78]

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[76] Giustozzi. Page 5

[77] Ibid. Page 6

[78] Afsar & Samples. Page 50.

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The guerillas of the Taliban organisation have a safe haven in the remote parts of Afghanistan. From here, they can operate in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The guerilla's success relies on getting logistic support from the tribal populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The guerrillas are nowadays drawn from the broad mass base of the insurgency while they used to be drawn only from the religious Madrassas. If a guerrilla dies fighting in the insurgency he is usually replaced by at least one relative who has to revenge him according to the Pashtun code of honour.[79]

One interesting feature in the Afghanistan insurgency is that insurgent-organisations have been paying young local people to conduct low level tasks such as firing upon NATO troops.[80] If these can be considered guerrillas or not is hard to say as they only might conduct a single mission out of monetary reasons. Being an organisation of networks, the Taliban is heavily dependant on charismatic leaders at various tiers of the organisation. The leaders have to be able to gather fighters around them willing to fight and die for them and provide the leadership this takes. This in turn, results in many fighters being primarily loyal to their commander. Newly recruited or loosely tied guerrillas or local militias rarely have any direct contact with the Talibans themselves, which adds to this leader-centred loyalty.[81]

The guerrillas that are recruited from the religious Madrassas are more directly loyal to the Taliban, since they have been indoctrinated and received religious education. These facts can explain why the loss of top leaders has had a major impact on specific networks but little on the Taliban organisation as a whole. When this happened, the subordinate commanders simply joined other networks or the network leader killed was replaced more or less successfully.[82] The methods of recruitment for the Taliban have changed through out the insurgency. Initially the Taliban relied on Madrassa's to educate and recruit young members to the organisation, who embraced the Taliban interpretation of Islam to the organisation. Lately, the Taliban have been recruiting more widely from all Pashtun tribes as well as from

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[79] Afsar & Sampes. Page 27

[80] S, Jones. *Afghanistans local insurgency,* RAND corporation, 2007, accessed on 2011-05-19,

<http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/01/31/IHT.html>

[81] Giustozzi. Page 5

[82] Ibid. Page 8

other ethic minorities. By recruiting from a more narrow part of the population they can now can incorporate areas not traditionally supportive of the Taliban. The organisation then evolves to fit these areas.[83]


Fig. 9 The Taliban network expanded[84]

C.5 Liaison with other groups

The actual strength of the different insurgents and to what degree they cooperate with each other has not been agreed upon. U.S military sources claim that cooperation between different insurgent groups has increased lately. [85] Some informal connections exist between the Taliban and larger independent groups such as Al Qaeda, Hezb-i-Islami and other similar

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[83] TH, Johnson & MC, Mason, *Understanding the Taliban and insurgency in Afghanistan ,*Naval postgraduate school, 2006, accessed on 2011-04-26,

<http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/docs/pubs/understanding%20the%20taliban%20and%20insurgency%20in%2 0afghanistan.pdf> Page 110

[84] Giustozzi. Page 7

[85] Katzman. Page 17

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organisations.[86] These informal connections come from sharing similar tribal and clan networks that provide access to weapons and materials.[87] Common goals and social background can also provide ties between the organisations. Other independent insurgent and criminal organisations often have ties in some way to the Taliban. They can have formed alliances or be tied by social or tribal ties. Hizb-i Islami for example is independent from the Taliban but have had some of its members drawn into the Taliban. Both the organisations tend to fight each other over local differences, while cooperating in other places. Others still have completely merged into the Taliban, such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan is thought to have done.[88] The connections include connecting to small groups outside the organisation such as small groups of bandits and mercenaries. These are tied in a patron-client type of fashion, where they can be paid to do small jobs, such as single IED attacks or encouraged to disrupt overall security in an area still under government control. The connections are also stretched to village militias of whom some have been integrated fully into the movement when Taliban has replaced their original leadership.[89]

C.6 Specialized departments

The single cell conducts most tasks itself and usually builds up departments if there is a need for them in their area. Despite this, they have a reciprocal connection to other cells in the area for physical and intelligence support. They have sequential interdependence for processing information and pooled interdependence on higher levels for media operations, IED making, specialized training and financial support.[90] The Taliban has a centralized pool of specialized departments. These include suicide squads, special training departments which consist of technicians for IED and suicide bomb building etc.

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[86] P, Bergman, B, Fishman & K, Tiedemann, *Inside Talibanistan*, Foreign Policy, Vol. Nov 2010, No. 182, P. 68-69. Accessed on 2011-04-13.

<http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.annalindhbiblioteket.se/ehost/detail?sid=ea8af71c-beb2-4d78-9343-80d106698bd3%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=108&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=57221159>

[87] Afsar & Samples. Page 49

[88] Giustozzi. Page 6

[89] Ibid. Page 6.

[90] Afsar & Samples. Page 51

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It also includes media departments that deal with psychological warfare and propaganda. These departments can be found through all organisational tiers and some of them can be drawn to the centralized pool for distribution to other regions if the need arises.[91]


Fig. 10 Centralised recourse pool

The underground in Afghanistan also benefits from the large scale and illegal growth of poppy and produce of drugs. This is the primary source of finance for the insurgency and an estimated one-third of Afghanistan's gross domestic product comes from poppy growing. The insurgent underground benefits from poppy growing being illegal, and therefore has to be conducted outside government control. Working together with drug-smugglers it helps to finance the insurgency.[92] Financing is important not only for buying weapons and ammunition but also for recruiting young men, who might be driven of monetary causes.

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[91] Afsar & Samples. Page 49

[92] Armed conflict Database – *Afghanistan*

<http://acd.iiss.org.proxy.annalindhbiblioteket.se/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?ConflictID=181&YearID=1303>

C.7 Command and control

Apart from what has been described earlier in the chapter, the leadership directs the Taliban through directives that are passed down as decrees to regional commanders and ultimately village cells. The village cell itself works fairly autonomous and according to the regional situation but aiming to fulfill the overall policy stated in the decrees.[93] The regional commander directs a number of local cells and controls some centralized resources and expertise. These centralized resources vary in regional needs and available resources.[94]

"Decision making within Taliban is a mix of Directive Control (broad, general guidance from the top and decentralized execution), Consultative Control (decisionsbased on consensus among leaders), and Autocratic Control (issuing strict orders with specific details for execution)."[95]

Fig. 11 Command and control

On routine tasks the reporting and orders are issued down a traditional chain of command. For more difficult tasks additional support may be required and the network structure of the organisation is used and information and support can be passed in any direction and skip tiers.[96]

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[93] Afsar & Samples. Page 55.

[94] Ibid. Page 50

[95] Ibid. Page 53-54

[96] Ibid page 55.

C.8 Territorial organisation

The Taliban organisation has divided its territory into four regional commands which do not correspond to the different personal networks, even though in some cases they come close. The Haqqani network is close to coinciding with the south-eastern command. Still, there are within the command, other Taliban commanders linked to other networks. The other three commands are the southern Afghanistan, eastern Afghanistan and western Afghanistan. These regions are fairly autonomous in planning and operations.[97]

The Taliban organisation (and not speaking of the loosely tied franchises) did, at an early period of the insurgency, appoint commanders at the various tiers within the commands. This was done from local commanders up to the regional command level. The top commanders within this field-command structure were called front commanders. Apart from these purely military commanders, there seems to have existed provincial commanders, whose role was primarily administrative and political tasks. Practically, the provincial commanders resolved disputes between commanders and villagers, between villagers as well as running logistics.

The Taliban experienced serious problems in making the two structures work together, and contrasts between provincial and front commanders are sometimes reported, but on the whole the system seems to have managed to keep going, surviving occasional clashes.[98]

D. SUMMARY

The Taliban organisation draws from religious roots but has evolved into an insurgent organisation not just drawing support from religion anymore. While the FLN was a planned organisation and uprising the Taliban can be seen as an organisation that has grown out of the insurgency. The structure of the Taliban is that of a network where loyalty can be archived for several reasons. The chain off command doesn't always go from top to bottom in the organisation but sideways, upwards and skips tiers. Some resources can be seen as centralised while most of the times the different cells care for themselves and can call themselves Taliban as long as they strive to archive the supreme Shuras strategic goals.

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[97] R Rüttig, Loya Paktia's Insurgency, in *Decoding the New Taliban,*

ed. Antonio Giustozzi, New York, Columbia University Press, 2009, 57ff. as quoted in Giustozzi. Page 9.

[98] Giustozzi. Page 9-10

6. Comparison

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will compare the results presented in the two subsequent chapters. The first section is introduction and outlines the subsequent sections. The second section is named discussion and here will the results from the Taliban and the FLN chapter will be examined and the both the organisational structures compared to each other. The final section is a summary where the main points from the comparison will be presented.

B. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON

B.1 Supreme command and directing power

Firstly, in Algeria politics had superiority over military matters and they were separated entities. This was established at conferences that gathered FLN top leadership. Different political institutions were created to ensure political supremacy over military. The Taliban supreme command can be derived from a single person and a ruling council. The ruling council is not a permanent institution though. The Taliban use their network structure to send out decrees that are carried down to local level.

- FLN had a political institution as supreme command directing, and a coordinating subject military wing.
- The Taliban have a single leader and a non permanent council. Local cells are fairly autonomous.

B.2 Leadership

In the Afghanistan case, the political and the military body are united and can't be differentiated. In Afghanistan, you can add a third type of authority which is religious. Mullah Omar himself draws support from religious authority. Personal relationships and tribal affiliation are important to become a leader in the Taliban structure. In Algeria, local commanders could achieve their status through personal relationships but when it came to higher positions, they had to climb the career ladder and be involved in politics.

- Leadership in the Taliban organisation can be based on personal relationships, religious authority, tribal affiliation and military deeds.
- Leadership in FLN could be achieved through being involved in the political game and climbing the career ladder. With this said, this does not mean that top leaders in the FLN were not charismatic.

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B.3 Politics

FLN had a political wing whilst the Taliban only is believed to have a proxy political wing. The political function was primary and had sovereignty over the entire organisation, something not recognized by the Taliban. In fact, according to a statement from the Taliban, Sharia laws did not allow political parties, which might be one reason a political party has not been formed.[99] They have instead a strategic aim and conduct a war of the flea to achieve this whilst not having a formalized political structure.

- FLN acknowledged political supremacy in all matters.
- The Taliban do not have a formal political body.

B.4 Organisation structure

The structure of the FLN was strictly hierarchical and had for example adopted French ranks for their regular units. This means a part of the organisation was divided into smaller parts and so on down to the basic unit. The Taliban structure is more of a hybrid network structure. Some resources are centralised while other are decentralised.

- The Taliban organisational structure is a network type of structure. They have struggled to create institutionalised bodies and those created are often ad oc.
- The FLN structure was a hierarchical one with leaders, sub leaders and so on. The task of each part of the organisation was clear and had been established by the leadership and as a result you could say the different elements where highly institutionalised.

B.5 Internal and external decision making

The Algerian insurgency was directed from a political delegation located not inside Algeria itself but in foreign safe havens. In Afghanistan, the direction and decrees for the insurgent organisation comes from inside the country itself. This was possible for the FLN, as first they had established political supremacy which the Taliban did not have and therefore had to use more control.

- In Algeria strategic direction and command came from safe havens abroad.
- In Afghanistan the directions and decrees come, and have to come from a place more local.

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[99] Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. Page 43. as quoted in Reese. Page 36

B.6 Regular and irregular units

FLN also distinguished between regular and irregular units following classic revolutionary warfare. The Taliban on the other hand has no regular forces and certainly does not distinguish between them both. FLN also had an organized underground that was structured in a hierarchical way. The Taliban underground floats into other elements as it can be both fighters and religious Mullahs. There are no frames or institutionalised underground.

- FLN made a distinction between regular and irregular units.
- The Taliban has no such distinction. You could say on the other hand there is a distinction between full and part time fighters.

B.7 Structural behaviour

The FLN evolved from initially having been almost independent Wilaya's towards a state of more and more centralization. This is shown by, for example, adopting uniforms and military ranks for the regular forces. The Taliban has on the other hand, evolved from a rather centralised organisation to a highly decentralised network type of organisation. The Taliban today are more decentralised than pre OEF. The way the structures have evolved is of course dependant on perquisites and a lot of different factors. Still, the FLN evolved even when put under significant military pressure to a more centralised organisation which the Taliban has not.

- The Taliban has become more decentralized during the insurgency
- The FLN became more and more centralized as the insurgency went on.

B.8 Rural or urban

Both the FLN and the Taliban are rural movements. Both seem to realise the value, at least symbolical value of cities. This manifested itself in the FLN campaign and the subsequent battle of Algiers and in the Taliban conquest of Qandahar in the 90s.

- Both organisations were rural movements but in FLN's case an effort to take the fighting to the cities was made

B.9 Foreign liaison

The Taliban don't enjoy any official support from another state. Although unofficially they have at least in the past had support from Pakistan and it is still believed to be associated with the Pakistani military in some way. FLN on the other hand enjoyed support from Egypt and Tunisia as well as from other states. Both organisations enjoyed foreign aid although in various forms. FLN had institutionalised aid from both Egypt and Tunisia as well as received

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military aid from other countries. FLN also gained funds from the trade union which had members inside mainland France itself. The Taliban has historically received aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.[100] Unofficially they are believed to receive aid from others through private donations from for example religious institutions in the Arab world.

- The FLN had foreign safe havens and institutionalised aid from states.
- The Taliban enjoys some foreign aid but it is highly unofficial. They also get aid through private donations and from religious institutions.

B.10 Command and control

For command and control and coordination between the different elements in the organisation both the Taliban and FLN were reliant on personal messengers and eye to eye meetings. For the FLN, the chain of command included a political wing in charge of deciding policies for the overall insurgency. It also had ties with recognized governments such as the Tunisian and Egyptian. The policies decided by the political wing were then executed by the military wing. The Taliban on the other hand, is a loosely tied organisation and compared to FLN, highly decentralized. Because the network is loosely tied the leadership has to rule by decree so that the local cells that foremost solve their own local problems have something to aim at. Directing them more directly, would mean that they lost their local autonomy and therefore would loose interest in siding with the Taliban.

- The Taliban rule their network by decree and exercise local autonomy under the condition that the local cells struggle to achieve the strategic aims declared in the decrees.
- The FLN converted political ideas into action on the grounds of their chain of command. This was followed up by control by political officers on all levels.

C. SUMMARY

The Taliban and FLN organisations are widely different. This chapter has used the results of the previous chapters and compared them to each other. What has come out is that the organisational structure has shown to be different at a variety of point and rather similar at others. Summarised the FLN was a hierarchical organisation while the Taliban is a networked organisation. This makes it hard to see how something based on one organisation can apply to the other.

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[100] Reese. Page 39

7. Organisation structure in modern COIN-theory

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look into the research question, why knowing the enemy structure is important and address the primary research question, whether modern COIN literature and theory addresses insurgent organisational structure.

The first section in this chapter is the introduction. The second section is called the importance of knowing the enemy structure and lists a few arguments why we should inquire about this. The third section is called "does modern COIN theory address organisational structure" and examines the question stated in the heading. The fourth and last section is called the summary and here a short summary of the chapter is presented.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING THE ENEMY STRUCTURE

So why have I've done this research? Knowing the structure of the opponent is a part of knowing him. In conventional warfare, analysing the structure of your enemy is an important part of the battle. Knowing the enemy's structure will help you point out his critical vulnerabilities and can help you identify his CoG (Centre of Gravity). Classical COIN literature always argues that the population is the CoG in COIN operations but this does not have to be the case. My argumentation is built on the indirect approach thinking in manoeuvre warfare, which can be seen as the opposite of 'body count' or attrition warfare which can be seen as a direct approach.

"The core of manoeuvre warfare is the concentration on the adversary's condition to conduct their operations and reach their goals."[101]

Gaining a picture of the insurgent structure can show us where he gains conditions to conduct operations from. The adversary's weaknesses such as critical resources should be identified to be able to attack these and eliminate his will to continue the struggle.[102] Knowing the enemy structure does not equal knowing where to behead it, weaknesses can come in other forms.

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[101] Försvarsmakten. *Doktrin för gemensamma operationer.* Försvarsmakten, 2006, Stockholm. Page 56.

[102] Ibid. Page 56

Manoeuvre warfare means that you search for vulnerable points in the adversary's structure and direct your blow there. [103]

In essence, manoeuvre warfare is outmanoeuvring your enemy physically and conceptually to create a system-shock by shifting his balance and generating a collapse in his organisation. To achieve this we need to manoeuvre to advantageous positions and put our strength towards the enemy's weakness.[104] Once again, if you know the structure of the insurgent you can anticipate his weaknesses and place your strength there, alternately force him to shift focus to one part of the organisation and strike at another. For example could be targeting the economic structure of the enemy to force him to direct resources there, while leaving his guerrilla network weaker.

The method to achieve this is the indirect approach. The indirect approach means that you manoeuvre so that a situation unfavourable for the enemy is created by shifting the force ratio to your advantage. This is central to the indirect approach. This means manoeuvring towards points where the adversary can offer the least resistance, a so called critical vulnerability.[105]

One example of adopting your way of fighting the enemy can be read about in an article by General McChrystal, here he describes how the intelligence function under his command had to be restructured as a network to fight the networked type of enemy in Iraq. [106]

So here in essence is why we want to know the enemy's organisational structure. By knowing it, we can find the point in the enemy structure where he is weakest, critical vulnerabilities and strike him there. So with this said one can notice this leans towards being a contribution to the enemy centric part of COIN theory, a part that has not been as popular as the population centric one.

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[103] Försvarsmakten. Page 57

[104] Ibid. Page 57

[105] Ibid. Page 58-59

[106] SA, McChrystal, *It takes a network,* Foreign Policy, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-26
 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network?page=0,2>

C. DOES FM 3-24 ADDRESS STRUCTURE?

So far I have shown the structure of the Taliban and FLN organisations to be fairly different and provided some arguments for why we should look into insurgent organisation structure. Now it is time to zoom in on the FM 3-24 to see if it does this. If it doesn't, why don't it?

Much of the literature written about counterinsurgency warfare is based on French lessons learned from Algeria. The American FM 3-24.2 relies heavily on Galulas ideas and writings and was printed as late as 2006. Galulas "*Counterinsurgency warfare*" was also republished in 2006 when General Patraeus was appointed Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq.[107] This literature and the modern ones deriving from this background, can be said to promote the population centric COIN approach theory. The price for the counterinsurgent is the population both Galula and FM 3-24 states.[108] In the light of this statement it is not surprising that finding enemy centric advice or articles is hard to find in the FM. But, COIN does not have to been population centric. There are several historical examples where insurgencies have been defeated by other means than the populationcentric approach, such as recently the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan government.[109]

FM 3-24 is in fact a manual and not a work on COIN theory which one should have in mind. It should in other words tell us how to conduct COIN operations. FM 3-24 does in one way mention structure. The manual features a chapter devoted to the insurgent. In this it says about the insurgency that it:

"*...[is] comprised of the five elements, the eight dynamics, and six strategies. The elements are the five groups of people—leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliary, and mass base—that form the insurgency's organisation."* [110]

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[107] Griffin. Page 561

[108] Gentile, *A strategy of tactics: Population centric COIN and the army.* Page 11

[109] Gentile. Page 11

[110] Headquaters Department of the Army. Page 41.

The manual also tells us that:

"Although no two insurgencies or insurgent organisations are alike, they still have elements that can be identified and some form of hierarchy."[111]

The elements describe the different parts of the insurgent organisation but do not explain the relationship between them. The eight dynamics and six strategies in their turn effect how the elements are composed. Neither does the intelligence preparation of the battlefield appendix have anything to say on the insurgent structure, something that you might find remarkable since it claims;

"(…)the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) allows commanders to develop the situational understanding necessary to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in successfully accomplishing the mission."[112]

In LTC David Kilcullen's twenty eight articles[113] insurgent structure is not mentioned either. The articles speak of how you should know the people, economy, history, religion and culture but not the insurgent structure. The same goes for Galulas articles that are quoted in the manual.

Skimming through references used in the manual such as *"Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance"*[114] yields the same result. Same goes for *"Small wars manual"*[115]. Through my research have I found one book entirely devoted to the structure of insurgents and that is Sinno's *"organisations at war"*. But this does still talk of organisations interacting with each other and doesn't really address the elements but rather the command and control structure. The RAND article *"Insurgencies and how they end"* provides some insights to

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[111] Headquaters Department of the Army. Page 45

[112] Ibid. Page 257

[113] Ibid. Page 265

[114] Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Commanders handbook for security force assistance,* United States Army Combined Arms Center, 2008, accessed on 2011-05-18, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf>

[115] United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual,* Air University, 1940, accessed on 2011-05-06, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/full.pdf>

insurgent structures and why statistically this is important to know. For example can you find out that hierarchical organisations usually do better than a fragmented network and that insurgencies rarely succeed in urbanized countries. The study also tells us that availability of a sanctuary improves the chance of success for an insurgent. This includes both internal and external sanctuaries. [116]

My explanation for the reason that it is hard to find insurgent structure is that picturing the enemy organisation structure and pointing out critical vulnerabilities would in fact be a more enemycentric approach to COIN than the populationcentric approach advocated by French COIN theorists and their followers.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided some arguments on why knowing the structure of your enemy is important and the main point is that it can provide you with inputs that help you identify the insurgent's critical vulnerabilities. These arguments derive from general thoughts in manoeuvre warfare. It has also been examined whether structure is addressed in FM 3-24 and found out it in fact does, but very sparsely and on a very general level. This includes appendixes such as twenty eight articles and intelligence in COIN. It has also looked into some of the references from FM 3-24 and the result has shown to bee the same. The result is that as a representative of modern COIN thought FM 3-24 does not address insurgent structure.

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[116] Connable & Libicki, Page XVI

8. Conclusions

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will present the conclusions drawn from this essay. The first section is called addressing the research question and here are the conclusions related to the primary research questions presented. The second section is addressing the secondary research question and here conclusions drawn relating to the secondary research question presented. The third section is recommendations for future research and the forth and last is a summary of this chapter.

B. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

B.1 What differences and what similarities are there to the FLN and the Taliban organisational structures.

First, the research has shown the Taliban and the FLN organisation structures to be very different in many ways. To sum it up in one sentence, is to say one is hierarchical while the other is an organisation built up of networks. This makes the organisations vulnerable in different ways. To sum up the results from chapter three and four I have created a scheme:

	FLN	Taliban
Supreme command and directing power	Political institution as supreme command directing, and a coordinating subject military wing.	Single leader and a non permanent council. Local cells are fairly autonomous.
Leadership	Achieved through being involved in the political game and climbing the career ladder.	Based on personal relationships, religious authority, tribal affiliation and military deeds.
Politics	FLN acknowledged political supremacy in all matters.	The Taliban do not have a formal political body.
Organisational structure	Hierarchical, with leaders, sub leaders and so on. Institutionalised elements.	The Taliban organisational structure is a network type of structure.
Internal and external decision making	In Algeria direction and decrees came from safe havens abroad.	Directions and decrees come and have to come from a place more local.
Regular and irregular	Made a distinction between regular and irregular units.	Unofficial distinction between full and part time fighters.
Structural behaviour	Became more centralised as the insurgency went on.	Has become more decentralized during the insurgency
Rural or urban	Rural	Rural
Foreign liaison	Foreign safe havens and institutionalised aid from states.	Unofficial and non institutionalised aid.
Command and control	Political ideas into action through their chain of command, followed up by control by political officers on all	Rule by decree. Local autonomy but the local cells struggle to archive the strategic aims declared

levels.	in the decrees.

B.2 Are insurgent organisational structures addressed in modern COIN (Narrowed down to FM 3-24)?

The counterinsurgency literature and FM 3-24 are very population centric and does not fully address how insurgent organisations can be structured. Therefore, they miss out on, for example listing critical vulnerabilities for the adversary or the organisation's CoG. It does mention how an insurgency is built up but not the relationship between the different elements, vulnerabilities or examples of different organisational structures. References used in FM 2-24 do not fully address insurgent structure either. This confirms FM 3-24 being very population centric in its approach, manifested in its practical population focused advises.

B.3 Why is it important to know the structure of your enemy?

It is important to know the insurgent's structure to be able to analyse his CoG. This does not always have to be the population but can be; decapitation can work on some organisations and not on others for example. The point is that we can pinpoint the insurgent's critical vulnerabilities if we know his structure and CoG. CoG doesn't always have to be the population but can depend on the structure of the insurgent.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Recommendations for future research on the subject would include researching a model for analysing insurgent structure. Researching different structures to provide examples on how insurgent organisations can be structured and analysing specific critical vulnerabilities and centre of gravity for the specific type of structures. Researching the effect when using similar techniques and methods against different insurgents could also further strengthen the results from this essay.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

As the result is that modern COIN literature do not fully address insurgent structure the author proposes that this is added to modern COIN theory. Different examples of organisation types and what methods has been successful countering them in the past not just population centric

approach might be presented. Manoeuvre warfare principles such as CoG and critical vulnerabilities can be applied to and successfully used in COIN warfare.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has tried to tie together what has been researched in this essay and present the conclusions. It has addressed the research questions through what has been researched previously in the essay. To sum it up in one sentence the result is that the organisations compared where different in many ways, this is not mentioned in FM 3-24 and it is important to know the insurgents structure to be able to analyse his CoG. It also provided some recommendations for future research where one research question is the effect of using the same methods against different organisation structures.

This essay claims to:

a) Have established that the organisational structures depicted in the research were different concerning both elements and command and control.

b) Have established that modern COIN relies very much on classic French population centric COIN theory and therefore doesn't address insurgent structure and its importance.

c) Have provided a few arguments derived from manoeuvre warfare thoughts and theory in favour of analysing insurgent structure.

Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan   2011-05-25
Martin Björnfors
SA VT 11

9. Summary

This essay initially provided background and purpose as well as the method used to complete the essay. It also provided aim and research questions, of which the first was; what differences and what similarities are there between the FLN organisation's structure and that of modern day Taliban? The second was; is insurgent organisation structure addressed in modern COIN theory narrowed down to FM 3-24.

It then described the FLN and Taliban organisations and went on to compare the results in a subsequent chapter. What this resulted in, was a few major and a few minor differences, as well as some similarities. The major differences were the hierarchical structure of FLN as compared to the network structure of the Taliban. Another was that the basic unit in the Taliban organisation is fairly autonomous while the basic FLN units were incorporated, directed and controlled by the larger organisation.

Another chapter was presented where a few arguments derived from manoeuvre warfare thought were presented on why it is important to know the enemy structure. The main point being, if you know the insurgent structure you can pinpoint his critical vulnerabilities. It also examined if FM 3-24 raises the question of insurgent structure and found out that it does so very sparsely. Since it is a manual and not a work on theory it should provide you with head on actions you should consider in your COIN effort. It does this, but in a populationcentric way. It does not for example tell you do structural analysis of the insurgent so that you might find out his CoG or critical vulnerabilities.

This essay claims to:

a) Have established that the organisational structures depicted in the research were different concerning both elements and command and control.

b) Have established that modern COIN relies very much on classic French population centric COIN theory and therefore doesn't address insurgent structure and its importance.

c) Have provided a few arguments derived from manoeuvre warfare thoughts and theory, in favour of analysing insurgent structure.

A conclusion drawn from the essay is that insurgent organisation structure should be examined and addressed in COIN literature and theory.

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Appendix A. Note on the sources used

A. GENERAL

A secondary source is never better to you than primary; even so, they have been valid to my work. As this has been a qualitative literature study foremost validation of the literature has been important.

The Algerian conflict is still somewhat of a debated subject in France. Some of the books I've viewed can be considered subjective. For an example here is General Jacques Émile Massu's book about the battle of Algiers. This has not been used as a reference for my essay. Galula have I considered useful as a source since he is frequently citied and a well recognised author on the subject. FM 3-24 does not provide any footnotes in the manual itself, but there are articles concerning the derivation of the manual which I have used. Some other of the authors like Trinquer and Horne can also be said to be well recognised authors. These are like Galula recognised and frequently cited in scientific works on the Algerian war.

B. SOURCES ON FLN

- For the FLN chapter I have drawn a large body of the text from Paul A. Jureidini's case study of the Algerian war produced for the American Special Operations Research Office. This study was completed in 1963. The good part of this is that it was published so close to the end of the Algerian war though this can also be its disadvantage. A study completed so soon afterwards will probably have used few sources on for example numbers and strength. The Special Operations Research Office was administered by the American University and sponsored by the US Army.[117]

- The section on FLN has used one article from *"Security Studies"* which is a journal published by Routhledge, where published articles have undergone editorial and double-blind peer review by at least two reviewers.[118]

- It also features one article from "*Small wars and insurgencies",* which is another journal from Routhledgde. This is more of a forum to discuss the historical, political, social, economic and psychological aspects of insurgency, counter-insurgency, limited

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[117] U.S congress, *A History of the department of defence federally funded research and development centres*, Defence acquisition university, 1995, accessed on 2011-05-20 <http://www.dau.mil/educdept/mm_dept_resources/reports/OTA-History-FFRDC.pdf> Page 55
[118] Tailor & Francis group, *Security studies*, Tailor & Francis, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/09636412.asp>

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> war, peacekeeping operations and the use of force as an instrument of policy and does not mention peer review on their homepage.[119]

- Two sources derived from the *"The Journal of Strategic Studies"*, another Routhledgde journal, where all articles have undergone rigorous peer review based on initial editor screening and review by one or more anonymous referees.[120]

- It also features one article from *"History today"*, which is a non peer reviewed popular history magazine. On their homepage they say *"Essays by the world's leading scholars, on all periods, regions and themes of history, are published. All are carefully edited and illustrated to make the magazine a pleasurable, as well as an informative, read."*[121]

- It also features a master thesis for military art and science from the U.S army *"Command and General Staff College"*.

Generally the essay lacks other side sources deriving from Algeria and FLN themselves. Much of the articles are written lately as well, even though I have tried to use sources from the same epoch. The *"History Today"* article has not gone through peer-view which made me remove some of the citation and use other sources.

C. SOURCES ON THE TALIBAN

- One article is derived from the *"Foreign Policy Research Institute"*. This is a non profit organisation that conducts research, publishes journals and conducts education. The staff includes a Pulitzer prize winner and a former aide of the U.S secretary of state.[122]

- One source derives from *"The Century Foundation"*. The foundation is a nonprofit public policy research institution. On their homepage can be read that the century foundation that their; *"staff, fellows, and contract authors produce publications and participate in events that (1) explain and analyze public issues in plain language, (2)*

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[119] Tailor & Francis group, *Journal details*, Tailor & Francis, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/09592318.asp>

[120] Tailor & Francis group, *Small wars and insurgencies*, Tailor & Francis, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/fjss>

[121] History today, *About us*, Andy Patterson, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.historytoday.com/about-us>

[122] Foreign Policy Research Institute, *About FPRI,* Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2011, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.fpri.org/about/>

provide facts and opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of different policy strategies, and (3) develop and call attention to distinctive ideas that can work."[123]

▪ One source that is used originates from the *"Foreign Policy"* which is an American magazine published by a division of the Washington Post. On the homepage itself they claim that *"Our readers want to be provoked, surprised, and presented with memorable information and rigorous analysis. They don't want long-winded arguments, insider jargon, narrow topics, or excessively technical writing (…). The ideal FP article strikes a balance: It is a reference for debate among specialists, but it also engages and informs a general-interest reader. Sharp analytical thinking should complement reporting."*[124] This indicates that the magazine is more of a popular based magazine rather than a really subjective and scientific magazine. Therefore have I used this source sparsely and checked out the information concurs with other literature.

▪ Another source used is from *"The Congressional Research Service"*. This is an organisation that works exclusively for the U.S congress providing policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation.*" Analyst (…) double-check all statements of fact; and document and vet all sources (…) We maintain an outstanding reputation for objective and nonpartisan analysis. Our experts are vigilant in evaluating issues without bias. A multi-layered review process also helps ensure that CRS products present issues and analysis in a manner that is fair, considered and reliable."*[125]

▪ A report used comes from the "*Norwegian Defence Research Institute"* (*FFI)* and their Transnational Radical Islamism Project. The FFI is responsible for defence related research in Norway. FFI is also the chief adviser for the Norweigan state on defence related science and technology.*[126]*

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[123] The Century Foundation, *About the Century Foundation*, 2011, The Century Foundation, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://tcf.org/about>

[124] Foreign Policy, *Writers guidelines,* 2011, The Slate Group, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/writers_guidelines>

[125] Library of Congress, *Values,* 2010, Library of Congress, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/values.html>

[126] Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, *FFI in short 2009-2010,* 2010, FFI, accessed on 2011-05-20, <http://www.ffi.no/en/About-FFI/Sider/FFI-in-short-2009-2010.aspx

- One article used comes from the "*RUSI Journal",* a journal published by the Royal United Service Insitute. The articles in the journal are peer reviewed both externally and internally.[127]

- The essay also features four master theses originating from "*The Naval Postgraduate School"* and "*Command and General Staff College"*. These have been approved and published.

- *RAND Corporation* is a non profit research organisation. The organisation has a built in system of principles which include peer viewing and that data should be the best available as another example.[128]

Generally the sources used tend to draw material from the same literature which is a clear disadvantage. Some of the material also halts a bit from being forced to use open sources as much information is classified.

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