Sociological Perspectives on African Peace Support Operations
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1. INTRODUCTION

“In a sense, things got better after the peacekeepers left. People realized that no one was going to help them and took matters in their own hands.”

Paul Rusebagini, manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines and saviour of 1,288 lives during Rwanda’s Genocide.

Although peace support operations are not limited to Africa, their presence in the continent’s security architecture cannot be ignored.

Sub-Saharan Africa hosted 27 out of 63 UN peace support missions. A further, four operations from the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), three missions from the African Union (AU), one intervention from the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU), and five undertakings from the European Union (EU). Numerous unilateral peace-making initiatives, mostly led by former colonial powers, could also be included in the list of peace support operations. Commonwealth Africa is not only the continent that received the most missions: it hosted the biggest and the most expansive one. Four African missions, UNAMID, MONUC, UNMIS and MINURCAT, consume 64% of the UN peacekeeping budget.

This quantitative data offers only a partial understanding of this complicated phenomenon. Peace support operations (PSOs) ought to provoke substantive sociological analysis. Interventions from third parties in African conflicts have transformed the continent. In spite of the constant innovations and hard work of different organizations, obvious successes of peace support operations appear limited. PSOs have on several occasions been resented by the African populations, as demonstrated by blatant mocking – and at times attacks – by local population. Paul Rusebagini’s quote at the beginning of this work is a reminder of the challenge facing PSOs on the African continent.

The Sociology Team, part of the Department of Leadership and Management (ILM), wishes to contribute towards building stronger peace PSOs and believe that this is only possible with strong unbiased academic research. The current brochure presents recent trends in PSOs as a way of fostering discussion in the field of military sociology. It is divided in eight parts. The first part will provide the conceptual framework behind peace support operations and the second will look broadly at the sociological and historical background to the current situation. The third and fourth parts will look more precisely at the lessons learned from past and present PSOs. The fifth part will highlight the Swedish contribution to African peace missions. In the sixth section, the brochure will present sociological trends that affect current missions and will then finish with some questions that need to be included in the research agenda.
2. PEACE AND AFRICA: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

PSOs have changed over time and acquired a conceptual complexity. This chapter looks at the historical progression of the concept of peace in Africa, and presents the basic concepts underlying PSOs. It aims to clarify why PSOs matter for military sociology.

2.1. MILITARY SOCIOLOGY AND PSOs

Military sociology is a relatively new field. While some social sciences, psychology as an example, have been studied for centuries in military academies, sociology only established itself during the 1960s, with scholars like Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz as forbearers.

Sociology is the study of society. The concept of society, which is broader than the concept of “state”, refers to the sum of individuals living together in groups on a given territory, and who “interact on the basis of common norms and identities” (Callaghan and Kernic 2003, 14). Military sociology adheres to this conceptualisation. But as the army is both part of the larger society and a society in itself, with its own “cultural identity, values, norms, traditions and complex, regulated forms of social interaction” (Callaghan and Kernic 2003, 14), it remains a source of debate how much the military society evolves independently to the “real world”.

So far, military sociology has mainly focussed on the open social system constituted by armed forces and society in a traditional combat context, providing a localised perspective that has much more in common with social psychology than sociology (Callaghan and Kernic 2003, 16, 37). New roles for the military, such as PSOs, increase the need to study the military as an integrate part of the wider society. More sociological knowledge is needed to get the full picture (Callaghan and Kernic 2003, 29).

Therefore, a sociological perspective on PSOs needs to deal with manifold levels: it needs to understand various social entities as circumscribed and finite social entities, as well as the relationship between various social groups: the peacekeepers, the belligerents, the civilians and the facilitators of the peace process.

2.2. SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND PSOs

Peace missions also demand a stronger sociological perspective as they are constantly evolving. We refer to those missions as peace support operations, or PSOs. PSO is a concept coined to refer to “an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace” (UK Ministry of Defence 2004, 2). PSOs conglomerate different sorts of operations, mostly peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. They all aim at a single purpose: ending conflict and reaching sustainable peace through the interposition of a third party. The difference between the three is the level of involvement of the third party.
Peacekeeping is a physical interposition between belligerents’ forces in order to create conditions for the parties to reach a political solution to conflict, to monitor compliance with the conditions, and to stabilise the situation on the ground (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004, 95-97; Aggestam and Björkdahl 2009, 206). In other words, it is a pause to buy time for active diplomacy as a way to dispel distrust and incite a minimum of confidence (Norton, A.R. and T.G. Weiss, 31; Fetherston 1994, 126). Some refer to it as traditional peacekeeping, although the concept has gained complexity over time, with the arrival of second and third generation peacekeeping missions, where peacekeepers have seen their involvement level increased along with the concepts. Two main types of missions have been drafted. UN missions made under the Chapter 6 of the UN Charter are about mediation and observation, whereas Chapter 7 approves the use of military force to protect the mandate and authorizes sanctions.

Peacemaking describes “action to bring hostile parties to agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of United Nations” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 11). War, in many cases, is the cessation of peaceful interactions and their substitution by violent confrontation. While peacekeeping attempts to stop the violence, peace enforcement attempts to restore the severed interaction, and to change the attitude of the main actors in the conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 250). It is about containing conflict through de-escalation, mediation, negotiations and intervention from third parties. It also aims to identify and support structures (i.e. institutions and infrastructure), to strengthen and solidify peace, to negotiate and to mediate at the macro-level between parties to the dispute and work either alongside or prior to peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994, 11; Boutros-Ghali 1992, 131).

Peacebuilding answers to the need that, once peace has been enforced and kept, social institutions need to be rebuilt in a way to foster sustainable peace. It is an “enormous experiment in social engineering” that uses a comprehensive approach to create stable and democratic states out of countries dismembered by war (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2009, 16; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 216; Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson 2008, 321). This came from three conclusions: traditional peacekeeping missions are unlikely to produce comprehensive or lasting resolution if they are only there to supervise ceasefires or to oversee elections; formal agreements need to be underpinned by understandings, structures and long-term development frameworks that will eliminate cultures of violence; and no solution is viable without the inclusion of local actors and the civil society (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 216). Compared to peacekeeping or peacemaking, it is a much longer term process. In the current paper, we will use the term peace support operations, or PSO(s), to describe the three phenomena, as they are intertwined, and often metamorphosing from one to the other during their deployment. Peacekeeper will refer to someone performing any form of PSO.

Operations beyond peacekeeping need a strong understanding of sociology: to understand how peacekeepers as militaries are collaborating with other security forces and how they interact with civilians and warring parties. Military sociologists need now to enrich those highly sensitive missions by providing strong studies on how the peacekeeper, which is also a soldier, can influence the social interactions of the actors in the conflict, understanding that the actions of the peacekeeper can foster or undermine social relations deemed necessary for peace.
2.3. LEGACIES AND TRADITIONS BEFORE COLONIZATION

A continental historical legacy is too wide to be thoroughly presented in this document, but a fact remains: it is neither colonisation nor modernism that brought order and peace to the African continent. Unfortunately, our knowledge of what happened before colonization remains vague and limited.

Western myths have framed African societies in different ways, taking their inspiration from philosophers such as Rousseau (“noble savage”) and Hobbes (state of nature characterized by “Bellum Omnium contra Omnem”). Social science holds a tradition of depicting Africa as pre-modern societies that have never evolved, a racist point of view that has been challenged very recently with the rise of thinkers like Franz Fanon and Cheikh Anta Diop.

Historical research proved those stereotypes as being wrong. Africa remains a continent with various historical legacies, but it contained highly organized polities and societies before European colonization. Various empires have controlled part of the territory: the Empire of Ghana, Mali, Ashantis, Zimbabwe or the sophisticated Swahili city states in East Africa. Many African states had structures of governance, including tax collection, diplomacy with foreign states, bureaucracies and other elements of modern statehood. Many nations even had strong democratic institutions (Zartman 2000, 49).

African societies had conflict prevention and peacemaking mechanisms which were multilateral and on an ad-hoc basis. In many societies, like the Fulanis and the Buems, conflict prevention and pre-emptive diplomacy were efficient tools (Zartman 2000, 44, 49). In the case of the eruption of a conflict, many societies had strong moral codes and legal principles to bind the two parties involved, often through the so-called “sacred laws” interpreted by the Elders. Elders often became the peacekeeper that would enforce peace until the conflict was resolved (Zartman 2000, 73).

Peace in different African societies was negotiated by envoys and mutual trust was built through different ceremonial acts: marriage, oath-swearing ceremonies or religious services where each side would celebrate the god of the other faction (Zartman 2000, 73). Oromos and Somalis created a multi-levelled system of peace making based on reparation, which held till recently. Behaviours of belligerents are still imprinted in those legacies.

2.4. SLAVERY AND COLONIZATION: VIOLENCE AS THE NEW PARADigm

Paul Tiyambe Zeleza

A new era began for Africa when the Portuguese built what is known as the Elmina Castle in 1482, on the current Ghanaian coast. It launched a scramble amongst European powers for the continent. Some wanted to bring civilization; others wanted to save the soul of the “pagans”; but almost everyone wanted wealth from the resources of a rich...
continent, be it gold, diamonds or slaves. They were not the first ones, but none did it in such a scale.

Looking at the heavy content of slavery and colonization is a difficult task as figures and real impacts are far from being fully understood. Finding culprits does not change anything as the effect remains the same: a culture of violence and terror replaced existing social ties (Nhema and Zeleza 2008, 100). During 500 years of colonization, Africa has become the birthplace of several violent concepts: genocide with the Hereros, concentration camps during the Boer War, ethnic cleansing forcing different people to move to inhospitable land for not being enslaved, etc. Polities were “subverted and destroyed” and Africa was under “military siege” (Assensoh 2001, 12). And the way to freedom has not been bloodless as many populations had to seize weapons in a way to gain independence, bringing violent anti-colonial uprising all over Africa.

Violence is a short way to summarize colonial experience. The process left ruined societies living in newly independent countries burdened with the task of building statehood and nations on artificial borders (Nhema and Zeleza 2008, 101).

If this limited view of history cannot represent an entire reality, one should bear in mind that the current situation cannot be fully understood without looking at the past. Former colonial powers remain involved in their former colonies, and play an important role in shaping the wars and the conflicts of the present moment, and unsolved historical legacies influence the sociological aspects of conflicts as they deeply traumatised a whole society, and can explain some of the current suspicion towards PSOs. Antagonism among Africans and inherited from colonialism is also important, like the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi proved. History has created social dynamics that keep influencing current missions. The role of a military sociologist is therefore to identify those elements that intervene in the current social interactions among all the different actors of a peace process.
3. PSOs AND AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Peacekeeping is the reverse of military action; it is the peaceful application of a military presence in the interest of a political process.

(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 5)

In February 1945, all the states signed the United Nation Charter in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, marking the founding of the United Nations. While PSOs were not explicitly part of the Charter, they evolved as one of the main tools to achieve this objective (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 1-99).

Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson, strongly supported by the then UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, set down the five principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties; non-use of force except for self-defence purposes; voluntary contribution of contingents from small, neutral countries; impartiality and non-intervention, respect of sovereignty; and day-to-day control of peacekeeping by the Secretary General (Fetherston 1994, 13).

While the first PSO occurred in 1948 during the Arab-Israeli war, the first test for the concept during the Suez Crisis raised expectations: UNEF 1, the first UN-sponsored PSO, was overwhelmingly successful in securing a cease-fire and facilitating the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt (Fetherston 1994, 13).

3.1. PEACEKEEPING IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT AFRICA

The peacekeeping mission following UNEF 1 was less successful. In 1960, the newly independent Belgian Congo became a challenge for the ideals of the young UN organization. When the Congo declared independence from Belgium, the new country did not have the capacity to maintain the unity of its territory.

The UN Security Council mandated the Operation des Nations-Unies au Congo, ONUC, to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian colonial forces, to assist the Congolese Government with maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance to the new-born state. This mandate quickly proved insufficient though, and ONUC was extended to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Congo, preventing civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, including mercenaries (United Nations 1961). Resources for the mission were not, however, commensurate with its extended objectives (Nze Ekome 2007, 13).

In summary, the UN got embedded in a complex civil conflict where there was no peace to preserve. The Congo crisis became a “source of disagreement in the UN” because of its ambiguous mandate, and its lack of adequate international support or planning. The financial controversy over ONUC generated “a crisis so serious that the continued existence of the UN itself was in doubt” (Nze Ekome 2007, 13). For Congo, ONUC ensured its territorial integrity but did little to protect elected President Patrice Lumumba.
against the rise of Mobutu Sese Seko, who was backed by France, the UK and the USA. ONUC was the sole UN peacekeeping mission in Africa during the Cold War and became a symbol of the incapacity of the UN to go against the great powers’ will.

Two other organizations have also made attempts at PSOs in Africa during the Cold War. The first one was initiated in Chad by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1981 and was considered an “unmitigated failure due to serious lapses in the mediation process and the peacekeeping operation” (Amoo; Ero 2000; Olonisakin 2000, 49). The failure brought to power Hissène Habré, now awaiting trial in Senegal for human rights violations.

The second attempt was launched by the Commonwealth in 1980, and was more successful in bringing peace in former Rhodesia, which had seen an anti-colonial upsurge against white-ruling policies of Ian Smith’s government. The Commonwealth mission’s 1,548 international staff succeeded in maintaining peace, demilitarizing militias, and presiding over a peaceful election that was deemed free and fair (Griffin 2001, 158), which, incidentally brought to power Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

3.2. THE END OF THE COLD WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR AFRICAN CONFLICTS

_With the end of the Cold War, we moved into what [some] defined as “new dimensions of security”; regional stability, nationalism, fundamentalism, North-South issues, the new risks of ethnic, religions, social, environmental, economic and an endless number of other possible crises and problems, an avalanche of “smaller” problems replacing the previous overwhelming risk of a Third World War._

Bo Hult, Swedish National Defence College

_While Africa may be important, it doesn’t fit into [our] national strategic interests._

George W. Bush, during an electoral speech in February 2000

1989 was a year of hope. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, numerous analysts suggest that this could have been the end of war, even of history (Fukuyama, 1991). However, conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Kuwait revealed that the end of one era meant the beginning of a new one, which was not necessarily more peaceful.

For Africa, the fall of the Iron Curtain meant the end of a strategic interest. Cold War manipulations had been at the core of African politics. Governments and opposition movements had tailored their positions in order to gain the support of one of the great powers, the latter sponsoring regimes, which committed human rights abuses and corruption, in the name of keeping the country within their realm of influence. After 1989, many African regimes lost their sponsors and their geopolitical relevance. This brought radical regime changes in numerous African countries.

South Africa’s apartheid regime was an obvious casualty of this new international realm. Influential countries had condemned South Africa for its segregation regime but had still
supported it in the name of the fight against Communism. With the end of the Cold War, the African state was forced to drop its racist policies which eventually led to the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. This change in government ended South Africa’s invasion of Namibia and its support for guerrilla factions in Angola.

Another casualty of the end of the Cold War was the former Republic of Zaire, formerly the Belgian Congo. The Western world had heavily subsidised General Mobuto for over 40 years in order to safeguard the country’s large reserve of natural resources against a Communist take-over. Sudden changes on the global geopolitical map led the United States and other foreign sponsors to abandon economic and military support of what had been labelled “kleptocracy”. General Mobuto was forced to step down, which triggered the most deadly war since World War II.

Losing foreign sponsorships was a determining factor in African conflicts over the past 20 years; however, solely focussing on the end of the Cold War does not present the whole picture. Forty years of financial mismanagement by corrupted and incompetent leaders had burdened the economies of African states. Massive foreign debts, decreasing prices for raw material, a depressive and steady decline of purchasing power, autocratic rule that had dried up public funds were all common features across the continent (Collins and Burns 2007, 376). Over-indebted African countries had to turn to the Breton Woods Institutions which imposed strict state reforms (known as structural adjustment programs) in exchange for loans. The system of clientelism crumbled – where leaders paid their allies for their loyalty – as money became scarce, spreading discontent among populations whose allegiance had been bought or imposed.

Africa also confronted new factors which affected security and stability. The continent has been dramatically hit by HIV/AIDS, some countries facing HIV prevalence rates of almost 30 percent. Global warming, with massive floods and increasing desertification, has become an important issue in a continent that still struggles to feed its population. Urbanization is also a destabilising factor: discontent from unemployed urban youth and social inequalities are creating fertile grounds for civil strife and terrorism. Global inequalities feed into this frustration as globalization allows Africans to see how technology and modernity can enhance one’s life, without offering them the chance to take part in it.

Thus, the relative stability of the Cold War left a relative instability. According to the Foreign Policy 2009 index of the failed states, Sub-Saharan African countries hold the first five positions and represent 30 out of the 60 listed countries (Foreign Policy 2009). The new conflicts that emerged were the results of state weakness and the incapacity of African states to have a monopoly on power within their national boundaries (Swedish National Defence College 2002, 20). Post-Cold War conflicts also brought an explosion of civilian deaths at a rate never reached before (Mychajlyszyn and Shaw 2005, 4).
4. NEW ROLE FOR THE UN: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW GENERATIONS OF PSOs

The end of the Cold War meant the end of the stalemate within the Security Council and an opportunity for a more active role for the UN Security Council in international peace and security. Military staff involved in peacekeeping increased from 10,000 in 1988 to 80,000 in 1993 (Swedish National Defence College 2002, 21).

At the same time, new operations faced the harsh reality of this new generation of conflicts. Flemes summarised it this way: “lightly armed peacekeepers were sent into situations in which there was no peace to keep, often with ill-defined objectives, ambiguous mandates that did not spell out their tasks in clear terms, and without the human and material resources they needed to do those tasks” (Flemes 2009, 135). There was a need for new tools to build and ensure sustainable peace.

What was referred to as traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War was replaced by peace-enforcement and state-building operations. A new generation of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations emerged. It included a “mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 22; Herrhausen). Two concepts surfaced: peacemaking and peacebuilding (cf. part 1).

PSOs have evolved, and are increasingly labelled as “comprehensive” and these comprehensive approaches need strong bases in sociology. The next section offers an overview of memorable challenges, but also some successes.

4.1. MEMORABLE CHALLENGES

PSOs in Africa in the post-Cold War context were quickly confronted with severe challenges, despite the new opportunities for intervention. Their failures have been catastrophic not only for the peace they were intended to keep, but also for the credibility of the UN system. Some argue that the African crises of the 1990s, in particular in Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda, have “contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for the UN”, but at the same time “spurred efforts to create new regional and sub-regional security in Africa” (International Peace Institute 2008, 2). This section provides clear examples of those issues.


Angola’s conflict comes from the long struggle towards independence from Portugal in 1974. Portugal’s abrupt departure left behind rival armed liberation movements that were incapable of resolving their ideological differences and ethnic divides. The country fell into a civil conflict, fuelled by Cold War enemies: the United States, South Africa, the USSR and Cuba (Collins and Burns 2007, 375). The result was perpetual conflict for 30 years. The end of the Cold War offered the first opportunity for the international community
to play a constructive role in Angola. UNAVEM I, deployed in 1988, was successful as a traditional peacekeeping mission in charge of monitoring Cuban and South African troop withdrawal. Unfortunately, it was unable to prevent the ensuing clash between local factions aimed at controlling the government (Gwinyayi 2004, 659). UNAVEM I successfully fulfilled its mandate, but that did not prevent the conflict from turning into a full-blown war. In 1998, a “corrupt government mesmerized by wealth” fought an “inhumane opposition obsessed with power” (Chabal and Birmingham 2002, 182).

UN sanctions and peace enforcement activities were ineffective against the illegal weapons trade in spite of a UN embargo. The trafficking of the “blood diamonds” and growing interest in oil continued to fuel the conflict (Chabal and Birmingham 2002, 182). In 2002 the conflict ended; the end can be attributed more to the death of a rebel leader, which disintegrated the chain of command within his military faction and impeded the faction’s actions, than on progress at the peace talks (International Crisis Group 2003, 3).

Angola became a case of “UN fatigue”: long standing UN efforts to resolve the conflict and bring peace to the country proved futile to solve a long-standing and protean conflict. UN failure was largely due to a lack of resources and the downsizing of the UN peacekeeping missions (Gwinyayi 2004, 648).


Somalia has coped with instability since its independence in 1960. Constantly, groups are fighting each other in attempts to control the country. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, was enthusiastically created in 1992 to uphold the ceasefire between two warring factions and to assist humanitarian relief effort. Very quickly, UNISOM I came under attack by Somalia’s warring parties. In a bold move to ensure humanitarian access to civilians, the US launched a multinational intervention force called UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope, UN-mandated to use “all necessary means” to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid. UNITAF, which was UN-backed, was intended to lead the way to an expanded-mandate mission, UNISOM II, and then to peacebuilding.

UNISOM was operating in a “very complex and volatile situation with difficult underlying cultural issues and alliance making” (Pouligny 2006, 75). Problems emerged when the mission was perceived as an occupying force by Somali armed factions. Peacekeepers came under attack, most notoriously when two US Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and American Marine corpses were dragged through the streets of the capital, Mogadishu. The international community was shocked to discover the hostility against what was intended to be a humanitarian operation. As a result, Bill Clinton decided to pull out American troops.

Somalia left a considerable stain on the international community’s psyche. The Somalia operation remains the largest deployment of staff in Africa at a given time (Bah and Aning 2008, 118). Somalia was an inversion of the traditional role of UN peacekeepers:
they became part of conflict in a collapsing state (Pouligny 2006, 127; Taylor 2009). Lee emphasizes the major issue here:

By choosing to expand the mandate of the mission beyond its focus, the UN mission lost its impartiality and became a party to the conflict and, in so doing, lost the ability to achieve its core mandate of supporting humanitarian assistance. This, in turn, led to local misunderstanding of UN intervention as an act of aggression, drawing UN peacekeepers into the fighting (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 99).

This was a considerable move from traditional peacekeeping mission’s universal consent, impartiality and non-use of force (Fetherston 1994, 31).

The biggest collateral damage was the “Somalia Syndrome”, which describes the feeling shared among the international community very weary of intervening in conflict situations, where its strategic interests were not directly threatened. This inaugurated a decade of “half-hearted engagements” (Bah and Aning 2008, 118). Following this failure, the US Administration adopted a policy reluctant to direct intervention in UN ventures where national interests were not directly threatened, an idea spread by other international actors (Bah and Aning 2008, 119).

4.1.3. RWANDA: UNOMUR (1993-95) AND UNAMIR (1993-96)

In October 1993, UNAMIR was created to observe cease-fire agreements during a civil war between two ethnic-based factions: the Hutus and the Tutsis. Under-staffed and under-resourced, the mission was overstretched from the beginning and highly dependent on Belgian troops, which were perceived as pro-Tutsis by the Hutus. UNOMIR was initiated to ensure that no military support cross the Rwanda-Uganda border.

When it appeared that genocide was about to unfold, the mission made several attempts to prevent it, but each time the UN Headquarters ordered the mission to stop its intended actions and reminded it of its limited mandate (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 100). There was also confusion within the mission over “the rules of engagement, not to mention the fact that there was insufficient planning for any possible humanitarian crisis situations that could arise” (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 100).

The international community’s blatant disregard for the 800,000 Rwandans killed during the 1994 genocide came to epitomise the lack of interest in Africa. This was the most significant failure of UN peacekeeping. The international community, still deeply affected by the “Somalia Syndrome”, was a passive spectator of the unfolding drama: 10,000 civilians were being killed per day (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 101). Attempts to intervene were blocked at the UN, and the international community greatly resisted the label of genocide as a way to avoid intervention as prescribed by international law (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 101). The French army launched Operation Turquoise, a military operation which strictly evacuated European nationals and ignored the Rwandan civilians being killed. Several were left with the belief that peace missions were there to defend Western interests, and subsequently would not dare protect African civilians.
Since the international community’s debacle in Rwanda, all new UN missions have been deployed under a Chapter VII mandate to enable them to react to developments without additional authorisation from the Security Council, offering a slim silver lining (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 101). But the biggest failure might be in the incapacity to prevent this particular conflict from igniting the whole region, most notably Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.1.4. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: MONUC (1999-2010), MONUSCO (2010-PRESENT)

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, fell into turmoil when, after facing a massive flood of Rwandese refugees, neighbours supported an attack against the crumbling Mobutu regime in 1996, with the silent approval of the great powers (Reyntjens 2009, 79). A second conflict started when the same neighbours consider that the new masters of Kinshasa were not compliant enough (Reyntjens 2009, 112). The results have been more than a decade of ongoing warfare.

The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC, was set up in 1999. It has become the most expensive peacekeeping mission ever, and the one which has faced the fiercest critics (Tull 2009, 215). Ridiculed by the press, repeatedly assaulted by civilians, described as tainted with “cowardice” in a UN report: many were eager to criticise MONUC’s inefficiency in bringing anything close to peace to the Great Lakes region (Tull 2009, 215). Denis M. Tull diagnosed two problems: an inconsistent approach to the vague concept of “robust peacekeeping”, and the failure to adapt to a dynamic conflict environment where interests of the actors constantly shift (Tull 2009, 215). Nevertheless, it is unclear, so far, whether this mission has been any worse than others, especially in light of the very complicated situation on the ground, and the constant lack of resources and staff (Tull 2009, 215; Prunier 2009, 9).

MONUC was replaced in July 2010 by the Mission de l’ONU pour la stabilisation en RDC (MONUSCO), which consists in an important resource downsizing and a stronger focus on the Eastern part of the country.

4.2. RELATIVE SUCCESS OR SMALLER FAILURES?

Some peace support operations have been relatively successful. Others, even if they faced considerable criticism, proved that some lessons were learned and improvements made in the management and deployment of PSOs.

4.2.1. NAMIBIA: UNTAG (1989-1990)

Since World War I, Namibia has been occupied and administered by South Africa. In 1988, in compliance with a UN peace plan for the region, South Africa agreed to leave. Thus, there was no open conflict to manage.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group, UNTAG, was launched in 1989 to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. Its mandate
consisted in monitoring the withdrawal and demobilization of all military forces. Peaceful elections brought 97% of registered electors to elect a Constituent Assembly that drafted a constitution on 9 February 1990 (Rubinstein 2008).

This traditional peacekeeping operation was overwhelmingly described as successful for its ability to help Namibia move away from South Africa’s annexation. The reasons: it had a simple mandate, was operating in a straightforward conflict where all parties were eager to move on (Gwinyayi 2004, 649-652; Rubinstein 2008).


The interrelated conflicts of the Mano River Basin have been described as “the most controversial and resilient contemporary struggle” (Mychajlyszyn and Shaw 2005, 43). When different factions launched an attack against the regime of Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1989, over a decade of conflict started with devastating effects for the country and its neighbours: Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

When the Liberian conflict reached full-blown civil war, the UN did not show interest. Nigeria therefore stepped in and launched the first peace mission mandated by the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, under the name of ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG (Ero 2000). In 1993, the United Nations did mandate and deploy a UN mission to Liberia, UNOMIL. ECOMOG and the following UN mission faced many hardships: a slow deployment, inadequacy of peace support operations, poor coordination with humanitarian agencies, incapacity to implement a DDR program, failure to develop cooperation with UN agencies (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 103).

ECOMOG committed many abuses, but was perceived as more capable than the UN mission. The latter was described by a fact-finding report as having a serious lack of cohesion, a clear mandate understood by the peacekeepers, communication, coordination, military training and equipment (Olonisakin 2008, 2). The failures within the UN mission spurred the UN to do some serious work and eventually provoked an important turn-over in 2001. The mission in Sierra Leone thereafter provided the region with much needed peace and stability (Olonisakin 2008, 2). Since the end of the conflicts, both Liberia and Sierra Leone have organized peaceful elections and faced encouraging futures, although fragile. ECOMOG, as we will see in section 6, became a model mission. The successes of those missions also helped to build the security capabilities and the readiness of ECOWAS.
5. THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

Peacekeeping is a central component of Sweden's contribution to global security. Sweden aims at helping to maintain international peace and security so as to facilitate fair and sustainable global development. In a longer-term perspective, Swedish participation in peace support operations is also a matter of promoting national security and Swedish interests.

Sweden has been an actor in African PSOs since the beginning. It contributed 6,200 troops to ONUC, the UN mission in Congo and the first mission in Africa. It was also on the front line when UN troops clashed against the Katangese gendarmerie in 1962. The operation left 19 casualties among the Swedish contingent (Ulriksen 2007, 555).

In all, Sweden contributed to 16 UN missions in Africa, 4 EU-led operations and provided advisors to one AU mission. Sweden's contribution to African peace has been more than sending troops; it also made strong efforts in security capacity-building, especially through the EUFOR initiatives under the EU.

It played a major role in Somalia in 1991, in Angola in 1995, and in Liberia in 2003. A full list of Swedish contributions can be found in the “List of Internationally-sponsored PSOs” in Africa on page 41.

Sweden participates in numerous multilateral efforts in PSOs. It is the framework nation of the Nordic Battle Group, with a mechanized infantry battalion and a tactical and strategic support unit aiming at rapid deployment on demand. It is the largest contributor in terms of troops (Jakobsen 2007, 461). It is also part of the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations, SHIRBRIG, an international intervention unit that has made forces available for UN missions since 2000 (Jakobsen 2007, 462).

The Scandinavian countries also contribute to the Petersberg Tasks, an agreement among the Western European Union countries to deploy troops and resources for a spectrum of military operations such as PSOs, humanitarian interventions and rescue tasks.

As of December 2009, Sweden has 7 observers involved in African missions; 4 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 3 in Sudan.
6. NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES

PSOs are constantly evolving, and doing so within an international context which is also changing. New peace support operations will need to deal with new realities. A new relationship between civilians, peacekeepers and belligerents is being built. Military sociology needs to keep an eye on developments as they are likely to transform Africa and its societies. The current section focuses on trends likely to change the sociological aspect of conflicts in the 19th century.

6.1. A NEW NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: NEW TOOLS, NEW OUTCOMES?

Since the end of the Cold War, numerous new tools have been created by the international community to help create and sustain peace.

The Special Courts for Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court are sending a clear signal that perpetrators of crimes against humanity will be held responsible for their acts. It is an important move from the Cold War years where numerous human rights abusers were never held accountable for their crimes. At the same time, the current arrest mandate against the Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir, as well as the quasi exclusive prosecution of African leaders, raise criticism among Africans who feel targeted by the new court system (Jeune Afrique 2009).

The Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, has been an influential policy that follows a long list of concepts aimed at defining a norm protecting civilians: “the right to intervene”, “human security”, “sovereignty as responsibility”, Kofi Annan’s “individual responsibility” (Evans 2008, 19). In sum, the R2P highlights the responsibility of each state to protect its citizens from gross abuses. When a state is unable or unwilling to uphold this responsibility, it falls on the shoulders of the international community to prevent crimes, to react in a proportional and timely manner, and to rebuild (Evans 2008, 19). It has been integrated into the AU body of law, and opens new ways to conceptualize civilians in the international law system.

Those two elements are just two of the many new tools created in the last decade. Other examples are the Kimberley Process, the Ottawa Convention on Landmines and the creation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

While acknowledging the good of these initiatives, several voices worry that these ideas are simply not implemented in the “real world” (Rieff 2002, 15). It also raises the question of how those new concepts can influence missions, and influence the overall social dynamics that lead to peace. It also introduces a meta-narrative based on a whole new vocabulary, which could lead to the redefinition or the empowerment of some social actors.
6.2. PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN-LED PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

It is far better to be free to govern or misgovern yourself than to be governed by anybody else.

Nkwame Nkrumah

I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in their efforts to solve the problems of this continent. I dream of our vast deserts, of our forests, of all our great wildernesses.

Nelson Mandela

Pan-Africanism was coined to encapsulate the idea that Africa is “one continent, one people”. Developed by different voices and visions, including WEB Du Bois, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Nkwame Nkrumah, it remains strongly tainted by anti-colonial spirit. Nevertheless, it found a new definition with the birth of the African Union and the call for closer integration among African countries.

In terms of peace and security, pan-Africanism means, in former Ghanaian President Nkrumah’s words, “unity to find appropriate African solutions to problems and prevent the intervention of non-African powers” (Jaye 2008, 155). ECOWAS, the AU and SADC have all launched initiatives inspired by this idea. Pan-Africanism is a tool to affirm the identity of a social actor, the Africans, and changing the relationship that it has with other actors involved in the field of peace in Africa.

The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, was created in 1975 by 16 West African states. It entered the field of peace support operations in 1990 through a Nigerian initiative called ECOMOG in a move to end the first Liberian civil war. Three interventions followed: Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and on the border of Guinea and Liberia in 2001. The lack of interest of the international community for the conflict in Liberia, a conflict that has fuelled a regional crisis, spurred the development of ECOWAS (Ero 2000).

Those interventions have often been cited as a model for Africa and received considerable positive attention as much from the pan-Africanists eager to find African solutions to African problems as from the international community that remains cautious to intervene in Africa (Ero 2000).

It would nevertheless be unrealistic to describe ECOMOG operations as obvious successes, as the list of problems during the mission is long: lack of neutrality; human rights violations committed by peacekeepers; no accountability; absence of clear guidelines, principles or rules of engagement; and serious disagreement among ECOWAS members (Ero 2000; Human Rights Watch 1993; ECOWAS 2005, 14-19).

ECOMOG provided new confidence for ECOWAS, an organization that still struggles to find a place in the international security system (Ero 2000). ECOMOG increased the confidence of Africans in terms of managing their own security, and the positive perception of civilians to ECOMOG deployments shows that it does matter (Olonisakin 2008, 115).
ECOMOG successes were also an important factor in the reform of the African Union, AU, as an actor in peace matters. In spite of aggressive stances against colonialism and apartheid, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) remained a marginal actor in security during its entire existence from 1963 to 2002. The African Union was created on 2 July 2002 to replace the OAU. The new organization expanded continental security integration, and moved away from its predecessor’s policy of non-intervention and intransigent stance toward the sovereignty of individual states. It reserves the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds, drawing those guidelines directly from the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Hanson 2009, 4; Murithi, Scanlon, and University of Cape Town. Centre for Conflict Resolution 2006, 75).

Its first test in PSOs was in 2003 with the African Mission in Burundi, AMIB. This operation involved more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. They were sent to monitor the peace process, to provide security and to establish conditions that would allow for a UN peace support operation to enter the country (Murithi 2008, 75). This set the footing for a division of tasks between the AU and the UN over the following years; first, the AU assured deployment and peace stabilisation, and the UN came afterwards with the full range of a peace-building mission (International Peace Institute 2008, 9).

Two other missions followed. In 2005, the AU launched the African Union Mission in Sudan, AMIS. Darfur is the “AU’s most significant test to date” (Murithi 2008, 76). In 2007, AMISOM, the AU’s third mission was created to stabilize the situation in Somalia. Even if a real assessment needs to face the test of time, the new organization has proved that it can live up to the challenge of the XXIst century, notably in its capacity to act swiftly. The creation of the African Standby Force offers the possibility of a rapid deployment of force for a broad spectrum of operations, such as humanitarian missions, large-scale peacekeeping missions or peace-enforcing operations (Patoka and Swedish National Defence College 2009, 7). However, the force has yet to be operational.

But serious issues need to be tackled. Most notably, the AU missions have been attacked in the last two deployments, leaving casualties among AU troops. For Pan-Africanists, African-led PSOs are expected to be more legitimate than the ones led by outsiders. Recent experiences show that this might not stand the test of reality.

Funding problems also needs to be resolved in a way to strengthen the AU peace support operations. So far, dependency on external resources denies the organization “the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace support operations it may wish to undertake” (International Peace Institute 2008, 12).

A final point can also be made on fact that positive attention brought a lot of support to the AU’s security capabilities, while other elements affecting peacebuilding still need to be framed. (International Peace Institute 2008, 5).

It nevertheless opens the door to a “continental organization within a robust security system” in spite of “questionable legitimacy” and “conflicting political agendas” (Powell
In theory, the AU is very promising. But the real test is to come. Other African regional organizations, like the South-Africa Development community, are building their peace management capabilities, but real capabilities for operations have yet to be seen.

6.3. NEW ACTORS, NEW DYNAMICS

We encourage the vision of a strong, regional security architecture that can bring effective, transnational force to bear when needed. America has a responsibility to advance this vision, not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity. When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems— they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response. That is why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy, technical assistance, and logistical support, and will stand behind efforts to hold war criminals accountable. And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world.

US President Barack Obama, 11 July 2009, during his address to the Parliament of Ghana

We are looking to the East where the sun rises, and have turned our backs on the West where the sun sets.

President Robert Mugabe, May 2005

The end of the Cold War meant more possibilities for the UN. At the same time, some countries and organizations did not hesitate to by-pass the heavy bureaucracy of the international institution and act: OSCE in former Yugoslavia, NATO in Afghanistan, the “Coalition of the willing” in Iraq, etc. Although almost irrelevant for Africa, those initiatives represent repetitive infringements on the UN Security Council’s monopoly to initiate a war.

Others, like the African Union (AU) or the European Union (EU), develop new roles on the international realm with UN approval. Those international players changed the way peace is built and fostered by the international community. Now, the UN must work with institutions that all have their own culture and objectives. But it opens new windows of opportunity in terms of managing peace, the result of which could be positive.

The peace support operations during the conflict in Sierra Leone have faced numerous difficulties due to the action of three independent players that were poorly coordinated: ECOMOG, the UN and the United Kingdom (Olonisakin 2008, 92). The Ivorian crisis faced similar issues when UNOCI came under attack after a French unilateral decision to bomb the Ivorian air float. UNAMID, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur faces similar struggles with leadership and coordination amongst the two organizations. This raises important issues in sociological terms in the way all those actors interact and how this contributes to a peaceful outcome.
For Africa, the European Union (EU) became an important player in terms of PSOs; on
the grounds that different operations have been deployed over the years with a strong
focus on building African capacities. Former Colonial states also got involved through
the European Union’s (EU) action. During a European Council meeting in 1997,
the EU adopted a “Common Position” that set conflict prevention as a priority. Since
then, the EU capacity to get involved in African peace support operations has steadily
increased in the CFSP/ESDP. It was institutionalized with the African Peace Facility, an
initiative that created an organ dedicated to African conflict management (Olsen 2009,
246). Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 stabilized the security situation in the Ituri
province by filling the security vacuum following the repatriation of Ugandan troops,
which was unmanageable for the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo,
MONUC (Turner 2007, 27). The UN-mandated EU mission to fight piracy in Somalia,
NAVFOR, has blurred the line between peace and military operations.

Although offering required help in the field, the EU-led assistance operations have often
been perceived as self-interested. The EU has been accused of using those missions
to establish itself as an international actor (Olsen 2009, 246; Gegout 2009, 232).
EU’s support to African missions might also be a way to avoid costly and unpopular
deployment of European troops on the continent (Olsen 2009, 246; Nivet and European
Union Institute for Security Studies 2006, 7). Many also doubt the capacity of the EU
to develop a policy independent of its member states, which are also former colonial
powers. France, which played a key-role in bringing African peace missions onto the EU
agenda, can be seen as trying to retain more influence on the continent than unilateral
intervention would (Charbonneau 2008, 112).

Beyond EU intervention, colonial powers remain involved unilaterally in their former
colonies in Africa. For example, the British Royal Air Force intervened directly in 2001 in
Sierra Leone. France has launched 64 unilateral operations in Africa since 1989, and keeps
three permanent military bases (Djibouti, Libreville and – soon to be closed – Dakar) and
three temporary (Abidjan, Bangui, N’Djamena) (Charbonneau 2008, 78). Great Britain
and Portugal, although to a lesser degree, also remain involved. This involvement can also
take indirect forms: French military bases across the continent, the obscure Françafrique
network, illegal weapons sales in spite of embargoes. In many ways, national institutions
have developed a military culture and sociological mechanisms in their own way to deal
with inhabitants of former colonies. Be it positive or negative, it needs to be looked at
through a sociological lens to understand how these behaviors influence missions.

Other actors are also increasing involvement. The United States of America was highly
concerned with containing the Communist threat in Africa, but relaxed its involvement
during the 90s. However, it has since reaffirmed interest in African security, mostly
through the enactment of a stronger command for Africa, AFRICOM. The “Somalia
Syndrome” of the nineties disintegrated after 9/11. The terrorist attacks against American
embassies in Eastern Africa or in Mauritania at the end of the 90s were a signal that Africa
should not be out of the strategic focus. The Bush Administration moved to a new policy
on Africa when it realized that “failed” or “fragile” states which provide sanctuary to
terrorist groups can become a dangerous mixture threatening America’s national security.
America has also sought to use Africa to protect its national interests by exploring Guinea Gold oil as an alternative to Middle East oil, and by containing Chinese efforts to grab Africa’s resources (Bah and Aning 2008, 118).

AFRICOM is more than a command that will serve US interest. It allows to work collaboratively with African partners, including the AU or ECOWAS, as a way to build security capabilities (Bah and Aning 2008, 126). This is especially true in the Sahel, where troops and resources are being injected to contain the terrorist groups (Hanson 2009, 4).

In parallel, Asian countries’ interest for Africa has also grown substantially over the last decade. Overall figures show that Africa’s exports to Asia increased at an annual rate of 20 per cent in the last five years and have grown to 30 per cent since 2003, China being by far the main one (Aning and Lecoutre 2008, 44).

China sustains a policy of business without interference in national affairs. As China’s President said: “[China] respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them”. Chinese investors became the last resort of many regimes that lost support from the traditional Western donors. Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe have both found an ally ready to put down money in exchange of resources without criticizing poor human rights records. It also became a last-chance banker for many countries that left Western investors distrustful. China has injected several billions of dollars into countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. China is not simply a benevolent state; it knows its interests. China has secured natural resources to sustain its growth while providing basic infrastructures to countries in dire needs (Lagerkvist 2009, 119; Ampiah and Naidu 2008, 3).

But China’s policies are also changing. China has recently been described as having a “constructive” attitude in the Darfur crisis after lobbying the Sudanese government to accept a UN mandated peacekeeping operation, committing to send 275 military engineers and some aid to the UN peacekeeping force, and calling for a comprehensive political solution to the crisis (Large 2007, 9). It also maintains a naval presence on the Somali Coast to protect commercial vessels from piracy.

Other Asian countries are also relevant actors: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and India. Asia may not yet influence peacekeeping missions as much as the US or the EU, but different visions of PSOs are already emerging. It could also provide an alternative to Western-led PSOs in countries that still fear any action, even good-willed, from former imperial powers.

And the list is not exhaustive. Lebanon, the Gulf States, Iran, and Brazil are other actors metamorphosing Africa’s face. For military sociology, all this foreign interminglement is deeply transforming the relationship among actors. New actors transform existing social dynamics.
7. WHICH ROLE FOR MILITARY SOCIOLOGY IN PSOs?

As peace missions grow in complexity, the importance of a “comprehensive approach” gains in importance. A “comprehensive approach” has various definitions and interpretations, but is generally used to describe “both a general collaborative culture between a multitude of actors engaged in complex emergencies, and the wide scope of coordinated and collaborative actions undertaken by [the actors] to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management and evaluation of that engagement” (Nilsson et al. 2008).

A comprehensive approach is rooted in sociology. Six issues, detailed below, are likely to appear on the radar of sociological research on PSOs.

7.1. IDENTIFYING THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT

What NATO did in former Yugoslavia was different from what it did on Darfur or in Rwanda. When it happens to Rwanda — [there’s a] sense of saying: ‘Well it’s the Rwandans – savages, tribal warfare, ethnic strife.’ And it’s nonsense.

Tom Ndahiro, member of the Rwandan Human Rights Commission

When an insurgent is killed, his entire tribe has to be eliminated in order to achieve peace in the country.

Ivorian writer Ahmadou Kourouma, “Waiting for the Wild Beasts to Vote”

In 1994, over 800,000 Tutsis and Moderate Hutus were killed during the Rwandan Genocide by extremists. After having refused to intervene during the crisis, the international community has expressed its shame and horror at what happened.

In spite of similar mass atrocities in former Yugoslavia a few years before, the 1994 Rwanda Genocide garnered media headlines referring to the eruption of tribal violence, the expression of an “African savagery” and even “esoteric”, a vocabulary that has not been attached to the Balkan War (Cramer 2006,31; Prunier 2007,124). Liberia, Sierra Leone and Congo have also been labelled as “barbarian conflicts”, a clear expression of racism according to some scholars (Cramer 2006, 31). Furthermore, many analysts adopted an Afro-pessimist view, preaching “The Coming Anarchy” and resuscitating the idea as an animal-like society entrenched in chaos and violence, as incarnated by Rupert Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s famous novel *The Heart of Darkness*. Many media and academics have thus obscured the fact that, beyond violence and atrocities, people fight for a reason: “There is no barbarism and no anarchy […] Underneath the apparent chaos is a means-ends rationality” (Cramer 2006, 31).

Rwanda was a carefully home-planned genocide, but that needs to be linked to many years of “colonial manipulation of tribal identity, interference by foreign powers, and the unravelling of the old Cold War order” (Collins and Burns 2007, 376). Conflicts of Congo and Liberia are also the consequence of a long historical and social process. Calling out “barbarism” proves that the international community, including African states themselves, is just a label to avoid asking real questions about what causes it.
New lenses are now provided to get a better understanding of the causes and drivers of conflicts. Academics do not hesitate to develop new paradigms of thinking in terms of social causes in African conflicts. Stephen Ellis emphasizes the role of religion in conflict and proposed new epistemologies to conduct research. Harald Welzer and Jared Diamond proposed an approach based on the scarcity of resources and the environmental pressures. Cramer proposes a pragmatic approach to conflict based on human necessities and needs, and provides understanding on why the international community needs to perpetuate the irrational idea behind African crisis:

Essentialists’ ideas of ethnicity, tribalism, identity and “primordial animosity” work as codes for an understanding of how primitive these warring societies are, of how distant they are from the grace of “our” enlightened modernity. The mystification works at two levels. First, this view expresses a self-image of Western, or Northern, society, distinguishing it by its stability and peaceful order and offering it as a generous model of shared values to be adopted off the shelf by aspiring modernisers (Cramer 2006, 7).

Africa is not the ultimate horror, but needs strong and unbiased social studies devoid of prejudices. As peace needs a good understanding of the situation, military sociology needs to provide thorough analysis of the actors, be they army, militias or criminal groups. Warring parties in African conflicts can be conceptualized and studied in a rational way by military sociology. From this perspective, military sociologists are necessary to provide analysis of the social dynamics that create and solve conflicts, while not forgetting that peacekeepers are also elements of this process.

7.2. UNDERSTANDING THE PERCEPTION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACEKEEPER AS AN ACTOR

*Humanitarian intervention is the self-given right by a state to send soldiers in another state to kill poor innocents in their own country, their own village, their own case, their own hut.*

Ivorian writer Ahmadou Kourouma, “Allah is Not Obliged”

Blue Helmets involved in “traditional peacekeeping” like in Namibia had relatively straight-forward mandates: they were to keep buffer zones between warring parties which consented to their presence. Peacekeepers in UN missions of the Cold War were respected and casualties were unheard of.

When news channels broadcasted the information of peacekeepers being killed in Somalia, it came as a surprise to the international community that this era had ended.

It was nothing new for Africa. Peace support operations have almost all been perceived as hostile. In Congo, resentment towards the Blue Helmets started in 1960 when the incapacity of the UN troops to protect President Patrice Lumumba led to accusations of the UN troops being agents of the “imperialists”. The resentment from this previous experience still has repercussions on the current PSOs, with local civilians and belligerents
still sharing hostility or scepticism towards UN troops (Turner 2007, 149). So far, little research has tried to evaluate the damage of the past traumas and their legacy in people’s psyche as exposed in Kourouma’s quote.

In Rwanda, the UN mission’s incapacity to act brought a lack of confidence from the Tutsis, and mockeries from the Hutus. For the rest of the continent, a shared feeling was born of the genocide that peacekeepers are there only to preserve foreign interests.

In Somalia, an intense anti-Western rhetoric has developed following the disastrous UN missions of the early nineties. Direct clashes between the UN forces and warlords, as well as the story of a 16-year old Somali tortured by Canadian peacekeepers, brought an escalation of violence and a conception of UN peacekeeping forces as “imperialist”. This rhetoric of foreign invasion remains vivid and has led to attacks on African Union peacekeeping forces recently in both Sudan and Somalia. Further complications in the Horn of Africa region have extended this rhetoric to any “foreigners”. NGOs and UN convoys are often targeted by warring parties, spearheading a lucrative market of ransom payments in Somalia over the last years.

Sudan strongly opposed for many years, any form of peacekeeping missions in Darfur, using “anti-imperialist” rhetoric. Khartoum considered the conflict as “purely Sudanese”, and, calling on the state sovereignty as inscribed in the UN charter, qualified foreign involvement as a neo-colonial intervention (Prunier 2007, 127). It accepted a limited deployment of an AU and UN hybrid force, whose ability to fulfil its mandate is constantly hampered by the active obstruction of the Sudanese authorities.

In other situations, peacekeepers became criminal elements that undermined the perception of the mission. The ECOMOG mission gained notoriety for its corruption, human rights abuses and looting. In multiple missions, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Liberia, PSOs have created sexual exploitation rings around peace missions.

Whether deserved or not, negative local perceptions of the peacekeeping force undermine peace support operations. And this perception is not free from the influence of aspects unrelated to the mission. Different populations deeply resent foreigners, be they Europeans or not. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, memories of colonial violence and many years of turmoil made the population frightened of all foreigners, be they under a UN flag or an African one (Hochschild 2006; Butcher 2007). Post-colonial resentment is often ignored by the peacekeeping missions. French peacekeepers in Côte-d’Ivoire and Belgian ones in the DRC have played an important role in the respective missions. On many occasions, their neutrality has been contested by local populations, bringing resentment from both government and rebels (Prunier 2009; Turner 2007; Bouquet 2005).

Peace support operations are not evolving in a vacuum; they affect the real world and can lead to further social disruption. They come with important budgets and logistics, resources that are scarce in Sub-Saharan countries. Peace support operations often become the wealthiest entity when deployed. Those means can be very disruptive for civilians who would often perceive peacekeepers’ involvement as strictly profit-making enterprise (Aoi,
The relative wealth of peacekeepers compared to local populations allows for exploitation, especially sexual exploitation, evidence of which was found in Liberia and the DRC (Pouligny 2006, 101; Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007). The void left, once the missions are repatriated, can also create new inequalities and tensions. In Kosovo, massive money from the international community has created salary disparities among the population and created a bubble that will not survive once the foreign institutions leave (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007). This became the case in Somalia: “many Somalis are convinced in all good faith that the money from the international community is their due, that it does not belong to anyone, which means […]”, thus creating a culture of dependency that glooms the horizon of a sustainable future (Pouligny, Béatrice 2006, 61). Fighting parties have even started kidnapping foreigners for ransom as a means of generating income.

In these cases, PSOs had unintended consequences from the actors and social dynamics into which it deployed. Military sociology needs to offer a deep study of the relationship between the different social elements to reach successful outcomes, as much on the military level as on a wider level.

### 7.3. IMPROVING CULTURAL AWARENESS OF PSOs TOWARDS NATIVE POPULATIONS

In 1957, during the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operation in Gaza, peacekeepers sprayed a minaret with machine gun fire from which a muezzin was calling for the prayer. The peacekeepers thought it was a call for “civil disorder”. They were not aware that this was simply an element of a daily Muslim life (Rubinstein 2008).

This anecdote is an extreme situation where peacekeepers lacked cultural awareness, but tells a univocal story: culture is an “important factor in the interactions between local peoples and the individuals and groups belonging to a peacekeeping mission” (Rubinstein 2008, 12). The incapacity of understanding local cultural codes and legal systems is often quoted as a cause behind the incapacity of finding a sustainable peace in Somalia (Pouligny 2006, 273). As culture includes the way to communicate among others, peace support operations need to be able to master this element in a way to send the “right” message (Rubinstein 2008).

On this aspect, one solution is for PSOs to rely on local staff as cultural interpreters. This is not without repercussions. It creates a brain drain of educated elites likely to accept a position that they are over-qualified for, but with a better salary than what they would receive in the community. Money considerations can thus restrain educated locals from becoming leaders in their own community, and from positively influencing the peace process as actors. PSOs build alienation into the salary gap between local staff and better-off expatriate workers, and a difference of treatment that creates segregation, which is especially evident during daily security checks (Rubinstein 2008). It also means that it is dependent on a minority of locals who can speak foreign languages, who are more likely to be part of an elite and less able to interact with marginalized groups of society (Pouligny 2006, 72).

A PSO cannot simply outsource the cultural aspect of its mission. It needs to be well
thought out and fully integrated within the mission. Different theoretical models assume varying degrees of the importance of culture in conflict. But if relevancy of culture as a source of conflict remains debatable, a reality remains: culture and identity play a role in bringing about peace, as cultural awareness is necessary to communicate with the locals and avoid further damages (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 307).

Culture glues together the different social entities that frame PSOs. It is a necessary component that needs to be well-thought out, as denying its importance could easily lead to the failure of PSOs. Contrary to military sociology, we need to look further than military culture, and provide strong studies on the manifold manifestation of cultural phenomena. An effective peacekeeper is not one that is acclimating only to the military culture of his own army; it is one that is attuned to the culture of the region where peace is being built. It is also one that is able to deal with the different cultures interlinked in the PSO.

7.4. STRENGTHENING COMMUNICATIONS AND COHESION AMONG DIFFERENT SOCIAL ACTORS

In different instances, PSOs have proved to be poorly articulated, either paralyzed by an unclear mandate or through different issues in applying those mandates. In other cases, mandates evolved quickly when facing difficulties in the field. In all cases, understanding missions can be a headache. If this affects the outcome of the operations, it also confuses populations, warring parties, and even peacekeepers themselves.

The different peace mandates in Somalia remain telling examples of such a phenomenon. In this case, the unclear and constantly changing mandates led to actions that became quickly incoherent and that complicated an already difficult mission (Pouligny 2006, 22). In other cases, like in the DRC, the intricacies of the situation, the high turn-over among peacekeepers and the lack of resources of the peace mission created a situation where a clear mandate faced daily changes in its implementation. There is some evidence that the lack of consistency within the PSO’s mandate confuses civilians, who become less likely to support those missions (Pouligny 2006, 22).

Aside from difficulties arising from changing mandates, many operations have been unable to communicate with the population. In the DRC, the PSO’s communication strategies targeted foreigners as opposed to the local population. The media strategy focused on international media, leaving local media with no tools to explain the current mission to the population. It appears that gaining African's support is not a priority in most missions (Pouligny 2006, 147). In Somalia, this led to dramatic outcomes when the UN peacekeeping mission was unable to counteract the anti-UN propaganda from certain militias. In Sierra Leone, when the mission took an important step to reach the hearts and minds of the people, the population changed its negative perception of the mission to a favourable one (Olonisakin 2008, 68). This is not totally surprising as the army is an institution that deals much more with secrecy than establishing communication. Social communication is a crucial factor of PSO success. And to do this, we need to have a clear picture of what constitutes the different social entities of the peace process. However, it goes beyond simple conviction. Theory has paid little attention to the peacekeeper’s perception of civilians and local fighters. In many cases, foreigners perceived
African civilians only as “victims”, a patronizing attitude that tends to disempower local population rather than give them an opportunity to participate in the peace process (Pouligny 2006, 273). Labelling someone as a victim is a way to state that they are helpless, and leads to exclusion.

The issue of exclusion takes many sides: peace missions focussing on urban areas and omitting rural area populations; international NGOs having better access to peace processes than native NGOs; civil society representatives chosen by the international community; incapacity of the mission to face societal changes; lack of contact between peacekeepers and civilians creating a sense of fear and mistrust in the latter; etc. (Pouligny 2006, 107). Women especially are consistently forgotten or overlooked by the peace missions, their needs and contribution to peace are rarely taken into account (Ivarsson and Försvarsberedningen 2004, 30, 2).

The lack of representation often means a peace process that focuses on what either the international community or the belligerents want, not what is best for the local population. In such a system, the “international community” would impose their norms and values rather than find a solution that would account for local values and visions of peace. This became an important issue in Guinea-Bissau, where local populations and politicians argued that, given that the international community wanted elections to take place, they should pay for them. The assassination of President Joao Vieira could also be perceived as the lack of penetration of the rules of democracy. This situation also underlies the gap of understanding on what “sustainable peace” means between the peacekeeper and the local actors. And, in the same system, fighters will look for themselves, not for the people, often settling the causes for the next conflict, like in Angola.

This creates a crisis of legitimacy in PSOs; an issue that needs to be researched as legitimacy is at the core of the resentment against peace missions. It is even more important in countries that have left an entire society in shackles where decades of violence did not provide any institutions on which to build.

The exclusion question also refers to issues at the basis of African-led PSOs: African militaries. Many African armies come from countries with poor democratic governance, in some instances, military rulers and well-known human rights abusers. The issues became obvious with the participation of Nigerian troops in the ECOMOG mission. The country took the lead of the mission in Liberia, while the military head of the country that came in power through a coup was himself deposed by another coup. This partly explains the poor human rights score of ECOMOG, and the lack of accountability for crimes committed during the mission, contributing to the local alienation towards the PSO (Human Rights Watch 1993).

The relationship between civilians, the peacekeepers and the “international community” is crucial in solving a conflict. More sociological studies are needed to understand how the dynamics between these actors contribute or not to sustainable peace, but, most of all, those entities need to be identified and given a proper voice for workable peace processes.
One of the impacts of the “Somalia Syndrome” has been that the international community, wary of direct involvement, has focussed on developing security capacities of African countries. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the École de Maintien de la Paix de Bamako, two initiatives meant to provide quality training to African peacekeeping troops, are obvious examples of how this strategy has worked so far.

There are numerous questions to ask, notably concerning the fact that many countries are considered weak democracies. Various forms of training, often funded by international institutions, could be used to strengthen militaries maintaining non-democratic regimes. Guinea junta leader Moussa Daddis Camara has taken part in similar training. Some would argue for an education that would focus on “more radical reforms in the army’s structure, training, and sense of civic duty need to be undertaken”, but it remains unclear how we can build such an approach (International Peace Institute 2008, 6). And, as the army remains the main provider for PSOs, one has to be reminded that the first job of a military is to make war. States need soldiers first, and peacemakers second. It is important to understand the effects of the increasing abilities of African soldiers for PSOs, as this raises several questions. As an example, by fostering peace training, will it influence military culture, and therefore weaken the defence of African states? Does Africa need warriors that can defend the security of their citizens, or pacifiers that can impose peace on citizens?

Different military cultures are also an underlying aspect of PSOs involving peacekeepers from different nationalities, battalions and levels of qualification. The training mostly takes national features into consideration; in how to be efficient once there is a deployment. Therefore, there is a need to better understand how armies work and what mechanisms could lead to a better inter-army cohesion, a counter-intuitive activity for soldiers that are trained to fight the enemy and not to cooperate or to engage in peaceful dialogue. Military sociology, in its core, is necessary for the operational success of PSOs.
8. CONCLUSION

This educational material aims at highlighting the sociological content behind PSOs. Rather than being an exhaustive document, it is much more an overview on how the discipline can enrich our knowledge of the issue.

As PSOs remain the work of the army, military sociology has a role in shaping those missions. But as the business of making peace is gaining complexity, the military sociologist needs to expand the scope of analysis beyond the limits of the army barracks. Cultural awareness, inclusion of the civilians, improving communicational skills; these are only three aspects that the military are not trained to deal with though are urged to use during PSOs.

Besides, the African continent remains an under-researched continent. Causes and dynamics of conflicts are misunderstood and we have limited studies on how African armies are inter-operable. Specialists of African militaries are rare, and publications are limited. The international community builds capacities from unknown armies.

The Sociology Team is keen to contribute to stronger African PSOs. We believe that such a process can only be built by a joint research agenda in cooperation with Africans, and in challenging common knowledge. Former South African President Nelson Mandela once said that Africa's greatest potential is the human. As sociologists, we agree with such a thought and believe that African security and peace architecture is dependent on this great social potential.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


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<tr>
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<th>TROOPS COMMITTED BY SWEDEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries.</td>
<td>5331 militaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Common-wealth</td>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>To maintain peace, demobilise militias, and preside over a peaceful election.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>OAU</td>
<td></td>
<td>To monitor peace agreements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola.</td>
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Sources: UN, ECOWAS, Swedish Armed Forces
In gray: Missions including Swedish troops
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and to carry out a number of other duties.</td>
<td>79 police persons</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>To oversee the First Liberian Civil Conflict.</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To verify the arrangements agreed by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, for monitoring the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire period, and to observe and verify elections, in accordance with the Peace Accords.</td>
<td>65 military observers</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To monitor the ceasefire and to organize and conduct a referendum which would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the Territory's future status.</td>
<td>85 militaries, 5 staff officers and 35 police persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To help implement the General Peace Agreement, ending the civil war and signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana.</td>
<td>29 military observers</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To monitor the civil war ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in the city. The mission’s mandate and strength were later enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>USA (UN mandate)</td>
<td>Special operation mandated by the UN and lead by the US army to prepare the ground for UNOSOM II.</td>
<td>300 military and medical personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To exercise good offices in support of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and the Liberian National Transitional Government to implement peace agreements following the First Liberian War; investigate alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections First Liberian Civil War</td>
<td>1 military observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rwanda/Uganda</td>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandan parties on 4 August 1993 that would bring an end to Rwandan Civil War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>307 militaries and 2 police persons</td>
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<td>Chad-Libya</td>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance during the civil strife</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Operation Turquoise</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To verify the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces from the Aouzou Strip in Chad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Operation Turquoise</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>To evacuate foreign civilians. Allegedly evacuated some of the top leaders of the Habyarimana regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To assist the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and relevant Security Council resolutions</td>
<td>91 militaries and 61 police persons</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.</td>
<td>6 military observers and 48 police persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone civil war, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law.</td>
<td>19 military observers</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability in Bangui and vicinity; supervise, control storage, and monitor the disposition of weapons retrieved in disarmament exercise; assist in capacity-building of national police; provide advice and technical support for legislative elections. Later, MINURCA was also mandated to support the conduct of presidential elections and supervise the destruction of confiscated weapons.</td>
<td>20 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>To enforce peace among warring parties during the civil conflict and to stop RUF rebellion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To cooperate with the Government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan following the civil conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 that ended the Second Congo War. To maintain liaison with the parties and carry out other tasks, the Security Council set up MONUC on 30 November 1999, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier resolutions.</td>
<td>25 observers and 196 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>UNOGBIS</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To contribute to the peacebuilding effort following the end of the civil war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ethiopia/Erithrea</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To maintain liaison between Ethiopia and Erithrea, following a peace agreement, and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire.</td>
<td>13 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>To ensure the respect of the pace agreement during the civil conflict.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>FINISH</td>
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<td>MISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Operation Palliser</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>To establish order during civil war and rescue foreigners.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Guinea/Liberia</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>To secure the borders.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Operation Licorne</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>To support UN peace mission and to protect French expatriates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.</td>
<td>875 militaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>To support the peace effort Second Liberian Civil War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>ARTEMIS</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Emergency assistance mission in Ituri in expectation of MONUC’s reinforcement.</td>
<td>90 troops</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>ONUB</td>
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<td>To support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation after the civil war, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To ensure the peaceful implementation of the agreement that ended the civil war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>To contain violence and protect civilians.</td>
<td>3 military advisors and 1 EU military observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005, thus ending the Second Sudanese Civil war; and to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, and protection and promotion of human rights.</td>
<td>6 militaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>To support MONUC and reinforce security during the elections and to support the reform of the security sector.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To take necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians, without “prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”.</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Chad/Central African Republic</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>To maintain multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons from Darfur in the borders area of Chad and Central African Republic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Chad/Central African Republic</td>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>To support transitional governmental security structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>EUSSR</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>To support security sector reform.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>NAYFOR</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>To fight piracy on the Somali coast.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping; protect vulnerable shipping; help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery; monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>5 military observers and 4 Police Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>To pursue stabilization efforts in Eastern Congo according UN Resolution 1925. To protect civilians and humanitarian effort against armed groups. To monitor implementation of the arms embargo. To provide technical and logistical support for the organization of national and local elections upon explicit request from Congolese authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) was established as a national university college on 1 January 2008, with the right to issue academic degrees. This implies that the college now offers a wider selection of civilian university programmes than before. SNDC has existed in its present form since 1997. The College aims to be society’s main resource of excellence for education and research in the management of civilian and military assets in periods of tension, crises and war. SNDC contributes towards national and international security through research and development, and educates military and civilian personnel in leading positions as part of the contribution to crisis management and security issues. Research is carried out in diverse but inter-related subject areas, and subsequently disseminated to target sectors of society, both nationally and internationally.

DEPARTMENT OF LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

The Department of Leadership and Management (ILM) is orientated towards research on and education of professionals, who fill or will fill leadership positions in the armed forces, civil crisis management, and civil service. Its work is carried out in an interdisciplinary academic environment, encompassing the whole spectrum of leadership activities from combat or warfare to various forms of conflict prevention, crisis management, stabilizing operations, and the reconstruction of states. The main focus is on today’s new leadership challenges due to an increasingly complex, multi-dimensional and multi-cultural environment and to the emergence of new types of international military, civilian, and military-civilian operations.

The two primary areas of the department are education and research, with the aim of creating the prerequisites for tomorrow’s leadership tasks in an increasingly complex social and cultural environment. Due to the special focus on questions related to the field of ‘leadership in demanding conditions’, ILM secures a unique position as an academic department in the field of social and human science (research) as well as a general leadership developer and trainer (education), today and in the future. ILM is located in Stockholm and Karlstad.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marc-André Boisvert is a researcher affiliated with the Swedish National Defence College. He specializes on African civil-military relations and sociological aspects of peace support operations and security-sector reforms. His main expertise is West and Central francophone Africa and Central-Eastern European countries.

Marc-André is also a freelance journalist (text, photos and audio) based in Dakar, Senegal. He has worked over the years for La Presse (Montréal, Canada), Le Soleil (Quebec, Canada), IRIN (UN), Radio-Canada (Montreal, Canada), AP (US), and several others. The range of countries covered includes Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mauritania, Ghana, Kosovo, Poland, Estonia.

He holds a M.A. in Political Science from Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada).
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